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Abstract
The thesis compares national perspectives on the legitimacy of the European Union. It 
develops a definition of legitimacy as a dual concept. Formal legitimacy describes the 
constitutional nature of a political system, whereas felt legitimacy is defined as the 
aggregate citizen beliefs about the legitimacy of their political system. Legitimacy is 
important for the EU because it is a necessary condition for its efficacy and long-term 
stability. The EU’s need for legitimacy also increases in proportion to the degree of 
integration. The legitimacy of the EU is unusual in that it varies among the member 
state from whose perspective it is evaluated. That is because the EU’s legitimacy is 
contingent on the constitutional structure and national identity of its member states. 
An empirical analysis of the legitimacy of the EU from the perspective of Britain and 
Germany reveals that the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit relative to the British 
and German political systems. The nature and severity of the deficit depend on 
country-specific factors, but the single most significant cause from both countries’ 
perspective is the lack of a European identity. Europeans do not regard themselves as 
one political community, and they feel limited attachment or trust towards each other. 
This diagnosis implies that the legitimacy deficit can only be remedied either by 
creating a European identity or by reducing the need for its creation. The legitimising 
potential of these two strategies differs between Britain and Germany, reflecting 
country-specific variations in their perspective on the legitimacy deficit of the EU. 
While the legitimacy deficit can in principle be resolved, the varying effectiveness of 
these two strategies, and the reluctance of political decision-makers in the EU to 
pursue either strategy, make an effective resolution of the legitimacy deficit unlikely 
to occur in the forseable future.
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Introduction
0.1 The Research Questions
This thesis deals with two central research questions:
Does the European Union suffer from a legitimacy deficit, and if so, what is its 
nature?
If the European Union suffers from a legitimacy deficit, is it susceptible to a remedy, 
and what form could a remedy take?
This introductory chapter sets the general context for answering these questions. It 
defines key terms and concepts and explains the methodology used in the thesis. The 
introduction explains the general importance of legitimacy to political systems and 
argues that the EU is itself a political system. That makes legitimacy relevant to the 
EU, and it makes a potential legitimacy deficit a problem in need of resolution. 
Finally, the introduction briefly outlines the structure of the following chapters.
0.2 The Importance of Legitimacy
Legitimacy matters. It is a quality of political systems which they can possess to 
varying degrees.1 According to Easton’s widely used definition which is adopted here, 
a political system is that part of a wider social system through which values are 
authoritatively allocated for a society and accepted as binding. In addition, a political 
system is defined by a stable and clearly defined set of institutions for collective 
decision-making, their use by citizens and social groups to achieve political aims, and 
the continuous interaction of political demands and political outputs.
1 David Easton: A Systems Analysis o f Political Life. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965),
p.286
2 Ibid.. pp.21-25
3 Simon Hix: The Political System o f the European Union. (London: Macmillan, 1999), p.2
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The significance of legitimacy as a concept to political science becomes apparent 
from an investigation of its definition.4 In general terms, legitimacy can be defined as 
a political relationship between a political system and its members.5^ Legitimacy is 
concerned with the right of a political systemj or its designated representatives, to 
exercise political power. This right to rule is normatively justified with reference to a 
particular set of reasons and values, or legitimising principles.
These historically and socially variable legitimising principles include norms about 
the valid sources of authority, the qualification of representatives to exercise that 
authority (election, heredity, etc.) and the ends that authority should serve.6 
Legitimising principles provide a standard against which the rightfulness of a political 
system and its exercise of political power can be assessed. The legitimate exercise of 
power is therefore synonymous with the rightful exercise of power. It follows that 
legitimacy has two dimensions.|lt is claimed by political systems as a justification for 
their powers, but it also manifests itself in public beliefs about the rightfulness of that 
claim.7 ^ Legitimation describes the activity of legitimising the powers of a political 
system. Legitimacy is the product of successful legitimation.
By providing the normative underpinning for justifying political systems legitimacy is 
one of their most important qualities.legitim ate political system commands popular 
support, and it can rely on public acceptance of the political commands it issues. Such 
acceptance of the right to rule is qualitatively different from mere obedience to a 
political system and compliance with its rules and commands. Obedience is merely a 
minimal condition for a political system to exist.
In absence of a sufficient degree of legitimacy, political systems may secure 
obedience by relying on public acquiescence and inertia. Ultimately, coercion remains 
the only instrument for ensuring public obedience and hence the continued existence 
of a political system. But even coercing citizens into accepting the exercise of power
4 A more detailed theory o f legitimacy is presented in Chapter 2 .
5 The discussion is therefore confined to political legitimacy and excludes application o f  the term to 
other forms o f social organisation or structure, such as the economic system or instances o f religious 
domination. See: Rodney Barker: Political Legitimacy and the State. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
p.15,20
6 David Beetham: The Legitimation o f Power. (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.21
7 These two dimensions o f legitimacy are also identified by Weber, see: Barker (90): op. cit.. p.59
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by their government may in the end be insufficient to prevent a system from 
collapsing, as the history of many of the world’s political dictatorships has 
demonstrated.8 It will at the very least seriously damage the effectiveness with which 
the powers of the political system are exercised.9 In Easton’s terminology, the 
political system will be stressed because the operation of its two defining variables, 
the allocation of values for a society and society’s compliance with them, is 
endangered.10 The possession of legitimacy helps prevent system stress, since it 
reduces the cost of governing for a political system by maximising public support and 
minimising public resistance.
“A member [o f a political system] may be willing to obey the authorities 
and conform to the requirements o f the regime for many different reasons.
But the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part o f  
the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the 
authorities and abide by the requirements o f the regime. ”1}
The terms “support” and “legitimacy” are therefore not equivalent, and legitimacy is
19 •not merely inferred from obedience, as some critics maintain. In a legitimate 
political system, obedience to the system is morally sanctioned and accepted by the 
public.13 Support for the political system arises from the belief that it conforms to 
personally held moral principles about what is right and proper in the political sphere. 
In other words, legitimacy constitutes the normative grounds for people’s political 
obedience and support of their political system.14 Coercion or habitual acquiescence 
are inadequate substitutes for this function of legitimacy. This is why, historically, 
nearly all political systems have sought to legitimise themselves. By so doing they 
have greatly facilitated their efficient operation and long-term stability.15
8 Beetham (91). op. cit., p.26
9 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.279
10 Ibid, p.24
11 Ibid.. p.278
12 See: Rodney Barker: “Legitimacy: The Identity o f the Accused”, Political Studies, vol.42, no.l, 
1994, p.101
13 Barker (90), op. cit.. p.33ff
14 Beetham (91), op. cit.. p.26
15 Barker (90), op. cit.. p. 14
Introduction 15
These considerations suggest that, with regard to the order, stability and effective 
functioning of political systems, legitimacy is an independent variable.16 Although 
other variables, such as organisational resources, coercion and external macro factors 
(for example wars), also affect the stability of a political system, legitimacy represents 
a crucial factor.17 Legitimacy is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient condition, for the 
long-term viability and effectiveness of political systems. That is no doubt one of the 
reasons why “the identification of the conditions which justify government and
1 Rrequire obedience has always been at the centre of political enquiry.”
0.3 The Applicability of Legitimacy to the EU19
Political legitimacy is conventionally discussed with respect to states, but the EU is 
not a state in the Weberian sense of having a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
coercion. Some scholars have therefore questioned the relevance and applicability of 
the notion of legitimacy to the EU. According to some versions of the “new 
governance” school of EU studies, many of the categories of political theory, such as 
legitimacy and democracy, are implicitly premised on the model of the state. The EU 
not only lacks statehood, it constitutes a unique system of non-hierarchical, regulatory 
and deliberative governance. The EU is, in other words, a political system sui generis 
which cannot be easily compared with other, national political systems.21|Does such a 
claim disable a comparative analysis of the legitimacy of the EU? This thesis argues 
that it does
To begin with, statehood can express itself in different forms. Caporaso, for instance 
classifies the EU as an “international state”, but there is no need to engage into
16 Beetham (91), op. cit.. p.26. However, for the first five chapters this thesis will focus on legitimacy 
as a dependent variable, since they are mainly concerned with the various factors causally responsible 
for different degrees of legitimacy.
17 Ibid, p.33f
18 Barker (90), o p . cit.. p.4
19 To avoid terminological confusion, the acronym EU is used throughout the thesis, although the 
discussion concentrates on the first pillar (the EC). The term EC is only used for references which 
clearly pre-date the creation o f the EU in 1992.
20 Simon Hix: “The Study o f the European Union II: The “New Governance” Agenda and its Rival”, 
Journal o f European Public Policy, vol.5, no.l, 1998, p.41
21 For a review, and rejection, o f these arguments see: Ibid.. pp.38-65
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semantic redefinitions of statehood. The EU can fulfil many of the traditional 
functions of government without the classic apparatus of a state. And it need not be 
a state to fit the definition of a political system offered above: its political outputs 
affect the authoritative allocation of values in European society, it has a clearly 
defined set of institutions and an increasing number of social and political groups 
make demands on the system and interact with it.24 European integration has produced 
a full-blown political system not inherently different to any other democratic political 
system. The EU exercises executive, legislative and judicial powers which pose 
questions of freedom, power, democracy and legitimacy just as in other political
Of.
systems. Easton’s definition of a political system, by not being premised on 
statehood, thus opens the possibility of supranational political systems. Indeed, Easton 
argues that
“not only is there an international political system, but it may in fact be 
usefully interpreted as just another type o f  system, to be analysed, 
described and compared with all the other systems. [...] The international 
political system possesses a theoretical status that is equivalent in every 
respect but one with the political systems o f  national societies. It differs 
only in the fact that the component units o f the international system 
consist o f  large and powerful subsystems that we call national political 
systems, [...]. To be sure, there are differences in power among the 
subsystems o f the international system. But this is equally true o f  national 
systems depending upon the legitimacy o f the authorities and upon the 
looseness or tightness o f the coupling among subsystems [...]. This 
interpretation o f the international political system as just another kind o f  
political system cognate with any national system creates no theoretical 
hardships, at least with the systems conceptualisation developed here. ”27
While some of the theoretical and explanatory ambitions of systems theory have been 
criticised, the core of Easton’s theoretical framework and its definitions remain
22 James A. Caporaso: “The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post- 
Modern?”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol.34, no.l, 1996, pp.29-52
23 Hix (98), op. cit.. p.41
24 Ibid.. p.41-43
25 Ibid, p.43
26 Ibid, p.54
27 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.485f
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widely used, especially in the literature on legitimacy. Since the EU undeniably does 
engage in authoritatively allocating values for a society, albeit an international one, it 
must justify its powers to do so - in short, it must legitimise itself. Indeed, most new 
governance scholars concede the importance of the notion of legitimacy to the EU, 
while at the same time maintaining that much of its content - the old legitimising 
principles based on popular sovereignty and the national state - needs adapting to the 
new and unique type of political system the EU represents.29
New governance theorists can therefore acknowledge the need for legitimacy without 
compromising their claim that the EU is a political system sui generis. That leaves the 
methodological problem about comparability unresolved. ^ The EU may be a political 
system, but national political systems may differ from international ones. Although 
the members of an international political system seek to resolve some of their 
problems through the authoritative allocation of values, that process tends to be based 
less on strong feelings of legitimacy, less centrally organised, less continuous and less 
strictly complied with than in many national systems. The EU is qualitatively 
different from its member states. For instance, the EU lacks some of the functions of 
sovereign states such as the provision of internal and external security or tax raising 
powers.^It also lacks a “demos” on which to build a European democracy.3 Can the 
quality of its legitimacy therefore be validly compared with that of its member states 
which possess all these features?
The answer to this question is positive if the traditional analytical paradigm for EU 
studies, the international relations approach, is replaced with a comparative politics 
approach./While the IR paradigm may be appropriate for the study of European 
jftfegration, the comparative politics approach is more useful for the analysis of the 
^European political system.32 This thesis is concerned with the latter which means that 
it does not conceptualise the EU as sui generis, but compares the EU to other political
28 For instance: , Bettina Westle: Politische Legitimitat - Theorien, Konzepte, empirische Befimde. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989), Hix (99), op. cit.. pp.2ff.
29 Markus Jachtenfiichs and Beate Kohler-Koch: “Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem”, in: 
Markus Jachtenfiichs and Beate Kohler-Koch: Europaische Integration. (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 
1996), p.34ff
30 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.487
31 See Chapter 5. pp.23 Iff
32 Simon Hix: “The Study o f the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics”, West 
European Politics, vol. 17, no.l, 1994, pp.22-24
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systems. It recognises that the EU is an international political system whose 
legitimacy is for structural reasons likely to be lower than that of its member states. 
However, the EU is constantly evolving, and its need for legitimacy increases in 
proportion to the degree of European integration.33 The more the EU is involved in the 
authoritative allocation of values which affects European citizens directly, the more it 
requires legitimacy.34 The wide legislative, executive, regulative and judicial powers 
exercised by the EU are already just as much in need of legitimation as the powers 
exercised by sovereign states.
Even some new governance scholars have recently come to agree that the EU “could 
well be compared with other political systems and their solutions to the problem of 
responsible and responsive governance from an analytic as well as from a normative 
standpoint.”35 Although the EU is not state in the Weberian sense, it fulfils many of 
the traditional functions of states and possesses the characteristics of a political 
system. The legitimacy of the EU is therefore susceptible of analytical comparison 
with that of its member states.
0.4 A New Perspective on the Legitimacy of the EU
A considerable body of academic literature has accumulated which debates whether 
the EU is somehow insufficiently legitimised or even illegitimate.^Jhe original 
contribution of this thesis lies in exposing and overcoming three serious shortcomings
'"N
in existing academic treatments of the question of the EU’s legitimacy^ I
First, the current debate does not draw on a sufficiently differentiated theory of 
legitimacy which could be applied for empirical legitimacy research of both national 
and international political systems. There is currently no academic consensus as to 
whether and to what degree the EU is legitimate. This is because scholars employ 
different and often incompatible analytical tools and adopt different interpretations of
33 Helen Wallace: “Deepening and Widening: Problems o f Legitimacy for the EC”, in: Soledad Garcia: 
European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp. 100
34 David Beetham and Christopher Lord: Legitimacy and the European Union. (London: Longman, 
1998), p.14
35 Markus Jachtenfiichs: “Democracy and Governance in the European Union”, in: Andreas Follesdal 
and Peter Koslowski (eds.): Democracy and the European Union. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1998), 
p.41f
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the meaning of the word “legitimacy”, none of which is fully able to capture the 
multiple dimensions of a notion as complex as legitimacy. Without a rigorous 
grounding in political theory applied research on legitimacy can at best yield partial 
insights. To remedy this shortcoming, jthis thesis develops its own theoretical 
framework, the dual concept of legitimacy, which draws on existing dualistic theories 
of legitimacy. The dual concept provides the analytical tools for an empirical, 
falsifiable assessment of the extent to which claims about a legitimacy deficit in 
Europe are justified.
Second, the existing literature does not acknowledge the essential contingency of the 
legitimacy of the EU on the particular national frame of reference chosen. This thesis 
argues that the EU is so intertwined institutionally with its member states, and its 
popular perception is so influenced by factors determined at the level of each member 
state that the EU’s legitimacy depends on the member state from whose perspective 
the question is approached. The methodological implication of this contingency is the 
need to study the legitimacy of the EU against the concrete background of a particular 
member state.
However, this property of the EU is best illustrated by analysing its legitimacy from 
the perspective of two member states which will yield contrasting results. Britain and 
Germany have been selected as particularly interesting case studies because, 
compared to other large member states, the compatibility of domestic formal and felt 
legitimacy with EU membership is high in Germany, but very low in the UK. As a 
consequence, their national perspectives on the legitimacy of the EU differ noticeably, 
and they deviate from the European average in opposite directions. Other large 
member states, to which the discussion will occasionally refer, are either closer to the 
European average (like France) or they distort the analysis because their national 
political system suffers from a severe legitimacy deficit of its own (like Italy). 
Because the British and German political system are both well-legitimised, their 
contrasting perspectives on the legitimacy of the EU illustrate more clearly how 
research results on this issue vary with the degree to which national political systems 
are compatible with EU membership.
36 Hix (98), op. cit.. p.54f
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Third, the strategies to remedy the legitimacy deficit which are proposed in the 
existing literature offer at best partially effective solutions to the problem. Just as with 
the diagnosis of the problem, much of the literature on possible solutions has some 
theoretical shortcomings. It underplays the different dimensions of legitimacy and 
disregards the country-specific nature of the legitimacy deficit. Some remedial 
strategies are even counterproductive because they either merely displace the 
legitimacy deficit from one sphere to another, or they are effective in one member 
state while aggravating the deficit in another. Based on the diagnosis of the nature of 
the EU’s legitimacy deficit in each of the two member states surveyed, this thesis 
studies five possible remedial strategies and assesses which factors act as constraints 
in the search for solutions to the problem of the legitimacy deficit.
0.5 Analytical Structure and Methodology
The thesis falls into four parts: a review of the existing literature, a theoretical 
discussion of legitimacy, an empirical application of the theoretical framework 
developed and an evaluation of remedial strategies. The first and the last part are 
mainly based on the existing secondary theoretical literature in EU studies, 
supplemented with some primary legal and political sources. These include 
resolutions of the European Parliament, legal documents and political pamphlets. The 
dual concept of legitimacy on which the empirical analysis of the legitimacy of the 
EU is based, combines two different analytical approaches. Formal legitimacy is 
based on a legal-institutionalist approach, whereas felt legitimacy is based on political 
culture theory and employs the methods of public opinion research. The second 
chapter addresses some of the problems associated with the methods employed for the 
study of formal and felt legitimacy.
The application of formal legitimacy involves the study of constitutional and legal
documents as primary sources, but it also draws on secondary sources in the shape of
academic interpretations of the constitutional reality  ^ and^political culture in particular
political systenis. The application of felt legitimacy is based on quantitative public 
-- i *
opinion surveys conducted in Germany and Britain about attitudes to these two
national political systems and the one of the EU. Where possible, these will offer
cross-temporal and cross-national consistency to enable accurate comparative
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analysis. The Eurobarometer series, which quantitatively dominates this thesis, has 
been often been called “exceptional” in meeting these unusual methodological 
challenges.37 It analyses public attitudes across member states towards common 
stimulus objects, the EU as well as the respective member state, employing questions 
standardised over time and across countries. The analysis of public opinion surveys is 
supplemented with qualitative indicators of legitimacy. These include analysis and 
interpretation of national identities, the presence or absence of significant elite 
cleavages, the presence of any significant anti-system parties, manifestations of open 
hostility, such as breaches of the law or riots, election turnouts and public 
participation in political activities.
0.6 Chapter Outline
The last ten years have witnessed a steady rise in the number of scholarly discussions 
which have explicitly or implicitly dealt with the legitimacy of the EU. The first 
chapter takes stock of the academic literature analysising the legitimacy deficit of the 
EU and submits it to a critical scrutiny. It groups this literature into five categories 
which reflect the principal analytical perspectives from which the question has been 
approached. Identification and comparison of their key analytical and theoretical 
features helps to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these five categories. The 
first chapter concludes that each of them reveals partial insights, but none of them is 
rooted in a satisfactory theory of legitimacy which could then gainfully be applied to 
the EU. The academic debate also ignores that the EU is closely interwoven with its 
member states, both with regard to the formal organisational structure as well as with 
respect to the way it is publicly perceived. It follows that the legitimacy of the EU 
cannot be studied in isolation - discussions on this issue are necessarily country- 
specific and involve the member states.
To remedy these theoretical shortcomings, the second chapter opens with a discussion 
of a number of possible theoretical definitions of the concept of legitimacy from 
which it develops a new theory, the dual concept o f legitimacy. The theory is dualistic 
because all political systems have both formal and fe lt legitimacy. Formal legitimacy
37 Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton: “Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics 
o f Public Support for European Integration”, International Organization, vol.47, no.4, 1993, p.517
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describes the legal validity of the possession and exercise of political power. It is 
therefore concerned with the legitimising principles political systems use to justify 
themselves. Felt legitimacy denotes the justifiability of a political system in terms of 
the beliefs and values currently predominant in society. It measures to what extent a 
political system is considered legitimate by its citizens. By the end of the second 
chapter the dual concept is fully developed and its methodological and theoretical 
problems are discussed.
The third, fourth and fifth chapter apply the dual concept of legitimacy to an empirical 
comparative analysis of the legitimacy deficit of the EU. Since the EU’s legitimacy is 
always perceived through the prism of its member states in which it is structurally 
embedded, the formal and felt legitimacy of the two case studies, Britain and 
Germany, must be studied first. The third chapter discusses the formal and felt 
legitimacy of the United Kingdom, while the fourth chapter applies the dual concept 
to Germany. The empirical analysis of these two chapters reveals substantial country- 
specific variations which explain why the British and German political systems have 
different degrees of compatibility with EU membership. However, at a basic level, 
both countries formally legitimise political power through some version of 
representative democracy and their political systems enjoy by and large very solid 
levels of felt legitimacy.
Chapter five builds on these findings to analyse the formal and felt legitimacy of the 
EU from the British and German perspectives. The fifth chapter concludes that, 
relative to the national political systems of the FRG and the UK, the EU suffers from 
a legitimacy deficit, but this deficit assumes a different shape and severity from each 
country’s perspective. The lower compatibility of Britain’s formal and felt legitimacy 
with EU membership means that in all the different categories of the dual concept 
British levels of public support for the EU are almost consistently below those 
recorded in Germany. However, in both countries the weakest component of felt 
legitimacy is the lack of a European identity which could create affective attachment 
to the EU and solidarity amongst its citizens. Since EU institutions are also generally 
perceived as undemocratic, the EU’s legitimacy is over-dependent on support for its 
policy outputs which tends to be more volatile over time.
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By the end of chapter five, the first of the two central research questions is answered. 
The meaning and importance of legitimacy is clarified, and its application to the EU 
yields the conclusion that there is a relative legitimacy deficit in Europe, but its extent 
and nature is contingent on the national perspective from which it is studied. This 
analysis of the deficit provides a reference point from which a discussion of practical 
solutions to the legitimacy deficit can take place in chapter six.
Chapter six begins by revisiting the academic debate of chapter one, this time 
focusing not on the diagnosis of the legitimacy deficit, but assessing whether a 
successful legitimation of the EU is possible. The chapter assesses the dynamics and 
effectiveness of the legitimation strategies that have been advocated by participants in 
the academic debate. The discussion is structured with the help of the five schools of 
thought distinguished in the first chapter, each of which offers a distinct strategy for 
remedying the legitimacy deficit. These five strategies are evaluated against two 
criteria which any successful remedial strategy must meet.
The pertinence criterion assesses whether remedial strategies adequately address the 
exact nature of the legitimacy deficit. Since chapter five has diagnosed the lack of a 
European identity as the greatest factor responsible for the legitimacy deficit, any 
successful remedial strategy must therefore be able generate a sense of European 
identity. The pertinence criterion also considers whether the various solutions in the 
academic literature are mutually reinforcing or incompatible with each other and 
whether they have equal validity for both Germany and Britain. The feasibility 
criterion assesses the political feasibility of proposed remedial strategies in terms of 
the support they could generate amongst Europe’s political leaders. The evaluation of 
the five possible remedial strategies against the pertinence and the feasibility criterion 
makes it possible to answer the second research question at the end of chapter six.
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Chapter One: Analysing the Legitimacy of the EU - The State of 
the Debate
1.1 Introduction:
The large body of academic literature which implicitly or explicitly deals with the 
legitimacy of the EU contains a diverse set of conclusions. They range from the claim 
that the EU is perfectly well legitimised to assertions of its fundamental illegitimacy. 
This chapter surveys the different normative premises and analytical approaches in the 
scholarly debate on whether the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Submitting the 
existing literature to a critical scrutiny, the chapter concludes that none of the 
contributions offers a satisfactory theoretical framework which can capture the multi­
facetted nature of legitimacy. It then identifies the criteria for a more adequate 
theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy which can serve as a basis for comparative 
empirical research on the EU.
Five broad categories can be distinguished, and their names have been chosen to 
symbolise the major analytical approaches to the debate on the legitimacy of the EU. 
The first category, neo-functionalism, has raised least questions about the EU’s 
legitimacy, partly because most of its proponents do not consider it deficient. The 
second category (constitutionalism) questions the degree to which the EU enjoys 
democratic legitimacy, the third (communitarianism) draws attention to the lack of a 
communal identity among European citizens and the fourth (new governance) 
considers conventional conceptions of legitimacy inappropriate for a multi-level entity 
like the EU. Although each of them use different definitions of legitimacy, they do not 
call into question the scope of the EU’s powers. That sets them apart from the fifth 
category, containment, which questions the extent to which the very exercise of 
supranational political power is itself legitimate. It is concerned with the legitimacy of 
the vertical balance of powers between the EU and its member states rather than the 
horizontal distribution of powers between EU institutions.
Whereas the first four categories shares a broadly integrationist outlook, supporters of 
containment tend (to different degrees) to be more critical of the aim of ever closer
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Union. Nonetheless, containment is not simply to be equated with Euroscepticism, 
defined as opposition to a supranational EU. The term containment was chosen 
deliberately to reflect the fact that many of its proponents apply a conditional caution 
rather than a categorical objection to the EU which is motivated by their concern 
about its lack of legitimacy. The table below illustrates this relationship between the 
five categories and provides a convenient reference for the discussion to follow.
Academic School Analytical Perspective Nature of Deficit
Neo-Functionalism Functionalist No deficit/
Economic performance
Constitutionalism Institutionalist Lack of democracy
Communitarianism Sociological Lack of a demos
New Governance Functionalist/
Institutionalist
Lack of post-modern legitimising 
principles
Containment
1.2 Neo-Functionalism
Institutionalist/
Sociological
Too much integration/
Lack of a demos
Table 1.1
Neo-functionalism has been the classic and long-dominant approach to the study of 
European integration, yet neo-functionalists have generally paid little attention to the 
issue of legitimacy. They are primarily interested in analysing the integration process, 
and they seek to explain how the transfer of policy responsibility to the EU came 
about. The traditional neo-functionalist approach to European integration has been 
patrician, technocratic and corporatist.1 Insofar as legitimacy and public support 
feature at all in the literature, they are being discussed from a functionalist analytical 
perspective which regards legitimacy as a function of socio-economic benefits.
For instance, John Monnet argued that popular consent to European integration would 
be a consequence, not a precondition of a technocratic pursuit of common policies.
1 Helen Wallace (93), op. cit., p.95
2 See: William Wallace and Julie Smith: “Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the 
Problem ofPopular Consent”, in: West European Politics, vol.18, no.3, 1995, p.144
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Neo-functionalists like Haas postulated that the creation of efficient European 
institutions generating maximal economic welfare and prosperity would in the long- 
run “spill over” into public attachment to the project of “ever closer Union”, thereby 
endowing it with legitimacy. At least, increasing beneficial interaction among the 
social and economic elites of the member states would over time create and reinforce 
a common interest of the wider political community. The strong theoretical emphasis 
on elites meant that at least early neo-functionalism paid very little attention to wider 
public attitudes.4 Later contributions to the debate adopt a more differentiated 
position. Lindberg and Scheingold’s model of a “permissive consensus” postulates 
that the level of popular support affects the scope for integration policies pursued by 
the elites. Public attitudes towards the EU can facilitate or hinder the integration 
process, but they do not directly determine it.5
Even the more sophisticated neo-functionalist theories are premised on a flawed and 
reductionist account of the motivations behind political attitudes and beliefs.6 They 
wrongly predicted a rejection of what they considered outdated political and 
nationalist ideologies in favour of a de-politicised, technocratic search for wealth 
maximisation. Apart from Deutsch, one of the few neo-functionalists aware of the 
importance of a sense of communal identity for the integration process , most scholars 
assumed that individual loyalties, whether elite or not, are based on utilitarian
Q
considerations of interest rather than affective ties of identity. For instance, Lindberg 
and Scheingold argued that “ ...the major problem becomes one of maximising wealth 
- clearly a question for the experts, the technocrats.”9 Contemporary academics agree 
with near consensus that decades of ever increasing economic and political integration 
have not “spilled over” into a strong and sustainable common attachment of the wider
3 E. B. Haas: The Uniting o f Europe: Political. Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958)
4 Oskar Niedermayer: “BevOlkerungsorientierung gegentlber dem politischen System der EuropSischen 
Gemeinschaft”, in: Rudolf Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen fiir eine Europaische 
Union. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), p.322
5 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold: Europe’s Would-Be Polity - Patterns o f Change in the 
European Community. (Hemel Hempstead: Englewood Cliffs, 1970), p.41
6 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 146
7 Deutsch considers the development o f a sense o f identity a necessary condition for the integration 
process. See: Karl W. Deutsch et al: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. (Princeton, New  
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957)
8 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 146
9 Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit.. p.269
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political community.10 Moreover, the end of the Cold War has deprived the EU of its 
historical functional legitimacy as a defence for its members’ liberal democracies 
against the backdrop of the Soviet threat and autocratic South European regimes.11
It follows that neo-functionalists must deny, or at least play down, the existence of a 
legitimacy deficit because its acknowledgement would invalidate one of the core 
assumptions of their own theory. Decades of ever increasing economic and political 
integration, culminating first in the Single Market and more recently in the Single 
Currency, should have “spilled over” into a significant transfer of loyalties towards 
the EU and elimination of any residual legitimacy deficit, yet it has failed to do so.
The prediction is based on flawed assumptions in neo-functionalist theory, according 
to which loyalty towards the EU is created by means of a “learning process”. 
Individuals are assumed to perceive the EU as the source of their utilitarian interests, 
become committed to its maintenance and finally develop identitive links with the EU
19and the broader community it serves. Yet this argument is based on the mistaken
premise of EU outputs being highly visible, tangible and intelligible to citizens and
1 ^that feelings of collective identity are predicated upon strictly functional concerns. 
However, Jacques Delors once remarked that “you do not fall in love with the 
common market”14, and communal attachments have failed to materialise, thus 
leaving the EU over-dependent on support for its policy outputs. Even if neo­
functionalists acknowledged the persistence of a deficit, constitutionalists as those 
reviewed in the next category would deny the effectiveness of an output-geared, 
functionalist remedy which is all neo-functionalism can offer.15
It should be noted in passing that a similar charge can be made against neo­
functionalism’s great intellectual adversary inter-govemmentalism.16 Like neo­
10 For an overview see: Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p.l44fF
11 Helen Wallace (93), op. cit.. p.99
12 Juliet Lodge: “Loyalty and the EEC: The Limitations of the Functionalist Approach”, Political 
Studies, vol.26, no.2, 1978, p.238
13 Ibid., p.239, 246
14 Jacques Delors quoted in: Brigid Laffan: “The Politics o f Identity and Political Order in Europe”, 
Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol.34, no.l, 1996, p.95
15 Ibid., p. 100
16 See for example: Alan S. Milward: The European Rescue o f the Nation State. (London: Routledge, 
1994), or: Andrew Moravcsik: “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
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functionalism, its analytical focus is on the integration process, political actors and 
policy outcomes, but its implicit assumptions about the EU’s legitimacy are 
diametrically opposite to those of neo-functionalism. Inter-govemmentalists do not 
raise the legitimacy question because on their account the EU is ultimately firmly 
controlled by its member states. Being legitimate themselves, national governments 
merely delegate powers to the EU, thereby lending legitimacy through national 
channels upwards. However, ever since the EU had outgrown the format of an 
“ordinary” international organisation, its dependence on legitimation through the 
member states has come under considerable strain. The over-reliance on indirect 
legitimacy is now widely believed to be one of the contributing factors to the 
perceived legitimacy deficit. Just as with neo-functionalism, inter-govemmentalists 
are reluctant to admit to such a deficit because its existence would be tantamount to an 
admission that the EU no longer conforms to the inter-govemmentalist image of a 
limited, indirectly legitimised international organisation.
The disinterest these two important integration theories show in legitimacy should 
maybe not come as a surprise. After all, they are primarily interested in explaining the 
integration process rather than discussing the legitimising problems arising from the 
current or any future European political system. The literature survey will therefore 
now turn away from process-centred theories towards the most prominent perspective 
from which European legitimacy has been discussed: the concern about democracy in 
the EU.
1.3 Constitutionalism
The traditional approach to the legitimacy debate has been conducted from the 
perspective of democracy. The approach is analytically rooted in institutionalism, and 
its main motivation is to increase public acceptance of the EU through institutional 
engineering. It claims the key to legitimacy problem lies in divergence between the 
actual legitimation of European institutions and widely-held popular beliefs about 
how they should be legitimised. As democracy has become the only acceptable form 
of legitimising political institutions in the countries of Western Europe, scholars
Intergovemmentalist Approach”, in: Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott (eds.): Economic and Political 
Integration in Europe. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.29-80
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began to compare the democratic “quality” of national political systems with that of 
the EU. A large majority of them have concluded that the process of legislative 
policy-making in the EU is characterised by what has widely become known as the 
“democratic deficit”. Representatives of this approach can be found among political
1*7 t o  I Q
scientists , (predominantly German) legal scholars , and even politicians.
The Toussaint Report of the EP offers maybe the best and most concise definition of 
the democratic deficit which entails
“the combination o f two phenomena: (i) the transfer o f powers from the 
Member States to the EC; (ii) the exercise o f these powers at Community 
level by institutions other than the European Parliament, even though, 
before the transfer, the national parliaments held power to pass laws in 
the areas concerned."
As the EU assumes more and more functions hitherto only associated with sovereign 
states, so the democratic deficit school argued, its institutional structure has to reflect
<71
this transformation in order to retain public support. Given the constitutional ideals 
prevalent in Western Europe, this means tailoring a liberal democratic constitution for 
the EU based on the model of a (federal) state.
It becomes evident from this definition that most discussions of the democratic deficit 
are analytically restricted to comparative investigations of the shortcomings of
17 See for instance: Brigitte Boyce: “The Democratic Deficit o f  the European Community”, in: 
Parliamentary Affairs, vol.46, n o .4 ,1993, pp.458-477
Juliet Lodge: “Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy”, in: Journal of Common Market Studies. 
vol.32, no.3, 1994, pp.343-68
Werner Weidenfeld: Europa 96: Reformprogramm fur die EuropSische Union - Strategien und 
Optionen fiir Europa (Giitersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1994)
18 Claus-Dieter Classen: “EuropSische Integration und demokratische Legitimation”, Archiv des 
offentlichen Rechts. vol. 119, no.2, 1994, pp.238-60
Philip Raworth: “A Timid Step Forwards: Maastricht and the Democratisation o f the European 
Community”, in: European Law Review, vol. 19, no.l, 1994, pp. 16-33
19 Michael Heseltine: The Democratic Deficit: The Balance in Europe for Britain to Redress. (London: 
Centre for Policy Studies, 1989)
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul: “Der Vertrag von Maastricht im Deutschen Bundestag”, in: Europa- 
Archiv, vol.48, no.13, 1993, pp.405-412
20 European Parliament: Committee on Institutional Affairs. Report bv Toussaint. 1/2/88, PE 
111.236/fin., p.lOf
21 Beate Wieland: “Verfassungspolitische Probleme der Staatswerdung Europas”, in: Rudolf 
Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen fur eine Europaische Union. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1991), p.430
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European parliamentary democracy. They usually propose to solve the democratic 
deficit by means of enhanced scrutiny powers for the national parliaments of the 
member states, or by giving the EP a greater role in legislation and sustaining the 
EU’s executive, or both.
Only a few scholars disagree with this analysis and dispute the existence of a 
democratic deficit, but their arguments are based on an unusual reading of legitimacy. 
For instance, Kluth adopts an extremely restrictive, legalistic definition of democratic 
legitimacy for assessing whether the EU conforms to the principles of the German 
Basic Law.22 Banchoff and Smith confusingly equate democratic legitimacy with 
political participation (“contestation”). Contrary to their assertion, the popular 
recognition of the EU as an arena in which to pursue political objectives may at best 
signal the absence of any obvious delegitimation. After all, MEPs representing the UK 
Independence Party may participate vigorously in the deliberations of the EP, but they 
still regard the EU as altogether illegitimate.
The conventional assessment of the legitimacy deficit offered by constitutionalists 
suffers from at least two theoretical flaws. The first flaw lies in the generally ill- 
defined and muddled terminology constitutionalists employ for their arguments. 
Second, constitutionalism is guilty of premising its discussion of the EU on the 
traditional model of the nation state, although the EU is evidently not a nation state.24
As regards the first flaw, the two central concepts of constitutionalism, democracy 
and legitimacy, are rarely defined with sufficient precision, and sometimes they are 
even used interchangeably. The contested meaning of “democracy” is ignored by 
conflating the many facets of the term into an often ill-defined and exclusively 
parliamentary understanding of democracy. The confusion of different political
22 Winfried Kluth: Die demokratische Legitimation der EU. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), p.90ff
23 Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell P. Smith: “Introduction: Conceptualising Legitimacy in a Contested 
Polity”, in: Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell P. Smith (eds.): Legitimacy and the EU. (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p.2f
24 “Nation” is a contested concept. When refering to nation state or nationhood, this thesis follows 
Smith by defining nation as a named population sharing a historical territory, common myths and 
memories, a standardised public culture and common legal rights. Nationhood is not ethnically 
primordeal and immutable - it is constructed and susceptible to manipulation, but only in the very long- 
run. See: Anthony D. Smith: “National Identity and the Idea o f European Unity”, International Affairs, 
vol.68, no.l, 1992, p.60
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conceptions of democracy means both the extent and nature of the democratic deficit, 
as well as its political significance, remain hotly disputed.25 Ultimately, the agreed 
meaning of the word “democracy” is “rule by the people”, but beyond this rather 
general definition little consensus is possible.
Often, a broad distinction is made between the different procedures advocated for 
translating democracy into practice, such as direct or indirect, liberal, plebiscitarian or 
people’s democracy. The choice of any one of them affects the structure as well as the 
scope of the political system, depending, for instance, on whether democracy is 
understood as entailing the popular control of the means of production (economic 
democracy). A similar problem arises with regard to the existence conditions for 
democracy within a given political system. To which extent do people have to 
participate in, or at least consent to, major political decisions? Even within the field 
of representative democracy unanimous agreement is rare. For even a mode of 
government which technically fulfils the basic criteria for representative democracy 
(having a law-making assembly regularly elected by universal suffrage) might still be 
considered profoundly undemocratic in every other respect.
The earliest forms of constitutionalism also suffered from a fallacious equation of 
democracy with legitimacy, resulting in a reductionist focus on the “democratic 
deficit.” By empowering the EP constitutionalists believed they could also solve the 
legitimacy deficit. Such flawed reasoning is based on the frequently implicit 
assumption that “democracy” is the paramount feature of political systems in Western 
Europe, if not tantamount to a system of government itself. However, political 
systems employ a whole range of sometimes competing legitimising principles such 
as rule of law, regulatory expertise, accountability or balance of powers, out of which 
democracy is but one. These various legitimising principles of a political system must 
be analysed separately as well as within a concrete comparative political context, 
since their meaning and the relative value attached to them will vary cross-nationally.
25 Brigitte Boyce, op. cit.. p.458
26 Like power or justice, the notion of democracy can be understood as an “essentially contested 
concept”: it is appraisive, internally complex, open-textured and there are no fixed criteria for its 
application. See: William Connolly: The Terms of Political Discourse. (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Heath, 2nd ed. 1983), p. 14
27 Roger Scruton (ed.): A Dictionary o f Political Thought. (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1996), p .l30 f
28 Ibid.. p. 131
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By narrowly focusing on parliamentary competencies the democratic deficit approach 
ignores that the exercise of political power is not confined to representative legislative 
bodies (consider judicial or regulatory powers, for instance).
A good example is the ongoing debate about the legitimation of the European Central 
Bank. The legal and institutional framework enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty 
follows the functionalist legitimising principle favoured in Germany, according to 
which the Central Bank, like the Bundesbank, is formally legitimised by virtue of its 
technocratic expertise in pursuit of price stability. Legal independence from any 
undue influence or operational interference by political actors provides the 
constitutional means to achieve this objective.
From another perspective, still predominant in France, the conduct of monetary policy 
is a quintessentially political affair and not simply a question of technocratic 
expertise. Central banks should be democratically accountable to the electorate, and 
should be made to pursue the economic objectives of the government of the day. 
While there is little chance of this notion formally legitimising the ECB short of 
amending the Treaties, one might speculate about attempts to secure political 
influence over the central bank in constitutional reality, for instance via the so-called 
Euro-X committee. Because of their narrow preoccupation with the EP older 
versions of constitutionalism have little to contribute to this debate, yet a widely
accepted legitimation for the ECB is essential, given the impact of its monetary
•  ^1powers on the performance of economies in the EURO-zone.
Not all the authors who might be grouped into the constitutionalist category would 
fully subscribe to the somewhat simplistic tenets of the democratic deficit school, 
even though the latter has long dominated the debate. In the meantime, the debate has 
progressed from the rather unimaginative and often self-interested demands to 
empower the European Parliament.32 Scholars increasingly recognise the complexities
29 Brigitte Boyce, op.cit.. p.466
30 “France Plans for Economic Policy Role”, Financial Times. 27/4/1998, p.2
31 Rainer Lepsius: “Nationalstaat oder Nationalitatenstaat als Modell ftir die Weiterentwicklung der 
Europaischen Gemeinschaft”, in: Rudolf Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen fUr eine 
Europaische Union. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), p.24
32 One obvious case is the article written by the then EP President, Klaus Hansch: “Europaische 
Integration und parlamentarische Demokratie”, Europa Archiv. vol.41, no.7, 1986, pp. 191-200
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of European constitutional reform, but the debate has tended to assume a distinct 
character in Britain and Germany.
Reflecting the centrality of the Basic Law in German political life, the debate became 
largely dominated by legal and constitutional arguments about the consequences of 
European integration. Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, for example, led to 
speculation among German academics about the possibility (and desirability) of an 
incipient statehood of the new EU and the constitutional implications this might 
entail.33 Problems such as the role of the European Court of Justice as a constitutional 
court within the institutional framework34, or the necessary degree of centralisation35 
were thrown into sharp relief by the 1993 Maastricht judgement of the Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) which revived the debate amongst lawyers and political 
scientists about the constitutional status of the EU and the possibilities for its 
democratisation.36
In Britain, the debate was largely confined to political scientists who sought to 
identify additional institutional dimensions in which the EU could be said to be 
insufficiently legitimised. Doubts about openness and accountability within a 
fragmented institutional framework or reflection on the conflict between 
representation and efficiency put the old concern about parliamentary government 
into a wider context. Others pointed towards the potential dangers increased 
institutional majoritarianism would pose for centre-periphery relations in the Union 
and even cautioned against an adoption of parliamentary government. Often this 
dilemma is discussed in terms of the balance between territorial and popular
33 See review in: Heinrich Schneider: “Gesamteuropaische Herausforderungen an eine Europaische 
Union”, in: Rudolf Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen filr eine Europaische Union. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), pp.41-144
34 Roland Bieber: “Verfassungsentwicklung und Verfassungsgesetzgebung in der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaft”, in: Rudolf Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen fur eine Europaische 
Union. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), p.403f
35 Wieland, op. cit.. p.445
36 See for instance: Classen, op. cit., pp.238-60. Also: Dieter Grimm: Braucht Europa eine 
Verfassung?. (Miinchen: Carl Friedrich von Simens-Stiftung, 1994)
37 John Peterson: “The European Union: Pooled Sovereignty, Divided Accountability”, Political 
Studies, vol.45, no.3, 1997, pp.579-96
38 Vernon Bogdanor and Geoffrey Woodcock: “The European Community and Sovereignty”, 
Parliamentary Affairs, vol.44, no.4, 1991, p.484
39 Renaud Dehousse: “Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there Alternatives to 
the Majoritarian Avenue?”, in: West European Politics, vol. 18, no.3, 1995, p.l 19
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representation.40 Bogdanor and Woodcock, on the other hand, have shifted attention 
towards the accountability of European institutions and the Council in particular41 - an 
idea which was developed further in Lodge’s article on the transparency (or lack of it) 
of these bodies.42
Notwithstanding these attempts to broaden the perspective to institutional aspects 
beyond the EP, even more sophisticated versions of the argument still suffer from a 
second flaw of constitutionalism. By implicitly adapting the organisational model of 
the state to the EU, constitutionalists have tended to overlook an elementary defect 
within their assumptions. The EU simply is not a state, and its lack of statehood may 
curtail the scope for unqualified adaptation of national constitutional paradigms to 
forms of supranational governance. Beetham and Lord identify four structural 
requirements of a majoritarian democracy which are still missing in the case of the 
EU: widespread normative popular endorsement for a European parliamentary 
democracy, a unidimensional structure of political cleavages, a high level of social 
homogeneity, and a public opinion that is capable of being organised into coherent 
and stable majorities.43
These structural limitations are not acknowledged by the democratic/constitutionalist 
approach. Its institutionalist analysis of the legitimacy deficit suffers from the inherent 
flaw of ignoring the social premises it is built upon. As a consequence, 
constitutionalists fail to understand to complex nature of the legitimacy deficit of the 
EU. The lack of a parliamentary democracy is only one important cause for the 
legitimacy deficit. The creation of a constitutional structure enjoying widespread 
public support is a necessary, but not a sufficient pre-condition for a legitimate EU.44
Legitimacy also depends on the existence of a powerful collective identity amongst its 
citizens. There can be no democracy without the corresponding demos self­
consciously exercising its right to govern as the popular sovereign. The legitimacy of
40 Werner Weidenfeld: Reform der Europaischen Union - Materialien zur Revision des Maastrichter 
Vertrages 1996. (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1995), p.40
41 Bogdanor and Woodcock, op. cit.. p.482
42 Lodge (94), op. cit.. pp.343-68
43 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.,p.77
44 Peter Graf Kielmansegg: “Integration und Demokratie”, in: Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler- 
Koch: Europaische Integration. (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996), p.50
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democratic institutions in the EU is premised on the peoples of Europe recognising 
their shared membership of a single political community.45 At the moment there is no 
constitutionally defined single European people which also perceives itself as such. 
To summarise, the constitutionalist analysis of the legitimacy deficit of the EU is 
flawed because is ignores the difference between democratic structure and democratic 
substance, such as a demos.46 Constitutionalists treat the EU’s current institutional 
design as the root cause of the legitimacy deficit, but widespread public support for 
EU institutions cannot exist independently of a European collective identity.47
• • 481.4 Commumtanamsm
Communitarians regard the lack of a feeling of shared identity amongst the peoples of 
Europe as the main factor responsible for the legitimacy deficit of the EU. From the 
communitarian perspective such a feeling is indispensable because people judge the 
legitimacy of their political system not just on the grounds of how it reaches political 
decisions, but also on who belongs to it. The EU currently suffers from “fragmented 
identities”.49 Popular attachment is still mostly directed at the national (or in some 
member states even sub-national) political and territorial communities which remain 
the pivotal shapers of most aspects of political life.50 National public spheres in the 
member states are still to some extent culturally isolated from each other, and they 
remain anchored in national histories that define the parameters of political 
discourse.51
Neunreither aptly captured this discrepancy between supranational governance and 
national political identities with his remark that the democratic deficit is also an
45 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 152f
46 Grimm (94), op. cit.. p.38
47 Kielmansegg, op. cit.. pp.54-58
48 In this context, communitarianism not synonymous with communitarianism as a political philosophy, 
even though one of the leading protagonists in the debate about Europe’s “social legitimacy”, Joseph 
Weiler, is a communitarian in both senses of the word.
49 Soledad Garcia: “Europe’s Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers o f Citizenship”, in: Soledad 
Garcia: European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp. 1-29
50 A. M. Sbragia: “Thinking about the European Future: The Uses o f Comparison”, in: A. M. Sbragia 
(ed.): Europolitics: Institutions and Policy-Making in the “New” European Community. (Washington 
DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992), p.274
51 Jtirgen Habermas: “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future o f Europe”, 
in: Praxis International, vol.22, no.l, 1992, p. 12
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identification and transmission deficit.52 Neither do Europeans identify themselves 
sufficiently with the political system of the EU, nor do its institutions possess the 
“transmission channels” every political system needs to conduct a permanent dialogue 
with its citizens.53 For instance, more extensive media coverage of EU politics is not 
to be confused with genuinely pan-European media which have failed to emerge.54 
Public political debate and widespread democratic participation are vital legitimising 
elements for modem polities, but they are difficult to Europeanise because of 
Europe’s linguistic and cultural diversity.55 This may bar the way towards 
representative government within a “European nation state” as envisaged by some 
constitutionalists because the need for a European identity grows in proportion to the 
degree of integration.56 Under the prevailing conditions, a “nationalities state” where 
citizens are affiliated to two political communities (national and European) may be all
• C7that is structurally attainable in the EU.
CO
There is also a wider concern about a cultural cleavage across the EU. Peel echoes 
Jacques Delors’s fear that a latent cultural and ideological north-south divide in the 
Union may well erupt into political crisis in the future.59 He claims these fault-lines 
extend beyond monetary policy into areas such international trade agreements and 
even attitudes towards the very way the EU is run, as the recent debate about fraud 
and mismanagement in the Commission has demonstrated.60 Peel concludes that it 
will therefore require exceptionally skilful diplomacy from the dominant Franco- 
German axis, which cuts across this fault line, in order to contain the north-south 
divide in the future.
In short, the communitarian school substitutes the institutionalist analytical 
perspective of constitutionalism with a sociological one, studying the social 
preconditions of legitimate government. It argues that every political system must
52 Karlheinz Neunreither: “The Syndrome o f Democratic Deficit in the European Community”, in: 
Geraint Parry (ed.): Politics in an Interdependent World. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994), p.97
53 Ibid.. p. 10Iff. 106ff
54 Grimm (94), op. cit.. pp.41-43
55 Lepsius, op. cit.. pp.27-29
56 William Wallace: The Transformation o f Western Europe. (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 103-06
57 Ibid, p.36
58 Garcia, op. cit.. pp. 19-21
59 Quentin Peel: “The EU’s Real Split”, Financial Times. 25/2/1999, p.26
60 EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, a Frenchman, ridiculed the EP’s fight against corruption as 
“rather Nordic” and “a little bit protestant”. See: “No chicken”, Financial Times. 17/9/1999, p. 19
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develop a strong sense of mutual political identification on which it can draw in times 
of economic or military crisis and severe internal differences of interest. Citizens must 
broadly accept both the decision-making procedure of their political system, as well as 
its definition for membership of it, for the organisation to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public. Living under a particular political system, in most cases a state, requires 
a certain degree of mutual trust and solidarity amongst its citizens which arise from at 
least a basic set of shared values and interests as well as a widespread feeling of 
belonging.61 In their absence, public reluctance towards democratic majority decisions 
will prevail in each member state of the EU for fear of “national interests” being
ff)outvoted by the other European states.
Weiler illustrates this point with the rather drastic but very apt example of asking his 
readers to
“...imagine an Anschluss between Germany and Denmark. Try and tell 
the Danes that they should not worry since they will have fu ll 
representation in the Bundestag. Their screams o f  grief will be shrill not 
simply because they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent 
minorityship (that may be true for the German Greens too), but because 
the way nationality, in this way o f  thinking, enmeshes with democracy is 
that even majority rule is only legitimate with a demos, when Danes rule 
Danes. ”63
Weiler, of course, draws this analogy when discussing the so-called “no-demos 
thesis” which can trace its intellectual parentage to the Maastricht decision of the 
German Constitutional Court.64 Linking the idea of demos necessarily to nation and 
peoplehood, this argument leads to the conclusion that the EU does not have the 
authority or legitimacy of a “demos-cratic” state because institutions such as the EP 
are not the representative of a single people.65 In most of its different versions, the no­
demos thesis rests crucially on the premise borrowed from German constitutional law
61 Helen Wallace: “Pan-European Integration: A Real or Imagined Community?”, Government and 
Opposition, vol.32, no.2, 1997, pp.225ff
62 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 152
63 Joseph Weiler: “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism”, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, vol.35, no. 1, 1997, p. 116
64 BVerfGE 93. 155
65 Weiler (97a), op. cit.. p. 117
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that only nationhood or even peoplehood can constitute a valid basis for a modem 
democratic state.
One might object to Weiler’s argument by pointing out that British constitutional law 
does not share the same normative belief in the inextricable link between statehood 
and peoplehood, partly because Britain has never adopted the ius sanguinis definition 
of nationality. Still, the argument would retain much of its validity even if these two 
concepts were analytically decoupled. In fact, Weiler goes on to criticise the German 
court for continuing to rely on an outdated and offensive ethnic definition of 
peoplehood, and his own proposed definition of citizenship offers a more tolerant 
modem alternative.66
Kielmansegg has been similarly keen to avoid an organic-national concept of identity 
based on ethnicity. Instead, he believes that identity is the product of closely-knit 
“communication-communities”, “experience-communities” and “memory- 
communities”. He regards this triangular conception of shared communities as one of 
the existence conditions for a stable democracy because it provides sufficient stability 
for a polity to function effectively and relatively uncontestedly.67
Communitarians argue that such feelings of shared identity are not simply a by­
product of economic co-operation in Europe, nor can they be created by mere 
institutional design. They must be complemented by active identity-building. Even 
if effective in tandem with social and cultural policies, institutional engineering will 
only contribute incrementally towards the creation of a European political community 
with a strong sense of its own identity.69 A widespread and stable feeling of identity 
takes a very long time to develop, and this process is not easily susceptible to outside 
influence. That does not mean identities are eternal or immutable (unless the term 
identity is rather crudely equated with ethnic or even racial homogeneity), it only 
cautions against a simplified view of the legitimacy deficit resulting from a far too 
narrow analytical base.
66 See Chapter 6. pp.276ff
67 Kielmansegg, op. cit.. p.55
68 Neunreither, op. cit.. p. 109
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There is no doubt about the importance of a socio-cultural dimension to the EU or its 
need for the development of some degree of collective consciousness. 
Communitarians have rightly criticised the existing debate for ignoring this dimension 
of legitimacy. But whichever version of the communitarian school is adopted, there 
always remains a more fundamental problem. Communitarian arguments can be 
turned on their head when it comes to the conclusions drawn from their analysis. They 
claim the EU lacks legitimacy because it has failed so far to underpin its considerable 
supranational powers with a sufficiently strong communal identity of the peoples of 
Europe. At the same time, communitarians stress the fact that such political identities 
are hard to create and only evolve over long periods of time. That suggests another 
possible conclusion to be drawn from the communitarian analysis, this time yielding 
the opposite result: the EU lacks legitimacy because it has failed to decelerate the 
extension of its strong supranational powers to a speed compatible with the gradual 
emergence of its communal identity.
In conclusion, the communitarian school rightly maintains that the success of 
democratic reform of the EU is contingent upon a strong feelings of popular 
attachment and belonging to it. But in the absence of such feelings, one is left to 
wonder whether the current degree of integration is susceptible to successful 
legitimation at all, other than in the very long-run. Such considerations have given 
rise to scepticism about the more conventional approaches towards the legitimacy 
deficit.
1.5 Containment
This heading comprises a broad spectrum of views ranging from caution about further 
integration to calls for secession from the EU. Containment does not really exist as a 
unified self-conscious school of thought within the European debate. But the label 
provides a useful tool for categorising a group of people who base their arguments on 
similar premises.
69 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 148 f
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Analytically, the containment school combines an institutionalist with a sociological 
perspective, except for debates on EMU where functional and institutional arguments
70tend to be interlinked. Its frequent concern about the compatibility of the EU with 
national constitutional orders means that, academically, constitutional lawyers 
outnumber political scientists in the containment school. Its widespread scepticism 
about the possibility or desirability of “ever closer Union” has made arguments in 
favour of containment more widespread in Britain than in Germany. They are also 
rarely advanced by the community of (mostly integrationist) political scientists in 
both countries who tend to reject the strategy of reducing the need for legitimacy on 
normative grounds.
One the one hand, proponents of containment share the communitarian line of attack 
on constitutionalism. They agree that the current insufficiently developed collective 
identity among Europeans renders the legitimacy of European institutions unstable, or 
makes them even illegitimate. However, they draw different conclusions from this 
analysis. Many proponents of containment consider nationhood an essential ingredient 
of political identity. Successful and stable states must be able to draw on the loyalty of 
their people which derives from a feeling of belonging and nationhood.71
The argument can be decoupled from the contentious notion of (civic or ethnic) 
nationalism, however. Regardless of whether a sufficient degree of belonging and 
identity can ever be attained in non-national polities, supporters of containment 
merely need to argue that the EU has neither nationhood nor any adequate substitute 
(such as notions of European citizenship) from which to derive the necessary loyalty 
and support. Whereas communitarians react to this analysis by proposing ways in 
which loyalties to the EU might be fostered, the containment school argues that such 
attempts will have little tangible effects for a long time to come.
Rather than fostering the kind of transnational collective identities necessary for 
current and future European integration, supporters of containment prefer the inverse 
solution. They want to adapt the degree of integration to the existing levels of
70 For example: John Redwood: Our Currency. Our Country - The Dangers o f European Monetary 
Union. (London: Penguin, 1997)
71 Ibid, p. 14
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communal feelings amongst Europeans. Since existing levels of identification with 
the EU tend to be low, but emotive attachment to member states remains resilient to 
developments towards supranational governance, the EU can only be legitimised as an 
extension of the nation state.72 This reasoning leads to calls for a containment of the 
integration process73, if not its reversal towards a Europe des patries where member 
states co-operate intergovemmentally through the Council.74
On the other hand, containment advances a second, altogether different line of 
argument against the constitutionalist school. Most constitutional proposals have 
concentrated on a better congruence between the political regime of the EU and the 
sort of institutional structure considered legitimate by the population at large (in the 
terminology developed in chapter two: between formal and felt legitimacy). But 
scholars have neglected to consider the effect of the reformed EU on the constitutional 
structure of the member states. Especially (German) lawyers have become alarmed at 
the decreasing constitutional compatibility of the national and the European level. 
This could render efforts towards constitutional reform at the European level self- 
defeating.
For instance, a fully parliamentary system would fall foul of the German 
constitutional doctrine that links democracy to the existence of a people
nc
(iStaatsvolk). From the German constitutional perspective, the EU is still mainly
legitimised indirectly through its member states. In institutional terms this means that 
legitimacy is conferred foremost through the national parliaments via the Council of 
Ministers. In the absence of a European people, a strengthening of the EP vis a vis the 
Council of Ministers, for example, would thus exacerbate the legitimacy deficit rather 
than offer a remedy. Huber, for instance, believes that granting “positive democratic 
competencies” (full law-making powers) to the EP, thus enabling it to legislate 
against the Council’s will, would sever the national legitimising chain and hence 
breach art.79 III of the German Basic Law. Moreover, the current degree of 
integration has the potential to undermine, or even revolutionise, the existing German
72 Ibid.. p,15f
73 Ralf Dahrendorf: Why Europe? Observations by a Liberal Sceptic. Text o f Lecture delivered at the 
London School o f Economics on the 23/2/1998
74 Redwood, o p . cit.. p. 193
75 See arguments o f the Federal Constitutional Court: BVerfGE 93. 155 at 184f
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constitutional order.77 Given the high degree of legitimacy the Basic Law enjoys 
amongst the citizens of the Federal Republic, its emasculation by the EU might in 
itself be perceived as illegitimate.
The same, only for different reasons, applies for the British constitution. As long as 
the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty remains valid, the EU must in 
legal terms be regarded as an international treaty organisation whose legitimacy is
*70
institutionally conferred through Parliament alone. The issue of democratic 
accountability should therefore be discussed with respect to the Council of Ministers
70rather than the EP. Some constitutional lawyers have already warned about the 
growing incompatibility between European jurisprudence and British constitutional
510doctrine and the danger this poses to the latter. Increased institutional integration, 
for instance by installing a full-blown system of representative government in 
Brussels, will only contribute to undermine the domestic constitutional framework 
and, given its strong public support, any legitimising function it may have played for 
the EU.81
Those who consider Britain’s long-standing opposition to deeper institutional
517integration paradoxical in view of the country’s ancient democratic traditions 
perhaps underplay the extent to which the constitutional framework and national 
identity have contributed to associating democracy with self-government in a 
sovereign Parliament. Interestingly, British proponents of the view that the core of 
the national constitutional order needs to be protected in order to retain its legitimacy 
have sometimes backed up their argument by referring to the Maastricht judgement of 
the German Constitutional Court.84
76 Peter M. Huber: Maastricht - ein Staatsstreich? (Stuttgart: Richard Boorberg Verlag, 1993), p. 16, 32f
77 Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider, Angelika Emmerich-Fritsche and Thomas Beyer: “Der Vertrag liber 
die Europaische Union und das Grundgesetz”, Juristen Zeitung. 1993, pp.751ff
78 Alan Sked: A Proposal for European Union. Occassional Paper 9, (London: The Bruges Group, 
1990), p. 19
79 Norman Lamont: “Selsdon Group Speech, 11 October 1994”, in: Martin Holmes fed.): The 
Eurosceptical Reader. (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 102
80 H. W. R. Wade: “What Has Happened to the Sovereignty o f Parliament?”, The Law Quarterly 
Review, vol.107, no.l, 1991, pp.1-4
81 Tony Benn: “The Common Market: Loss o f Self-Government”, in: Martin Holmes (ed.): The 
Eurosceptical Reader. (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.38-41, also: Redwood (97), op. cit.. p.202
82 Helen Wallace (93), op. cit.. p.98f
83 See: Chapter 3, pp,120ff
84 Redwood (97), op. cit.. p.203
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By containing the process of European integration the EU will be under less pressure 
to legitimise its institutions and create a sense of European identity. As an additional 
benefit, the EU will also be rendered less incompatible with the constitutional orders 
of its member states. However, these arguments neglect the negative impact of 
containment on the EU’s ability to deliver supranational policies. Depending on how 
radically the EU’s powers would be cut back under the containment strategy, there is 
a real danger of undermining EU policies, like the Single Market, which enjoy 
widespread public support. After all, even Single Market legislation now comprises 
an ever-widening number of policy areas, but many supporters of containment wish to
Of
see some of them returned to national responsibility.
In this respect, the strategy to reduce the need for EU legitimisation may well be self- 
defeating. The continued transfer of political powers to Brussels from the SEA 
onwards has occurred in response to a declining ability to exert national political 
influence over many areas of economic policy. Member states also consented to a 
growing pooling of sovereignty in order to reap the economic growth arising from 
closer integration. A reversal of the integration process may therefore endanger some 
of the economic benefits for which the EU enjoys popular legitimacy in the first place.
To conclude, the containment approach challenges constitutionalism on the grounds 
that introducing representative government to the EU risks reducing its legitimacy 
because it undermines the existing constitutional structures in Britain and Germany. 
The majority of constitutionalists who fully support the goal of “ever closer Union” 
could respond by describing such legal incompatibilities as a temporary consequence 
of the EU’s incipient statehood. They might argue that, over time, the integration 
process will dissolve these incompatibilities into a harmonious federal legal structure. 
But this line of thought falls foul of the second containment argument. A federalist 
system would not only emasculate national political regimes enjoying solid 
legitimacy, it would also lack the stable underpinning of a strong European collective 
identity on which the viability of a European government would depend.
85 Competition policy may serve as an example for a rapidly growing and often contentious field of  
Single Market-related EU activity.
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Just as any other of the four schools of thought, containment can offer new insights by 
focusing on a different perspective from which the legitimacy deficit can be defined. 
However, by abandoning the normative commitment to European integration, 
advocates of containment endanger the functionalist legitimacy of the EU as a 
provider of economic growth. The question remains, however, whether the 
containment approach as a whole, or any of the other two categories surveyed so far, 
operates within analytical and theoretical mindsets that leave them incapable of 
understanding the true nature of the legitimacy deficit. Increasingly, contributors to 
the academic debate reply to this question in the affirmative.
1.6 New Governance
Unimpressed by the discussion about the relative merits of the democratic, 
communitarian or containment perspective on the debate, an increasing number of 
scholars has urged a fundamental revision of the theoretical framework within which 
questions about the legitimacy of the EU are formulated. Despite individual variations 
in their theoretical approaches, one can identify two core arguments which lie at the 
heart of what has become known as the new governance school.86 This classification 
encompasses a variety of perspectives, including multi-level governance and policy- 
network theories, but their core assumptions with regard to legitimacy are sufficiently
0*7
similar to warrant the unified label new governance.
The first argument is premised on an analytical shift away from the institutionalist 
parameters that had dominated the democratic and the containment viewpoint towards 
a new version of functionalism. A state is defined by its ability to function as the 
guarantor of external and internal security and provider of public goods 
(“governance”) rather using the institutionalist definition of states as autonomous
oo
polito-administrative systems (“government”).
86 Hix (98), op. cit.. p.38
87 Ibid.. p.39ff. Beetham and Lord use the phrase “technocratic version of legitimacy” instead. See: 
Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p. 16-22
88 Michael Ztim: “Ober den Staat und die Demokratie in europaischen Mehrebenensystemen”, in: 
Politische Vierteliahresschrift. vol.37, no.l, 1996, p.29
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Empirically, new governance theory makes use of the globalisation argument about
• • OQthe increasing internationalisation of human, especially economic, activity. National 
economic systems become increasingly interwoven as important economic actors 
gradually sever their hitherto strong territorial links. The growth in the number of 
multi-national corporations and the emergence of global capital markets severely 
undermines the economic autonomy of the state. Economic systems become more 
interdependent and societal actors occupy an increasingly important place beside the 
states. At the same time, many of the most pressing political problems, such as 
environmental pollution or nuclear disarmament, cannot be solved from within the 
boundaries of individual states, but require international co-operation instead. As a 
result, globalisation weakens the steering capacity of individual states.90
Analytically, this means that the institutional and the functional definitions of 
statehood cease to be synonymous, as they had been in the past.91 This has serious 
consequences for the legitimacy of modem states. The prevailing understanding of 
legitimacy is analytically linked to the continued congruence between governance and 
government. The institutions of a state (government) enjoy (democratic) legitimacy 
because they represent the political will of the nation and they possess the means to 
translate that will into effective policies {governance). This legitimising link is 
challenged, however, when political problems collectively recognised by society can 
no longer be translated into effective policy-solutions by the political representatives 
to which they have been transferred. The old congruence between those who govern 
and those who are being governed gradually disappears. To put it differently, the 
people as the legal sovereign may still formally reign, but they have lost their ability 
to govern effectively.
In order to recapture some of that steering capacity states have started to co-operate 
trans-nationally.94 This leads to the second argument advanced by the New 
Governance school, which considers the institutional implications of the functionalist
89 Jachtenfiichs and Kohler-Koch, op. cit.. p.21f. See also: James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel 
(eds.): Governance without Government - Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992)
90 Ztim, op. cit.. p.27
91 Ibid.. p.30
92 Jachtenfiichs and Kohler-Koch. op. cit.. p.32
93 Ztim, op. cit.. p.36
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argument above. While supranational organisations such as the EU can help states to 
regain some of the steering capacity lost as a result of the globalisation process, such 
organisations are characteristically dominated by national executives. The autonomy 
of national governments is strengthened at the expense of those they are meant to 
govern because governments function as gatekeepers between the national and the 
supranational arena.95 As a consequence, the possibility of supranational governance 
does not diminish the gap between functional and institutional statehood since 
governance occurs on an organisational level separated from the (legitimised) national 
institutions of government.96 While European integration might fulfil the functional 
conditions for democracy, it does not meet the institutional ones because government 
and governance no longer occur within the same political arena.
These discrepancies are reinforced by the particular nature of the EU as multi-level 
governance. One of the means by which the EU can hope to increase its scope for 
effective governance is by co-opting non-state actors into the policy-making process 
which are directly affected by its policies. This makes the relationship between state 
and non-state actors polycentric and non-hierarchical because they are mutually
07dependent on each other. The Union lacks a single central agenda-setting and co­
ordinating actor, and its policy-making process is characterised by highly complex co­
operation between a wide variety of state and non-state officials operating at different 
organisational levels. National and European institutions are thus intrinsically 
interwoven. The joint involvement of political, social and administrative actors and 
the peculiar organisational structure have given rise to a description of the EU in 
terms of policy-networks98 or governance without government
These structural conditions are characterised by a low level of institutionalisation, 
informal arrangements and a relatively high degree of membership fluctuation. The
94 Ibid.. p.32
95 Ibid.. p.35
96 IbkU p.36
97 Markus Jachtenfiichs: “Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance”, European Law Journal. 
vol.l,no.2 , 1995, p .l24 f
98 For an overview, see: R. A. W. Rhodes, Jan Bache and Stephen George: “Policy Networks and 
Policy-Making in the EU: A Critical Appraisal”, in: Liesbet Hooghe (ed.): Cohesion Policy and 
European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp.367-387
9 Rosenau and Czempiel, op. cit.. esp. pp.219-94
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EU also distinguishes itself by permanent institutional change which even transforms 
some areas in the institutional framework of the member states.100 Lastly, in 
comparison to national politics, European governance is disproportionately concerned 
with regulation rather than resource allocation or redistributive policies - the EU 
develops towards a “regulatory state”.101 Regulating the Single Market requires more 
of an administrative and problem-solving rather than a politicised bargaining style of
i nopolicy-making and gives high prominence to scientific expertise. This in turn 
reinforces the Commission’s dependence on a wide network of advisory expert 
committees staffed mostly by the non-state representatives of functional interests.
According to the new governance school, it is these three features of the European 
political system - the relationship between state and private actors, the multi-level 
character and the dominance of regulation - which warrant the terminology o f post­
modern statehood103 or governance beyond the state.104 Its proponents stress that such 
governance beyond the state is not to be equated with governance above the state. 
Rather, they suggest that it partly replaces the state with a “post-sovereign, poly- 
centric, incongruent, neo-medieval arrangement of authority.”105
It follows that solutions to the legitimacy deficit will have to take account of the sui 
generis, post-modern nature of the EU, for new governance theorists do not deny the 
proposition that the multi-level system is insufficiently legitimised.106 They only 
contest the usefulness of the old institutionalist remedies developed in the national 
context and propose instead functionalist remedies for what they by and large 
consider a functionalist problem. Since policy-making in a regulatory state like the 
EU is by nature de-politicised, legitimacy deficits cannot arise from the absence of a
1 H7parliamentary democracy in the EU. These considerations call for new forms of
100 Jachtenfiichs (98), on. cit.. p.45ff
101 Giandomenico Majone: “The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems”, West European 
Politics, vol.22, no.l, 1999, p. 1-3
102 Giandomenico Majone: “Regulatory Legitimacy”, in: Giandomenico Majone (ed.): Regulating 
Europe. (London: Routledge, 1996), p.299
103 Caporaso, op. cit.. pp.29-52
104 Jachtenfiichs (95), op. cit.. p. 124
105 Philippe C. Schmitter: “Representation and the Future Euro-Polity”, Staatswissenschaften und 
Staatspraxis. vol.3, no.3, 1992, p.56
106 Jachtenfiichs and Kohler-Koch, op. cit.. p.33
107 Majone (99), op. cit.. p.21
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legitimacy, which are not conceptually based on the image of the state, to be devised
1 ORto fit the properties of post-modern statehood.
At first sight, new governance theory appears to bear a resemblance to the neo- 
functionalist school of thought, not least in their common roots in a functionalist 
analytical perspective. A closer comparison reveals two crucial differences. As 
discussed above, neo-functionalists tend to play down the existence of a legitimacy 
deficit, whereas new governance scholars acknowledge the legitimation problem. The 
second dissimilarity between neo-functionalism and the new governance approach is 
the former’s neglect of the multi-level structure of the EU.109 New governance 
theorists can therefore agree with scholars in the other three categories on the 
existence of a legitimacy deficit, while at the same time pointing to the functional and 
structural constraints which limit the scope for institutional solutions to it.
A critical assessment of the new governance analysis of the legitimacy deficit has to 
deal with each of the two fundamental arguments its proponents advance. Turning to 
the functionalist argument about the internationalisation of governance first, any 
critique will centre more on questions of degree rather than principle. “Globalisation” 
certainly is not just a fashionable catch-phrase, and many of the developments listed 
under that heading, such as the weakening of the steering-capacity of individual 
states, do take place. Three points ought to be considered, however. First, the impact 
and degree of globalisation have often been exaggerated. After all, the ability to 
borrow on global rather than local capital markets suggests that greater capital 
mobility increases government’s freedom of manoeuvre in fiscal policy, even though 
running a country’s Treasury may become more complicated and risky as a result.110
Second, the trend towards globalisation is not the inescapable fate of humanity. 
Rather, it is deliberately encouraged and positively embraced by most Western 
governments - witness the successful and unanimous conclusion of the Uruguay 
round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1993.
108 Jachtenfiichs (98), op. cit.. p.50
109 Ibid.. p.39f
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Third, the globalisation process needs to be placed into historical context. O’Rourke 
and Williamson have compared the current world economy with that of the late 
nineteenth century only to find that in many respects national economies were more 
integrated one hundred years ago than they are now. The most important factor may 
have been migration, but even international capital flows have only recently achieved 
the level, relative to the size of the world economy, which they occupied in the 
decades before the Great War.111 Crucially, however, O’Rourke and Williamson argue 
that, just as back then, the current globalisation process is not irreversible and a
119“globalisation backlash” may still occur at some point in the future. Such 
arguments undermine the new governance claim that unavoidable and uninfluenceable 
processes of globalisation destroy the old principle of territorially organised
1 1 ' j
representative politics and transform the nature of governance.
The second fundamental argument, the claim about the unique multi-level nature of 
European governance, is largely a matter for empirical investigation. New governance 
theory can provide valuable insights into the way political power is organised and 
exercised at the European level. It also deserves credit for emphasising the 
fundamental structural differences which should caution against a simple adaptation 
of traditional definitions of legitimacy embedded in the context of the nation state to 
the supranational, but “non-statal” EU. Nevertheless, the approach is not free from 
criticism.
First, the functionalist framework and the almost exclusive emphasis on policy- 
outcomes are partly attributable to the academic background of the major new 
governance scholars in national public policy studies. They are generally less 
interested in the broader question of the legitimacy of the European political system as 
a whole. New governance scholars raise an important analytical problem, but 
unfortunately they rarely develop their arguments further by demonstrating how to 
adapt the definition of legitimacy to become applicable beyond the limits of the 
traditional state. Moreover, one can agree with the first, empirical argument about the
110 “Schools Brief: Bearing the Weight o f the Market”, The Economist, vol.345, no.8046, 6/12/1997, 
p. 124-25
111 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson: Globalisation and History. (Cambridge (MA): The MIT 
Press, 1999), pp.207-19, 225-34
112 Ibid.. chs.6+10, p.286f
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new governance nature of the EU, while disagreeing with the second, normative 
argument that technocratic forms of legitimation are in fact appropriate.114
Second, the EU does not constitute a political system sui generis which is not 
susceptible of comparison with traditional states. The mere fact that new governance 
often draws on the concepts of comparative public policy demonstrates that the 
emergence of regulatory governance is a national as well as a European 
phenomenon.115 Even more importantly, European politics is not exclusively 
concerned with regulatory policy and technical, and hence remote, public policy 
decisions.116 Many of the EU’s legislative initiatives, such as directives under the so- 
called “Social Chapter”, are highly controversial politically, and they directly affect 
the population in the member states as well as their economies at large.
While policy networks and regulation may play a more prominent role in Europe than 
in national polities, large areas of political activity of the EU would have been 
conducted through national parliamentary bodies before power over these areas had 
been delegated to the European level. Politics always involves value choice between
117competing priorities which cannot be reduced to technical matters.
By overemphasising the post-modern regulatory character of the EU, new governance 
scholars tend to neglect the point that nowadays political institutions with wide- 
ranging decision-making powers need democratic legitimacy. Technocracy is rarely 
perceived as legitimate. And with the force of the globalisation argument somewhat 
punctured, they cannot always retort by dismissing the call for European 
parliamentary structures as almost intrinsically counter-productive. In other words, 
while the new governance paradigm has stimulated a much-needed discussion about 
the possible legitimisation of regulatory and policy networks, it is misleading to 
present the European legitimacy deficit as being confined to these areas alone and 
requiring a sui generis remedy.
113 Jachtenfiichs and Kohler-Koch, o p . cit.. p.23
114 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p i7
115 Hix (98), o p . cit.. p.45f
116 Ibid, p.41-43
117 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.20
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1.7 Conclusion
This survey of the academic literature has identified five analytical approaches to the 
question about the legitimacy deficit of the EU. It concludes that none of them offers 
a satisfactory analysis of whether and to which extent the legitimacy of the EU is 
deficient. There are two principal reasons for this conclusion.
First, each of the five analytical perspectives relies on a partial and incomplete 
account of legitimacy. The EU’s undemocratic institutional design, the lack of a 
European identity, its increasing incompatibility with national constitutional orders, 
the need for effective governance and popular policy outputs - all these factors have a 
bearing on, and play a role in, a comprehensive diagnosis of the legitimacy deficit of 
the EU. But none of these factors on their own capture the all these different 
dimensions of the term legitimacy. Most contributions to the debate operate with an 
underdeveloped theory of legitimacy, leaving them with a far too narrow analytical
I  1 Q
framework. The peripheral location of legitimacy studies relative to the main 
research interests of the authors surveyed, such as public policy or European 
integration studies, contributes to the problem of “undertheorising” the concept of 
legitimacy. Very often the task of defining legitimacy is only paid slender attention, 
or what it signifies is quite simply taken for granted.119 That leaves the term with an 
imprecise meaning, sometimes to be used inconsistently even within the same 
contribution to the debate.
One consequence is the common failure to distinguish between the second-order 
theory and the first-order normative content of legitimacy. Normative preferences 
about how the EU should be legitimised must be separated analytically from a 
theoretical framework for empirical legitimacy research. The “democratic deficit” 
debate provides a good example of how this distinction can be muddled. By 
collapsing normative models of legitimation (in this case parliamentary democracy) 
into the meaning of the term legitimacy, they automatically create a value-laden 
account of legitimacy itself. While other approaches to the question of legitimacy in
118 Although Beetham and Lord’s book is based on multiple dimension o f legitimacy, their approach 
remains vulnerable to the second criticism o f the existing literature discussed in the paragraphs below. 
See: Ibid.. p.23ff
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Europe are not as obviously prone to the same fallacy, they nevertheless fail to draw 
this analytic distinction between first- and second-order discourse about legitimacy. 
Such a distinction is not only necessary for a clear-cut separation of personal 
normative preferences about how the EU should be legitimised from an abstract 
discussion about the concept of legitimacy. It is also indispensable in the context of 
the EU, as the next paragraphs demonstrate.
Second, most analyses of the legitimacy deficit ignore a unique characteristic of the 
EU. Unlike most states, the EU is not a self-contained political system, but it is in 
many ways interlocked with its member states, both with regard to its formal 
organisational structure as well as with respect to the way its legitimacy is perceived 
publicly.120 Particularly with regard to EU policy-making a gradual “institutional 
fusion” has made the distinction between national and European institutions less 
clear-cut and blurred their division of competencies.121 However, the slow erosion of
199“discrete constitutional spaces” does not preclude the analytical separation of the 
European and national political systems. While there has been a degree of “fusion” of 
national and European political institutions, the EU remains embedded in very 
different constitutional structures and national identities which shape very country-
191specific perceptions of its legitimacy, both formal and felt.
As regards formal legitimacy, the EU constitutes a major challenge to the national 
forms of legitimation. But since the EU interacts with distinct national constitutional 
constellations and policy-making styles, the nature of that challenge differs among 
member states.124 As regards felt legitimacy, public attitudes towards the EU are 
strongly influenced by country-specific factors, such as domestic political culture, 
national identity or historic experiences.125 The felt legitimacy of the EU is therefore 
perceived from distinct national perspectives in each member state. It follows that the
119 Witness the cursory definition o f “legitimacy” in: Jachtenfuchs (98), op. cit.. p.47
120 Wolfgang Wessels and Dietrich Rometsch: “Conclusion: European Union and National 
Institutions”, in: Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels: The European Union and Member States - 
Towards Institutional Fusion?. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp.328-65
121 Ibid, p.329
122 Klaus H. Goetz and Peter J. Cullen: “The Basic Law after Unification: Continued Centrality or 
Declining Force?”, in: Klaus H. Goetz and Peter J. Cullen (eds.): Constitutional Policy in Unified 
Germany. (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 18
123 Wessels and Rometsch, op. cit.. pp.358-60
124 Ibid, p.360
125 Niedermayer (91), op. cit.. pp.344ff
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legitimacy of the EU cannot be studied in isolation - discussions on the issue are 
necessarily contingent upon the country from whose perspective the EU is discussed. 
This has already become apparent in the above survey of the academic debate whose 
contributions have often been conceived from a distinctive German or British 
perspective. Definitions of the legitimacy deficit have invariably been influenced by 
the domestic constitutional and cultural context of the authors’ member state.
Only a comparative study of the legitimacy deficit can fully demonstrate the 
contingency of the findings on the particular member state from whose perspective 
the EU’s legitimacy is being evaluated. Comparing the perspectives of two member 
states with very different domestic patterns of formal and felt legitimacy, in this case 
Britain and Germany, will help to highlight the extent to which the issue is indeed 
country-specific. Comparative research, however, requires a second-order theory of 
legitimacy which enables an empirical comparison of different national first-order 
beliefs about what makes the EU illegitimate.
To summarise, none of the five categories which helped to structure the survey of the 
literature is based on a theoretical account of legitimacy which fulfils the two 
requirements identified above: recognition of the multi-facetted and complex nature 
of legitimacy itself and an acknowledgement that the EU’s legitimacy deficit is 
contingent on the context of an individual member states. The next chapter will devise 
a theoretical framework which meets these two requirements.
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Chapter Two: Towards The Dual Concept of Legitimacy
2.1 Introduction
The first part of this chapter briefly explores the principal theoretical interpretations of 
the term legitimacy that have been used by political scientists, sociologists, 
philosophers and lawyers. The second part is devoted to the introduction of the 
theoretical framework employed in the subsequent chapters: the dual concept of 
legitimacy. The chapter will close with a discussion of a number of methodological 
and theoretical objections that could be raised against the dual concept of legitimacy.
2.2 Different Theories of Legitimacy
The introductory chapter has defined legitimacy as a quality of political systems 
which concerns the right of the representatives of a political system to exercise 
political power. Legitimacy affects the long-term stability and effective functioning of 
political systems. Two dimensions of legitimacy were distinguished. One the one 
hand, political systems claim legitimacy to justify their right to rule by referring to a 
particular set of legitimising principles, such as popular sovereignty or divine 
authority. These legitimising principles provide a standard against which the 
rightfulness of a political system can be assessed. On the other hand, the legitimacy of 
a political system can also be measured in terms of the level of public support it 
receives. In a legitimate political system such support is not based on coercion or 
apathy, but is normatively sanctioned and accepted by the public.
Such a general definition is compatible with a great number of different theoretical 
elaborations of this contested and multi-facetted concept.1 Broadly, one can 
distinguish between empirical and normative theories of legitimacy which are 
concerned with distinct issues. The former merely seeks to explain support for 
political systems by asking whether and how, as a matter of fact, legitimacy has been 
secured in a particular political system at a particular point in time. The latter is
1 Like power, justice and democracy, the notion o f legitimacy can be understood as an “essentially 
contested concept”: it is appraisive, internally complex, open textured and there are no fixed criteria for 
its application. See: Connolly (83), op. cit.. p. 14
2 Barker (90), op. cit.. p.7f
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concerned with justifying particular forms of legitimation by propagating their 
underlying political and moral values. That makes the evaluation of normative 
theories of legitimacy controversial because people judge them against their own 
values and political beliefs. Empirical theories of legitimacy, on the other hand, are in 
principle open to proof or falsification because they seek to measure rather than judge
■3
the political values of, and public attitudes towards, a particular political system.
Just as much as in their treatment of legitimacy, the theories discussed differ in having 
been conceived from the perspective of different academic disciplines such as 
philosophy, sociology, jurisprudence or political science. It is important, therefore, to 
add the disclaimer that the next section does not aim to provide a comprehensive 
survey of the academic literature on legitimacy, nor to do justice to the detailed 
arguments of the scholars it mentions. It is rather intended to locate the dual concept 
of legitimacy within the major conceptual ways of thinking about legitimacy. In doing 
so, it also demonstrates the importance of transgressing the somewhat rigid and 
artificial boundaries between the above-mentioned academic disciplines that discuss 
legitimacy, while remaining aware of their analytical or conceptual differences.
2.2.1 Normative Philosophy
In response to a certain degree of popular discontent with the political systems in 
many countries in the late 1960s, a number of theories have postulated a crisis of 
legitimacy by focusing on the erosion of popular belief in the legitimacy of political 
systems. Rather than adopting an empirical, quantitative perspective by using the 
emergent techniques of public opinion surveying, many scholars preferred to 
approach the topic from a philosophical and explicitly normative standpoint.4 Jurgen 
Habermas, for instance, regards the state as legitimate only when it fulfils the 
normatively justifiable expectations of its citizens which the capitalist state, by his 
account, cannot achieve.5 Yet Habermas believes that a rational, objectively true basis 
for submission to authority can be discovered. Only when norms are based on what he 
terms “discursive will-formation”, or rational consensus, can legitimate authority be 
derived from them. Crucially, such will-formation can only occur under conditions
3 Ibid.. p .l l
4 See: Westle (89), op. cit.. p.44
5 Jurgen Habermas: Legitimation Crisis. (London: Heinemann, 1976)
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where all members of society have “adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions 
and functional imperatives of their society.”6
Similarly, Held believes that an “ideal normative agreement” is required to satisfy the 
conditions for “legitimacy as rightness” where the principle of autonomy is fully 
entrenched in social life.7 Only then are rules and laws being followed because people 
consider them to be right rather than merely instrumentally expedient. Hence his 
equation of the principle of autonomy, on the basis of which public power is justified,
Q
with the principle of political legitimacy. However, the autonomy necessary for ideal 
normative agreement is again premised upon people being in the (hypothetical) 
position to make fully informed and unconstrained decisions.9
If only fully informed and fully rational consent really counts, then a political system 
which receives popular consent based, for instance, on a feeling of traditional 
attachment to the ruler would not qualify as legitimate.10 This has given rise to the 
criticism that, on Habermas’s and Held’s criteria, legitimate authority can only 
emerge among citizens with the knowledge of Plato’s philosopher kings.11 The 
criticism seems fair as far as Held and Habermas seek to offer an applicable guide to 
political reform, but it is misdirected to the extent that they conduct an abstract 
philosophical search for morally ideal, forms of legitimacy, irrespective of their 
attainability in practice.
These brief summaries of Held’s and Habermas’s theories suffice to show that both 
provide a normative set of existence conditions for legitimacy against which existing 
political systems may be evaluated. Current Western political systems suffer from a 
legitimacy crisis because they do not conform to the Held’s and Habermas’s 
demanding standard for legitimate governance. Importantly, this standard is not 
whether a political system is actually accepted as legitimate by its citizens, but 
whether it is morally acceptable according to the normative criteria of Held’s and 
Habermas’s moral philosophy. In short, empirical and the normative theories of
6 Ibid.. p .l 13
7 David Held: Democracy and the Global Order. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 161-62
8 Ibid.. p. 153
9 Ibid.. p. 16If
10 Barker (90), op. cit.. p.36
11 Ibid.. p.89
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legitimacy pursue two different questions: Held and Habermas are less interested in 
measurable, existing levels of legitimacy, they rather want to investigate abstract,
1 7ideal forms of legitimacy. Prescriptive approaches like these are therefore largely 
immune to the charge sometimes levelled against them that their claims about a crisis
1 7of legitimacy are not empirically falsifiable.
However, the purpose of this chapter is to find an empiricist theoretical framework 
capable of comparing existing political systems for their actual, observable level of 
legitimacy rather than prescribing any particular form of legitimacy.14 The aim is not 
to pronounce upon the “truth” or “falsity” of public legitimacy beliefs in terms of their 
moral value, but merely to ascertain what these beliefs are. Any empirical legitimacy 
study must adopt the perspective of an external observer who, without judging these 
values himself merely discusses the manner and degree to which the members of a 
particular political system accept them. While normative philosophy represents an 
important and valuable branch of the study of legitimacy, it pursues research 
questions and employs analytical perspectives which differ from the empirical 
political science framework within which most of the applied research on legitimacy, 
including this thesis, is conducted.15
2.2.2 Empirical Political Science and Sociology
Many political scientists and sociologists have chosen a less overtly normative 
definition of legitimacy than the one adopted by prescriptive political philosophy. 
Liberal pluralism as represented by Lipset, for instance, accepts that legitimacy “may 
be associated with many forms of political systems, including oppressive ones.”16 
However, since legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to maintain
12 Ibid.. p.69
13 Max Kaase: “Legitimitatskrise in westlichen demokratischen Industriegesellschaften: Mythos oder 
Realitat?” in: Helmut Klages and Peter Kmieciak (eds.): Wertewandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel. 
(Frankfurt: Campus, 1979), pp.328-350
14 As becomes apparent from the definition o f dual legitimacy below, the quality o f legitimacy o f a 
particular political system (e.g. EU) has to be measured against potential competing forms o f formal 
legitimacy (e.g. national) and the normative content of felt legitimacy prevailing within the society o f  
that political system. It follows that in the less normative framework pursued below, an “ideal” form of 
legitimacy (insofar as the theory admits o f such abstract ideals) would be one in which formal 
legitimacy is internally consistent and non-contradictory as well as completely congruent with the 
concept o f legitimacy prevailing at the fe lt level.
15 See: Westle (89), o p . cit.. pp.43-49
16 Seymour Martin Lipset: Political Man. (London: Heineman, 1960), p.64
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popular belief in itself, Lipset considers democracy best placed as it allows social
conflicts to be expressed openly. By providing formal procedures with which to
legitimise their resolution, democracy also helps to moderate these conflicts and
facilitates political decision-making. That suggests that the efficiency of state
structures may be contributing to its legitimacy, and Lipset does indeed draw that
conclusion.17 Lipset consequently defines legitimate democracy as “the moderate
state of conflict” in which an unspoken consensus on core values exists as the basis
1 8for a more limited consensus on policies. While he relates legitimacy to popular 
beliefs about the appropriateness of political institutions rather than commending or 
condemning these beliefs, Lipset still betrays a certain normative preference towards a 
fairly balanced, traditionally ordered liberal democratic political society.
Max Weber, on the other hand, does not condone any particular form of legitimation, 
but is concerned with the sociological examination of the different existing, 
observable forms of legitimation. In fact, Weber was probably the first scholar to turn 
his attention to the subject in any detail. His approach develops from his discussion on 
domination and obedience, having defined domination “as the probability that certain 
specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”19 
According to Weber, the two elements of domination are inner justifications such as 
the appeal to legitimacy and external means such as coercion, fear or rewards. Weber 
then identifies three types of inner justification: traditional, charismatic and
OC\legal/rational authority. All states lay claim to any combination of these three types 
of authority to legitimise their monopoly of coercion by which they are characterised.
Interestingly, democracy is not among the different possible forms of legitimacy he 
identifies, although Max Weber has pointed out the need for a certain minimal degree 
of consent to domination, at least from the social elite of the state.21 For instance, no 
social group with the power to overthrow the state must believe the state to be 
illegitimate. Weber does not treat democracy as a form of legitimacy because it can 
take many different forms. Democratic states may be legitimate because democracy is
17 Ibid., p.64ff
18 Ibid., p.71
19 Max Weber: Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretative Sociology. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wintrich 1978), p.53
20 Ibid^p^lSff
21 Ibid.. pp. 1407-8
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the traditional way of conducting public affairs, because they are being led by a 
charismatic leader (plebiscitarian democracy) or because they operate according to 
reasonable and fair procedures.
Although the theories of legitimacy advanced by Lipset and Weber represent the kind 
of empiricist approach this chapter is looking for, they exhibit a tendency to treat the
99legitimacy of a political system as synonymous with popular support for it. 
However, legitimacy has two dimensions, since it refers both to the formal 
legitimising principles (such as popular sovereignty) and to the popular support for 
them.23 These two dimensions must analytically be carefully separated because they 
can diverge under certain circumstances. For example, a political revolution will often 
be triggered by a rapidly declining belief in the legitimacy of a political system (for 
instance Russian Tsarism), even though from a legal standpoint the constitutional 
principle (heredity) remains formally legitimate. In fact, “discussions of legitimacy 
have been most vigorous at just those times when the order and justice which a 
normative theory of legitimacy appears to offer seem, by the fragility of such a theory, 
to be most endangered.”24 Barker also reminds us of the extreme case of Northern 
Ireland where a considerable minority of the population does not believe the United 
Kingdom to be the legitimate exerciser of state power over their territory, although it
•  9Sno doubt formally is.
2.2.3 Positive Jurisprudence
Particular care must therefore be taken not to appear to reduce the meaning of 
legitimacy to the mere public belief in it. It would drain the term of some of its 
explanatory value and would also underplay the fact that legitimacy is first of all a 
legal term, and as such, independent of public attitudes. It follows that any 
comprehensive understanding of the term legitimacy should incorporate its 
jurisprudential meaning to which the discussion will now turn. Like legality, 
legitimacy has its etymological roots in the Latin word lex, but the two expressions 
are not synonymous.
22 William Connolly: “Legitimacy and Modernity”, in: William Connolly (ed.): Legitimacy and the 
State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p.lOf
23 See: Introduction, p. 13
24 Barker (90), op. cit.. p.4
25 Ibid.. p. 113
Chapter Two 60
Legality is a procedural standard for testing the correct application of positive law. 
Thus, if an exercise of power is found ultra vires, it is by this criterion illegal, since 
the power has not been exercised in conformity with the legal standards set for its use. 
Legality does not deal with the appropriateness of the legal standards themselves. 
Such evaluative issues of political morality are the realm of legitimacy which, 
according to the definition above, deals with the normative question about the
9 ( \rightfulness of the rules of a political order. Positive law itself is usually legitimised 
with reference to certain underlying principles of legal and political philosophy. For 
instance, constitutional theory in most countries relies on certain normative 
philosophical premises to provide the legitimising basis for the formal constitutional 
distributions of state powers.
This relationship between positive law and its legitimising principles has its parallel in
9 7Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules. Defining primary rules as 
the content of the legal system (e.g. criminal law), secondary rules are some sort of 
meta-rules governing the former by establishing rules for legislative and judicial 
behaviour and providing the standards for identifying primary rules. The most 
important of the secondary rules is the so-called “rule of recognition” from reference 
to which all other rules derive their validity. The rule of recognition has to be 
understood as representing the supreme constitutional principle, for instance
90
parliamentary sovereignty.
Rules of recognition are not fully synonymous with the legitimising principles of a 
political system, however. Hart is primarily concerned with describing legal systems 
and their existence conditions. Although he acknowledges the normative nature of the 
rule of recognition, he hardly elaborates on the implications of this fact.29 He never 
discusses questions of legitimacy directly, in other words, questions about the 
philosophical origins or the rightfulness of the rule of recognition. Quite to the 
contrary, he correctly believes that disputes about the supreme legal criteria
26 Hence Joerges’s observation that the problem o f legitimacy unities law and political science, see: 
Christian Joerges: “Das Recht im Prozefl der europaischen Integration”, in: Markus Jachtenfuchs and 
Beate Kohler-Koch: Europaische Integration. (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996), p.76
27 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed. 1994), p.79ff
28 Ibid, p.94ff
29 Ibid.. p. 107. The rule o f recognition may also entail moral criteria for what counts as law.
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themselves are extra-legal value-judgements which lie outside the positivist scope of 
his book.
Although “legitimacy” and “rule of recognition” share many properties, legitimacy 
has a wider meaning: legitimising principles of a political system will always entail a 
rule of recognition, but this statement cannot be inverted. Legitimacy connects the 
rule of recognition with its justification in prescriptive political philosophy, and 
weighs its application against other, subordinate but possibly conflicting, 
constitutional principles. To illustrate this point with an example which will be 
discussed below in far greater detail: even though parliamentary sovereignty is the 
rule o f recognition in Britain, political power is exercised with reference to many 
different legitimising principles. These are, for instance, legal or hereditary in nature, 
and their validity and position within the hierarchy of norms is in turn justified with 
reference to the particular set of prescriptive philosophical values which underlie the 
British constitution.
But legitimacy also needs a social dimension, since the rightfulness of the exercise of 
political power has to be publicly acknowledged for the system to be efficacious. 
Hart’s jurisprudence contains such a sociological component. His existence conditions 
for a legal system require non-violent acquiescence and obedience from the bulk of 
society, but officials must adopt an “internal viewpoint” towards the rule of
*)A
recognition. In other words, they must accept the rule of recognition not just out of 
habit, but as the “correct” norm for conduct, and they must do so because they take it 
as providing authoritative reason for identifying valid law. Hart stresses the 
importance of general social belief in, and the acceptance of, the rule of recognition, 
but to require such beliefs only of the official class seems to be misguided.
Hart’s requirement for elite support merely ensures that a legal system remains stable 
and efficacious, but stability and efficacy alone do not make such a system legitimate. 
As discussed above, normative acceptance of the right to rule is qualitatively different 
from mere obedience, which is all Hart requires from the bulk of society. Indeed, 
political systems could maintain their own stability by resorting to coercion of their 
citizens, whose compliance with political orders would then be based on endurance
30 Ibid.. p,116f
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rather than normative acceptance. In such cases the term “legitimacy” is simply no 
longer applicable. This restriction should not come as a surprise, since Hart only deals 
with the efficacy of legal systems rather than the legitimacy of political systems. 
Consequently, his theoretical discussion of the social conditions of a legal system is 
rather brief and too little developed in order to be adaptable to a discussion on 
legitimacy.
2.2.4 Dualistic Theories of Legitimacy
The above survey of different theoretical approaches concludes that empirical 
political science and positive jurisprudence each contribute important insights to the 
understanding of legitimacy. They illustrate, respectively, how the term legitimacy 
refers to the formal structure of a political system and to the public support it receives. 
Both are essential components of legitimacy, and the meaning of the term cannot be 
reduced to just one of them. The insights from empirical political science and positive 
jurisprudence should therefore be combined in a dualistic theory of legitimacy. It must 
separate analytically the formal content of the political system, both positive and 
normative, from public beliefs about it, and it must be able to illuminate the 
conceptual relationship between these two elements. Some theories of legitimacy, like 
those of Weiler and Beetham, acknowledge its dualistic character.
Beetham’s account even goes beyond a dualistic theory by introducing consent as a
third dimension to legitimacy (his other two dimensions of legitimacy are the legal
•  • •  ^1validity of power and the social justifiability of the rules governing power). In
Beetham’s view, a political system is delegitimised when at least its most significant 
or most powerful members withdraw their consent and cease to co-operate with the 
state. While this analysis is undoubtedly correct, there are two reasons for 
suggesting there is little need for the notion of consent to become a third dimension in 
a definition of legitimacy. First, withdrawal of active consent must be treated as 
dependent on, or a function of, a deficiency in felt legitimacy. If a sufficiently large 
number of people withdraw from co-operation with a political system or even actively 
oppose it (Beetham has former Eastern Europe in mind), then they will have done so 
on the basis of a shift in public beliefs and norms about the sort of political power
31 Beetham (91). op. c it pp.!2f
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deemed legitimate. Hence, the causes for the erosion of legitimacy are logically prior 
to the visible delegitimisation in the form of withdrawn consent. All by itself the level 
of consent is unlikely to vary a great deal, but it is very responsive to felt legitimacy.
Second, this relationship between consent and felt legitimacy cannot be inverted. Felt 
legitimacy is not a function of consent. A political system may be faced with an 
erosion of felt legitimacy to the extent that the population considers it outright 
illegitimate, but an outside observer may not detect any evidence of consent to the 
regime being withdrawn. That may be because the widespread use of coercion by 
the regime has induced a fearful population to engage in regime-sponsored “mass 
mobilisation”, which Beetham considers a possible sign of active consent to a political 
regime.34
Alternatively, a population may exhibit some kind of satisfied apathy which results in 
low levels of active consent. Beetham counts turnout in democratic elections as
-if •
another sign of consent. One could therefore invoke the United States as an example 
where, due to satisfied apathy, levels of consent as measured by election turnouts are 
much lower than the level of popular support for America’s political institutions (felt 
legitimacy).36 Although it may be as difficult to measure beliefs as it is to observe 
popular behaviour in these cases, these two examples have also shown that, apart 
from being dispensable, introducing consent into a concept of legitimacy is more 
misleading than revelatory for empirical research into the legitimacy of political 
systems. In short, the inclusion of consent into Beetham’s account of legitimacy does 
not yield any theoretical insights that could not be gained from the dualistic theory of 
legitimacy.
The constitutional lawyer Joseph Weiler offers such a dualistic theory. He draws a 
distinction between formal and social legitimacy. On Weiler’s account, formal 
legitimacy is achieved when the requirements of the law are observed - in other
32 Ibid., p.20
33 Rosemary H. T. O’Kane: “Against Legitimacy”, Political Studies, vol.41, no.3, 1993, p.476ff
34 Beetham (91), op. cit.. p.93f Beetham does at the same time acknowledge the potential o f mass 
mobilisation being abused for such purposes.
35 Ibid, p.92
36 G. Bingham Powell: “American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective”, American Political 
Science Review, vol.80, no.l, 1986, pp.17-44
37 Joseph Weiler: The Constitution o f Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.80ff
Chapter Two 64
words, when legality is ensured. He also argues that in Western Europe formal 
legitimacy is inextricably linked to democracy. Social legitimacy is achieved when 
the political system enjoys “a broad, empirically determined societal acceptance”, and 
when the system is committed to, and actively guarantees, “values that are part of the 
general political culture, such as justice, freedom and general welfare.” Weiler’s 
principal distinction is very helpful because it is empiricist and distinguishes 
analytically between the two dimensions of legitimacy identified above.
However, Weiler’s definition of formal and social legitimacy is in some respects 
problematic and potentially inconsistent. For instance, he rightly criticises the 
frequent confusion of the concepts of legitimacy and democracy.40 To illustrate this 
point with a stark example, he contrasts Weimar Germany, where democratic 
institutions enjoyed little legitimacy, with the Third Reich whose undemocratic 
structure initially received widespread legitimacy. While non-democratic forms of 
government would be unlikely to command social legitimacy in today’s Europe, the 
reverse case, whereby a democratic political system loses social legitimacy, is not 
inconceivable.41 On Weiler’s own criteria, an abstract political science definition of 
formal legitimacy should therefore not be analytically tied to the concept of 
democracy. Rather than arguing that a political system “satisfies formal legitimacy if 
its power structure was created through democratic processes”42, it would be more 
appropriate to say that democracy is the only form of formal legitimacy that enjoys 
social legitimacy in today’s Europe.
Second, according to Weiler’s definition, the EU does not suffer from a deficit in 
formal legitimacy because its Treaties have been democratically approved by national 
parliaments.43 This assessment neglects the country-specific nature of the EU’s 
legitimacy. While the Union meets the legality criterion and has been created by 
democratic institutions (thus meeting Weiler’s conditions for formal legitimacy), its 
constitutional structure interacts with, and sometimes challenges, the constitutional 
structures of its member states. This gives rise to varying degrees of incompatibilities
38 Ibid.. p.80
39 Ibid., p.80
40 Ibid, p.79
41 Ibid, p.79f
42 Ibid, p.80
43 |b id , p.84
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between the European and national level of formal legitimacy which contribute to, 
and form part of, the overall legitimacy deficit of the EU.44
Third, Weiler’s definition of social legitimacy is not unproblematic either. His 
definition combines two different criteria (“societal acceptance” and the active 
guarantee of “justice, freedom and general welfare”). Again, one can point to 
examples where these two criteria yield different verdicts about the social legitimacy 
of a political system. For example, the EU Treaties contain a legal commitment to the 
values of justice, freedom and welfare, but the EU enjoys comparatively little societal 
acceptance. Conversely, Hitler’s Germany did enjoy popular support despite its 
disregard for justice and freedom. There is also a more general problem with making 
the guarantee o f  substantial values a criterion for social legitimacy. Who is to judge 
how these abstract values (“justice, freedom and general welfare”) should be realised 
in practice, and hence, whether they are adequately protected in any given political 
system? Weiler’s explanatory footnote refers, amongst others, to Habermas which 
suggests that the social legitimacy of political systems might be judged according to 
external, normative criteria which may differ from the “empirically determined”45 
citizens’ beliefs.
Finally, Weiler’s “brief excursus”46 into the subject of legitimacy must be developed 
further in order to become operational for applied comparative research on the 
legitimacy of the EU. Although he indicates some of the factors contributing to social 
legitimacy (identity, welfare, democracy), these do not find their way into his 
analytical framework - his concept of social legitimacy remains largely 
unidimensional.47 The different components that make up social and formal 
legitimacy need to be clearly identified and their dynamic interaction analysed in 
order to be able to explain the complex processes that determine social attitudes 
towards political systems. Weiler’s dualistic understanding of legitimacy provides a 
useful starting point on which to build such a more detailed theoretical framework for 
empirical legitimacy research.
44 See Chapter 5. pp.236ff
45 Weiler (99), op. cit.. p.80
46 Ibid, p.80
47 Ibid, p.83-85
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To summarise, the two dimensions of legitimacy need to be reflected in a dualistic 
theory like the one offered by Weiler. But Weiler’s basic distinction needs to be 
refined and his theory to be elaborated before it can be applied for empirical 
legitimacy research. In particular, it must adopt a “bottom up” perspective to take 
account of the contingency of the EU’s legitimacy on the member states from whose 
national context it is evaluated. It must also offer a more detailed analysis of the 
different components of legitimacy, how they interact with each other and how these 
dynamics affect the overall legitimacy of political systems. It is therefore time to 
introduce a new “dual concept of legitimacy” in the next section which builds on, and 
goes beyond, the existing theoretical work on the subject.
2.3.1 The Dual Concept of Legitimacy - The Basic Structure
Building on the preceding discussion, an analytical distinction is made between 
formal and fe lt legitimacy. Formal legitimacy is concerned with the claim of a 
political system to legitimacy and the justification given for it. This justification 
consists of normative legitimising principles (popular sovereignty, heredity, divine 
law, etc.) which are normally codified in a system of positive legal rules 
(constitution). In other words, formal legitimacy describes the constitutional nature of 
a political system. It describes the legal principles which justify the right of a political 
system’s representatives to exercise political power.
While dealing with the justification for political power, formal legitimacy is therefore 
equally concerned with the question about its legal validity. Legitimate political 
power must conform to the constitutional rules for its legally correct allocation and 
exercise. Legitimate power must also adhere to the philosophical foundation of the 
constitution itself. There are then three elements to formal legitimacy: the normative, 
extra-legal basis of constitutional philosophy, the legally codified constitutional order 
and the empirical constitutional reality describing how, and by whom, political power 
is actually being exercised. In their application to a political system, these three 
elements have to be logically coherent and consistent with each other.
Before proceeding to a definition of felt legitimacy, one more comment has to be 
made concerning the relationship between the constitutional order and constitutional
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reality. Since law is open-textured, these two can hardly ever be synonymous. Even 
extensively codified constitutions cannot capture every aspect of political reality, nor 
are they designed for that purpose.49 Through its application in daily political life, 
every formal legal system has developed an evolving set of practices only some of 
which are legal in nature such as parliamentary rules of procedure. Historically, 
important developments of constitutional reality in European democracies have been 
the emergence of tightly organised political parties and, more recently, professional 
interest groups. This constitutional reality is very often described in terms of influence 
or power relationships and thus belongs to the realm of political science rather than 
law or jurisprudence.
A discussion of constitutional reality becomes particularly important when the actual 
exercise of political power significantly deviates from, or even violates, the formal 
legitimising principles of a regime. For instance, criticism of a political system 
sometimes centres around a perceived incongruence between the formal constitutional 
order and constitutional reality.50 The problem remains, however, that concepts like 
“influence” or “power” admit of less determinacy and precision than the discussion of 
legal principles so that claims about a subtle, non-legal shift in the balance of power 
of a political system are more contestable and less easily identified.51 The open 
texture of law and the mutable nature of political reality ensure that formal legitimacy 
itself is never fully static but subject to perpetual evolution. An empirical application 
of formal legitimacy, while describing the current constitutional reality, must 
therefore highlight areas of constitutional evolution over the recent past.
Felt legitimacy concerns the justifiability or rightfulness of a political system in terms 
of the beliefs and values currently predominating in society. Unlike the institutional-
48 Hart, op. cit.. p. 124ff
49 E. C. S. Wade and A. W. Bradley: Constitutional and Administrative Law. (London: Longman, 11th 
ed. 1993), p.5, in the context o f the kind of theory o f legitimacy developed here see: Westle (89), op. 
cit.. p.171
50 A classic example would be: Richard Crossman: “Introduction to Walter Bagehot”, in: Walter 
Bagehot: The English Constitution, (Glasgow: Fontana, ed. Crossman 1963), pp. 1-57
51 Dieter Fuchs, Giovanna Guidorossi and Palle Svensson: “Support for the Democratic System”, in: 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs: Citizens and the State. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), p.329
52 This applies in particular to emerging political systems such as the EU. See for example: Helen 
Wallace: “The Institutions o f the EU: Experience and Experiments”, in: Helen Wallace and William 
Wallace (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.37- 
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legal approach for formal legitimacy, felt legitimacy borrows conceptual elements 
from political culture theory with its emphasis on sociological and cultural factors. It 
investigates the relationship between formal legitimacy and what the political society 
in general considers to be a legitimate political order. In other words, felt legitimacy is 
conceived here as an aggregative concept which concerns the sum of individual 
beliefs about the macro features of a political system. A significant discrepancy 
between the formal distribution of political power and this historically and socially 
variable set of normative beliefs has a serious impact on the overall legitimacy of a 
political system, even if formally legitimate. Ultimately, such a scenario may lead to 
the demise of the delegitimised political system and its replacement with a new one.
2.3.2 Political Culture Theories
Being concerned with the public beliefs and attitudes reflected in a particular political 
culture, the notion of felt legitimacy will now need some further theoretical 
elaboration based on political culture theory. One of the first fully operationalised 
account of political culture theory, Almond and Verba’s “Civic Culture”53, defined 
political culture as the citizen attitudes towards politics and the political system. They 
studied their formation with the help of the emerging methodological tool of empirical 
survey research. On the premise that beliefs, feelings and values significantly 
influence individual political behaviour, Almond and Verba argued that a country’s 
political culture constituted an important constraint upon its political structure, while 
at the same time also being shaped by it.54 They analysed this mutual influence using 
cognitive, affective and evaluative modes of orientation towards the system culture, 
the process culture and the policy culture of a polity. Almond and Verba concluded 
that affective feelings towards political systems {system affect) could ensure their 
long-term legitimacy.
Easton’s elaboration on Almond and Verba’s basic framework distinguishes between 
three different objects of political support, namely political authorities, the political 
regime and the political community. The political community consists of the members
53 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)
54 Gabriel A. Almond: “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept”, in: Gabriel A. Almond 
and Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture Revisited. (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1980), p.27
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of a political system “seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division 
of labour”55, and support for it is expressed in terms of a sense o f  community. Political 
authorities refers to the incumbents of political roles or offices. In most political 
systems the political authorities would be the government, but Easton has deliberately 
chosen the term political authorities because of its broader conceptual scope.56 The 
political regime is subdivided into three hierarchical components, namely the values, 
the norms and the structures of authority. Easton defines these in a similar fashion to 
the components of formal legitimacy introduced above.57 Values are broad guiding 
principles which can be taken for granted, such as for example freedom, equality or 
political responsibility.
“Norms specify the kinds o f procedures that are expected and acceptable 
in the processing and implementation o f demands. The structures o f  
authority designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is 
distributed and organised with regard to the authoritative making and 
implementing o f  decisions - the roles and their relationships through
CO
which authority is distributed and exercised. ”
Easton also distinguishes between two levels or modes of political support, specific 
and diffuse support.59 Political support as a whole is defined as the evaluative 
individual orientation towards political objects through either attitude or behaviour, 
and this orientation can be positive, negative or neutral.60 Specific support is 
positively related to the satisfaction obtained from the perceived outputs and 
performances of the political authorities. Diffuse support “refers to evaluations of 
what an object is or represents, not of what it does.”61 It is characterised by 
fundamentality and durability and has two components, trust and legitimacy. Being 
thus less utilitarian, diffuse support is impervious to rapid change and constitutes “a
f\*Xreservoir of favourable attitudes.”
55 Easton (65), op. cit.. p. 177
56 M ± ,  p.212
57 Constitutional Philosophy, Constitutional Order, Constitutional Reality.
58 Easton (65), on. cit.. p. 193
59 David Easton: “A Re-Assessment o f the Concept o f Political Support”, British Journal o f Political 
Science, vol.5, no.4, 1975, pp.435-58
60 Ibid* p.436
61 Ibid.. p.444
62 Ibid.. p.445
63 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.273
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While there is a clear “feedback loop” between specific support and output, diffuse 
support is independent of the specific rewards members obtain from a political system 
in the short-run.64 For example, diffuse support allows citizens to respect the political 
office whose incumbent they might oppose. Over time, however, the orientations 
derived from particular outputs become dissociated from performance and are 
transformed into generalised attitudes towards the political system (diffuse support).65
This definition already indicates that the two modes (specific and diffuse) of support 
have different degrees of relevance for the three different objects of support, 
community, regime and authorities. Indeed, the sources of specific support are the 
identifiable outputs (legislation, policies, judicial decisions etc.) and perceived general 
performances of political authorities.66 In other words, specific support is not directly 
applicable to either the political regime or the political community. Diffuse support, 
on the other hand, is applicable to all three objects of support.
“Whereas specific support is extended only to the incumbent authorities, 
diffuse support is directed towards offices themselves as well as towards 
their individual occupants. More than that, diffuse support is support that
6 7underlies the regime as a whole and the political community. ”
The sources of diffuse support are childhood and continuing adult socialisation and 
direct experience on whose basis members adjudge the moral value of supporting a 
political regime or community for their own sake (rather than for any outputs from the
/:o
political system).
Despite its age, Easton’s dichotomy of specific and diffuse support is still widely 
used69 and has the advantage over Almond and Verba’s “Civic Culture” approach of
64 Ibid.. p.363-81
65 Easton (75), op. cit.. p.446
66 Ibid, p.441f
67 Ibid.. p.445
68 Ibid, p.446
69 See for instance: Oscar W. Gabriel (ed.): Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im 
vereinigten Deutschland. (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997b); Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, op. 
cit.. p.324; Westle (89), op. cit.. pp.48-49; Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al.: Political Action: Mass 
Participation in Five Western Democracies. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979); Dennis Kavanagh: “Political
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being able to account for the dynamic aspects of legitimacy in terms of spill-overs and 
“overflows” between different political modes and objects. For instance, over the 
long-run output-related specific support for the political authorities may feed into
nc\ •diffuse support for the political regime. Also, Easton needs to rely less on emotional 
commitment than Almond and Verba’s system affect in explaining the legitimacy of a 
polity.71 Instead of having to explain low levels of legitimacy for a particular political 
system with reference to some opaque notion of affective feelings, Easton can trace its 
causes to an analytically separable range of (often rationally founded) evaluative 
beliefs. The emphasis on political support in Easton’s systems theory and its 
adaptability to supranational political systems make it better suited than any rival
77
theories for the research agenda of this thesis.
Nevertheless, Easton’s approach has not remained uncontested, both at a fundamental
7-5
level and with regard to the details of his argument. The next few paragraphs will 
consider some of the criticism directed against the classification of his categories, 
while more general objections to political culture theories will be considered together 
with the methodological problems surrounding both formal and felt legitimacy 
towards the end of the chapter. Amongst those critics who wish to retain Easton’s 
basic structure, a large number have criticised the imprecision in his treatment of the 
two modes of support (diffuse and specific).74
First of all, it seems questionable whether diffuse support can be extended to the 
incumbents of political offices (political authorities) without contradicting Easton’s
nc
characterisation of diffuse support as fundamental and durable. By their very nature, 
incumbents of political offices tend to change frequently, and the (more permanent) 
political offices are not normally tied to particular occupants. The only exception may 
be a case of Weber’s charismatic authority where the political office and its occupant 
are conceptually united. However, the union of office and occupant in the case of
Culture in Great Britain: The Decline o f the Civic Culture”, in: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba: 
The Civic Culture Revisited. (Toronto: Little Brown & Company, 1980), p. 152
70 Easton (65), op. cit.. chapters 23-28
71 David P. Conradt: “Changing German Political Culture”, in: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba: 
The Civic Culture Revisited. (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1980), pp.221-22
72 See: Introduction, p. 16
73 For a comprehensive critique from within systems theory see: Westle (89), op. cit.. pp.73-90
74 M d , pp.78-90
75 Ibid, p.86f
76 Weber, op. cit.. p.215ff
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charismatic authority would be categorised as a feature of the formal political regime. 
A similar problem arises from Easton’s definition of legitimacy which he subdivides 
into ideological, structural or personal. Legitimacy, by virtue of being a component 
of diffuse support, must be fundamental and durable, so that its application to the 
temporary incumbents of political offices (personal legitimacy) seems misguided.
7 7Incumbents may be able to lend their office higher legitimacy in the long-run , but 
this will come about because of the high moral or material output they have achieved
70
which is measured in terms of specific support.
Second, the notion of trust shifts uneasily between its source in specific support in
7 0terms of generalised output performance and its classification as diffuse support.
O A
Although Easton sometimes speaks of trust in the regime, in the long-run levels of 
trust are created or lost through the long-term actions of authorities (incumbents),
o 1
either in terms of their performance or personal qualities. Elsewhere, Easton defines 
trust as the “probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing 
anything to bring them about.” Levels of trust in the political regime depend on the 
extent to which its values, norms and structures are geared towards the common 
interest, whereas the political authorities gain trust by pursuing the common interest in 
their output and performances. This definition raises doubts about the independent 
explanatory value of the concept of trust. Trust in the political regime might equally 
be measured in terms of diffuse regime support whereas trust in the political
a a
authorities seems to be identical to specific output support. Despite Easton’s
Aff
attempts to reconcile these inconsistencies , the notion of trust further muddles his 
concept of diffuse support to the extent that “diffuse support is literally diffuse in the 
sense of having uncertain contents.”
The next few paragraphs will suggest a number of modifications of the Eastonian 
paradigm with the intention of rendering it more consistent and simplifying it to make
77 One might consider President de Gaulle or Commission President Delors as examples here.
78 Westle (89), op. cit.. p.87ff
79 Dieter Fuchs: “Trends of Political Support”, in: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf Rytlewski (eds.): 
Political Culture in Germany. (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp.235-36
80 Easton (75), o p . cit.. pp.448-49
81 Ibid.. p.449
82 Easton (75), op. cit.. p.447
83 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.31 Iff
84 Westle (89), op. cit.. p.70f
85 Easton (75), op. cit.. pp.446-8
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it operational for empirical research. This will result in a theory of political support 
compatible with the dual concept of legitimacy developed above. The diagram below 
illustrates how these modifications contribute to the detailed structure of the dual 
concept of legitimacy.
an
First, political authorities can only be the object of specific, not diffuse, support. 
Conversely, specific support does not apply to the political regime and the political 
community.88 Easton’s classification for measuring specific support as instrumental, 
expressive or extraneous is not adopted. It is too complex and detailed for empirical 
application, and suffers from internal inconsistencies.89 Instead, sources of specific 
support are the outputs and performances from the political authorities and the 
perceived personal abilities of incumbents of political offices. Trust in political 
authorities is also treated as a source of specific support, since it contributes to the 
legitimacy of a political system only in the long-run.
Second, being theoretically inadequate and conceptually tied to political authorities, 
trust therefore disappears as a component from diffuse support.90 It follows that 
diffuse support is now unidimensional, and its only remaining component, legitimacy, 
has two objects, the political regime and the political community.91 Support for both 
objects is characterised by its fundamentality and durability. Since the legitimacy of 
a political community usually expresses itself through affective communal ties such as 
national identities, it seems to make sense to follow Easton by saying that diffuse 
support for the political community is reflected as a sense o f political community. 
While legitimacy can thus be associated with two objects of support (community and 
regime), the term felt legitimacy, given its above definition as part of the dual concept 
of legitimacy, will for reasons of consistency henceforth exclusively refer to support 
for the political system as a whole.
86 Fuchs (93), op. cit.. p.236
87 Most empirical applications o f Easton’s theory have taken this view, see: Westle (89), op. cit.. 
pp. 165-66, 186
88 Russell J. Dalton: Citizen Politics in Western Europe. (New Jersey: Chatham, 1988), p.228
89 Westle (89), op. cit.. p .l84 f
90 Ibid.. pp.84-85, 167, 187-88
91 Ibid.. p. 188
92 Easton, (75), op. cit.. p.445
93 Easton (65), op. cit.. pp. 187-88
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Third, Easton’s classification of legitimacy into ideological, structural and personal 
legitimacy contributes to the confusion about the meaning and status of political 
authorities (see discussion of personal legitimacy above). It unnecessarily complicates 
the discussion and does not offer any significant theoretical insights. It is therefore 
abandoned in favour of the definition of legitimacy developed for the dual concept.
Fourth, Easton’s three hierarchical components of a political regime (the values, 
norms and structures of authority) are themselves a source of considerable confusion 
and conceptual complication.94 In order to tie Easton’s system theory closer to the 
dual concept of legitimacy, they are therefore replaced with the equivalent three 
components of formal legitimacy, namely constitutional philosophy, constitutional 
order and constitutional reality. This makes particular sense if it is remembered that 
the political regime was defined above as the formal political order - it is therefore 
conceptually synonymous with formal legitimacy.
2.4 The Dual Concept of Legitimacy - The Detailed Structure
(formal legitimacy*) 
political regime political authorities political community political system 
felt legitimacy
diffuse support specific support diffuse support
* (Consisting of: Constitutional Philosophy, Constitutional Order, Constitutional Reality)
Figure 2.1
The detailed structure of the dual concept of legitimacy has thus adapted Easton’s 
systems theory to the needs of the discussion of felt legitimacy. To summarise, the 
dual concept comprises the formal and felt legitimacy of political systems. The formal 
legitimacy of a political system is tantamount to the political regime. The felt
94 Westle (89), op. cit.. p.74f
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legitimacy of a political system is determined by and dependent on the three objects of 
political support, in other words (diffuse) support for the political regime, (diffuse) 
support for the political community and (specific) support for the political authorities. 
It follows that felt legitimacy, has three sources, two of which are diffuse. The 
diagram above should help to illuminate these relationships. The next three sections 
deal with the contribution, or spill-over, to felt legitimacy from each of the objects of 
support in turn.
2.4.1 The Components of Felt Legitimacy: The Political Community and the Question 
of Collective Identities
Diffuse support for the political community can have a significant impact on the 
legitimacy of a political system.95 However, members of a political community may 
belong to different nationalities, live in different cultures and traditions or believe in 
different religions. They may share the same political community while at the same 
time belonging to different social communities.96 Notwithstanding potential social 
differences, a sense o f  political community (which measures the strength of support) 
expresses itself through
‘feeling o f belonging together as a group which, because it shares a 
political structure, also shares a political fate. Regardless o f  the 
dissimilarities o f  customs, religion, socio-economic status, nationality, 
and the like, to the extent that there is a feeling o f  political community, the 
members will possess mutual sympathy and loyalty with respect to their
07participation in a common political unit. ”
Communal ideologies can be employed to stimulate a sense o f  political community 
which measures the community’s cohesiveness as a group.98 Easton defines 
communal ideologies as “convictions that express, as well as reinforce, the sense of 
political unity among the members as a group of persons sharing a common set of 
structures, norms and values for political purposes.”99 Every political system must 
develop a broad and deep reservoir of such independent community support based on
95 Beetham (91), op.cit.. p.451
96 Easton (65), o p . cit.. p. 183
97 Ibid, p. 185
98 Ibid, p.325, 333ff
99 Ibid.. p.334
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a strong sense of mutual political identification on which it can draw in times of 
economic or military crisis, severe internal differences of interest or other forms of 
system stress. Even in the absence of such a sense o f  political community or affective 
political bonds, there may still be (for example) instrumental support for the 
community, such as the benefits from political co-operation. “But if a sense of 
community fails to emerge and deepen over time, as a source of support, it may leave 
the system extremely vulnerable to stress.”100
While the concept of political community is not synonymous with the concept of the
nationhood, a securely and long-established sense of national autonomy and identity
can be a powerful provider of additional political legitimacy, as Beetham reminds
us.101 Breuilly even regards the political identity nationalism supplies as essential to
meet the requirements of effective modem political action, such as co-ordination,
10 '?mobilisation and legitimacy.
The literature on nationalism and national identity is vast and there is little scholarly 
agreement on the definition of key concepts and research questions to be addressed.
As a result, the major paradigms in the debate on nationalism make different 
assumptions about the nature of collective identities and about wether the dynamics of 
identity (trans-)formation can be influenced. Since the options for legitimising the EU 
by means of identity-building is discussed in detail in chapter six, it will suffice at this 
point to indicate briefly how the different theories of nationalism approach the 
dynamic aspects of collective identities.
Primordialists tend to conceive of the nation as an organically rooted, ancestrally 
based immemorial community which is based on social and cultural phenomena such 
as language, religion, territory and kinship.104 Such organic theories of nationalism 
were first advanced by the German Romantic movement. It argued that the world 
consists of culturally (or even biologically) differentiated “natural” nations which
100 Ibid.. p. 187
101 Beetham (91), o p . cit.. p. 133
102 John Breuilly: Nationalism and the State. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) p.381
103 The next few paragraphs will loosely follow Smith’s classification o f the major paradigms in the 
debate on nationalism. Anthony Smith: Nationalism and Modernism. (London: Routledge, 1998), 2 2 Iff
104 For instance: Pierre van den Berghe: The Ethnic Phenomenon. (New York: Elsevier, 1979),
Clifford Geertz (ed.): Old Societies and New States. (New York: Free Press, 2nd ed. 1972)
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form the bedrock of history.105 Primordialists would therefore deny that national 
identity can be created artificially, and they may point to the enduring predominance 
of organic national identities in the member states of the EU.106
Modernists, on the other hand, generally regard nations as modem cultural artefacts
and “imagined political communities”.107 Nations are products of modernity rather
than deeply rooted in history, and they are the constructs of national political elites
1 08who engage in deliberate and rational nation-building. In contrast to pre-modem 
group identities, the modem nation was formed through processes of state 
centralisation, administrative expansion and territorial demarcation, characterised in 
the nation state as a “bordered power container”.109 Widespread loyalty is ensured by 
means of the mass education system which communicates a standardised and centrally 
sustained national (high) culture.110 These assumptions make some modernists argue 
that a European identity can be “invented” and made to resonate widely by means of 
deliberate nation-building111 or through “spill-overs” from the integration process. 
Indeed, Easton explicitly refers to European integration. He suggests that increasing 
co-operation might be one way of breeding the degree of mutual identification and 
affective political bonds (diffuse support) necessary for the long-term stability of any
119political community.
Post-modernists argue that in the age of globalisation nationalism has lost its state-
i 11
making and economy-forming functions. National identity and ethnicity are 
gradually being replaced by supranational or even global identities fostered by mass 
communication, economic interdependence and cultural homogenisation. Post­
modernists also tend to reject nationalism as normatively undesirable. Some have 
therefore suggested that constitutional patriotism should replace nationalism as the
105 Anthony Smith (98) on. cit.. p. 146
106 Daniela Obradovic: “Policy Legitimacy and the European Union”, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, vol.34, no.2, 1996, pp.213ff
107 Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities - Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism. 
(London: Verso, 2nd ed., 1991), p.6
108 Breuilly, op. cit.. p.2-15, Karl Deutsch and William Foltz (eds.): Nation-Building. (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1963)
109 Anthony Giddens: The Nation State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 120
1,0 Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p.55-57
111 For example: Deutsch et al, op. cit.
112 Easton (65), op. cit.. p .l86f
113 Eric Hobsbawm: Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p .l75 f
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focus of collective identities.114 Alternatively, a new plural nationalism with an 
emphasis on ethnic diversity and multiculturalism might assume that function. 
Consequently, post-modernists tend to reject the relevance of nationalisms in current- 
day Western Europe and propagate the notions of “thin identity” and citizenship as a 
more appropriate communal ideology for the EU.115
Some recent contributions have attempted to bridge the gap between modernism and 
primordialism, such as the “ethno-symbolism” of Smith and Armstrong. Smith defines 
ethnic communities as constituted not by lines of physical descent, but by the sense of 
continuity, shared cultural memory and collective destiny embodied ancestral myths 
and a sense of social solidarity.116 While stressing the historic legacy of ethnic 
identities, ethno-symbolists acknowledge that in modernity nationalism reinterprets
117these myths, symbols and memories to generate national identities. Successful
national identities are therefore often based on older, pre-modem ethnic and cultural 
118ties. As regards the dynamics of identity-formation in the EU, ethno-symbolists 
adopt an intermediate position by conceding the possibility of European nationhood, 
while consigning its feasibility to the very long-run (decades rather than years).119
Whichever interpretation of nationalism and national identity is adopted, one must 
bear in mind that a future European identity will probably always co-exist with other 
layers of identity. While the twin structure of the nation state and democracy that 
emerged from the French revolution often led to the conceptual (con-) fusion between 
ethnos and demos as the politically organised people, there are sometimes 
multinational realities behind individual states, the obvious example being
1 70Switzerland. Consequently, Llobera distinguishes between the exception of the 
ethnically homogenous nation state and the norm of the culturally much more
171heterogeneous national state. Such a distinction makes the dual concept of 
legitimacy applicable not only to multi-national states, but also to supra-national
114 Jilrgen Habermas: “The European Nation State - Its Achievements and its Limits”, Ratio Juris. 
vol.9, no.2, 1996, pp.285ff
115 Garcia, op. cit.. pp. 10-15,21-27, Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. pp.43-47
116 Anthony Smith: National Identity. (Harmsworth: Penguin, 1991)
117 John Armstrong: Nations before Nationalism. (Chapel Hill NC: University o f North Carolina Press, 
1982), pp.8ff
118 Anthony Smith (98), op. cit.. p. 195
119 Anthony Smith (91), op. cit.. pp,174ff
120 Garcia, op. cit.. p. 10
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organisations like the EU. A supra-national political community can be viable without
having to replace its component national communities to become the exclusive source
of collective identification.
“It follows that just as the scope o f  a political system will vary with the
system level, so will the scope o f the political community. It is just an
aspect o f the system to which we may be referring. We may range from the
local to the broad international community. For a person to say that he is
a Parisian, a Frenchman, and a European indicates three different levels
122o f political community to which he simultaneously adheres. ”
2.4.2 The Political Regime
The political regime is the second important object of diffuse support which affects 
the legitimacy of a political system. Understood in a legitimising, rather than partisan 
sense, ideology will provide a normative framework of political principles and values 
against which regimes can be assessed. As Easton puts it,
“...the power o f  the authorities and o f  the regime both depend upon 
continuing validation through some set o f  values, a legitimating ideology.
We may describe these as ethical principles that justify the way power is 
organised, used, and limited and that define the broad responsibilities 
expected o f the participants in the particular political relationships. [...]
In descriptive terms, we may identify them as the felt bases or grounds o f  
obligation, the standards by which basic political arrangements and 
practices are tested and validated. Belief in the rightness o f  these values 
or principles and in the compatibility o f a regime and its authorities with 
them constitute a major source o f  motivation for support o f  these 
objects. ”123
Since this chapter treats political regime as synonymous with formal legitimacy, 
Easton’s legitimating ideology is the equivalent of the normative content o f  formal 
legitimacy. A legitimating ideology is concerned with the question about the moral
121 Joseph R. Llobera: “The Role of the State and the Nation in Europe”, in: Soledad Garcia: European 
Identity and the Search for Legitimacy. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p.71
122 Easton (65), op. cit.. p. 181
123 Ibid, p.292
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right to rule, and a legitimate regime can enjoy a considerable civic commitment to its 
maintenance and defence based on the moral conviction of its members.124 Even 
authoritarian regimes seek to create some degree of legitimacy for themselves because 
by doing so they can reduce the cost of governing and shore up the stability of their 
political system. Any legitimating ideology will also contain values as to the 
appropriate degree of individual civic involvement in the decision-making process of 
the regime.125
While such ideological commitments emerge from the educative socialisation process 
during childhood, personal experiences with the political regime may make the 
continuing adult socialisation assume a life of its own. This creates some scope for 
the political authorities of the regime to influence the legitimating ideology in its 
favour by reinforcing the political culture both through the socialisation process and 
by acting in accordance with it. However, people will judge a political regime not 
only according to its formal constitutional order, but they will also take constitutional 
reality into account. The political regime may enjoy lower support than the formal 
legitimising principles on which it is based if the translation of the latter into
p o
constitutional reality is considered to be flawed. But a lack of compatibility 
between the regime’s normative values and the conduct of political authorities (or an 
incompatibility between the legitimating ideology represented in the regime as 
opposed to those espoused by its citizens) will have little impact on felt legitimacy in
1 9Q
the absence of a credible alternative system of formal legitimacy.
2.4.3 The Political Authorities
The third source of felt legitimacy is support for the political authorities. This support 
is specific rather than diffuse in nature because it is influenced by utilitarian factors 
and has a merely indirect and long-term connection to legitimacy. The creation of 
specific support for the political authorities is the easiest and most direct response to
124 Easton (75), op. cit.. p .45If
125 This provided the theoretical basis for the argument about a crisis o f representative democracy, see: 
Fuchs (93), op. cit.. p.233
126 Easton (75), op. cit.. p.445-46
127 See below, pp.82ff.The causation from the regime to political culture is particularly important for 
regime transitions, see: Richard Rose and Edward C. Page: “German Responses to Regime Change: 
Culture, Class, Economy or Context?”, West European Politics, vol. 19, no.l, 1996, p.6
128 Westle (89), op. cit.. pp. 171-4
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110system stress. Specific support is generated by satisfying public demands for
positive policy outputs from the political authorities. If this demand satisfaction can
be maintained over the longer term, specific support will spill over into felt legitimacy
111for the political system. Having as its object the actions and performance of the 
government or political elites rather than the structure of the regime, levels of specific 
support fluctuate with the actual policies and the governing style of the political
1 l*n
authorities. In other words, specific support is object-specific in that it is related to
111people’s perception of the output from political authorities.
It is here that we can usefully incorporate notions such as confidence or trust (in 
political authorities). If specific support is low because citizens are dissatisfied with 
either the output and performances or the personal merit of the political authorities, 
then the perpetuation of low specific support over the medium term will respectively 
affect either public confidence or trust in these political authorities.134 Only when the 
low levels of specific support persist in the long run will dissatisfaction with the 
political authorities spill over into lower felt legitimacy of the regime as a whole.
i o <
While post-war Italy might serve as an example of such a process , poor economic 
performance in Britain in the 1960s and 70s has only led to a decline in trust and 
confidence in the country’s political elite without translating into a significant erosion 
of felt legitimacy.136
Conversely, regimes with a low level of felt legitimacy, as for instance some newly 
founded regimes or regimes in a ideologically or ethnically divided country, will seek 
to accumulate diffuse political support through the provision of beneficial output and 
benevolent performance of the authorities. Indeed, Easton makes a specific reference 
to European integration when he argues that the economic benefits from supranational
129 Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, op. cit.. p.329
130 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.275
131 Ibid, p.273
132 Easton (75), o p . cit.. pp.437-39
133 Ibid, pp.437-39
134 Gabriel A. Almond: “The Study o f  Political Culture”, in: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf Rytlewski 
(eds.): Political Culture in Germany. (London: Macmillan, 1993), p.21
135 Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg: “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions”, in: Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs: Citizens and the State. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp.309-10
136 Almond (80), op. cit.. p.21
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co-operation may in time spill over into diffuse regime and community support for an
1T7emerging international political system like the EU.
2.5 Legitimation of Political Systems
The previous sections have provided the theoretical framework for analysing existing
levels of legitimacy in a political system, but have touched only indirectly on the
potential for its legitimation through political leadership. This raises questions about
the nature of the dynamic relationship between legitimation policies and mass support
for political systems. The interdependence between public support and system output
by means of a dynamic feedback loop constitutes an integral part of Easton’s systems
theory. If a political system suffers from a legitimacy deficit, its political leaders can
resort to omnibus legitimating responses which aim to increase support for all three
1-10
components of felt legitimacy.
Deutsch’s cascade model of elite-mass linkage offers a more detailed explanation of 
how political leadership can influence citizens’ attitudes towards the political system. 
His model comprises five levels of political stratification which form interconnected 
opinion pools: they reach from the socio-economic and political elites, via the mass 
media and opinion leaders down to the politically relevant strata of society. 
Communication and information flows more easily from the higher status level to the 
lower ones than it does the other way. While political elites can exercise national 
opinion leadership and management, the lower status levels have their own measure
1 7Qof autonomy and are capable of innovation and initiative in these matters.
Hoffmann agrees that the prevalence of pro-European political leaders, and their 
effect on political culture and public opinion, is one of the conditions conducive to 
integration (and to the obsolescence of the nation state).140 Deutsch’s assumptions 
have been empirically tested in a recent case study which provides some evidence that
137 Easton (65), op. cit.. p. 186f
138 Ibid., p.307
139 Karl Deutsch: Analysis o f International Relations. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 
pp. 119-31
0 Stanley Hoffmann: “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f the Nation State and the Case o f Western 
Europe”, Daedalus, vol.95, no.3, 1966, pp.862-915
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elite mobilisation does indeed affect levels of mass support for the EU.141 Previous 
empirical research by Dalton and Duval also supports this argument. They 
demonstrate that public attitudes towards European integration are frequently 
conditioned by the way national political elites and the media portray, and react to, 
political developments in the EU.142
However, the scope for the political leadership to pursue legitimation policies is 
limited, and in some cases no amount of active legitimation can prevent levels of 
legitimacy falling below a minimum threshold. Beetham warns against an 
oversimplified account of legitimation which treats citizen beliefs largely as the 
product of direct influence by the powerful. Political leaders never influence, let alone 
control, all the means of disseminating and reproducing ideas in any society. Even 
totalitarian political systems have been unable to achieve comprehensive felt 
legitimacy, despite their monopoly over official propaganda. This is because people 
are never merely the passive recipients of ideas or messages to which they are 
exposed. They tend to be selective, assessing ideas and information against their own 
lived experience, beliefs and values.143 Cognitive mobilisation of West European 
electorates over recent decades has enhanced their ability to formulate independent 
attitudes towards their political system.144
In conclusion, political leadership can succeed in legitimating political systems over 
time, but the dynamics of legitimacy are determined at both mass and elite level. 
There is considerable, but not unlimited scope for political leadership to influence the 
legitimacy of a political system by means of legitimation policies. In particular, 
political leadership can adjust the components of felt legitimacy themselves, for 
instance through constitutional {regime) and economic {authorities) reform or by 
promoting a communal ideology {community). Alternatively, political elites can seek
141 Bernard Wessels: “Support for Integration: Elite or Mass-Driven?”, in: Oskar Niedermayer and 
Richard Sinnot (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p .l61 f
142 Russell Dalton and Robert Duval: “The Political Environment and Foreign Policy Opinions - British 
Attitudes towards European Integration 1972-79”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 16, no.l, 
1986, pp.l 13-34
143 Beetham (91), op. cit.. p .l05f
144 Ronald Inglehart: “Long-Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification”, Government and 
Opposition, vol. 12, no.2, 1977, pp. 150-77
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to legitimise a political system by influencing the public perception of the political 
system through media coverage, propaganda and education.145
The impact of elite action depends on a number of contextual variables. For instance, 
elites are less likely to be able to lead public opinion on an issue where citizens have 
deeply held values and beliefs or which is contested among the elites themselves.146 
Two useful indicators for the degree of elite consensus on the EU are the positions of 
the media and of political parties. Empirical evidence suggests that the media have a 
certain amount of influence on whether citizens evaluate the EU positively or 
negatively.147 Likewise, political parties are able to mobilise their supporters quite 
successfully both for and against the EU.148 Consequently, if media coverage is 
politically polarised and the “European question” is entangled in the competitive 
struggle between parties, successful legitimation of the EU becomes more difficult. 
On the other hand, a broad pro-European consensus among political parties and the 
media facilitates attempts to legitimate the EU through political leadership.
2.6 Challenges to the Dual Concept of Legitimacy
Having identified and discussed the detailed structure of the dual concept of 
legitimacy, this section considers some of the wider theoretical and methodological 
problems associated with formal and felt legitimacy.
Formal legitimacy is based on a legal-institutionalist methodology. Traditional 
institutionalism has been confined to descriptive, formal comparative analysis of 
political systems and their institutions. Its proponents treat legal rules and procedures 
as the basic independent variable and the functioning of political systems and the 
behaviour of its actors as a dependent variable. This approach has long been criticised 
by behaviouralists as being unable to explain the true nature of power relationships 
between institutions and their actors. Institutionalism neglects the variables which 
denote informal arrangements of society and their role in the formation of the exercise
145 Barker (90), op. cit.. p. 143
146 Inglehart (77a), op. cit.. pp. 170-75
147 Dalton and Duval, op. cit.. pp. 113-34
148 Bernard Wessels, op. cit.. pp. 156-60
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of power.149 However, modem versions of institutionalism can incorporate 
behaviouralist insights into how a political system operates in practice.150 New 
institutionalism, for instance, adopts a wider view of what constitutes institutions 
which takes account of less formalised aspects of a political system, such as policy 
networks. It also connects formal institutional rules with their normative context by 
studying the values, codes and cultures into which institutions are embedded.151
The concept of formal legitimacy acknowledges that the legal allocation of power
within a political system cannot fully explain the actual distribution of political power 
1within that system. It therefore complements the analysis of the formal 
constitutional order of political systems with a discussion of constitutional reality. 
Consequently, the application of formal legitimacy involves the study of 
constitutional and legal documents as primary sources, but it also draws on secondary 
sources in the shape of academic interpretations of power relationships and 
institutional values within political systems.
The measurability of felt legitimacy poses four major theoretical and methodological 
challenges. Most of them concern the problem of determining the true nature and 
intensity of support for a political system. Easton distinguishes between supportive 
actions as overt support for a political system and supportive attitudes as covert 
support.153 The empirical measurement of both forms of support cause 
methodological difficulties. In the most extreme case, political coercion or the fear 
thereof may make it impossible to gather accurate empirical information about the 
level of covert or overt public support for a political system. Quiescent behaviour and 
verbal support may both misrepresent “genuine” individual orientations because they 
have been performed under duress.154 However, the methodological requirement for 
an uncoerced expression of overt and covert support can be considered as met in 
Western Europe to which this thesis is geographically confined.
149 For a influential and classic critique see: David Easton: The Political System: An Inquiry into the 
State o f Political Science. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971 2nd ed.), esp. pp.37-89,233-306
150 R. A. W. Rhodes: Understanding Governance - Policy Networks. Governance. Reflexivitv and 
Accountability. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), pp.79-83
151 For an EU-related discussion of new institutionalism see: Kenneth A. Armstrong and Simon J. 
Bulmer: The Governance of the Single European Market. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1998), pp.50-63. Also: Hix (94), op. cit.. pp. 18-22
152 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 171
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A second, more general methodological problem lies in the definition of the necessary 
degree, breadth and intensity of support for a political system to qualify as 
legitimate.155 On one side of the argument, Wright draws attention to the fact that 
Western democracies have historically rarely enjoyed comprehensive and active 
citizen support. Democratic political systems can therefore be considered legitimate as 
long as there is no significant active opposition to them.156 This leads Wright to reject 
Easton’s argument about the importance of diffuse support for the legitimacy of a 
political system. Concluding from his US-based study of public attitudes Wright also 
rejects Easton’s basic distinction between specific and diffuse support because he
1 ^ 7denies its theoretical validity and usefulness. He measures support mostly in terms 
of “trust” which, at his time of writing, had been shaken in the American political 
system by the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam war. Based on contemporary 
empirical research he argues that
“efficacy and trust; far from being independent o f outputs, seem to be 
rather sensitive to them: their level appears to rise and fa ll precisely in 
response to these 'disappointments * against which the reservoir o f  diffuse 
support is supposed to protect the system.1,159
However, because of its theoretical imprecision the notion of “trust” is eliminated 
from the dual concept of legitimacy which resolves most of the theoretical objections 
to Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse support.160 Besides, empirical 
research from a non-American context have often been more reconcilable with 
Easton’s theory than Wright’s US-based study.161 Even Wright concedes that systems 
theory offers a viable account of the impact of the crucial social group of “consenters” 
on the stability of democratic government.162 This can easily be reconciled with 
Easton’s argument that
155 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 198-200
156 James D. Wright: The Dissent of the Governed. (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p.275-9
157 IbjcL, pp.72-7, 196-200
158 I b ii ,  p.259ff
159 Ibid.. p. 196
160 Oskar Niedermayer and Bettina Westle: “A Typology o f Orientation”, in: Oskar Niedermayer and 
Richard Sinnott (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p.37
161 Ekkehart Zimmermann: “Crises and Crises Outcomes: Towards a New Synthetic Approach”, 
European Journal o f Political Research, vol.7, no.l, 1979, p.88
162 Wright, op. cit.. pp.270-76
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“equal expression o f supportive attitudes cannot automatically be given 
equal weight with respect to their consequences for the persistence o f a 
system. A few powerful members, such as an active political elite, a 
military cadre, or an organised intelligentsia, may be able to make their
positive or negative support count for more than high levels o f  support
1 £0
from unorganised millions. ”
While this may be particularly true as far as the persistence of non-democratic 
political system is concerned, Wright underestimates the importance of mass 
legitimacy for democracies. Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture study started from the 
opposite premise that successful democracies required active mass participation based 
on the informed rationality of citizens.164 Westle maintains that persistent disinterest 
in the political process by a large section of the population might undermine the 
foundations of a democratic political system, even if that effect was not intended.165 
While support from the politically relevant members of a political system may be 
sufficient for its stability, in order to achieve legitimacy a political system, in 
particular a democratic one, must be able to enjoy at least some degree of support 
from all social and political groups.166
Westle’ normative objections make sense even from a purely empirical point of view. 
A democratic political system is by its very nature (“one member, one vote”) more 
dependent on widespread support, since at least formally every citizen is politically 
relevant. This has been most visibly reflected in the referenda on European integration
1A7held in various member states over the past decades. Despite the emphasis on elite 
support in the early neo-functionalist literature on European integration, more recent
1 AQstudies have emphasised the need for general public support for the EU. That is not 
to deny the important role of elites in mobilising support for a political system.169 But 
the question of whether the EU currently suffers from a legitimacy deficit because it
163 Easton (65), op. cit.. p. 167
164 But Almond and Verba also argue that participatory citizenship must be complemented with trust, 
passivity and deference to authority for political systems to be viable and stable. Almond (80), op. cit..
p.16
65 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 199
166 Ibid.. p.39
167 Richard Sinnot: “Bringing Public Opinion Back in”, in: Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnot 
(eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p.31
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does not enjoy mass support must be separated from the question of whether elites can 
successfully influence the dynamics of legitimation by mobilising such support over 
time.170
The comparative approach adopted here will help to determine at least relative levels 
of legitimacy for different political systems. It follows that a political system suffers 
from a legitimacy deficit when its level of felt legitimacy is markedly lower relative to 
other political systems. In the case of formal legitimacy, legitimacy incompatibilities 
exist when the constitutional orders of two overlapping political systems (national and 
supranational, for example) challenge or undermine each other. Felt legitimacy will 
always be imperfectly realised, and the legitimacy of state power is a question of
171degrees rather than absolutes, even at the level of the individual citizen.
Advocates of constitutional reform, for example, will often either criticise the 
legitimising basis of some aspects of state power (e.g. republicans living in a 
constitutional monarchy) or they will point to what they conceive as an inconsistency 
between this legitimising basis and the constitutional power which is derived from it. 
Nonetheless, they will be unlikely to reject outright all current state power as 
illegitimate, and a distinction must be drawn between a legitimacy deficit and a 
complete erosion of legitimacy. Easton believes that minimal levels of support are 
often difficult to determine empirically “on a scale dividing viability from collapse. It 
may represent, rather, a critical range within which systems or its objects may 
roam.”172 Sometimes this critical level can only be determined ex post facto once a 
political system has collapsed.173
A third theoretical problem arises because some existing public opinion surveys can 
only partly and incompletely be related to the various categories of felt legitimacy, as 
the next few chapter will demonstrate.174 It is very important to appreciate the 
epistemological limitations of survey techniques for analysing the legitimacy of a
169 Bernard Wessels, op. cit.. p,160f
170 The former is concerned with the analysis o f the status quo (the subject o f chapters 3-5), whereas the 
latter investigates the dynamics o f change (the subject o f chapter 6).
171 Westle (89), op. cit.. p.244
172 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.223
173 Ibid, p.224
174 See comprehensive discussion o f the application o f Easton’s concept to a broad range o f opinion 
surveys in: Westle (89) op. cit.. pp.91-168
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political system. The dual concept of legitimacy recognises that a purely 
quantitative approach based exclusively on an interpretation of public opinion surveys 
may be an insufficient indicator of the legitimacy of a political system.
The empirical application of felt legitimacy will therefore complement quantitative 
survey data with a discussion of qualitative indicators of the felt legitimacy of a 
political system. Possible indicators suggesting a low level of felt legitimacy might be 
the existence of significant anti-system parties, very low participation rates at 
elections, mass protest movements or, in the most dramatic case, even the occurrence
1 7Aof outright rebellion and widespread civil disobedience. If public opinion surveys 
are thus put into a wider context, a reasonable accurate empirical picture of the 
legitimacy of political systems can be gained. This is particularly illustrative when 
gauging the intensity of public attitudes: a comparatively low number (say 20%) of 
people dissatisfied with their political system may pose a greater threat to its 
legitimacy if sufficiently motivated and mobilised to engage in anti-system 
conduct.177
The fourth theoretical and methodological problem concerns the causal relationship 
between public attitudes (covert support), public behaviour (overt support) and the 
legitimacy of a political system. Barry has accused political culture methodology of 
determinism, since it assumes that political socialisation produces political attitudes,
- t  Q
which in turn cause political behaviour and underlie political structures. Barry 
believes this causality can work the other way round, but many scholars of legitimacy
170are happy to acknowledge that institutions and performance influence attitudes. 
Indeed, this mutual interdependence lies at the heart of Easton’s systems theoretical
1 ROdiscussion of legitimacy as well as the dual concept of legitimacy developed here. 
Barker is similarly reluctant to accord legitimacy the status of an independent variable
I  Q Y
and an analytically distinct source of support for political systems. He is sceptical
175 Jan W. Van Deth: “Introduction: The Impact o f Values”, in: Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor 
Scarbrough (eds.): The Impact o f Values. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 12
176 Zimmermann, op. cit.. p.91f, 94-96
177 Easton (65), op. cit.. 234
178 Brian Barry: Sociologists. Economists and Democracy. (London: Macmillan, 1970), p.45ff
179 David Beetham: “In Defence o f Legitimacy”, Political Studies, vol.41, no.3, 1993, p.489
180 Easton (65), op. cit.. pp.27-33
181 Barker (90), op. cit.. p.58ff, 196
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about a causal account of legitimacy because it faces the difficulty of differentiating 
empirically between acceptance of power and acceptance of authority (justified 
power). To illustrate such difficulties, he cites the example of a terrorist bank robber 
and an “ordinary” criminal bank robber, only one of which disobeys the political 
system because he deems is unjust or illegitimate. Barker believes that an observer 
cannot distinguish between these two cases, but his argument can be challenged in the
1 59following way.
To begin with, his example is not entirely relevant to this thesis which postulates a 
link between support and system stability rather than between obedience and
1 Q-^
stability. As argued before, obedience may be habitual, superficial and unstable. 
Support on the other hand expresses (stable) moral agreement with the authority of a 
political system. The dual concept of legitimacy adopts a method for quantifying 
support for the political system which measures supportive beliefs separately from
1 5isupportive actions. It can therefore distinguish between observed behaviour 
(obedience) and the motives behind such behaviour (legitimacy). Since it is applied to 
contemporary political systems, the dual concept also avoids the methodological 
problem of being unable to determine the beliefs of member of historic political 
systems. In short, the dual concept of legitimacy is not affected by any of the 
theoretical obstacles which make Barker reluctant to explore the causal links between 
political support and system stability.
The fifth methodological problem arises from the fact that some empirical studies 
have recorded a considerable lack of political awareness and cognitive sophistication 
among citizens. Public opinion was often found to lack a clear ideological structure, to 
support mutually inconsistent beliefs and to fluctuate capriciously which led Converse
1 8Ato conclude that public opinion researchers were often studying “non-attitudes”. 
But his preferred solution, namely to restrict research to the political attitudes of 
elites, is unsatisfactory. As argued above, democratic political systems are structurally 
linked to public opinion regardless of whether public opinion has followed elite
182 Ibid., p.58
183 See: Introduction, p .l3 f
184 See p.88f above.
185 Barker (90), op. cit.. p.59
186 Philip Converse: “Attitudes and Non-Attitudes”, in: E. Tufte (ed.): The Quantitative Analysis o f  
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attitudes or has been formed independently. Besides, Converse’s findings have been at 
least partly mitigated by the “cognitive mobilisation” of Western electorates as a 
direct consequence of improved educational levels among citizens over recent 
decades.187 As far as fluctuations in the level of support are concerned, these tend to 
occur predominantly in attitudes towards particular policies or political actors 
(specific support) rather than in beliefs about the underlying legitimacy of political 
institutions or political identity (diffuse support). Finally, the dual concept of 
legitimacy acknowledges the potential for low levels of public cognitive 
sophistication by cross-checking some of the results of opinion surveys with polling 
data about electoral knowledge of the political system of the EU.
2.7 Conclusion
The second chapter has introduced the dual concept of legitimacy which provides the 
theoretical underpinning for a comparative empirical investigation into the legitimacy 
of the Germany, Britain and the EU. The theoretical framework chosen fulfils the 
conditions listed at the end of the first chapter. It is theoretically detailed enough to 
capture the multi-dimensional nature of a notion as complex as legitimacy. It 
constitutes a second-order theory of legitimacy which does not pass a value 
judgement on the legitimising principles employed by political systems. Instead, it 
provides a framework for empirical analysis of actual levels of legitimacy.
The dual concept examines the formal legitimising principles of a political system and 
enquires whether and how these legitimising claims are accepted at the level of felt 
legitimacy. A legitimacy deficit, therefore, does not arise because a political system 
fails meet some external normative criterion of legitimacy, but because it is 
considered insufficiently legitimate by its members. Finally, the normative neutrality 
of the dual concept makes it ideally suited for comparative research because it can 
illustrate the country-specific nature of the legitimacy deficit of the EU. As a second- 
order theory, the dual concept can therefore analyse how national first-order beliefs 
about the legitimacy of the EU differ amongst member states.
187 Ronald Inglehart: The Silent Revolution. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)
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Chapter Three: Formal and Felt Legitimacy of the UK
3.1 Introduction
The first chapter argued that the formal and felt legitimacy of the EU is contingent 
upon the member state from whose perspective it is analysed. This is because EU is 
institutionally closely intertwined with its member states (formal legitimacy) and its 
popular perception is strongly influenced by factors such as political culture and 
identity which are largely determined at the national level (felt legitimacy). This 
chapter and the next provide two contrasting national reference points, Britain and 
Germany, from whose perspective the EU’s legitimacy is analysed in chapter five.
It is argued below that Britain’s formal and felt legitimacy differ in some crucial 
respects from that of Germany which means that the nature of the challenges arising 
from EU membership differs as well. Britain’s historically embedded, uncodified 
constitution, common law jurisprudence and a unitary doctrine of sovereignty give 
rise to a formal legitimacy which cannot easily accommodate EU membership. The 
EU is based on an alien legal and state tradition, and it challenges the core of the 
British constitution, parliamentary sovereignty. High levels of felt legitimacy for 
Britain’s political system and a national identity which (con-)fuses national with 
parliamentary sovereignty mean that supranational integration is often perceived as a 
threat rather than an opportunity. The low constitutional and cultural fit of Britain’s 
formal and felt legitimacy with the character of the EU results in a distinctive national 
perspective from which the legitimacy of the EU can be analysed.
3.2.1 Formal Legitimacy: Constitutional Philosophy
Most of the differences between Britain4 s and Germany4 s formal legitimacy, and their 
varying degree of compatibility with the EU, have their origin in distinct national 
constitutional philosophies, in particular different conceptions of the state, 
sovereignty and jurisprudential traditions. Analysis must therefore begin with
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Britain’s constitutional philosophy which has in many respects developed separately 
from, and partly in opposition to, the constitutional tradition of Western Europe.1
The key to an understanding of Britain’s unique constitutional philosophy lies in the 
absence of a codified constitutional document or a body of constitutional law. The 
content of the British constitution has to be inferred from its sources, the legal and
•j
non-legal (practices, conventions) constitutional rules. This means that important 
constitutional principles, such as the royal prerogative or parliamentary sovereignty, 
are not themselves grounded in statute. Many conventions derive their authority from 
unanimous acceptance and recognition, but others fall into a grey area where their 
status as a convention either has not yet be fully established or is increasingly 
considered questionable. In short, the British constitution remains based on an 
informal, subtle and implicit operational code whose evolution is based on political 
practice.
Dicey has characterised the British constitution as “historic” because it gains its 
strength and authority from the long historical continuity of its norms and 
institutions.4 The origins of the monarchy and the House of Lords date back to Anglo- 
Saxon times and the House of Commons emerged in the medieval period. 
Evolutionary change of institutional functions within a framework of unchanging 
forms has been the hallmark of the British constitution. The lack of a special legal 
procedure for amending the constitution creates unique dynamics because 
constitutional change is often implicit, occurs without a clearly defined end and has 
frequently unpredictable long-term implications. Important developments sometimes 
becomes apparent only in retrospect and may not be reflected in formal constitutional 
change.5
One crucial phase in the gradual historical evolution of Britain’s constitutional 
philosophy is the struggle between Crown and Parliament in the 17th century which 
resulted in the constitutional settlement of 1688. The outcome of the Glorious
1 Kenneth Dyson: The State Tradition in Western Europe. (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p.36
2 Wade and Bradley, op. cit.. pp.l2ff
3 Philip Norton: The Constitution in Flux. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p.7
4 Quoted in: S. E. Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden: Comparing Constitutions. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 100
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Revolution which vested sovereignty in the Crown-in-Parliament has a threefold 
significance. First, it marks an important departure from West European constitutional 
developments. The assertion of parliamentary supremacy made it impossible for the 
Crown to emulate the continental trend towards monarchical absolutism.6 Indeed, 
from a Whig perspective of history the British constitutional model of limited, 
parliamentary government was consciously contrasted with the emergence of 
centralised, autocratic monarchy on the continent. The struggle between Crown and 
Parliament was therefore not only about internal sovereignty, but it also became an 
identity-shaping struggle to assert external sovereignty in opposition to the perceived 
monarchical despotism in France and the claim to spiritual leadership from the Roman 
Catholic Church.7
Second, Britain departed from the West European state tradition by not developing an 
abstract concept of the state. Whereas continental Europe witnessed a practical and 
theoretical concern with state-building, the notion of an autonomous state acting out 
its inherent purposes was too bound up with the establishment of absolute
o
monarchical rule to become acceptable in Britain. In continuity with medieval 
political practice the constitution evolved as a series of restrictions placed on the 
ancient (and extra-parliamentary) prerogatives of the Crown whose powers where 
balanced by the traditional rights of Parliament, the courts and local communities. The 
Crown as the British symbol of the state is the fount of executive authority in whose 
name the most important executive and judicial office-holders exercise their powers.9 
The royal prerogative constitutes “the gradually diminishing residuum of customary 
authority, privilege and immunity, recognised at common law as belonging to the 
Crown, and the Crown alone.”10 In most cases exercised by convention through Her 
Majesty’s Ministers, the prerogative encompasses powers such as the appointment of 
ministers, the making of treaties, the power of pardon, the making of legislation 
through the Privy Council {Orders in Council), the dissolution of Parliament or the
5 Nevil Johnson: In Search of the Constitution. (London: Methuen, 1977), p .l32 f
6 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p.39ff
7 See discussion on pp. 120ff below.
8 Dyson (80), op. cit.. pp.38-41
9 Johnson (77), op. cit.. pp.210
10 S. A. de Smith: Constitutional and Administrative Law. (London: Penguin, 1971), p.45
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declaration of war.11 The Sovereign is the nominal head of government to which Her
Majesty’s Ministers are formally answerable and to whom the armed services and the
10police swear allegiance. The Monarchy as person and institution also serves as a 
cultural symbol of unity by representing the traditional affective ties of community in 
the multi-national society of the UK.
Third, British jurisprudence is based on judge-made common law rather than the
heritage of Roman law which influenced continental legal systems. Britain’s distinct
jurisprudential tradition offers another explanation why little attention was paid to
defining the state as a political, legal or socio-cultural concept. The doctrine of
precedent, central to the English common law system, circumscribes the scope for
judicial discretion. Precedent is binding on the judiciary, and judicial discretion is
restricted to cases where no legal precedent exists. This allows the legal system to
evolve naturally and organically without interference from a coercive state with the
power to validate legal rules. Unlike the Roman law tradition, British jurisprudence
does not conceive of the state as a formally recognised legal institution, subject to a
1 ^system of public law. There is no genuine public law structure stipulating certain 
administrative legal standards (other than the rule of law) protected by administrative 
courts. Likewise, no effort was made to express the idea of the state through an 
explicit and legally codified constitution which could have clearly identified and 
articulated the state’s purpose and institutional operation.14
Fourth, the constitutional settlement of 1688 enshrined the legal principle of 
indivisible parliamentary sovereignty which derived from a distinct English approach 
to constitutional jurisprudence based on the command theory of law. The command 
theory of law emerged in the 17th century and was originally advanced in the writings 
of Thomas Hobbes.15 It was later refined in the works of Bentham16 and John 
Austin17, and has dominated English jurisprudence until recently.18 The command
11 T. C. Hartley and J. A. G. Griffith: Government and Law - An Introduction to the Working o f the 
Constitution in Britain. (London: Weidenfels and Nicolson, 2nd ed. 1981), p. 196
12 Norton (84), op. cit.. p. 14, or: Geoffrey Marshall and Graeme C. Moodie: Some Problems o f the 
Constitution. (London: Hutchinson, 4th ed. 1967), p.41
13 Johnson (77), op. cit.. pp.82ff, 90
14 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p.212f
15 Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, (ed. C. B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968)
16 Jeremy Bentham: O f Laws in General, (ed. H. L. A. Hart, London: Athlone Press, 1970)
17 John Austin: The Province o f Jurisprudence Determined. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954)
Chapter Three 96
theory of law defines law positively, without any reference to its content. This 
distinguishes it from both the common law and the natural law traditions which 
stipulate that all law must conform to, respectively, certain procedural conditions or 
the normative law of nature. Instead, the command theory defines law with reference 
to its source, the will of the sovereign. By separating legality from morality, laws 
retain their legal validity even if they run counter to socially acknowledged moral 
principles, as long as they have emanated from the determinable sovereign law-maker.
In Britain this sovereign law-maker is Parliament, in contrast to most continental 
constitutions which vest sovereignty in the people.19 The 1689 constitution therefore 
rests on two logically separate legitimising concepts. The first, the concept of 
unlimited and indivisible sovereignty, has its origins in the command theory of law. 
But this notion of sovereignty is not legitimised by the Hobbesian argument of homo 
homini lupus. Instead, sovereignty is based on the John Locke’s notion of consent as
onthe basis for political authority. This is the second legitimising principle of the 1689 
settlement, and it draws on an understanding of consent as practised under the pre­
revolutionary constitution. It reflects the traditional English notion dating back in its 
rudimentary form to the Magna Carta which conceived of legitimate government as 
government consented to by the (parliamentary) representatives of the political 
nation?1
Because sovereignty lies in Parliament rather than with the people, history has shown 
the concept of parliamentary sovereignty to be compatible with a variety of forms of 
representation. In Locke’s own time, the scope of the political nation was confined to 
those with a material interest in the state, in other words, the propertied classes. In 
constitutional terms, the notion of democracy is an innovation introduced with the 
Reform Act of 1867.22 The constitutional settlement between King, Lords and 
Commons did not involve the people as a constituent power who have remained
18 Norman P. Barry: An Introduction to Modem Political Theory. (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1989), 
p.36
19 Heidrun Abromeit: “VolkssouverSnitat, Parlamentssouveranitat, VerfassungssouverSnitat: Drei 
Realmodelle der Legitimation staatlichen Handelns”, in: Politische Vierteliahresschrift. vol.36, no.l, 
1995, pp.49ff
20 John Locke: Two Treatises o f Government, (ed. Peter Laslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960)
21 Judge (93), op. cit.. pp.6-7
22 Ibid^ p.24
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subjects of the Crown rather than becoming citizens with constitutionally guaranteed 
rights.23 It is therefore misleading to speak of popular sovereignty, as Albert Dicey 
does.24 First, British constitutional doctrine conceives of legal sovereignty as 
indivisible. It can either rest with the people or with parliament, but not both. Second, 
the authority of Parliament is strictly speaking not derived from the sovereignty of the 
people. Rather, parliamentary sovereignty is legitimised by the (presupposed) tacit
*yc
consent of the political nation.
These four features of Britain’s constitutional philosophy, an uncodified constitution, 
a distinct state tradition, common law jurisprudence and the unitary doctrine of 
sovereignty, have resulted in a formal legitimacy which cannot easily accommodate 
EU membership. There is little “fit” between the institutional structure and cultural 
norms of the EU and the UK, which means that membership in the EU poses unique 
challenges for Britain’s formal legitimacy. This can be demonstrated by analysing the 
elements of formal legitimacy particularly affected by EU membership, namely the 
constitutional supremacy of Parliament, the role of courts and law, subnational 
government, political culture and executive-legislature relationship.
3.2.2 Formal Legitimacy: Central Features and the Impact of EU Membership
The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty
Conceiving of sovereignty as indivisible and vesting it in the Crown-in-Parliament 
has two important implications for the formal legitimacy of the UK. First, the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty becomes the paramount constitutional principle in 
relation to which all other institutions or legitimising norms are legally speaking 
subordinate. The Crown-in-Parliament, comprising the two Houses of Parliament and 
the Sovereign, is omnicompetent with no executive or legislative matter being in 
principle outside its reach. The only way in which legislation can be amended or
23 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p.40
24 Albert Venn Dicey: Introduction to the Study o f the Law o f the Constitution. (London: Macmillan,
9th ed. 1939)
25 Consequently, parliamentary sovereignty also rules out the possibility o f any constitutional doctrine 
of mandate. See: Carol Harlow: “Power from the People? Representation and Constitutional Theory”, 
in: Patrick McAuslan and John McEldowney (eds.): Law. Legitimacy and the Constitution. (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), p.73f
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repealed is through a new Act of Parliament (“Parliament cannot bind its successors”). 
Such legal supremacy entails the rule that Parliament’s power over its own procedure, 
privileges and immunities be respected and not interfered with by the law courts. 
This is because, legally speaking, Parliament is the highest court in Britain - hence it 
is also styled the High Court o f Parliament. Courts cannot set aside duly enacted 
statute law and judicial rulings can be altered by Parliament even retrospectively. 
Even the Crown’s prerogative powers, although in origin independent of Parliament, 
can be restricted by the latter. Indeed, the scope of royal prerogative is “gradually 
diminishing” because some of its powers have been replaced by (constitutionally
751superior) statute passed in Parliament. As the terms Crown-in-Parliament or High 
Court of Parliament suggest, the supreme legal authority is therefore vested in a body 
that exhibits a fusion of powers with the “supreme executive, legislative and judicial 
authority all rolled into one”.29
Second, the combination of an uncodified constitution and a unitary doctrine of 
sovereignty have created unique constitutional dynamics. In the absence of a legally 
entrenched constitution or a body of constitutional law which would stipulate any 
special formal requirements for enacting or amending constitutional norms, 
Parliament is theoretically unconstrained in its legal power to effect constitutional 
change. Statutes relating to constitutional law are changed or repealed in exactly the 
same way as any other statute. However, while the combination of an uncodified 
constitution and a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty may facilitate the change of 
subordinate constitutional norms, it also precludes the possibility of qualifying the 
omnicompetence of Parliament by introducing rival centres of sovereignty. If ultimate 
legal sovereignty ceased to be located in Parliament alone, the very core of the British 
constitution would be undermined.
These constitutional dynamics of Britain’s formal legitimacy have been clearly 
illustrated by the European Communities Act 1972, which makes the legal provisions 
for the UK’s accession to the EC in 1973. Passage of the 1972 Act, or subsequently
26 Wade and Bradley, o p . cit.. p .31
27 Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden, op. cit.. p.57
28 Norton (84), op. cit.. p.6
29 Ibid.. p.57
30 Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden, op. cit.. p.43
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arising implications of EU membership, have never necessitated any formal
 ^t
constitutional change, unlike in Germany for example. In that sense the British 
constitution was flexible to adapt to a new legal order. On the other hand, EU 
membership threatens to undermine the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and 
hence the very core of the British constitution. The potential incompatibility between 
parliamentary sovereignty and Britain’s EU membership was already acknowledged 
in 1971 when Lord Denning argued that
“...if this country should go into the Common Market and sign the Treaty 
o f Rome, it means that we will have taken a step which is irreversible. The 
sovereignty o f  these islands will thenceforth be limited. ”
The most important consequence of the 1972 Act is that its section 2 (4), in 
conjunction with section 2 (1), effectively guarantees the supremacy of Community 
law by expressing a rule of construction whereby UK courts should interpret 
parliamentary statute in such a manner as to be consistent with European law. EU 
membership has therefore raised the novel and important constitutional question 
whether British courts even have the power to strike down or suspend Acts of 
Parliament should they find them conflicting with European law. In order to make the 
supremacy of EU law compatible with parliamentary sovereignty, the judicial doctrine 
of “literal rule” had to be abandoned, according to which statutes were interpreted 
literally by the courts. Instead, courts sometimes had to interpret parliamentary 
statutes purposively by going as far as to imply words to fill a gap in order to render 
them compatible with EU law.34 In cases where this was impossible, courts decided to 
deny effectiveness to UK legislation to the extent that it conflicts with EU law and 
under the proviso that the courts were satisfied that the inconsistent domestic 
legislation did not intend to repeal sections 2 (1) or 2 (4) of the 1972 Act.
31 See: Chapter 4. pp.l44ff
32 Blackburn v Attorney General Cl971). 2 All ER 1380 at 1381CCA)
33 Lawrence Collins: European Community Law in the United Kingdom. (London: Butterworth, 4th ed.
1990), p.28
34 Pickstone v Freemans pic (1989) AC 66. (1988) 2 All ER 803
35For example: R. v Secretary o f State for Employment, ex. p. Equal Opportunities Commission (1994) 
1 All ER910 (HU). For the intention o f repeal to be recognised by the courts nowadays, Parliament 
would need to legislate in express repeal o f some or all o f the provisions o f the 1972 Act. See: Collins, 
op. cit.. p.39
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This uneasy constitutional compromise was severly tested in the landmark 
Factortame case in which the Court of Appeal reversed an earlier decision of the 
Divisional Court temporarily to disapply parts of the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act, 
which the plaintiffs had considered incompatible with EC law. The Court of Appeal 
argued that the courts had no power to disapply Acts of Parliament under the British 
constitution.36
Upon further appeal, the House of Lords confirmed the view that interim relief could 
not be granted since Acts of Parliament were considered compatible with EC law until 
found incompatible. Notwithstanding, their Lordships acknowledged that the 
Community principle of supremacy might force them to disregard the provisions of 
national law, and they referred the case to the ECJ for preliminary ruling.37 Only 
when the European Court confirmed its Simmenthal doctrine , did the House of 
Lords subsequently granted the interim relief requested, and Lord Bridge remarked: 
“...to insist that, in the protection o f rights under Community law, 
national courts must not be inhibited by rules o f  national law from  
granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical
9Q
recognition o f that supremacy. ”
As a result, the House of Lords in effect disapplied parts of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1984 for implied repeal of European legislation.40 Their Lordships preserved 
constitutional doctrine by assuming that, unless done so expressly, Parliament has no 
intention to pass legislation contravening EC law. This meant that, in order to follow 
Parliament’s intent, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 must be interpreted such as to 
become consistent with EC law.
The consensus among jurists holds that courts would continue to abide by the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty and uphold an Act of Parliament expressly overriding
36 R v Secretary o f State for Transport, ex p Factortame (19891. 2 CMLR 353 at 400-404 (CA)
37 Factortame (89), op. cit.. 2 All ER 692 at 693 (HL)
38 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary o f State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and Others 
(1990) ECR 2433 at 2434. See also: Chapter 5. pp.l83ff
39 R. v. Secretary o f State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd. (no.2) 1991 CMLR 3
40 Ibid.
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EC law.41 Also, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be assumed to have 
remained formally intact, since Parliament retains the power to amend or repeal the 
1972 A ct42 At the same time, membership of the EC has significantly increased the 
role of both domestic courts and the supranational ECJ with its rapidly developing 
body of case law so that future conflict between their powers of adjudication on the 
compatibility of British with EC law and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
must remain a very real possibility.43
EU membership has indirectly also given rise to an entirely different kind of challenge 
to the sovereignty of Parliament. The device of a popular referendum was first 
employed in the debate about continued British membership in the Common Market 
in 1975, and the use of referenda has now entered constitutional practice.44 In being 
based on popular rather than parliamentary sovereignty, referenda are alien to 
constitutional tradition which they have sometimes been accused to undermine.45 
However, the results of referenda are not binding and need to be confirmed by statute. 
While their may be overwhelming political pressure on Parliament to legislate in 
conformity with the outcome of the ballot, it is not legally obliged to do so, thus 
preserving its sovereignty. Also, Parliament retains the power to repeal legislation 
endorsed in a referendum.46
The Executive-Legislature Dimension
It is important to distinguish carefully between parliamentary sovereignty as a 
constitutional concept and the constitutional reality of Parliament’s role in the law­
making process and its position vis a vis the Government. From a historical 
perspective, the House of Commons has gradually become the dominant element 
within the constitutional framework of the Crown-in-Parliament.47 By convention the
41 In support o f this assessment, see for instance: A. W. Bradley: “The Sovereignty o f Parliament - in 
Perpetuity?”, in: J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.): The Changing Constitution. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), pp.32-40; D. Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok: Law and Institutions o f the European Union. 
(London: Butterworth, 6th ed. 1994), pp.363-64; Collins: op. cit., p.40
42 Bradley, op. cit.. p.93. More doubtful: Wade, op. cit.. pp. 1-4
43 Abromeit stresses the ultimate incompatibility o f British parliamentary sovereignty with forms o f  
supranational governance. Abromeit (95), on. cit.. pp.63-64
44 Norton (84), op. cit.. p.221
45 See discussion in: Ibid.. pp.219-225
46 Ibid.. p.217
47 For instance: Parliament Acts 1832, 1911, Representation o f the Peole Acts 1867, 1884, 1918, 1948
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Queen does not exercise her right to refuse assent to legislation, and the Sovereign has
40
lost nearly all discretion in the appointment of Ministers. Because it is non-elective, 
the House of Lords has also become increasingly subordinate to the Commons and 
today mainly fulfils the function of a revisory body which can only exercise delaying 
powers over legislation. The Royal Commission installed by the 1997 Labour 
Government to consider options for long-term reforms of the Lords does not envisage 
a considerable increase in the Lord’s power in the future.49 In short, the exercise of 
legislative sovereignty by the Commons is in theory nearly unfettered.
However, a number of parallel historic developments have meant that, in 
constitutional reality, the powers of the House of Commons have increasingly 
become concentrated in the hands of the Government and the Prime Minister of the 
day. By virtue of their legal status, Ministers of the Crown exercise important 
prerogative powers such as the conduct of foreign affairs and the making of Orders in 
Council.50 Only Ministers may authorise financial legislation, although all taxation 
and expenditure requires an Act of Parliament. While the same legislative procedure 
applies for both private and government bills, the latter are advantaged because the 
Government disposes of far greater resources for the drafting of bills and has control 
over the parliamentary timetable.51 The precedence of government business over 
private business and procedural rules such as the guillotine to curtail parliamentary 
debate further facilitate implementation of the Government’s legislative agenda.
Another important factor was the advent of the modem party system and the resulting 
need to manage party discipline amongst MPs through the “whipping system”. This is 
reinforced by the Prime Minister’s power of patronage and an electoral system which 
tends to assure single-party government. The convention of collective ministerial 
responsibility also increased governmental control over Parliament, since MPs 
wishing to sanction individual Ministers are ultimately faced with the alternatives of
48 Vernon Bogdanor: The Monarchy and the Constitution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.84ff
49 The House o f Lords Bill: Lords Reform and Wider Constitutional Reform. (London: House of  
Commons Research Paper 99/7, 1999)
50 Ibid^ p.92
51 Johnson (77) op. cit.. p.205
52 Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden, op. cit.. p.65
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either supporting the entire Government or voting it out. Moreover, Parliament’s 
capacity to enforce ministerial responsibility, aided by its Select Committees, is 
hampered by the size of government departments and the administrative secrecy 
epitomised in the Official Secrets Act.54
The above developments have profoundly transformed the law-making process over 
the past 150 years and led Richard Crossman to predict the degradation of the House 
of Commons, and even of the Cabinet, to the “dignified” part of the constitution next 
to the Lords and the Sovereign.55 Others have accused the British political system of 
degenerating into an “elective dictatorship.”56 More recently, Peter Hennessy 
criticised Prime Minister Blair for replacing cabinet government with a “Napoleonic”
cn
style of government.
But such radical analysis has been widely contested. Norton has argued that 
Parliament does exercise considerable power as a policy-influencing body, even
co
though its policy-making capabilities are limited. Second, parliamentary reforms 
such as changes in the work and structure of Select Committees have helped to 
reverse the trend of parliamentary loss of influence and bolstered a more independent 
behaviour from MPs.59 Developments since the last general election suggest that the 
trend towards more independent-minded Select Committees exercising greater 
executive scrutiny has continued.60 Third, the fact that the House of Commons’ 
political influence vis a vis the Government is often rather weak does not affect its
53 Alan Beattie: “Ministerial Responsibility and the Theory of the British State”, in: R. A. W. Rhodes 
and Patrick Dunleavy (eds.): Prime Minister. Cabinet and Core Executive. (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1995), pp.158-61
54 Colin Turpin: “Ministerial Responsibility”, in: Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver: The Changing 
Constitution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd ed. 1994), p. 151. Some members o f the Royal Commission 
on the Constitution even went as far as denouncing individual ministerial responsibility as “little more 
than a constitutional fiction”, Royal Commission on the Constitution. 1968-73. ii, Memorandum of 
Dissent, Cmnd.5460-1, (London: HMSO, 1973), p.4
55 Crossman, op. cit.. pp.39-54
56 Lord Hailsham: The Dilemma of Democracy. (London: Collins, 1978), esp. pp. 125-132
57 Peter Hennessy: “The Blair Style o f Government: An Historical Perspective and an Interim Audit”, 
Government and Opposition, vol.33, no.l, 1998, p.3f
58 Philip Norton: “Parliament and Policy in Britain: The House o f Commons as a Policy-Influencer”, 
in: Philip Norton (ed.): Legislatures. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 179
59 Ibid.. pp. 190-94, Judge is more critical o f the argument about a revival o f Parliament through internal 
reform, Judge (93): op. cit.. pp.214-6
60 Philip Norton: “Nascent Institutionalisation o f Committees in the British Parliament”, in: Lawrence 
Longby and Roger Davidson (eds.): The New Roles o f Parliamentary Committees. (London: Frank 
Cass, 1998b), pp. 15Iff
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theoretically near-omnicompetent constitutional position, since the Government 
depends on the confidence of the Commons the withdrawal of which can be tabled in 
a motion at any time.61 Consequently, when the Government’s majority in the 
Commons is very small, MPs may be able to exert correspondingly greater leverage 
over the policy process.
While Parliament may to some extent have reasserted its domestic role as a policy- 
influencer, it has struggled to adapt to the legislative process of the EU. To some 
extent, the problem affects all member states. As in Germany, EU membership has 
given the Government a potential structural advantage over Parliament because, as the 
principal institutional link between national and European institutions, the former can 
on occasions play the role of a gatekeeper. However, this problem is accentuated in 
Britain by the fact that Parliament remains badly attuned to EU membership.
Parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs is hampered by the dominance of a strong, 
centralised executive which can exercise considerable control over the legislature in a 
system of single party government. As a “talk” rather than a “work” parliament, the 
House of Commons is institutionally ill-suited to the detailed, influential scrutiny of 
EU policy initiatives.64 Shortly after accession to the EC, the Commons instituted a 
Scrutiny Committee to examine EC legislative proposals and recommend important 
issues for debate by the whole House. However, Government Ministers often 
consented to bill in the Council of Ministers without prior consultation of the 
Committee or a debate in the House, notwithstanding the “scrutiny reserve” enshrined 
in a 1980 resolution of the House.65 The Committee had also been given very limited 
terms of reference by the Government, thus denying it, for example, proper pre­
legislative scrutiny of the Single European Act.66 In 1990 a revised Resolution was
61 Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden, op. cit.. p.68
62 Vernon Bogdanor: “Britain and the European Community”, in: J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.): The 
Changing Constitution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd ed. 1994), p.8
63 Stephen George: “The Legislative Dimension”, in: Stephen George (ed.): Britain and the European 
Community - The Politics o f Semi-Detachment. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 102
64 Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmer: “United Kingdom”, in: Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang 
Wessels (eds.): The European Union and Member States - Towards Institutional Fusion?. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995), p.274
65 David Judge: “The Failure o f National Parliaments?”, West European Politics, vol. 18, no.3, 1995, 
p.86f
66 George, op. cit.. p.94
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adopted, the remit of the Scrutiny Committee widened and two new European
fn
Standing Committees were introduced to allow greater debate on EU proposals.
Despite conceding some reforms which improved parliamentary scrutiny, the 
Government has retained control over the powers and terms of reference of 
Parliament’s scrutiny committee. What stands out, therefore, is “the replication and 
reinforcement of pre-existing power differentials between the UK parliament and 
executive in the processing of EC legislation.” While the centralised nature of 
government in the UK has arguably slowed the adjustment of Parliament to EU 
membership, it has helped the executive to adapt to the European dimension.69
Single party government, executive control over Parliament and a European 
Secretariat at the Cabinet Office have all facilitated policy leadership and co-
70ordination at Prime Ministerial level. To some extent these characteristics are 
conditional on the size of the Government’s parliamentary majority and the political 
salience of the policy issue. If the majority is narrow and if the policy issue raises 
political controversy or has constitutional implications for parliamentary sovereignty,
71then the scope for Prime Ministerial policy leadership is reduced. Nevertheless, as a 
rule British Prime Ministers can exert greater influence over national EU policy than 
many of their continental counterparts because they normally face fewer (or weaker) 
domestic veto points, such as coalition partners, Parliament or subnational 
government. These factors also help to explain Britain’s good record in implementing 
EU law.72
Apart from these institutional constraints, there is also a behavioural and political 
dimension to Parliament’s slow adaptation to EU membership. The institutional 
context of adversarial majority party government has accentuated the continued party 
political controversy over EU policy and the sovereignty issue.73 As discussed below, 
British parliamentary culture has discouraged a behavioural adaptation towards a less
67 Judge (95), o p . cit.. p.88
68 Ibid, p.86
69 George, op. cit.. p.94f
70 Armstrong and Bulmer (95), op. cit.. p.264-66
71 A good example may be the Major Government’s difficulties in ratifying the TEU on the basis o f a 
very small parliamentary majority. Ibid.. p.259-61, 265f
72 George, op. cit.. p.97
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confrontational scrutiny of the substance of EU legislation. MPs are therefore less 
accustomed to the scrutinising and negotiating legislative tradition which 
characterises EU policy-making.74
This explains why the House of Lords, whose less partisan parliamentary culture 
emphasises detailed legislative review rather than confrontational debate, is deemed to 
exercise more effective scrutiny of EU affairs. Working through five sub-committees, 
the Lord’s Select Committee on the European Communities reviews EU draft 
legislation and reports on proposals which raise important constitutional or policy 
issues.75 Although the House of Lords lacks the scrutiny reserve power of the 
Commons, its Select Committee has established a very high reputation, even in 
comparison with other member states.76 The House of Lords may be constitutionally 
subordinate to the Commons, but it has adopted a procedural approach to EU 
legislation which enables more detailed and rigorous parliamentary scrutiny than that 
of the Commons. As suggested above, this seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion can 
be explained in terms of a unique political culture in Britain which is not well attuned 
to the policy-making style of the EU.
Political Culture77
Structural features of Britain’s formal legitimacy like the dynamics of relative 
majority voting or the unitary nature of the British state which concentrates formal 
powers and public attention on a sovereign Parliament at the centre have contributed
70
to a distinctive political culture. Parliament is considered the central arena for the 
public scrutiny of the Government, which makes for an adversarial rather than co­
operative style of politics between government and opposition. British political
73 Armstrong and Bulmer (95), op. cit.. p.257
74 Philip Giddings and Gavin Drewry: “Scrutiny Without Power? The Impact o f the European 
Community on the Westminster Parliament”, in: Philip Giddings and Gavin Drewry (eds.):
Westminster and Europe, (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.314
75 Philip Norton: Does Parliament Matter?. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 126
76 Philippe A. Weber-Panariello: Nationale Parlamente in der Europdischen Union. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1995, p .l06f
77 In this and subsequent chapters political culture is used in a wider sense to denote “the culture of 
political institutions” and the political system as a whole as expressed in institutional values and the 
norms o f political conduct. See: Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit.. p.5 If
78 Roger Eatwell: “Britain”, in: Roger Eatwell (ed.): European Political Cultures - Conflict or 
Convergence?. (London: Routledge, 1997 a), pp.50ff
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culture rests on the premise that divergent interests are best resolved through 
continuous, partisan public debate in which the choice between two contrasting 
alternatives is the common way of reaching conclusions. Party political pursuit of 
power becomes a zero-sum game in which the winner takes all. The long-standing 
notion of Her Majesty’s Opposition as an alternative to the government reflects this 
confrontational tradition of political accountability and has reinforced the dualistic 
nature of British politics.79
The unitary nature of the British state militates against the idea of institutional power 
sharing so that the survival of checks and balances depends on the social awareness
ftOamong political actors of the tacit constitutional assumptions involved. A general 
acknowledgement of the authority of common practices, which are seen as the 
precondition of individual freedoms, has substituted for the formal codification of 
constitutional arrangements within a hierarchy of legal norms. As a consequence, 
British political culture has shown little systematic concern for constitutional law or,
O 1
until recently, the constitutional rights of individuals.
Unlike in Germany, parliamentary legislation is often debated on its narrow political 
merits alone, with little regard paid to its potential legal or constitutional implications 
- a characteristic visible in the recent legislation for constitutional reform.82 
Normative questions about human rights like capital punishment, which is 
permanently abolished under the German Basic Law, have regularly been subject of 
parliamentary debate because in the tradition of legal positivism they are treated as 
inherently political rather than legal issues.83 Above all, the reluctance to leave 
normative legal issues like the scope of individual freedoms for the courts to settle is a 
reflection of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which accords the judiciary a 
constitutionally subordinate position vis a vis the High Court of Parliament.
79 Nevil Johnson: “Opposition in the British Political System”, Government and Opposition, vol. 32, 
no.4, 1997, pp.487-510
80 Johnson (77), op. cit.. pp.25-41
81 Ibid.. pp.l32ff
82 Vernon Bogdanor: Devolution in the United Kingdom. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
pp.287-298
3 Bradley, op. cit.. pp.27-29
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EU membership has not been very compatible with Britain’s political culture. For 
example, the judicial activism of the ECJ and its powerful role as a major 
integrationist actor have often been condemned, even by lawyers, as undemocratic 
“judicial legislation” and criticised for exceeding the competencies granted in the 
Treaties.84 Because the EU represents a challenge to Britain’s formal legitimacy and 
national identity, the issue of membership has understandibly been politically 
contentious. But Britain’s adversarial political culture has amplified and continuously 
renewed the controversy surrounding the “European question”, thus entrenching an
Of
elite cleavage among political parties and the media. However, the dividing lines of 
this cleavage are not static, as both main parties have crossed them at least once at 
some point over the last few decades and have experienced different forms and 
degrees of intra-party divisions over the issue. As a consequence of this elite cleavage, 
there has been continued political mobilisation both for and against the EU. This has 
reduced the scope for Government or other political actors to pursue active 
legitimation policies to increase mass support for the EU because any such strategy 
has faced strong political opposition and counter-mobilisation at elite level. 
Arguably, Britain’s adversarial political culture has therefore delayed and slowed
R7down the adaptation of political opinion to EU membership.
However, EU membership is slowly beginning to transform some aspects of Britain’s 
political culture. The opportunity since the late 1960s for British subjects to take cases 
against the government to the European Court of Human Rights gradually heightened 
public awareness of the rights-based political culture of continental Europe. In 
addition, the long period of Conservative rule during the 80s and most of the 90s drew 
attention to the relative lack of constitutional checks and balances against a 
government introducing far-reaching political change. These developments gave rise 
to a widespread political climate in favour of greater legal protection of civil liberties 
to which the 1997 Labour Government responded with the Human Rights Act 1998. 
As argued below, the Act is likely to accelerate the judicialisation of Britain’s
84 Trevor C. Hartley: “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution o f the European 
Union”, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 112, no.l, 1996, pp.95ff
85 Neill Nugent: “British Public Opinion and the European Community”, in: Stephen George (ed.): 
Britain and the European Community. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 191
86 Simon Bulmer: “Britain and European Integration: Of Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation and Semi- 
Detachment”, in: Stephen George: Britain and the European Community - The Politics o f Semi- 
Detachment. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p.27f
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parliamentary tradition and to throw into sharp relief the conflict between a politics- 
based and a rights-based political culture.
Any further Europeanisation of Britain’s political culture would probably require the 
adoption of a more proportional electoral system to increase the likelihood of 
coalition governments and an adaptation of those parliamentary procedures and 
traditions which encourage the current adversarial conduct of politics.88 Such 
measures could induce a behavioural change towards a less dualiStic, more consensual 
and co-operative political culture which may over time even help to soften the present 
elite cleavage on the EU. For the time being, however, the compatibility of Britain’s 
political culture with EU membership remains low.
The Constitutional Status of the Courts
Britain’s formal legitimacy circumscribes the constitutional position of another 
fundamental doctrine, the rule o f law. Parliamentary sovereignty implies that the role 
of the judiciary is confined to the interpretation of statutes (parliamentary intent) and 
judicial review of executive action that occurs on a statutory or traditional 
(prerogative) basis. However, some have regarded the doctrine of the rule of law as a 
significant counterweight to the powers of Parliament. Dicey even ranks the rule of
QQ
law as one of the two pillars of the constitution next to parliamentary sovereignty. 
Understood as a principle of constitutional morality, it is designed to disable 
government from abusing the unfettered power of parliamentary sovereignty. In this 
(Diceyan) way, the rule of law may even play a constitutional role akin to that of a 
Bill of Rights in other countries, but this view has been widely contested.90 It rests on 
a broad, normative (rather than a narrow, procedural) interpretation of the rule of law 
which is more concerned with the fair and legitimate use of powers rather than
87 See: Chapter 5. pp.216ff
88 See: Voting Systems: The Jenkins Report. (London: House of Commons Research Paper 98/112,
1998)
89 Albert Venn Dicey: “The Rule of Law”, in: Jack Lively and Adam Lively (eds.): Democracy in 
Britain. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 178-9
90 For a summary of the discussion see: Jeffrey Jowell: “The Rule of Law Today”, in: Jeffrey Jowell 
and Dawn Oliver: The Changing Constitution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd ed. 1994), pp.59-61
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lawfulness.91 Yet governments have sometimes exercised powers legally derived from 
statute which nevertheless contravened long-held constitutional conventions about 
how government should be conducted.92 Moreover, the courts are only empowered to 
apply the narrow interpretation of the rule of law (whether or not acts are ultra vires). 
Dicey clearly over-estimated the constraints on government that the broader sense of 
the rule of law might exercise, but the doctrine has not become totally insignificant.
First, courts have become less deferential in their stance towards government over the 
past 30 years and have begun a more determined and politicised application of judicial 
review which is epitomised by a recent ruling of the House of Lords which held that 
even Her Majesty’s Ministers can be held in contempt of court. These developments 
have emerged in parallel with a rapid increase in the number of applications for 
judicial review made to the courts. Judges have also become more creative in using 
their powers by adopting a wider interpretation of the three grounds for statutory 
review (lawfulness, fairness, reasonableness).94 Second, the repeal of fundamental 
constitutional statutes, the breach of important conventions or legislation in flagrant 
breach of the rule of law are considered at least politically impossible. Third, the 
courts imply in their rulings that Parliament intends to conform to the rule of law. 
They would only disapply the principle of the rule of law if Parliament expressly 
legislated to that intent, which again would be politically very difficult to do.95
However, the most important factor responsible for transforming the constitutional 
position of the judiciary has been Britain’s membership in the EU. As explained 
above, the primacy of EU law over national legislation has enhanced the importance 
of domestic courts which have gained the power effectively to disapply those 
provisions of Acts of Parliament that conflict with EU law. This challenge to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty occurred at a time of increasing domestic
91 Patrick McAuslan and John McEldowney: “Legitimacy and the Constitution: The Dissonance 
between Theory and Practice”, in: Patrick McAuslan and John McEldowney (eds.): Law. Legitimacy 
and the Constitution. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), p.l 1
92 For a discussion of examples see: Ibid., pp. 1-38
93 M. v. Home Office: sub nom M.. Re 1T9931 3 W. L. R. 433 H.L.. Held that a Minister of the Crown 
is amenable to contempt jurisdiction of the court even when acting in his official capacity. It thereby 
gave the court jurisdiction to grant injunctions against Ministers and other Officers of the Crown.
4 Robert Thomas: “Law and Politics”, in: Ian Holliday, Andrew Gamble and Geraint Parry: 
Fundamentals in British Politics. (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 149-53
95 Jowell, op. cit.. p.73
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constitutional debate, especially about the role of courts in protecting civil liberties.96 
The issue of human rights was also highlighted by a number of high profile defeats 
for the British Government at the ECHR during the 1980s and 90s.97
Some advocates of constitutional reform therefore called for an incorporation of the 
European Convention of Human Rights into domestic law to facilitate legal redress 
for UK citizens. The Factortame ruling also made it difficult to argue that 
incorporating the European Convention in analogous fashion to the EC Act 1972
QO
would be incompatible with the British constitution. More radical reformers argued 
in favour of adopting a codified constitution with an entrenched Bill of Rights, 
possibly on the basis of the European Convention of Human Rights.99 They suggested 
that only a clear break with constitutional tradition would buttress Britain’s 
institutions from erosion at EU level and domestically.100
Having supported constitutional reform in opposition, the 1997 Labour Government 
duly enacted the European Convention as the Human Rights Act 1998. The Act 
employs a rule o f construction similar to the EC Act 1972 discussed above. It allows 
judges to interpret UK law such as to be compatible with the Convention without 
enabling them to disapply parliamentary statute. Irreconcilable conflicts will merely 
be brought to the attention of Parliament on the presumption that it will wish to 
amend conflicting legislation.101 The format of the incorporation of the European 
Convention is therefore a compromise between the constitutional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the desire to give further effect to the rights under the 
Convention.
Despite the preservation of parliamentary supremacy by means of a rule of 
construction, implementation of the 1998 Act transforms the entire relationship
96 For an overview of the constitutional debate see: Anthony Barnett, Caroline Ellis and Paul Hirst 
(eds.): Debating the Constitution. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993),Robert Blackburn and Raymond 
Plant (eds.): Constitutional Reform. (London: Longman, 1999)
97 Thomas, op. cit.. p. 159
98 Wade (91), p.4
99 For example: Charter 88: Towards a Written Constitution. (London: Charter 88 Trust, 1993), Will 
Hutton: The State We’re In. (London: Johnathan Cape, 1995)
100 Institute for Public Policy Research: A New Constitution for the United Kingdom. (London: IPPR, 
1991)
101 The Human Rights Bill (HL), Bill 119 of 1997-98: Some Constitutional and Legislative Aspects, 
(London: House of Commons Research Paper 98/27, 1998), pp.8, 17-22
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between the courts and the legislature or the government. A declaration of 
incompatibility will carry great political weight, and Parliament may find it politically 
impossible to ignore infringement rulings by the courts. Backed by the often 
ambiguously phrased European Convention, the British judiciary is likely and to 
impose far greater constraints on the other branches of government than ever 
before.102 The legal interpretation of abstract individual liberties will also transform 
the role of the courts, hitherto confined to statutory review, and contribute to a greater
1 OTpoliticisation of the judiciary.
This in turn may increase political pressure for a reform of the British judiciary in 
order to strengthen its independence from the political process. For instance, it is 
increasingly argued that by combining the roles of Cabinet Minister and head of the 
judiciary the office of Lord Chancellor compromises the independence of the latter.104 
In the wake of reforming the House of Lords it has also been suggested to transfer its 
legal functions to an independent Supreme Court.105 Such major reforms would 
confirm and formalise the increased constitutional importance of the judiciary, but 
they go far beyond the agenda of the 1997 Labour Government. As suggested further 
above, an uncodified constitution develops dynamics of its own which means that a 
programme of limited reforms can create a domino effect of (often) unintended 
further constitutional change whose eventual equilibrium is difficult to predict.106 By 
altering the constitutional balance of power between the courts and Parliament, EU 
membership and the Human Rights Act may precipitate further and perhaps more 
radical reforms which threaten to undermine the traditional legitimising principles of 
the judiciary and ultimately the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty itself.
The Constitutional Status of Subnational Government
Britain is not a federal state like Germany because the constitutional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is inherently unitary in nature. If subnational governments
102 IMi, pp.6ff
103 Thomas, op. cit.. p,160f
104 Robert Hazell: “Westminster - Squeezed from Above and Below”, in: Robert Hazell (ed.): 
Constitutional Futures - A History o f the Next Ten Y ears. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p.l 15f
The conversy surrounding the Pinochet judgement in the House o f Lords fuelled this debate, see: 
“Next Century’s Law Lords May Sit in a Supreme Position”, Financial Times. 24/3/1999, p.9
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exercised any powers other than explicitly devolved from Parliament, they would 
therefore undermined the latter’s legal legitimacy. Consequently, the 1973 
“Kilbrandon Report”, which informed the ill-fated Devolution Bills of the late 1970s,
* • • 107explicitly ruled out a federal solution as incompatible with the constitution. 
Similarly, the powers and the institutional structure of local government itself derive 
strictly from statute, and they have been subject to considerable legislative change 
over the centuries.108
For instance, the Local Government Act 1985 abolished altogether the Greater 
London Council and delegated its functions to the London boroughs, the Corporation 
of the City of London and various ad-hoc bodies.109 The past two decades have also 
seen legislation reducing the powers of local authorities over schools and hospitals 
and limiting local budgetary control by empowering the Secretary of State for the 
Environment to cap local authority budgets on grounds of excessive expenditure.no 
Some critics have considered these developments as “a direct threat to the tradition of 
the self-sufficient local authority”.111 In response to such complaints, the 1997 Labour 
Government has legislated for the creation of a Greater London Authority with 
limited devolved powers and an elected mayor for the capital. It has also promised 
legislation providing for the direct election of local mayors who would assume the 
role of a chief executive of their Council.
The centralised, unitary nature of the British polity has been highlighted, and to some
119extent challenged, by EU membership. Through its regional and structural funds 
the Commission has sought to build direct relationships with the regions, bypassing 
central government. In the absence of a regional tier of government above county 
level Whitehall attempted to monopolise regional representation and funding 
negotiations. As a result, the EU funds available were sometimes not fully allocated 
or did not effectively meet regional priorities. The introduction of Regional 
Development Agencies and (possibly) elected regional assemblies has occurred at
106 Also: Hazell, op. cit.. pp.l 14ff
107 Royal Commission, op. cit.. paras.498, 539
108 Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden, op. cit.. p.54
109 Ibid., p.55
110 Ibid.. p.56
111 Martin Loughlin: “The Restructuring of Central-Local Government Relations”, in: Jeffrey Jowell 
and Dawn Oliver (eds.): The Changing Constitution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd ed. 1994), p.271
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least partly in order to make subnational institutions more compatible with the EU. 
EU membership has therefore contributed to a regionalisation of the UK, and it has 
offered an opportunity for subnational government to recapture some powers from the 
centre, especially by bidding for and administering the Commission’s regional and 
structural funds and through independent representation in the Committee of the 
Regions.113
EU membership has also contrasted Britain’s political centralisation with the trend 
towards federal or devolved arrangements in most other member states, thus 
increasing popular demand for a regional devolution of powers, particularly in 
Scotland.114 Finally, the EU has opened new strategic perspectives for the nationalist 
movement in Scotland and its policy of seeking secession from the UK. If it can 
secure continued membership in NATO and the EU after secession, Scotland will no 
longer depend on the UK for its defence or access to world markets. An independent 
Scotland in Europe would also offer most of the economic advantages of membership 
in the UK, thus reducing the political and economic cost of secession.115
Mindful of the growing regional discontent, particularly in Scotland, the 1997 Labour 
Government held referenda in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland over its plans to 
devolve powers to these areas and set up elected regional assemblies. With each of 
these referenda endorsed by the electorate, Parliament has legislated to devolve 
legislative control over most domestic affairs to a Scottish parliament and a Northern 
Irish assembly, and more limited secondary legislative powers, especially over health, 
education and transport, to a Welsh assembly.116 All three assemblies will be funded 
through block grants paid annually by the respective Secretary of State. In addition, 
the Scottish parliament can exercise limited tax-varying powers by varying the basic 
rate of income tax by up to three per-cent of the rate in the rest of the UK. Each 
assembly is lead by a cabinet-style executive headed by a first-minister.
112 Bulmer (97), op. cit.. p.62
113 Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit.. p.280f
114 For example: Constitutional Unit: Scotland’s Parliament - Fundamentals for a New Scotland Act. 
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116 Ibid.. p.202-13
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Parliament alone retains the power to amend or repeal the devolution acts, thus 
preserving parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover, the devolved Scottish and Welsh 
administrations do not enjoy the wide-ranging powers of the German Lander in EU 
policy-making.117 The Government has committed itself to involving them in the 
British negotiating team for Brussels whenever Welsh and Scottish affairs are 
considered. But the devolved executives cannot advance a specifically Welsh or 
Scottish position which deviates from the position of the British government.118 
Disagreements about whether legislation from the devolved assemblies lies within 
their powers granted in the devolution acts are referred to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council. By having the power of both abstract and concrete judicial review 
the Judicial Committee will thus assume the function of a constitutional court for 
devolution issues.119
As with the Human Rights Act, devolution will have two important effects on 
Britain’s formal legitimacy. First, the constitutional position of the courts will be 
bolstered vis a vis Parliament because the legal recourse to the Judicial Committee 
may be the only way of arbitrating constitutional claims that will be acceptable to 
both central and regional government.120 The Privy Council’s pivotal role in settling 
conflicts of competence between Westminster and the devolved assemblies will also 
accelerate the politicisation of the judiciary in a particularly sensitive area.
A second important constitutional effect of devolution is the dilution of parliamentary 
sovereignty in constitutional reality, even if it is formally preserved. Like the Human 
Rights Act, the full constitutional impact of devolution will only become apparent 
over time, but it is difficult to envisage circumstances where it would be politically 
possible for Parliament to repeal the devolution acts, except perhaps in the exceptional
191case of Northern Ireland. Devolution effectively divides legislative powers between
Westminster and the devolved assemblies rather than merely devolving them, thus
199creating a quasi-federal relationship. Indeed, the modus of devolution has been 
criticised as an unsustainable “half-way house” failing to adapt the unitary nature of
117 See: Chapter 4, pp.l48ff
118 For details, see: Bogdanor (99), op. cit.. p.278-83
119 Ibid.. p.206
120 Thomas, op. cit.. p. 156
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the British constitution in order to prevent the process of devolution from leading to 
the gradual disintegration of the UK.
Bogdanor agrees that it will be difficult “to bring into play the constitutional restraints 
in the Scotland Act. For it would be difficult to imagine an issue more likely to unite 
Scottish opinion than a conflict between the Scottish Parliament and a remote, 
London-based government.”124 The stability of the current constitutional 
arrangements will also be tested when Westminster and the devolved assemblies are 
being governed by different political parties. Conflicts over policy or competencies 
will then be drawn into the party political controversy of Britain’s adversarial political 
culture. The success of the devolution acts will therefore depend much more on 
psychological and political factors than on constitutional ones.
“The sense o f  common feeling will have to prevail over the sentiment o f  
states’ rights. Indeed, because it creates governmental relationships o f  
some complexity, quasi-federalism probably requires a greater sense o f  
loyalty to the whole, to the United Kingdom, than is necessary in a unitary
. . ,,125state.
To summarise, EU membership has reinforced pre-existing domestic challenges to 
Britain’s unitary state structures. Devolution has been designed to meet these internal 
and external challenges, to preserve the geographical integrity of the UK and to make 
its formal legitimacy more compatible with the EU. However, the reforms represent 
an unstable compromise between the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and semi- 
federal institutional arrangements. Whether this compromise can be stabilised in the 
long-run will depend on the dynamics of Britain’s uncodified constitution which are 
largely determined by the evolution of political practice.
Conclusion
Britain’s formal legitimacy has evolved organically around an uncodified constitution, 
the common law tradition, the concept of the Crown and the central constitutional
122 Ibid, p.293
123 John Barnes: Federal Britain - No Longer Unthinkable?. (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1998)
124 Bogdanor (99), op. cit.. p.288
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in relation to which all other institutions and 
legitimising principles are legally subordinate. This has given rise to a unitary state 
where the powers of subnational government depend on parliamentary statute. Courts 
lack the powers to review the substance of legislation, and there is no separate body of 
constitutional law. A number of institutional developments and a winner-take-all 
electoral system have resulted in tightly organised parliamentary majorities which 
allow Prime Ministers and their Governments to exercise centralised political 
leadership. This institutional structure has fostered an adversarial and weakly 
judicialised political culture.
Membership in the EU has posed serious challenges to the British constitutional 
system whose formal legitimacy is in some ways incompatible with supranational 
integration. Although a direct confrontation has so far been avoided, the supremacy of 
EU law sits uncomfortably with the core constitutional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. The steady influx of European legislation incorporated into British law 
leads to the uneasy fusion of two very different jurisprudential systems and
1 7Acultures. At the level of political culture, the consensual EU policy-making style 
and continuous bargaining among member states and among parties in the EP 
contrasts sharply with the British political tradition of adversarial debate, strong one- 
party government and the notion of the opposition as an alternative government. 
Finally, EU membership has arguably given nationalist movements, especially in 
Scotland, a more effective platform from which to advocate secession from the UK.
However, the recent domestic constitutional reforms may over time help to reduce 
these incompatibilities between the formal legitimacy of the UK and the EU. Two 
different viewpoints are emerging on this issue. According to one perspective, the 
direction of domestic reforms represent a degree of convergence with the formal 
legitimacy of other EU member states, thus reducing British “exceptionalism”. EU 
membership, devolution and the Human Rights Act have all bolstered the (previously 
subordinate) position of the judiciary vis a vis the other branches of government and
125 Ibid., p.295
126 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p.42f, 1 lOff
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will contribute to a greater judicialisation of politics. The increasing intrusion of EU 
law into the British legal system has introduced a new judicial dimension by diffusing 
the common law tradition with elements of continental jurisprudence.
More importantly, devolution and the Human Rights Act are beginning to affect the 
core principle of the British constitution, parliamentary sovereignty, almost as much 
as EU membership. While great efforts were made to keep the doctrine formally 
intact, in constitutional reality each of the three areas of constitutional evolution have 
affected the powers of Parliament to the effect that “parliamentary supremacy no
• • 19Qlonger possesses the clarity and firmness which it enjoyed” only a few decades ago. 
EU membership, devolution and the Human Rights Act have changed the previously 
centralised structure of the British political system by breaking up Parliament’s near 
legislative monopoly and introducing alternative policy-making bodies, in particular 
the courts, the devolved assemblies and European institutions.
Over time, these constitutional changes might also affect the political culture of the 
UK. A more judicialised, consensual and negotiating style of politics could develop 
which is closer to the patterns in most of the other EU member states. This trend 
would be reinforced by the mooted adoption of a more proportional voting system for 
general elections which would increase the likelihood of coalition government and a 
less adversarial style of politics. Such a Europeanisation of Britain’s formal 
legitimacy may bring about greater constitutional harmony between the UK and
i inEurope. Indeed, some of the proposals of the constitutional debate over recent
years, such as an entrenched constitution or the establishment of a Supreme Court,
111would further accelerate this convergence of formal legitimacies. Finally, domestic 
reforms such as devolution or the Human Rights Act are also designed to redress 
internal challenges to Britain’s felt legitimacy and preserve the Union’s territorial
199integrity.
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According to the opposite viewpoint, the above argument ignores the unique 
dynamics of the British constitution which combine the continuous, evolutionary 
adaptation of subordinate norms and institutions with the unbroken continuity and 
stability of its fundamental principles.133 At their core lies the strong and long­
standing constitutional tradition of democratic self-government, which is closely 
bound up with Britain’s national identity.134 This commitment to representative 
parliamentary government is symbolised in the constitutional centrality of the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty. Rather than representing a successful adaptation to 
internal and external challenges that stabilises the British constitution, the political 
dynamics unleashed by the reforms of Britain’s formal legitimacy threaten to 
undermine the fundamental features of the constitution, and maybe even the UK’s 
territorial integrity.135
The impact of internal and external challenges may stretch the old constitutional 
principles beyond breaking point, eventually leading to a complete transformation of 
Britain’s constitutional philosophy. Because of the unstable equilibrium they have 
created, EU membership and devolution, rather than reinvigorating the Union, may
t'l/’
also contribute to a gradual territorial disintegration of the UK. Yet public 
attachment to the fundamental features of the British constitution remains strong, not 
least because it is so long-lived and closely bound up with national identity. A 
Europeanisation of the British constitution could therefore undermine its felt 
legitimacy if it involves the wholesale shift towards new constitutional principles and
117traditions. Greater compatibility between the UK and the EU at the level of formal 
legitimacy may result in lower levels offelt legitimacy for the domestic (and probably 
the European) political system to which the discussion now turns. Consequently, it is 
cultural-normative constraints, such as the commitment to protecting Parliament as 
the guarantor of British democracy, rather than the lack of legal flexibility which may
133 Philip Norton: “In Defence of the Constitution - A Riposte to the Radicals”, in: Philip Norton (ed.): 
New Directions in British Politics? Essays on the Evolving Constitution. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar,
1991), p .157
134 See pp. 120ff below
135 Johnson (97), op. cit.. pp.506-08, John Redwood: The Death of Britain. (London: Macmillan, 1999)
136 Hazell and O’Leary, op. cit.. p.27
137 David Willetts: Modem Conservatism. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), pp.l52ff
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ultimately inhibit the constitutional adaptation of Britain’s formal legitimacy to the
1 0 0
challenges of EU membership.
3.3 Felt Legitimacy
The second part of this chapter deals with the felt legitimacy of the British political 
system. It divides into sections each dealing with one of the three components of felt 
legitimacy, namely the political regime, the political authorities and the political 
community. Each of these components face their own unique measurement problems 
which will be referred to in the course of the discussion. However, some problems 
recur throughout the discussion of felt legitimacy in this and the next two chapters. 
One of them concerns the difficulties associated with cross-national comparative 
research. While the predominant use of Eurobarometer surveys in this thesis helps to
• 1 'XQavoid many of these methodological problems, the Eurobarometer series itself 
suffers from another common problem of empirical public opinion research on 
legitimacy. Its survey questions tend to be insufficiently precise about the object of 
support they measure (in other words, regime, community, authorities).140 
Measurements of diffuse support for the political regime are sometimes 
“contaminated” with evaluations of specific output support, thus blurring the 
analytical distinction between the diffuse and the specific mode of support. The 
discussion of felt legitimacy in the UK, the FRG and the EU must therefore cross­
check the data on diffuse support for possible influences from specific output 
evaluations. Moreover, the following analysis, while primarily based on the 
quantitative results of public opinion surveys, will complement these for 
methodological reasons with a number of qualitative indicators of felt legitimacy.141
3.3.1 Political Community
The sense o f political community in the UK is rooted in a strongly developed, long­
standing national identity. The interpretation of British national history and identity
138 Armstrong and Bulmer (95), op. cit.. p.254
139 Eichenberg and Dalton, op. cit., p.517
140 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 159-164
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has been the subject of much academic debate over the past two decades.142 
Nonetheless it is possible for the purpose of this chapter to indicate a number of 
broadly accepted themes.143 According to one influential account, popular British 
identity developed rapidly in the century following the Act of Union with Scotland in 
1707. Britain’s protestant identity was shaped mainly in (political and military) 
opposition to Catholic France as the “hostile Other”.144 Rather than domestic 
centralisation or homogenisation, it was the perceived dissimilarity from others which 
unified the peoples of the United Kingdom. British identity celebrated the aspects 
which differentiated it from other nations.
The rise of Protestantism set Britain apart from a predominantly Catholic European 
continent and the dogmatic spiritual leadership of Rome. Later on, the 17 century 
struggle for supremacy between crown and parliament was perceived as confirming 
the superiority of British parliamentarism, symbol of liberty, over the monarchical 
absolutism pioneered in France. The historical myth of parliamentary self-government 
could build on the even longer tradition of limited monarchical power, dating back to 
the Magna Carta of 1215.145 In this fashion, the emergence of Britain’s historical 
identity became interwoven with the defence of external and internal sovereignty as 
symbolised in parliamentary supremacy. Concerns about national and parliamentary 
sovereignty became mutually reinforcing.146
The experience of Empire provided another aspect in which national distinctiveness 
was confirmed through the association of Britishness with free trade, economic 
prosperity, splendid isolation from Europe and the political influence of a world 
power.147 While Britain’s involvement in the two World Wars marked the decline of 
imperial power, the perception of Germany as an evil and dangerous threat and a 
relatively even distribution of sacrifices across classes further reinforced a sense of
141 Chapter 2 . p.88f
142 For a brief illustration o f the main approaches to the “new British history” see: David Cannadine: 
“British History as a New Subject”, in: A. Grant and K. Stringer (eds.): Uniting the Kingdom? The 
Making o f British History. (London: Routledge, 1995), pp 12-28
143 Eatwell, op. cit.. p.51
144 Linda Colley: Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. (London: Pimlico, 1994), pp. 11-54
145 Eatwell (97a), op. cit.. p.52
146 William Wallace: “What Price Interdependence? Sovereignty and Interdependence in British 
Politics”, International Affairs, vol.62, no.3, 1986, p.382f
147 Colley, op. cit.. pp.56-71, 85-98
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national identity.148 Many continental countries experienced political instability and 
military invasion during World Wars, but the successful defence of Britain’s long­
standing territorial integrity and its liberal democracy entrenched the attachment to 
self government. Coupled with Britain’s continuing global political and economic 
interests such as the strategic alliance with the USA, the (con-)fusion of parliamentary 
and national sovereignty have meant that European unification tends to be publicly 
perceived as a threat to national identity rather than a political opportunity.149
In contrast to Germany, ethnicity was not a central element of British national 
identity, although the English language played a unifying role.150 Pre-British identities 
in Scotland, Wales and Ireland persisted alongside the emerging sense of Britishness 
in the UK. State and nation have never become fully coterminous, and the emphasis 
on the UK as the Protestant isles helps to explain why the Irish could never be fully 
incorporated into the Union. On the other hand, the persistence of subjecthood, which 
does not link citizenship to ethnic nationality, made it easier to integrate post-war 
immigrants into British society, especially those from the Commonwealth who were 
already subjects to the Crown and had grown up under Britain’s cultural and linguistic 
influence.151
The implication of Colley’s thesis about the emergence of British identity is that it 
would come under strain when some of the factors promoting it - the presence of a 
hostile Other, Protestantism and polito-economic prestige - decline in significance or 
are diluted, for instance by the immigration of ethnic minorities. Economic decline 
and the receding memory of Empire and the two World Wars have all contributed to a
1 Orenaissance of pre-British identities in the component nations of the UK. In parallel, 
the sense of Britishness is argued to have weakened, and the continued viability of the
1 S’}traditional concept of British identity has recently come under attack. Despite
148 Eatwell (97a), op. cit.. p.54
149 Bulmer (92), op. cit., pp.9-14
150 Eatwell (97a), op. cit.. p.52
151 According to the 1991 census, 5.5% of the population come from non-white, immigrant 
backgrounds. See: Ibid., p.61
152 Cannadine, op. cit., pp.l9ff
153 For example: Andrew Marr: The Day Britain Died, (London: Profile, 2000), Tom Naim: The Break- 
Up o f Britain - Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, (London: New Left Books, 1977). A political science 
journal recently devoted an entire issue to the question of “Being British”. See: The Political 
Quarterly, vol.71, no.l, 2000
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decreasing national homogeneity and the effects of generational and ethnic change, 
Eatwell cautions not to overstate the problems for the classic view of British identity, 
and the following survey data seem to support his case.154 Increasingly strong regional 
identities which have even given rise to separatist movements seem to coincide with 
high levels of national attachment and pride.
Across the UK as a whole, 9% feel very attached to the EU, 58% to Britain, and 41% 
feel very attached to their region. But these figures disguise substantial regional 
disparities which are discussed further down.155 Based on a series of surveys 
McCrone and Surridge calculate a level of national pride among Britons considerably 
higher than in Germany.156 When asked what made them proud about Britain, nearly 
nine out of ten respondents mentioned national history and the armed forces, and two- 
thirds of respondents feel pride in Britain’s democratic institutions. These findings 
indicate that underlying sense of British identity as outlined above still resonates quite 
strongly among the population, not least because political leadership has failed to
* 157offer any coherent new interpretation of what it means to be British.
Such observations should not disguise considerable variations in attitudes within the 
four entities which make up the UK, namely England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Northern Ireland is the most obvious area of the UK which suffers from a 
contested model of identity, both socially and politically. It is a well-known fact that 
around 40% of the population in Ulster accord no legitimacy to the rule of the British 
Crown over their territory because they prefer to be governed by the Republic of 
Ireland instead.158 Unsurprisingly, a distinctive Northern Irish identity is weakly 
developed relative to the other areas of Britain, since people in Ulster tend to feel 
either Irish or British rather than Northern Irish. When asked in a 1996 Eurobarometer 
poll whether, in the near future, they saw themselves above all as citizens of the EU, 
citizens of the UK or citizens of their region, Northern Irish respondents saw
154 Eatwell (97a), op. cit.. p.60
155 Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.51. (Brussels: European Commission, 1999), pp.B10-12
156 David McCrone and Paula Surridge: “National Identity and National Pride”, in: Roger Jowell et al 
(eds.): British and European Social Attitudes. The 15th Report, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp.7-10
157 Eatwell (97a), op. cit., p.65f. The implications for British attitudes to the EU are examined in 
Chapter Five.
158 The only official poll on the issue was held in March 1973, but it was widely boycotted by 
nationalists. On a 58.1% turnout, 98.9% of those voting supported the constitutional link with the UK 
and only 1.1% voted in favour o f joining the Irish Republic. See: Bogdanor (99), op. cit.. p.98
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themselves disproportionately as European (17%) or British/Irish (68%) compared to 
the rest of Britain.159 The high proportion of “Europeans” amongst the population in 
Ulster may be composed of those who wish to dissociate themselves from the 
sectarian divide.
In Wales, 34% consider themselves foremost as Welsh citizens as opposed to 52% 
feeling British first. Scots regarding themselves primarily as British citizens (48%) 
only just outnumber those who feel their strongest allegiance belongs to Scotland 
(42%). A majority of Welsh (56%) and Scots (50%) identify with the Union Jack, 
compared to 88% of the English.160 Hopes that the latent separatist sentiments north 
of the English border would be contained by granting devolution to Scotland seem 
premature. A MORI poll conducted in March 1998 revealed that, in the long term, 
40% of Scots preferred a devolved Scotland within the UK, 47% a fully independent 
Scotland and a mere 9% were in favour of neither option, thus presumably preferring 
the status quo ante. However, Scottish attitudes towards independence fluctuate 
considerably. From 1997 to 1998 the number of Scottish separatists had risen by ten 
percentage points.161 By 1999, only 36% of Scottish respondents preferred full
1 fOindependence as opposed to 43% who prefer Scottish devolution within the UK.
These considerable fluctuations suggest that surveys designed to measure diffuse for 
the political community may have become “contaminated” with expressions of 
specific support for the political authorities. Another indicator of felt legitimacy for 
the political community is the existence and strength of political parties advocating 
separatism. Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Scottish National Party both formally 
advocate independence from the UK, albeit with less vigour in the case of Plaid 
Cymru. In the elections to the Scottish Parliament, the SNP achieved 28.7% on the 
first vote and 27% on the second which meant that over 70% of voters supported
163parties opposing Scottish independence. In Wales, Plaid Cymru polled 28.4% of the 
first vote and 30.5% of the second.164 In both cases dissatisfaction with the Labour
159 Eurobarometer: British Public Opinion on the European Union no.44.2 (unpublished), (Brussels: 
European Commission, 1996), p.38
160 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol.22, no.9, 1999, p.3
161 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol.21, no.6, 1998, p.6
162 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol. 22, no.2, 1999, p.4
163 “The New Politics”, The Economist, vol.351, no.8119, 15/5/1999, p.31 f
164 “A Cloudy Dawn”, The Economist, vol.351, no.8119, 15/5/1999, p.35
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government at Westminster may have benefited the nationalist parties as voters sought 
to express their protest in what they may have regarded a “second-order election.”165 
This assumption is borne out by a collection of opinion polls on voting intentions for 
general elections reveals that in April 1999 support for Plaid Cymru hovered around a 
mere 14%, whereas only around 25% of Scots would vote for the SNP in an election 
for Westminster.166 In view of these data it is maybe surprising that 62% of Scots 
believe Scotland will be a fully independent country in fifteen years time, regardless
1 f\lof whether they would welcome such a development.
3.3.2 Political Regime
Since the political regime component of felt legitimacy can be further subdivided into 
constitutional philosophy, constitutional order and constitutional reality, one must 
find survey questions whose responses reveal public attitudes towards each of these 
sub-categories. Measuring support for the political regime is fraught with difficulties 
because respondents to opinion surveys are prone to confuse the different objects of 
support. Westle’s comprehensive study of empirical applications of the Eastonian 
paradigm concludes that most of the survey questions she has analysed are imprecise 
in their reference to the political regime, or they even confuse the regime with another 
object of support, such as the political community. Besides, many survey questions, 
while ostensibly geared towards measuring regime support, stimulate responses 
evaluating specific output support rather than diffuse support (Westle’s example is the 
Eurobarometer question on how democracy works in one’s country). Strongly cyclical 
variations of support over time which coincide with a country’s business cycle are 
strong indicators of such “mis-targeted” surveys, Westle argues.168
Particular care has therefore been taken, in this as well as in the subsequent two 
empirical chapters, to ensure that the survey data selected do actually measure public 
attitudes towards the object of support they are designed to focus on. Public attitudes 
towards Britain’s constitutional philosophy, for example, have to be measured in
165 K. Reif and H. Schmitt: “Nine Second-Order Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis 
o f European Parliament Election Results”, European Journal o f Political Research, vol.8, no.l, 1980, 
pp. 3-44
166 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol.22, no.3, 1999, p.7
167 MORI (6/98), op. cit.. p.6
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terms of support for the principle of parliamentary sovereignty or, failing such a high 
level of specificity, support for democracy as an abstract political concept. In 1989, 
Eurobarometer conducted a survey asking West European publics about their attitudes 
towards their political systems in general.169 Fuchs et al consider some of these survey 
questions appropriate performance-independent indicators of diffuse support for a 
country’s constitutional philosophy because they elicit responses about the more
1 70abstract notion of democracy as such.
The first, more abstract question asked whether respondents were in favour or against 
the idea of democracy in principle without thinking of any existing democracies. 
95.3% of Britons were very much or to some extent in favour of the idea of 
democracy. In a second question, UK respondents were asked whether they thought 
democracy was the best political system in all circumstances, whether in certain 
circumstances a dictatorship could be a good thing, or whether living in a democracy 
or under a dictatorship made no difference to people like them. Here, only 77.4% of 
British respondents considered democracy the best political system in all 
circumstances, marginally below the EC average of 78%. However, of those who 
disagreed about two thirds were indifferent rather than positively oriented towards 
dictatorship.
The most likely interpretation of these findings points to the special case of Northern 
Ireland. If counted separately, only 65.3% of Northern Irish respondents agree that 
democracy is the best form of government, and the value for the Irish Republic is
171even lower at a mere 64.9%. Both in Ulster and the Republic those quoting 
indifference outnumber the qualified supporters of dictatorship by about two to one, 
thus reflecting little appetite for dictatorial government. More than nine out of ten 
Irish, both north and south of the border, support the abstract idea of democracy. It 
seems that disappointment with their actual democratic system led many Irish to feel 
indifferent between dictatorship and democracy as a form of government, especially 
since radical republican propaganda denounces democracy in the Province as a sham.
168 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 166
169 Eurobarometer: Survey: Racism. Xenophobia and Intolerance. (Brussels: European Commission, 
1989), pp.8-10
170 Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, op. cit.. p.348
171 Ibid., p.349
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Also, Northern Ireland is a somewhat exceptional position, given the ubiquitous army 
presence, the partially restricted application of civil rights under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act and the fact that the notions of ethnos and demos so closely intertwined 
in the Province.
Another Eurobaromter series measures general support for all three components of the 
political regime (philosophy, order, reality). Respondents are requested to indicate 
their attitudes vis-a-vis the political society they live in, namely whether they believe 
it ought to be “radically changed by revolutionary action”, whether it should be 
“gradually improved by reforms” or whether it “must be valiantly defended against all 
subversive forces.” The results are illustrated in fig.3.1 below.
Attitudes towards British Society
60
——  Revolution Defence Reform
Fig. 3.1172
Over a period spanning almost fifteen years the number of people wanting to 
overthrow the socio-political system of the UK never exceeded a single-digit 
percentage of the population. At the same time, there are about twice as many people 
in favour of reforms as are staunch supporters of the status quo. This ratio of 
reformers over conservatives is considerably higher than in the Federal Republic, for 
instance, where a larger number of respondents are willing to defend the status quo.173 
However, allowance has to be made again for the special case of Northern Ireland 
which may also account for public revolutionary sentiment in the UK at levels
172 Eurobarometer: Trends 1974-1993, (Brussels: European Commission, 1994), pp.37-48, and 
subsequent issues.
173 See Chapter 4. p. 168f
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roughly twice as high as in Germany. Qualitative analysis of Britons’ attitudes 
towards society seem to support these findings. After all, with the exception of 
Northern Ireland, no organised terrorist groups have operated in the UK for the last 
few decades with the aim to overthrow the political and social order of the country. 
Even as far as non-violent political activity is concerned, no significant “anti-system 
parties” exist in the UK.174 Those which might fall in that category, like the British 
Communist Party or the BNP, are electorally irrelevant, partly thanks to the 
majoritarian electoral system.
Moving on to the felt legitimacy of the constitutional order, it is especially revealing 
to analyse levels of support for those institutional features which have recently come 
under sustained criticism or have been met with demand for reform. The legitimacy of 
the hereditary principle has increasingly been questioned by constitutional reformers 
in Britain. This would suggest low levels of felt legitimacy for the (unreformed) 
House of Lords and a monarchical head of state. However, this assumption is not 
borne out by the quantitative data available.
Starting with the monarchy, consistently more than two-thirds of the British public 
have wanted to retain a hereditary head of state over the past five years, even during 
periods of intense negative media coverage on the personal problems of the Royal 
Family (see fig.3.2). Even specific output support for Queen Elisabeth II as a person, 
rather than the institution of the monarchy, consistently shows significant positive net 
satisfaction values when the public is asked about the way the Queen is performing
1 75her role as monarch. In summer 1998, for instance 73% of respondents were 
satisfied and only 18% dissatisfied with the Queen’s reign and 63% expressed 
satisfaction with the Prince of Wales’s performance as heir to the throne.176
174 Giovanni Sartori: Parties and Party Systems. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
p .l27ff
175 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol. 19, no.2, 1996, p.5, and MORI: British Public Opinion, vol.21, 
no.7, 1998, p.4
176 Ibid., p.4
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The situation is slightly different for the House of Lords, partly because a large 
section of the British public confesses to knowing very little about the institution. In 
1998, 81% of respondents admitted to knowing “just a little” or “hardly anything at 
all” about the House of Lords, a figure largely unchanged from earlier surveys in 1991
1 7ftand 1995. As regards public attitudes towards the House of Lords just prior to the 
House of Lords Bill 1999, 55% of those interviewed preferred a partly or wholly 
elected second chamber and 21% opted for the status quo, but amongst people who 
felt they knew “a great deal” or “fair amount” about the House of Lords, the largest 
number (31 %) wanted to preserve the status quo and a further 10% merely wanted to 
remove the voting rights of hereditary peers.179
In a similar poll conducted by Gallup in 1998, an even larger number of people (35%) 
wished to retain the current composition of the House of Lords, again making the
status quo the most popular option if directly compared to any one of the other
180alternatives. However, almost two-thirds of respondents rejected the status quo, 
pointing to a lack of consensus on attitudes towards the House of Lords which may 
well have been caused by the lack of public knowledge and (probably) interest in the 
issue.
177 ibid, p.4
178 MORI(6/98), op. cit.. p.6
179 Ibjd, p.6
180 Gallup Political and Economic Index. Report no.454, June 1998, p.6. Of the others, 32% favour an 
unspecified reform of the House of Lords, while 27% wish to see the institution abolished.
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How does the British public evaluate the constitutional order of the UK and its 
translation into political reality? One obvious set of data to consult is the widely used 
Eurobarometer series on satisfaction with democracy whose exact wording is: “On the 
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy works (in your country)?” The principle advantage of this 
series is its suitability for comparative research, since long-term data exist for Britain 
and Germany as well as the EU. However, scholars disagree as to whether the 
attitudinal object of this survey question is the regime or the authorities. Westle is 
highly critical of the contradiction in the way the question is formulated between a 
reference to diffuse regime support (“democracy”) and specific output support 
(“satisfied with the way democracy works”). Fuchs et al believe the Eurobarometer 
indicator does reflect a generalised attitude towards the political system, and they are 
dismissive of its classification as either diffuse or specific. Instead, they argue 
respondents in this survey evaluate not democracy as such, but constitutional reality
1 89or the “constitution in operation”.
One possible way of settling this issue is to compare the data from this particular 
survey with fluctuations in indicators of specific support, such as party allegiance, 
satisfaction with the government or future economic expectations. If responses to the 
Eurobarometer question on satisfaction with democracy are strongly correlated to 
satisfaction with government, or party preference, or economic optimism, then they 
are more likely to measure specific output support rather than diffuse regime support. 
This is because diffuse support is characterised by fundamentality, durability and its
1 89independence from fluctuations in specific support. The data from the 
Eurobarometer survey on satisfaction with democracy are depicted in fig.3.3 below.
181 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 163
182 Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, op. cit.. p.332
183 Easton (75), op. cit.. p.445
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Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works in Britain
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The data reveal noticeable fluctuations in satisfaction levels, but within an overall 
percentage band of no more than about fifteen points and at a very substantial average 
level of satisfaction of over 50%. However, Fuchs et al draw attention to a significant 
regional variation when extrapolating the responses given by Ulster interviewees. 
Starting from very low satisfaction levels of around 25% in 1976, there is a gradual, if 
highly fluctuating, increase in satisfaction with democracy towards a value of around 
40% in 1991.185 When counting the Province separately from the rest of Britain, 
Fuchs et al calculate a mean satisfaction rate over the period 1976-1991 of 59% for 
Britain and a mere 35% for Northern Ireland.
Fuchs et al also correlate the Eurobarometer survey with the party allegiance of 
respondents. As with interviewees in all the other member states, British respondents 
who were at the same time supporters of the party in government were more satisfied 
with the way democracy worked in the UK. The variance in satisfaction between 
government and opposition supporters in Britain amounts to remarkable 32.5 
percentage points - one of the highest of all the countries surveyed by
1 87Eurobarometer. Since these data derive from surveys conducted mostly during the 
1980s, the explanations for this striking satisfaction gap offered by Fuchs et al (large
184 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. pp. 19-34, and subsequent issues.
185 Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, op. cit.. p.338
186 Ibid., p.341
187 Ibid, p.345
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ideological divisions between both parties and Labour’s decade-long inability to win
1 HRgeneral elections) sound plausible.
Qualitative analysis supports the hypothesis that in particular during the 1980s and 
early 90s a significant section of British society was dissatisfied with the political 
regime rather than merely with the outputs its produced. The long era of Conservative 
governments pursuing far-reaching institutional reform and policy change has 
highlighted the potential political implications of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, namely the inability of other constitutional actors such as the law courts 
or even the House of Lords to balance significantly the political will of the House of 
Commons.
The potential for strong policy leadership by central government, an adversarial 
political culture and the ideological divisions between the two main parties during the 
1980s will all have contributed to the negative impact on felt legitimacy. The most 
striking example of this development were the violent public demonstrations against 
the Community Charge in 1990. The Britons who took to the streets that year did not 
accord legitimacy to Parliament’s power to charge taxes, and they vented their anger 
in the streets because they perceived no opportunity to seek redress from within the 
political system. On a far smaller scale, similar phenomena could be observed on a 
number of occasions during the 1990s, be it street blockades against the export of live 
stock or the unlawful encampments at road-building sites.
A good indicator of public disillusionment with their domestic political institutions is 
another survey which asks to what extent people feel they can rely on their own 
national parliament and government to make decisions which are in the interest of 
people like themselves (see fig.3.4).
188 Ibid., p.346
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Two features are striking about this set of data, although it covers too short a time 
period to allow long-term trends to be visible. For the first three years, confidence in 
British political institutions is lower than the Europe-wide average (in 1994, for 
instance, the mean value of all the fifteen member states amounts to 44% for national 
governments and 46% for national parliaments).190 Since the election of a Labour 
government for the first time in 18 years and the defeat of a very unpopular 
Conservative administration in 1997, British trust in both Westminster and Whitehall 
has rebounded. It even exceeded the European average of 37% for national 
governments and 40% for national parliaments in late 1997. Second, confidence in 
parliament is nearly always higher than the belief in the reliability of government, 
except for 1997.
A continuing public attachment to the idea of a sovereign and independent Parliament 
functioning as the “great inquest of the nation” may be a plausible explanation for the 
higher level of confidence placed in Westminster. Scandals which have tarnished this 
image, on the other hand, such as the so-called “cash-for-questions” affair may have 
contributed to government being the better trusted political institution in 1997. 
However, comparison with past trends and the experience of other European countries 
suggests this development to be of a temporary nature only. When recently low, but 
fluctuating, levels of specific support are discounted, diffuse support for the political
189 Eurobarometer no.42, (Brussels: European Commission, 1995), p.B28, and subsequent issues.
190 Ibid.. p.B28
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regime remains strong. This analysis is confirmed by high levels of pride in Britain’s 
political institutions which were seen to be a major factor explaining comparatively 
strong feelings of general national pride in Britain. As discussed above, political 
institutions such as a sovereign Parliament and the Monarchy are still closely bound 
up with Britain’s national identity which means that diffuse regime and community 
support are mutually reinforcing.
The question arises how recent constitutional reforms and continuing European 
integration, whose cumulative effect is to dilute the distinctive character of the UK’s 
political institutions, will affect diffuse support for the political regime. Despite the 
popularity of individual reforms such as devolution, taken together they threaten to 
undermine the core principle of the British constitution as well as an important 
element of Britain’s national identity. It remains questionable whether the UK’s 
political culture and its sense of identity would easily adapt to such a radical 
constitutional transformation. Replacing the historically evolved, fundamental core of 
Britain’s formal legitimacy with new constitutional principles may therefore cause a 
backlash in felt legitimacy.
3.3.3 Political Authorities
The most straightforward measures of specific support for the political authorities are 
opinion surveys on popular satisfaction with the government of the day. An analysis 
of these data sets helps to confirm the hypothesis that substantial political change 
coupled with long-standing political domination by the Conservative Party has 
affected public evaluations of satisfaction with democracy (see fig.3.5).
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Remarkably, the 1997 election of a Labour Government marks the first time for 
almost a decade where a greater proportion of the electorate was satisfied with the 
government than not. Even at the time of the 1992 election, which saw a return of the 
incumbent administration, there was a net-dissatisfaction of ten percentage points.
Notwithstanding, voter turnout at general elections has consistently held up at around 
74% which indicates that the electorate has retained its faith in the democratic 
system.192 After all, participation in elections has often been viewed as one of the 
most active forms of legitimating a political system.193 While some respondents may 
therefore be genuinely dissatisfied with a political system that consistently fails to 
return a government of their own political persuasion, the consistently high election 
turnouts and the impact of party allegiance suggest that evaluations of satisfaction 
with democracy at least partly measure specific rather than diffuse support. A 
comparison with another Eurobarometer survey, this time on personal expectations for 
year ahead, might help to shed yet more light on the degree to which fluctuations in 
satisfaction with democracy might be influenced by the economic cycle (see fig.3.6).
191 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol. 14, no. 10, 1991, p.2, and subsequent issues.
192 Source: House of Commons Library. For more details, see: Fig.5.6, p. 193
193 Beetham (91), op. cit.. p.92
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Better Worse Same
Juxtaposing the graph representing Britons expecting the year ahead to be better for 
them personally with fig.3.3 depicting satisfaction with the way democracy works in 
Britain, the evidence is ambiguous. For the first few years of the 1980s satisfaction 
with democracy declined before rebounding dramatically from about 1983 onwards. 
Future expectations for that period are relatively low throughout the first half of the 
1980s with the exception of a short-lived euphoria in 1982.
However, if one compares the decade from about 1985 to 1995 there seems to be a 
broad correlation between future personal expectations and the levels of satisfaction 
with democracy. Both graphs experience a decline towards the end of the 1980s, to be 
followed by a significant rise between the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1991. 
Subsequently, another decline sets in which is arrested towards the end of the year 
1993. It can be concluded that respondents evaluating their satisfaction with 
democracy seem to be at least weakly influenced by their attitudes towards specific 
outputs, such as economic well-being. The attitudinal object of this Eurobarometer 
survey thus appears to be a hybrid between diffuse regime evaluation and specific 
output support.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has provided one distinct national perspective from which the legitimacy 
of the EU can be studied. The first part identified the central features of formal 
legitimacy in the UK which have a low constitutional fit with the EU.
The primacy and supremacy of EU law challenges the sovereignty of Parliament and 
hence the unitary structure of Britain’s formal legitimacy. EU membership has 
strengthened the role of the courts and, indirectly, generated pressure for the 
devolution of political power towards subnational government. On the other hand, 
Parliament has struggled to adapt to EU membership, which reinforces its structural 
domination by the executive. Also, the scrutiny of EU legislation requires a 
consensual and bargaining policy-making style that differs from Britain’s adversarial, 
debate-oriented political culture. The effect of EU membership and recent 
constitutional reforms like devolution and the Human Rights Act has been to modify 
Britain’s formal legitimacy by diluting the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to 
the point of threatening to undermine the fundamental aspects of Britain’s formal 
legitimacy.
Such a development may endanger the felt legitimacy of the British constitution 
because, for historical reasons, parliamentary sovereignty has come to be equated with 
national sovereignty and has formed an important part of political culture and national 
identity. The second part of the chapter has revealed that the British political system 
enjoys high levels of felt legitimacy. Diffuse support for the political regime has 
experienced a temporary decline during the 1980s, but this trend appears to have been 
reversed in the past few years. A well-established national identity, which has been 
built on Britain’s historic exceptionalism and the fusion of national with 
parliamentary sovereignty, remains reflected in high levels of national attachment and 
pride, but coincides with growing nationalism within the component parts of the UK. 
The legitimacy of the UK as one political unit is now questioned by a significant 
minority among Scots. Ulster is a special case in all three categories of felt legitimacy, 
and its future within the UK remains much more uncertain than Scotland’s.
194 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. p.234, and subsequent issues.
Chapter Four 138
Chapter Four: Formal and Felt Legitimacy of the FRG
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a second national reference point from which the legitimacy of 
the EU can be analysed. Germany’s formal and felt legitimacy differs in some 
significant respects from that of Britain which means that the nature of the challenges 
which arise from EU membership differ as well. This chapter argues that the 
Germany’s political system is more compatible with European integration than the 
UK because there is a good constitutional and cultural fit between the FRG and the 
EU. The differences and contrasts between the two case studies of Britain and 
Germany will help to demonstrate in chapter five how the EU’s legitimacy varies with 
the distinct national contexts of its member states. Retaining the format of the last 
chapter, the first section examines the distinct characteristics of Germany’s formal 
legitimacy and the challenges they have faced from EU membership. The second 
section analyses the felt legitimacy of the German political system.
4.2.1 Formal Legitimacy: Constitutional Philosophy
Differences in the formal legitimacy of Britain and Germany originate in distinct 
constitutional philosophies. Unlike the UK, Germany’s constitutional philosophy is 
rooted strongly in the state tradition of Western Europe.1 As in the history of many 
other continental European countries, the evolution of German jurisprudence was 
heavily influenced by the Roman law tradition. This offered the legal basis for the 
state-building process by which post-medieval Europe sought to respond to internal 
and external political challenges. Law was conceived of, and developed as, the 
articulation of the state, enumerating the principles according to which public power 
is exercised. This later gave rise to an interpretation of the state as an abstract, 
impersonal entity with a clearly defined Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk and Staatsgewalt 
(territory, people and central authority). The state became a formally recognised legal
1 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p.28-36
2 Ibid.. p .41
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entity, subject to its own distinct norms and procedures and comprising a whole range 
of political institutions.
The relationship between rulers and subjects was regulated with recourse to the 
Roman law distinction between private and public law, and special administrative 
courts began to adjudicate the emerging body of public law. Concern with the validity 
and legality of state action gave rise to the doctrine of the Rechtsstaat which seeks to 
ensure regularity and uniformity in the exercise of power and to protect the 
inviolability of the legal order.4 Academic lawyers sought to devise a legal system 
characterised by precision, a preference for rational logic over historical experience 
and a strict hierarchy of the sources of law.5 While these aspects of the West 
European state tradition are reflected in Germany’s constitutional philosophy, two 
distinctive features set it apart from the development of other continental states.
First, the perversion of the concept of the Rechtsstaat during the Third Reich led to 
the adoption of a heavily normative theory of natural law and a rejection of legal 
positivism. The latter’s separation of law from morality was widely perceived to have 
helped totalitarianism maintain the pretence of abiding by the rule of law.6 The legal 
philosophy underlying modem German constitutional thought conceptually merges 
law and morality by making the former conform to the external moral norms of 
natural law. It was felt that the Germany’s post-war legal system needs moral content 
in order to be able to function as a protection against dictatorship. Claiming to be 
based on reason alone, natural law jurisprudence aspires to moral objectivism. Natural 
law theory operates on the principle that lex iniusta non est lex. At its heart lies the 
liberal idea of certain universally valid and inviolable human rights which any 
legitimate constitutional order must respect and give protection through the courts. 
Such rights are deemed essential for the development of human individuality and self- 
determination.
3 Ibid.. pp.34,40-42
4 Nevil Johnson: State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
2nd ed. 1983), pp. 13-17
5 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p .l08ff
6 Johnson (83), op. cit.. p. 16
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Second, the emphasis on natural law theory implies that another jurisprudential 
doctrine considered open to political abuse, legal sovereignty, was similarly shunned 
in the design of the German post-war constitution. German jurisprudence follows the 
tradition of the French revolution which stipulates that all power vested in the state 
emanates from the deliberate decision by “the people”. But it has rejected the notion 
of an all-encompassing and unconstrained popular sovereign. German constitutional 
law thus embodies two, potentially contradictory, jurisprudential doctrines: the 
egalitarian concept of popular sovereignty and natural law theory.
The German constitution, the Basic Law, reflects the competition between these two 
doctrines. Its article 20/2 stipulates that all exercise of state authority, including the 
framing of the constitution, must be derived from and made accountable to the people 
(iStaatsvolk). Legitimacy is conferred through free, secret and equal elections to the 
German parliament which, to give substance to the notion of popular sovereignty,
A
must exercise “a prevailing influence over the exercise of state power”. But the 
popular sovereign is not omnicompetent. Its scope is restricted by the moral principles 
of natural law which declare absolute and eternal the constitutional protection of those 
individual rights and freedoms that might suffer under an unconstrained tyranny of the 
majority.9 Explicitly protected are articles 1 and 20 which declare the Federal 
Republic a democratic and social federal state based on the rule of law and inviolable 
human rights. In its interpretation of art.79, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
furthermore declared immutable the principles of popular sovereignty, separation of 
powers, government accountability, the multi-party system and judicial 
independence.10
These provisions follow Fichte’s dictum that the people have no right to change their 
constitution if it is rational (according to the criteria of rationality employed by the 
natural law school!).11 Another example of the competition between popular 
sovereignty and natural law theory is the power of the FCC to overturn legislation
7 Gunnar Folke Schuppert: “The Constituent Power”, in: Christian Starck (ed.): Main Principles o f the 
German Basic Law. (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1983), p.38
8 Eckart Klein and Thomas Giegerich: “The Parliamentary Democracy”, in: Ulrich Karpen: The 
Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Germany. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), p. 146
9 This is the so-called “Ewigkeitsgarantie”, or “perpetuity clause” contained in Art.79/3 BL, Schuppert, 
op. cit.. pp.46-47
10 Ibid.. p.47
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from the “political representatives of popular sovereignty” (i.e. parliament) if they 
violate the natural law principles embodied in the Basic Law. The idea that popular 
sovereignty must be held in constitutional check to preserve individual liberties is 
seen as a solution to the inevitable conflict between personal freedom and 
parliamentary majoritarianism.12
In that sense the constitution, rather than the people, is sovereign, and the exact scope
11of popular sovereignty is indeed contested. Popular sovereignty was not even 
exercised when the Basic Law was adopted because it was never subjected to a 
referendum.14 However, the Constitutional Court has declared the Basic Law is 
legitimate and in accordance with popular sovereignty because it embodies the socio­
political values of the German people.15 Constitutional lawyers like Kriele argue that 
the people only enjoy the powers assigned to them in the constitution. If they were to 
exceed them, they would thereby abolish the constitutional state.16 Such thinking 
reflects a general opposition to the concept of indivisible sovereignty which is often 
associated with tyrannical majoritarianism rather than the pouvoir constituant of the
1 7social contract. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Basic Law does not even conceive
1 ftof an ultimate sovereign.
By refusing to regard sovereignty as indivisible, German jurisprudence has removed 
the conceptual difficulties which hamper a systematic separation of powers under the 
British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. A diffusion of sovereignty not only 
enabled the erection of strong judicial checks and balances. It is equally reflected in 
the long-standing constitutional practice of organising Germany as a federal state, 
which marks it off from the state traditions of most other large European countries.19 
A unified German nation state only emerged in 1871 out of a loose confederation 
among numerous kingdoms and principalities and, except for the duration of the Third
11 Fichte quoted in: Abromeit (95), op. cit.. p.52
12 Ulrich Karpen: “Application o f the Basic Law”, in: Christian Starck (ed.): Main Principles o f the 
German Basic Law. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983), p.59
13 Abromeit (95), op. cit.. p.59
14 Ibid.. p.59
15 Schuppert, op. cit.. p.43
16 Martin Kriele: Einftihnmg in die Staatslehre: Die geschichtlichen Legitimitatsgrundlagen des 
demokratischen Verfassungsstaates. (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1975)
17 Abromeit (95), op. cit.. p.51
18 Ibid., p.59
19 Dyson (80), o p . cit.. p. 115
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Reich, Germany has never been a unitary state. Finally, in the absence of an 
indivisible sovereign German statehood is also open to the possibility of supranational 
integration.21
In conclusion, Germany’s constitutional philosophy is based on Roman law and the 
state tradition of Western Europe, but the emphasis on natural law and a conception of 
sovereignty as divisible also differentiates Germany from that tradition. This distinct 
constitutional philosophy has given rise to a formal legitimacy marked by a diffusion 
of sovereignty and institutional pluralism.22 These characteristics are reflected in the 
supreme position of the Basic Law and the FCC, Germany’s federal structure, the 
relationship between executive and legislature and Germany’s political culture. There 
is a good “fit” between Germany’s institutional structure and cultural norms and the 
EU which means that Germany’s formal legitimacy faces different, and often less 
severe, challenges from EU membership than in the British case. The nature of these 
challenges can be illustrated by examining the central features of Germany’s formal 
legitimacy below.
4.2.2 Formal Legitimacy: Central Features and the Impact of EU Membership
The Supreme Constitutional Status of the Basic Law and Judicial Review
The supremacy of the Basic Law and the pivotal constitutional role of the FCC as its 
authoritative interpreter and guardian are the most visible reflection of the (horizontal) 
diffusion of sovereignty that characterises Germany’s formal legitimacy. The Court 
derives indirect democratic legitimacy from the fact that its members are elected
'J'Xjointly by the two chambers of parliament. Positioned at the pinnacle of the judicial 
structure, the FCC interprets the Basic Law, settles disputes between the federation 
and the Lander and rules upon the constitutionality of statutes upon appeals from 
citizens (constitutional complaint), the Federal President, the Federal Government, 
Bundestag, Bundesrat or the Lander. Unlike with British courts, decisions of the
20 Johnson (83), op. cit.. pp.3-9
21 Abromeit (95), op. cit.. p.64
22 Simon Bulmer and William Paterson: The Federal Republic o f Germany and the European 
Community. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 17
23 Arts.93 and 94, Basic Law
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Constitutional Court are binding for all state authority and cannot be overturned by 
subsequent legislation. In ruling on the compatibility of a statute with the constitution 
the Court can make reference to certain normative natural law principles that inform 
the spirit of the Basic Law.24
This has created ample scope for an ever more expansive interpretation of the Court’s 
powers, leading to its metamorphosis from being the guardian towards becoming the 
master of the constitution.25 Its importance in the German political system has 
acquired a dimension where “much of the political history of the Federal Republic, 
both in domestic and international affairs, and many important chapters of its social 
and economic history can be written through the Court judgements.” Although it 
generally enjoys a high degree of moral authority among the population, its 
judgements have on occasions proven controversial. Indeed, the powers of the FCC 
itself have been subject to sometimes fundamental academic and political criticism
77throughout its history. Two criticisms have been raised consistently over the years. 
First, its extensive interpretation of its own powers results in highly political questions 
being settled by the Court, which instead should belong to the domain of parliaments 
accountable to the electorate. Second, politicisation of the Court only serves to 
undermine its status as independent legal arbiter by exposing it to partisan political 
conflict. Despite various suggestions for reform, most commentators would already be 
satisfied with a behavioural departure from the judicial activism the FCC has 
displayed over recent decades.28
The constitutional centrality of the FCC and the supreme status of the Basic Law itself 
have been challenged by EU membership and, for a time, German reunification. As in 
Britain, the primacy of EU law has meant that a supranational court adjudicates on the 
compatibility of German legislation - and indeed the Basic Law itself - with the 
European legal order.29 Unlike Britain, this has not given rise to fundamental 
incompatibilities between the formal legitimacies of the FRG and the EU. Since the
24 Schuppert, op. cit.. p.47
25 Klaus H. Goetz: “The Federal Constitutional Court”, in: Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson and 
Steven Padgett (eds.): Developments in German Politics 2. (London: Macmillan, 1996a), p.97
26 IbkL, p. 102
27 For a very balanced overview see: Ulrich R. Haltem: “High Time for a Check-Up: Progressivism, 
Populism, and Constitutional Review in Germany”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Papers, no.5/1996
28 Goetz (96a) o p . cit.. p. 106
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drafters of the Basic Law rejected the notion of a unitary sovereign, post-war German 
jurisprudence conceives of sovereignty as diffused rather than indivisible. With regard 
to EU membership, this diffusion of sovereignty is reflected in art.24 of the Basic 
Law. Art.24 plays the crucial role of “integration lever” because it permits the transfer 
of legal authority to international organisations on a statutory basis without requiring 
constitutional amendments. The provisions of art.24 and the Basic Law’s commitment 
in its Preamble to a “united Europe” have hence been characterised as a “commitment 
to open statehood”.30
Whenever the FCC ruled on the constitutionality of Germany’s EC/EU membership it 
was more concerned with the protection of constitutional norms rather than the 
protection of an active sovereign. The court repeatedly stipulated that the integration 
process must not undermine the essential core of the Basic Law on the grounds that 
art.79/3 BL protects forever Germany’s federal structure and the fundamental rights 
and principles of the Basic Law.32 When European integration assumed a new quality 
with the ratification of the TEU, it was felt that art.24 on its own had become an 
insufficient constitutional foundation to support the integration process in the future. 
The occasion for an adaptation of the Basic Law to redefine the constitutional 
relationship with the EU arose in the wake of German reunification.
To some extent, the demise of the GDR presented a challenge to the Basic Law itself, 
since the Treaty of Unification could have taken recourse to art. 146 BL which 
suggested the adoption of an altogether new constitution. In the end, the Kohl 
government favoured an accession of the East German Lander to the FRG on the basis 
of art.23 BL, which made wholesale constitutional change redundant. A “Joint 
Constitutional Commission” of Bundestag and Bundesrat was subsequently appointed 
to study the options for more limited reform of the Basic Law.34 The Commission
29 Goetz and Cullen, op. cit.. p.25
30 Christian Rath: “Die unionswartige Gewalt des Deutschen Bundestages. Zur verfassungsrechtlichen 
Legitimation des gemeinschaftlichen Rechtssetzungsprozesses”, in: Zeitschrift filr Parlamentsfragen. 
vol.25, no.l (Sonderband), 1995, p. 124
31 Abromeit (95), op. cit.. p.64
32 For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 5. pp.l89ff
33 Goetz and Cullen, op. cit.. p. 10
34 Peter J. Cullen and Klaus H. Goetz: “Concluding Theses on Constitutional Policy in Unified 
Germany”, in: Klaus H. Goetz and Peter J. Cullen (eds.): Constitutional Policy in Unified Germany. 
(London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 166-67
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suggested only minor constitutional amendments, which may reflect a historically- 
induced reluctance to tamper with a stable constitutional framework that enjoys 
widespread public support (“constitutional patriotism”).35 But the lack of any 
substantial amendments to the Basic Law is equally attributable to the institutional 
checks and balances of Germany’s formal legitimacy which militate against 
constitutional reform. After all, political opinion was split and some, notably among 
the SPD and many East Germans, had hoped for more far-reaching modifications.36 
They were particularly disappointed that the reform of the Basic Law did not include 
a relaxation of the near-ban on federal referenda or other plebiscitary devices which 
had been discussed by the Constitutional Commission.
The Commission’s most significant proposals concern the adaptation of the Basic
Law to the process of European integration. Since the old art.23 BL had become
obsolete once reunification was completed, it was rewritten to reinforce and clarify
the “integration-geared” character of the Basic Law. The new Article reaffirms the
Germany’s commitment to participate in the development of the EU towards a united
Europe, but it ties this participation to certain conditions. The constitutionality of
European integration is now explicitly subject to the “eternity clause” of art.79/3 BL
in order to accommodate the concerns of the FCC. The new art.23 further stipulates a
development of the EU in congruence with the democratic, law-governed, social and
10federative fundamental principles of the Basic Law.
Although intended to resolve inherent conflicts between the Basic Law and European 
integration, the subsequent judicial interpretation of art.23 may create more problems 
than they solve. For example, the FCC rather boldly implied in its Maastricht 
judgement that in any future development of the EU is constrained by the German 
interpretations of democracy, federalism, the Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat principle.40
35 Ekkart Zimmermann: “Germany”, in: Roger Eatwell (ed.): European Political Cultures - Conflict or 
Convergence?. (London: Routledge, 1997), p.93
36 Goetz and Cullen, o p . cit.. p .l3 f
37 Ibid.. p.31
38 Georg Ress: “The Constitution and the Maastricht Treaty: Between Co-operation and Conflict”, in: 
Klaus H. Goetz and Peter J. Cullen (eds.): Constitutional Policy in Unified Germany. (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995), pp.48-51
39 Other provisions include the domestic participation o f Bundestag, Bundesrat and Lander in the 
legislative process o f the EU which will be discussed below.
40 Cullen and Goetz, op. cit.. pp. 171
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So far, the FCC has been satisfied that European integration is compatible with the 
Basic Law and that the conditions of art.23 are thus met.41 While the judgement 
leaves the door open for a more critical future assessment, it is unrealistic to imagine 
that the Court would obstruct EU reforms on the grounds that they may not conform 
to the FCC’s interpretation of the provisions of art.23. A more likely development is 
for the Court either to adopt a very wide interpretation of the article or to choose to 
ignore it in future rulings.42 Importantly, constitutional compatibility hinges on the 
future nature of the EU rather than the fact that the EU limits the legal sovereignty of 
the Federal Republic. Unlike the UK, there is only a conditional incompatibility 
between the formal legitimacies of the FRG and the EU because the “genetic code” of 
Germany’s formal legitimacy, the Basic Law, has always been programmed towards 
supranational integration.43
The good constitutional fit between Germany and the EU has also been enhanced by 
attempts to project domestic constitutional norms at the European level.44 One 
example for this practice are the conditions for the future development of the EU 
contained in art.23 of the Basic Law, another the German push for the incorporation 
of a Charter of Basic Rights into the EU Treaties45 The latter is particularly 
significant, since in its rulings on the compatibility of the EU with the Basic Law the 
FCC has been more concerned about constitutional norms, such as protection of 
fundamental human rights, than the transfer of sovereignty as such.46 These 
continuous efforts to enhance the in-built compatibility of the Basic Law with 
European integration have helped to manage the challenges of EU membership for 
other aspects of Germany’s formal legitimacy as well.
41 Ress, op. cit.. pp.60f, 65
42 Goetz and Cullen, op. cit.. p.35f
43 Klaus H. Goetz: “Integration Policy in a Europeanised State: Germany and the Intergovernmental 
Conference”, Journal o f European Public Policy, vol.3, no.l, 1996, p.37
44 Simon Bulmer: “Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics o f the European Union and German 
Power”, in: Peter Katzenstein (ed.): Tamed Power - Germany in Europe. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), p.67
45 For recent proposals by Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to adopt a European Charter of  
Basic Rights, see: “Fischer in Warning On Euro Stability”, Financial Times. 22/1/1999, p.2, “Bill o f  
Rights Plan to Unite Europe”, The Daily Telegraph. 22/1/1999, p.14
46 See: Chanter 5. pp. 189ff
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The Federal Dimension
If the pivotal constitutional role of the FCC symbolises the horizontal division of 
sovereignty, then Germany’s federal structure is legitimised by applying the “checks- 
and-balances” principle vertically through a geographical dispersal of constitutional 
power. Each of the sixteen sub-federal states (Lander) have their own elected 
parliament and government exercising a number of original governing powers.47 This 
is to protect against the centralisation and potential abuse of state power by the federal 
government which had occurred during the Third Reich.48 Additionally, there is a 
traditional legitimacy for federalism which was a characteristic of most previous 
German constitutions. As Watts points out, the federalism of the Basic Law is not 
founded upon the need to accommodate significant regional ethnic or cultural 
divisions 49 The framers of the Basic Law could therefore opt for a modernised 
version of the typically German “horizontal federalism” which - rather than leaving 
large original legislative powers for the Lander - dispersed the exercise of federal 
executive (and some legislative) powers. Horizontal or “co-operative” federalism is 
characterised by the fact that the federal and regional level of government are to a 
great extent interdependent because their competencies are “interwoven” 
(Kompetenzverflechtung).50
First, state governments are represented in the second chamber of the federal 
parliament, the Bundesrat, whose approval is needed for all federal legislation 
affecting the Lander.51 Successive judicial decisions have widened the scope of 
Bundesrat involvement to about sixty per-cent of federal legislation, even including 
minor amendments to existing statutes.52 Second, the implementation of most federal 
legislation is carried out by the Lander administrations which operate independent of
47 However, “federal law shall take precedence over Land law.” See: Art.31 Basic Law
48 Klein and Giegerich, op. cit.. pp. 147-48, see also: Eckart Klein: “The Concept o f the Basic Law”, in: 
Christian Starck (ed.): Main Principles o f the German Basic Law. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983),
pp. 15-37
Ronald Watts: “West German Federalism: Comparative Perspectives”, in: Charlie Jeffery and Peter 
Savigear (eds.): German Federalism Today. (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp.23-39
50 Fritz W. Scharpf: Optionen des Fdderalismus in Deutschland und Europa. (Frankfurt: Campus 
Verlag, 1994), pp.46-47
51 Art.50, Basic Law
52 Roland Sturm and Charlie Jeffery: “German Unity, European Integration and the Future o f the 
Federal System: Revival or Permanent Loss o f Substance?”, in: Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm 
(eds.): Federalism. Unification and European Integration. (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 165
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federal supervision (“administrative federalism”), thus severely curtailing the scope of 
the federal government’s executive and administrative powers. A third important 
feature of German federalism is the pooling of tax revenue between the three levels of 
government (local, state and federal), rather than allocating the income generated by 
particular taxes to one particular level of government.
This interdependence between the Federal Government and the Lander was further 
institutionalised as a consequence of the constitutional reforms of the late 1960s, 
establishing so-called Joint Tasks for both levels of government.54 Special procedures 
were drawn up for the creation of detailed legislation, planning and finance in a whole 
range of Joint Task areas, such as higher education, agricultural policy and regional 
economic development. Accompanied by a creeping expansion of Bonn’s powers in 
the field of concurrent legislation, the Joint Task legislation “saw the Lander 
governments gradually drawn into an increasingly centralised policy process in which 
their functions became ‘interlocked’ with those of the federal government.”55 This 
trend has gradually deprived the Lander of the capacity for independent political and 
economic policy-making. At the same time, the Federation has become highly 
dependent on securing agreement on policy with the Lander. The expanding powers 
of the Bundesrat and the prevalent political convention, if not legal stipulation, of 
unanimous decision-making in Joint Tasks areas has handed the Lander increasing 
veto power over policy proposals.56
While the problems arising from this increasingly interlocked policy-making have 
given rise to internal challenges for German federalism, the impact of EU 
membership has presented important external challenges. Externally, EU membership 
has challenged German federalism because it began to erode the constitutional 
autonomy and powers of the Lander. The gradual transfer of Lander competencies to 
European institutions was not initially compensated with Lander participation in the 
European policy-making process. Consequently, European integration amounted to an
53 Art.84, Basic Law
54 Art.91a/b, Basic Law
55 Sturm and Jeffery, op. cit.. p. 165
56 Simon Bulmer: “Unity, Diversity and Stability: The ‘Efficient Secrets’ Behind West German Public 
Policy”, in: Simon Bulmer (ed.): The Changing Agenda o f West German Public Policy. (Aldershot: 
Darthmouth, 1989), p.21f
57 Bulmer and Paterson, op. cit.. p .l88ff
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indirect centralisation of power in the Federation because the Federal Government, by 
virtue of its presence in the Council of Ministers, retained legislative iihfluence over 
the policy areas transferred from the Lander. In response to this extemtal challenge, 
the Lander have primarily sought to bolster their influence over EU ptolicy-making 
through their constitutional position in the Bundesrat. Immediately upon accession in 
1957 the Bundesrat introduced an EC Committee which has generally been 
comprehensively briefed by the Federal Government on new EU draft legislation.58 
Although the influence of its resolutions on Germany’s negotiating position has often 
been limited, the Bundesrat could exercise a degree of indirect, infcririal influence 
over the Federal Government as a consequence of its veto power over large areas of 
domestic legislation.
This veto power was also employed at the time of the Maastricht Treaty whose 
domestic implementation required Bundesrat approval. The Lander could therefore 
negotiate a significant enhancement of their EU policy-making influence to redress 
the federal balance of power.59 The revised art.23 BL empowers the Bundesrat to 
participate in the Government’s formulation of EU policy to the extent that the 
Lander’s interests and competencies are affected. In cases of disagreement, a two- 
thirds Bundesrat majority can bind the Federation to the Lander’s negotiating position 
on particular EU policies. In areas where the Lander enjoy exclusive legislative 
powers, they can even exercise the Government’s voting rights in the Council of 
Ministers.60 The Lander have also been instrumental in lobbying for the Committee of 
the Regions and the subsidiarity clause which were both introduced in the TEU.61
In short, the Lander have been successful in adapting to the external challenge of EU 
membership, and their success can be measured at both the domestic and the 
European level. Domestically, the Lander have been able to integrate EU policy­
making into the constitutional structures of co-operative federalism.. The new art.23 
replicates the characteristics of domestic policy-making, such as the interdependence 
between federal and sub-federal government and the need for a high degree of inter-
58 Dietrich Rometsch: “The Federal Republic o f Germany”, in: Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang 
Wessels (eds.): The European Union and Member States - Towards Institutional Fusion?, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996), pp.86
59 Ibid., p.88
60 Art.23/6, Basic Law
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Lander co-ordination. At the European level, the Lander have secured a new regional 
dimension to the EU’s institutional framework. The Committee of the Regions 
extends the role and influence of the Lander beyond the domestic constitutional 
context and enables them to operate independently at the European level. These 
developments amount to a Europeanisation of Germany’s federal system which has 
enhanced the already significant institutional congruence between the FRG and the 
EU. After all, both are characterised by an intergovernmental sharing of powers and 
a system of vertical and horizontal joint policy-making where executives dominate 
and policy implementation is carried out by subnational administrations.
Adaptation of Germany’s federal structure to the external challenge of EU 
membership has thus reinforced the institutional characteristics of Germany’s co­
operative federalism which have themselves become the subject of internal challenges 
within the Federal Republic. First, there has been increasing criticism against the 
democratic deficiencies of interlocked policy-making which came to be known as 
Politikverflechtung.64 Democratically, co-operative federalism facilitates the 
domination of policy-making processes by the political and administrative executives, 
thereby undermining parliamentary influence or control.65 The governments 
participating in joint decisions not only escape the scrutiny of their own parliaments. 
Every single government on its own can deny specific electoral responsibility for the 
joint decisions pursued with reference to constraints imposed by intergovernmental 
bargaining.66 Joint decision systems also seem to obstruct their own institutional 
evolution. This was clearly illustrated in the 1980s when the Kohl administration 
found it impossible to “unlock” German federalism by overcoming the constitutional 
hurdle necessary to remove art.91 from the Basic Law.
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63 Fritz W. Scharpf: “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration”, Public Administration, vol. 66, no.3, 1988, p.243ff
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Second, the unity of purpose between richer and poorer Lander on which the effective 
functioning of co-operative federalism depends gradually waned during the 1980s, 
heralding a rather disruptive phase of “litigious federalism”.69 More prosperous states 
appealed to the FCC against the established method of financial equalisation amongst 
German states. The inter-state conflict has rapidly increased with the accession of the 
five economically weak East German Lander to the Federal Republic in 1990. These 
developments have evoked predictions of the emergence of a “two-class federalism” 
in which economically strong states will increasingly pursue independent policies 
while Berlin will exert centralising pressure on poor Lander appealing to financial 
support from the federation.70
Third, co-operative federalism enjoys a decreasing degree of felt legitimacy and is
*71held in low esteem by the political class, the media and the general public. Years of 
mutual blockade over major political reform projects have been accompanied by long- 
winded, but ultimately fruitless attempts at conciliation between Bundestag and 
Bundesrat. Joint task policies (for instance on university education) have discredited 
themselves for their lack of vision or substance. The general disenchantment is 
reinforced by a slightly weakened public attachment to the goal of social 
harmonisation (partly because reunification has made full fiscal equality unachievable 
for some time to come).72 There is also a widespread perception of the financial 
equalisation system as cumbersome, inefficient and a disincentive to Lander reform. 
This has motivated some Lander to start what could turn into a new phase of litigious 
federalism.
Despite these internal challenges and the difficulties surrounding the integration of the 
five new Lander of Eastern Germany, the Joint Constitutional Commission suggested 
only minor constitutional amendments which amounted to a “non-reform” of German
69 Ibid.. p,166f
70 Heidrun Abromeit: Per verkappte Einheitsstaat. (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1992), p.81ff
71 See for instance: “Nichts geht mehr”, Per Spiegel, no.32,4/8/1998, p.63, or: “Fdderalismus in der 
Sackgasse”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 17/8/1998, p .10
72 Witness for instance the recent debate about the appropriate level and duration o f the so-called 
“Solidarity Surcharge” levied on top of income tax to finance East German reconstruction.
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federalism.74 Apart from the rewording of art.23, amendments to art.74, 75 and 80 
brought about a minor reallocation of competencies in favour of the Lander, 
especially in the area of concurrent powers. Consequently, there are still calls for a
nc
comprehensive constitutional reform of federalism , and both CDU and F.D.P. 
included demands for a reform of the federal structure in their manifestos for the 1998 
federal election.
In conclusion, German federalism has successfully adapted to the external challenge 
of European integration, but it has done so on the basis of an institutional structure 
which is facing increasing internal challenges. This raises the question whether the 
Lander’s ability to participate in European policy-making will suffer from the same 
problems that have challenged co-operative federalism in domestic policy-making. In 
particular, the new provisions for Lander participation threaten to exacerbate the 
institutional complexity of Germany’s European policy-making. If all Lander began to 
use their extensive new rights to the full (which many have not had the resources to 
do), the degree of consensus and policy co-ordination required may complicate the 
formulation of Germany’s European policy to an extent that it risks becoming 
immobilist, reactive and incoherent.77 Second, the growing divergence of interests 
between rich and poor as well as Eastern and Western Lander begins to extend to the 
European dimension as well, thus undermining the inter-state consensus necessary for
78an effective operation of the provisions of art.23. Third, the provisions of art.23 
reinforce the executive dominance of Germany’s co-operative federalism because 
they require close co-operation between the Federal and Lander governments. Joint 
policy-making in EU affairs marginalises democratic institutions because it hinders
7Qeffective parliamentary scrutiny by the Bundestag or the Landtage.
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Without the prospect for any large-scale constitutional reform of German federalism, 
the emergence of a “territorially differentiated policy regime”, in the domestic as well 
as the European arena, will contribute to the gradual “unlocking” of the current over-
OA
rigid institutional arrangements. The pressures arising from internal and external 
challenges may therefore combine to cause the slow transformation of Germany’s 
formal legitimacy towards a less co-operative style of federalism.
The Executive-Legislature Dimension
Germany’s executive-legislature relationship is another important example for the 
horizontal diffusion of sovereignty and the institutional pluralism that characterise the 
formal legitimacy of the Federal Republic. Again, this contrasts with the UK where 
power is concentrated in the executive and domestic veto points are often weak.
At first sight, the similarities between Britain and Germany appear strong. Although 
the Bundestag is not sovereign in the unitary sense of the British Parliament, it is the 
institution with the strongest claim to embody the doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
This is reflected in two general legal principles: the supremacy of statute law and the
01
principle that all essential political acts must be conducted on a statutory basis. 
While Bills can be introduced by the Federal Government or members of either
OA
Bundestag or Bundesrat, all statutes have to be passed as Acts of Parliament by the
OA
Bundestag and they precede all other acts of state. The yearly budget must be passed 
by federal statute, as must international treaties which regulate the political relations 
of the federation or relate to matters of federal legislation. In constitutional reality, 
just as in the UK, most legislation is sponsored by the government, and the Chancellor
o r
has the power to determine the general policy guidelines of the government. 
Nevertheless, there are also some important structural differences between the two 
political systems.
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First, a proportional voting system has ensured that, with one exception in the 1950s, 
the federal government has always depended on a coalition of parties for its 
parliamentary majority. Government by coalition constrains the Chancellor’s latitude 
for centralised policy leadership because he can normally exercise less direct control 
over his cabinet and his parliamentary majority than British Prime Ministers. The 
Chancellor’s room for manoeuvre is also limited by the principles of ministerial
or
autonomy (Resortprinzip) and cabinet collegiality. This horizontal division of power 
within the federal executive leaves individual ministries as relatively independent,
autonomous actors, thus leading to sectorised policy-making where inter-departmental
0*1
co-ordinating mechanisms are weak compared to the UK. Federal ministries only 
have a comparatively small number of staff and are primarily concerned with policy­
making rather than implementation. In contrast to Britain, where administrative 
decentralisation is a relatively recent phenomenon, the bulk of the policy-
oo
implementation is delegated to the Lander administrations.
Second, despite the far greater de jure constitutional powers of the British Parliament, 
its German counterpart might be described as more powerful in terms of its influence 
on legislation.89 One reason why it is considered a “work” rather than a “talk” 
parliament is the relative strength of committees in the Bundestag whose position is 
even constitutionally protected.90 Committees are well resourced, have the power to 
set their own agenda and can even draw on the expertise of civil servants who 
participate actively in committee work. Members of the Bundestag committees are 
also willing to take much more of a cross-party approach when scrutinising legislation 
than is the case in Britain.91 This means that a considerable number of amendments 
are passed which are retained in the final version of bills.
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90 Thomas Saalfeld: “The German Bundestag - Influence and Accountability in a Complex 
Environment”, in: Philip Norton (ed.): Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe. (London: 
Frank Cass, 1998), p.53
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Third, there is a structural and personal separation between the government and the 
parliamentary parties which have their own, separate organisation and political 
leaders.92 This separation is even more pronounced in the Bundesrat, since Lander 
governments sometimes take a different policy stance from that of the federal parties 
to which they belong. This limits the Chancellor’s influence over his MPs which is 
also constrained by the fact that he has a far more limited scope for patronage than 
British Prime Ministers.93 As a result, the Chancellor needs to accommodate to some 
extent the policy agenda of his own party and, due to the frequency of government by 
coalition, that of his coalition partners. In order to amend the Basic Law he must even 
build a consensus with the major opposition parties, since constitutional change 
requires a two-thirds majority in both Bundestag and Bundesrat.
Fourth, the Government’s powers are constrained by the power of the FCC to review 
the constitutionality of legislation, the Bundesbank and the federal dimension of the 
German state. As discussed above, the Lander governments are represented in the 
Bundesrat which co-operates in the federal legislative process and can even initiate 
Bills of its own 94 If Bundesrat decides to wield a veto over legislation, a “conciliation 
committee” between the two houses must find a mutually agreed compromise if the 
Bill under consideration is to be enacted. There is also no direct governmental or 
parliamentary control over monetary policy which are the sole responsibility of the 
independent Federal Bank, although its power over short-term interest rates has now 
been transferred to the ECB.95
EU membership has not significantly challenged these characteristics of federal 
policy-making, although it has threatened to marginalise the role of the Bundestag. 
European policy-making is conditioned by the same factors that influence domestic 
politics. The decentralisation of executive power means that neither the Chancellor 
nor the Foreign Ministry have a comprehensive mandate for formulating and co­
ordinating a coherent EU policy.96 Instead, a specialised ministerial bureaucracy and 
the Resortprinzip have led to a sectorised policy-making of considerable institutional
92 William E. Patterson and David Southern: Governing Germany. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 117
93 Ibid.. pp. 127-9
94 Bundesrat participation occurs mainly in the areas o f education, state and local finance, police and 
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complexity. Diffused ministerial responsibility and underdeveloped inter­
departmental co-ordination have complicated the formulation of a coherent policy 
agenda.97
While these characteristics replicate the domestic pattern to some extent, the 
Bundestag has experienced a more serious challenge to its constitutional role from EU 
membership. As in Britain, EU membership puts the Bundestag at a structural 
disadvantage because governments operate at the intersection between the domestic 
and the European level, enabling them to centralise power and act as gatekeepers for 
national parliaments. For a long time the Bundestag has therefore played a marginal 
role in the EU policy process, since it lacked effective influence over the 
Government’s European policy.98 The Bundestag belatedly adapted to the challenge 
of EU membership in the wake of the constitutional reforms undertaken in 1994." 
The new art.23 obliges the Federal Government to inform the Bundestag 
comprehensively and at the earliest opportunity about new EU draft policies. It also 
grants scrutiny reserve powers by enabling the Bundestag to vote on a resolution 
before a decision is taken in the Council. The Federal Government is obliged to take 
account of parliamentary resolutions in the course of Council negotiations. To 
facilitate a faster parliamentary response to EU draft legislation, the revised art.45 
establishes a special Committee on European Union which may exercise the 
Bundestag’s rights in EU affairs. These legally codified adaptations of Germany’s 
formal legitimacy were further reinforced by the FCC’s Maastricht judgement which 
stressed the legitimising function of the Bundestag’s role in European integration.100
Reforming the Basic Law has enhanced the compatibility of the Bundestag’s domestic 
constitutional role with the formal legitimacy of the EU, but its ability to exercise 
legislative influence has remained marginal in constitutional reality.101 There is “no 
evidence for any real increase in the Bundestag’s role”102 since its powers in EU 
policy-making was strengthend by the Basic Law, partly because the Bundestag still
96 Bulmer and Paterson, op. cit.. pp. 17, 25-42
97 Rometsch, op. cit.. pp.69-74
98 Bulmer and Paterson, op. cit.. pp.l66ff
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lacks an effective sanction to enforce its constitutional powers of scrutiny reserve. 
Another explanation would point to the broad political consensus in favour of 
European integration. This meant that MPs often preferred to strengthen the powers of 
the EP rather than the Bundestag because they regarded the latter as a more suitable 
institution for effective parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation. Moreover, the loss 
of parliamentary influence did not precipitate the same level of political concern as in 
the UK, partly because, for historical reasons, German political culture attaches more 
importance to democratic procedures than to the tradition of parliamentary self- 
govemment.104
Political Culture
The historic legacy of political extremism and repeated state failure, a distinct 
constitutional philosophy and numerous institutional checks and balances have all 
made for a very consensual political culture in the post-war Federal Republic.105 
Political debate is based on an inquisitorial and problem-solving rather than an 
adversarial approach to politics. Elite behaviour is “coalescent” and bargaining in a 
policy-making process which seeks to co-opt opposition parties and outside interests 
in order to overcome inter-institutional blockades.106 The resulting political style 
stresses mutual interdependence, social responsibility and pursuit of the public
107interest. These values are reflected in the notion of a social market economy and the 
spirit of “social partnership” between government, business and the trade unions 
which has enjoyed support across the political divide. Also, the bureaucracy and 
political parties are strongly interpenetrated which reinforces the stress on rational
10Rexpertise in political debate. The German civil service, unlike its British 
counterpart, does not discourage membership of a political party, and civil servants on
103 See for example: Rita StiBmuth: “Die Rolle des deutschen Bundestages im europaischen 
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temporary leave are strongly represented in both Lander parliaments and the 
Bundestag.109
By implication, German political culture shows an inherent lack of respect for 
politicking, and many contentious issues are depoliticised by reliance on legal norms 
and recourse to constitutional review by the FCC. The practice of judges objectively 
deducing one “right” answer from an all-embracing normative legal system often 
emasculates policy debate between government and opposition because politicians 
pre-emptively calculate the “constitutional risks” of any proposals for political 
reform.110 Another example for the judicialisation of political values are the “state 
objectives” listed in the Basic Law. They provide normative guidance to political life 
because they are intended to express the ultimate societal values and aspirations of 
German body politic.111 The importance attached to them by constitutional lawyers, 
but also the German public at large, was highlighted by the post-unification reform of 
the Basic Law which resulted in environmental protection being added to the list of 
state objectives.
The German state tradition also draws attention to the legal relationship between the 
state apparatus and society, and there is a strong belief that citizens are better
1 1 0
protected by judges than by politicians. Citizens can make constitutional 
complaints to the FCC and their individual rights and duties vis a vis the state are 
clearly enshrined in law and the constitutional bill of rights. This desire for legal 
certainty in the exercise of state power is strongly reflected in the concept of 
Rechtsstaat and the comprehensive public law system which enshrines public policy 
in a stable and legalistic institutional matrix.114
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To summarise, Germany’s political culture, which discourages political accountability 
by adversarial public debate, stands in marked contrast to British political traditions, 
but it also differs from other continental countries in its attachment to imperative legal 
norms and a strong judicialisation of politics.115 These differences help to explain why 
its domestic political culture has been more compatible with EU membership than in 
many other European countries.
First, the EU has presented less of a challenge to Germany’s formal legitimacy and 
national identity, thus making the issue of membership politically less contentious 
than in the UK.116 Since at least the late 1950s there has been a broad, if sometimes 
nuanced, elite consensus among political parties and the media in favour of European 
integration.117 Whenever the EU did become the subject of party political controvery, 
as it did among the F.D.P. in the 50s, the Greens in the 80s and, briefly and 
tentatively, the SPD in 1996, any nascent polarisation of the debate was quickly 
absorbed by the structural constraints of coalition government and a political culture
1 JO
which discourages a radical departure from the prevailing political consensus. The 
absence of any significant elite mobilisation of public opinion against the EU has 
provided greater scope for active legitimation policies to increase and stabilise support 
for the EU. Germany’s political culture has therefore been conducive to the adaptation 
of public opinion to EU membership.
Second, Germany’s political culture exhibits a far-reaching congruence with the EU, 
thus “creating a milieu in which German political actors can feel at home.”119 Both 
political systems exhibit a depoliticised, coalition-building and power-sharing style of 
policy-making, which values constructive and co-operative problem solving above the
190dogmatic defence of political position. As in Germany, European politics and 
integration are characterised by an emphasis on legal norms and a juridified style of 
governance, and they proceed within a clearly defined constitutionalised framework
115 Dyson (80), op. cit.. p.213
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191rooted in the Roman law tradition. Similarities between the EU and the FRG even 
extend to the corporatist involvement of the social partners and a commitment to 
economic cohesion. This high degree of congruence has meant that EU membership 
poses less of a serious challenge to Germany’s domestic political culture than in the 
case of Britain.
Conclusion
EU membership has not directly challenged the core of the German constitution as 
much as it has in the case of Britain. In some respects, the EU’s formal legitimacy is
1 99not fundamentally different from that of the Federal Republic itself. As a 
federation, the German political system is accustomed to multiple vertical layers of 
government, and the European political systems has adopted a version of “horizontal 
federalism” which is rather similar to that operating within the Federal Republic itself. 
The legal systems of the EU and the FRG are both products of the Roman law 
tradition, and the judicial review of parliamentary legislation, whether by the FCC or 
the ECJ, has long been a common feature of Germany’s political system. Even at the 
level of political culture, Germany is characterised by the same consensual, 
bargaining policy-making style that also predominates in the EU, right down to the 
preference for “concerted action” as symbolised in ECOSOC.
Even where EU membership has challenged aspects of Germany’s formal legitimacy, 
national institutions have responded through constitutional, procedural and policy 
adaptation to European integration. This Europeanisation of Germany’s formal 
legitimacy has been particularly visible in the federal dimension, the legislative 
dimension, the jurisprudence of the FCC and amendments to the Basic Law. In some 
areas, such as the role of the Bundestag in European policy-making, structural factors 
have limited the adaptation of national institutions, but in these cases a general 
commitment to integration has led to the search for European solutions to domestic 
problems. Examples include demands for a strengthening of the EP, the proposal of a 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the successful lobbying to establish the 
Committee of Regions.
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In conclusion, the Europeanisation of Germany’s formal legitimacy is not only a 
consequence of the good initial constitutional fit with the EU or the progressive 
adaptation of national institutions. Even at a fundamental constitutional level, 
Germany’s formal legitimacy is programmed to accommodate EU membership. The 
commitment to European integration is now a state objective of the Basic Law and 
has therefore entered the “genetic code” of the constitution. Integration in, and 
domestic adaptation to, the EU has therefore become part of the institutional logic of 
the German state.124
4.3 Felt Legitimacy
4.3.1 Political Community
The increasing Europeanisation of Germany’s formal legitimacy and the deeply 
embedded commitment to European integration have to be understood in the context 
of Germany’s unique national identity.125 A modem German nation state only 
emerged after the unification of 1871, and nation-building took place “with blood and 
iron” against external enemies, in particular France, rather than through a process of 
internal revolution or evolution. The state-building process could draw on the origins 
of German nationalism, which predates national unification and arose in opposition to 
the Napoleonic conquest of Germany. Rather than adopting the values of universal 
rights and citizenship of the French Revolution, German nationalism developed 
around the volkisch concept of common descent and an organic notion of nation and
1 *)fsstate following the ideas of Herder and Fichte. In the decades after 1871 German 
national identity was heavily propagated politically as a means of diffusing social and 
political cleavages. The traumatic experience of the First World War, the widespread 
feeling that it was lost only through “betrayal” on the home front and the perceived 
injustice of the Treaty of Versailles did little to encourage a reassessment of German 
nationalism. On the contrary, it provided fertile ground for an extreme radicalisation 
of national identity and culture during the Third Reich.
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Complete military defeat and national ruin in 1945 discredited militant German 
nationalism, and in the post-war era many Germans have been very hesitant to affirm 
their national identity openly. About a third of Germans considered national pride and
177patriotism “unimportant” in 1996. The reconstruction of a German national identity 
since 1945 assumed two dimensions. Internally, national pride was projected away 
from ethnicity onto Germany’s successful political institutions, economic recovery 
and the creation of a stable democratic society. Nationalism became replaced by
1751constitutional patriotism. As a result, Germans are primarily proud of their 
economic and scientific achievements, and 68% show pride in their political 
system.129 While this reorientation has found widespread popular resonance and 
acceptance, the legal definition of German identity still remains rooted in the 
ethnicity-centred concept of ius sanguinis. Prior to the recent modification of the 
citizenship law, this has complicated the integration of immigrants and Gastarbeiter 
who, unlike ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (Aussiedler), face substantial 
obstacles when seeking to acquire German citizenship.
Externally, German identity incorporated a European dimension in the shape of a
171commitment to the ideal of European unification which has survived reunification. 
The authors of the Basic Law made explicit provisions for European integration and
1 77included in its preamble a “post-national” commitment to a united Europe. The 
political reconstruction of post-war Germany and European integration therefore 
proceeded in parallel, making them like twins who “cannot remember an existence
1 77independent of the other.” Germany’s historical identity has always been influenced 
by its geographical location in the centre of Europe (it is bordered by nine other 
European countries). The federal tradition and the country’s post-war situation also 
shaped Germany’s national identity. In a “semi-sovereign state” whose nation was
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divided into two separate political systems the concepts of nationhood or national 
sovereignty provided no useful reference point for national identity.134
Germany’s sovereignty was fully regained only with reunification in 1990, and for the 
first time since the war there was once again one German “nation state”. Unification 
revived the lively debate of the 1980s about whether affective identification with the 
nation is desirable or dangerous. This raised the question to which extent the reunited 
Germany had regained a degree of “normality” among the nation state of Europe. 
But there remains a broad consensus that Germany’s historic experiences still offers 
relevant lessons for the future. Even amidst the enthusiasm for reunification 
Chancellor Kohl stressed that German unity and European unity represented “two 
sides of the same coin”, and he identified himself as both a German and a European 
patriot.136
There is less scholarly agreement about the nature (and survival) of a national identity 
in the former GDR. One hypothesis emphasises the impact of authoritarian 
socialisation which generated a national identity tied to the socialist ideals represented 
by the East German state. This interpretation implies the development of a political 
culture very different from that of the West.137 Alternatively, a common history, 
family ties and, above all, the powerful influence of the West German media ensured 
that a truly distinct East German political culture and identity could never take root
• • 1 ioand an all-German identity was conserved.
Empirical evidence cannot clearly support either hypothesis. Westle has conducted a 
sophisticated study of the impact of reunification on the German sense o f  a political 
community. While her sample of public opinion surveys between 1989 and 1993 
records levels of public approval of reunification rarely dipping below 80% in both 
parts of the country, opposition to unification has risen particularly in the East.
133 Bulmer (87), op. cit.. p. 15
134 Peter Katzenstein: Policy and Politics in Western Germany - The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State. 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987)
135 For a survey o f the debate, see: Westle (97), o p . cit.. p.61ff
136 Thomas Banchoff: “German Policy Towards the European Union - The Effects o f Historical 
Memory”, German Politics, vol.6, no.l, 1997, p.64
137 For example: G. Schweigler: National Consciousness in Divided Germany. (London: Sage, 1975)
138 G. J. GlaeBner: Die andere deutsche Republik. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989)
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Around 17% of both West and East Germans disapproved of the merger of their two 
countries in the period around 1993.139
More detailed analysis reveals that dissatisfaction with the economic situation acts as 
an important barrier to higher affective support for the new united political 
community.140 The disappointment expressed through low specific output support 
exist almost equally in East and West, but with an improvement of the economic 
situation in the New Lander, this should prove to be a temporary, if prolonged, 
phenomenon.141 In the long-run positive output performance should spill over into 
diffuse support for the community as well as the regime. More worrying is the 
renewed increase in nostalgic diffuse support for the political community of the old 
GDR which was already referred to above. After 1991, the trend towards higher 
diffuse support for the new unified country coupled with weaker identification with 
the old GDR has been reversed.
Parallel to these developments, a regional identity of the New Lander becomes slowly 
entrenched, and in 1993 regional identification exceeds both diffuse support for the 
unified FRG as well as the old East German state.142 To some extent these attitudes 
are reciprocal. In 1994, 24% of both East and West Germans agreed with the 
statement that “I feel more distant towards people in the other part of Germany than I 
do towards many of the foreigners living in our country”. 78% of East Germans and 
76% of their Western neighbours disagreed. In other words, a remarkable quarter of 
the German population felt a mutual foreignness to the respective other part of the 
country.143 To use Easton’s terminology, the existing sense o f  a political community is 
not yet sufficiently underpinned by a corresponding sense o f  a social community 
between East and West.144
The continuation of these trends is confirmed a 1996 Eurobarometer study asking 
respondents whether they feel as a citizen of the EU, a citizen of the Federal Republic
139 Westle (97), op. cit.. p.66
140 Ibid., p.67
141 Dieter Fuchs: “Welche Demokratie wollen die Deutschen? Einstellungen zur Demokratie im 
vereinigten Deutschland”, in: Oscar W. Gabriel (ed.): Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen 
im vereinigten Deutschland. (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997), p.l 13
142 Westle (97), op. cit.. p.68f
143 Ibid,, p.74f
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or a citizen of their own region.145 A clear majority in both East (58°//0) and West 
(59%) feel as German citizens, but only 7% of East Germans (as opposejd to 16% of 
their Western compatriots) feel as a citizen of the EU. East Germans seeim less likely 
to perceive their identity in post-national terms, probably because fewer cr>f them have 
been socialised into West Germany’s reconstructed post-war identity. This would 
explain why East Germans exhibit greater national pride in their country than West 
Germans.146 On the other hand, more than one in three (35%) East Germains feels as a 
citizen of their region as opposed to one in four (25%) West Germans. A s would be 
expected, Bavarians have the strongest regional identity amongst West Germans 
(33%), which is still below the average level of East German regional identity. The 
extent to which East German regional identity refers to the area of the olid GDR as a 
whole is revealed by Allensbach survey conducted in the New Lander ini 1995. 48% 
of respondents primarily felt as East German, only 32% felt primarily as <German and 
another 18% felt their strongest allegiance to their Land.147
As far as qualitative confirmation of these trends is needed, one can point to the 
success of the PDS in assuming the character of a specific “East German party” 
representing concerns particular to citizens in the New Lander. Its voter base is 
characterised by a tremendous regional divide, whereby the PDS wins around 20% of 
the vote of East Germans, but has the support of less than 5% of West German voters 
in general and regional elections. However, even within the PDS there is no organised 
movement campaigning for a reversal of reunification, which has become an accepted 
fact of life.148
To which extent is this comparative lack of a sense of a common political community 
temporary and contingent upon the considerable social and economic upheaval that 
reunification has brought about? In 1996, 81% of West Germans and 76% of East 
Germans agreed with the statement that “it will take many years until both parts of
144 See Chapter 2 . p.75
145 Eurobarometer: German Public Opinion on the European Union no.44.2 (unpublished). (Brussels: 
European Commission, 1996), p. 14f
146 McCrone and Surridge, op. cit.. pp.7-10, also: Westle (97), op. cit.. pp.67-69
147 Noelle-Naumann and KOcher (97), op. cit.. p.497
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Unity?”, German Politics, vol.5, no.l, 1996, p.22
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Germany really form a united whole.”149 Yet in the same year 58% of West Germans 
and 49% of East Germans were confident that the two halves of the country will 
ultimately grow together successfully. The remainder was almost equally divided 
between people who were uncertain about the outcome and those who were outspoken 
pessimists.150 These findings suggest a rather unstable sense o f political community 
for the immediate future, but they also point to an eventual consolidation in the level 
of diffuse support at levels comparable to the West German experience prior to 
reunification.
4.3.2 Political Regime
As before, it is useful to treat as separate the three components of the political regime 
identified in chapter two: constitutional philosophy, the constitutional order and 
constitutional reality. This will help to distinguish a mere popular dissatisfaction with 
the way the constitution operates in practice (constitutional reality) from cases where 
people reject the values of democracy as such (constitutional philosophy).151 When a 
democratic political regime enjoys low diffuse support it is far from certain that 
people would prefer a non-democratic constitutional philosophy in its stead, but only 
a breakdown into these three subcategories will allow that conclusion to be drawn.
How then do Germans evaluate the constitutional philosophy of democracy which the
first part of this chapter has shown to be a central legitimising principle of the FRG?
In the 1989 Eurobarometer survey already introduced in the last chapter 95.9% of
Germans are to some extent or very much in favour of the idea of democracy as such,
1considered abstractly without reference to their own political system. A second 
question asked respondents whether they consider democracy the best form of 
government under all circumstances, whether in certain cases dictatorship can be 
positive or whether the alternative did not make any difference to them. Here German 
respondents come down more firmly in support of democracy than their British 
counterparts do, even when excluding Northern Ireland. 82.2% believe democracy is 
always preferable which is above the EC average of 78%, but of the small remainder a
149 Noelle-Naumann and KOcher (97), op. cit.. p.556
150 Ibid., p.555
151 Westle (89), op. cit.. p. 17If
152 Fuchs, Guidorossi, Svensson, o p . cit.. p.349
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plurality is inclined towards dictatorship rather than being indifferent between the two 
forms of government.153
It is also important to ascertain whether respondents and political scientists use the 
same definition of the attitudinal object surveyed, in this case democracy. A number 
of surveys conducted by the Allensbach Institute make it possible to demonstrate 
empirically that Germans have at least a rudimentary understanding of what 
democracy actually means. More than 75% of Germans considered the following 
characteristics to be defining properties of a democratic country: freedom of 
expression and a free press, the choice between several political parties, regular free, 
equal and secret elections and the possibility of an orderly, non-violent change of 
government. More than two-thirds of Germans added to the list judicial independence, 
religious freedom, participation in political decision-making and political 
accountability to the electorate. The number of people identifying these characteristics 
of a democracy has been more or less stable since the survey was first conducted in 
1978.154 Fuchs et al have concluded from their analysis of a previous version of this 
Allensbach survey that, indeed, “citizens understand democracy as they should 
understand it.”155
The only slight variation occurs with regard to the conceptions of democracy 
entertained by East Germans. All the defining properties of democracy quoted in the 
Allensbach survey above are mentioned less often by citizens of the former GDR. 
This negative gap amounts on average to about seven percentage points. East 
Germans are far more likely to define democracy by economic characteristics instead, 
such as worker co-decision, income equality or the absence of severe social 
destitution.156 At least some citizens in the Eastern Lander do therefore entertain a 
slightly different conception of what the term democracy signifies which has probably
1 ^ 7been influenced by the communist ideology of the former regime.
153 Eurobarometer: Survey, op. cit.. p.9
154 Noelle-Neumann and KOcher (97) op. cit.. p.658
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This may also explain the East-West gap in a post-unification survey on democracy as 
an abstract constitutional philosophy. 86% of West Germans, but only 70% of their 
East German compatriots, consider democracy the best form of government. 
Significantly, however, 23% of East Germans are undecided on this issue. Fuchs 
interprets this as a sign of a possible confusion between democracy as an abstract 
constitutional philosophy and the (disliked) actual political regime of the FRG. 
Whereas 80% of West Germans consider the democratic system of the FRG the best 
form of government, only 31% of East Germans do. This suggests that around 40% of 
East Germans prefer a democratic system which differs from the one operating in the 
Federal Republic.159 Fuchs also draws attention to the fact that 53% of Easterners 
(27% West Germans) believe equality should ultimately take priority over freedom. 
Exactly the reverse proportion (33% East, 55% West) believes freedom is ultimately 
more important than equality.160 These findings support Fuchs’ hypothesis that East 
Germans tend to be sympathetic towards a constitutional philosophy of democratic 
socialism which puts a stronger emphasis on social justice and direct citizen 
participation.161
Another way of ascertaining public attitudes towards the German political regime as a 
whole is to survey public diffuse support for the current political society. As in the 
last chapter, the question put to (West German) interviewees was whether they wish 
radically to change society by revolutionary action, whether they think society should 
be gradually reformed or whether they advocate a valiant defence of society against 
all subversive forces. The result is depicted in figure 4.1 below.
158 Ibid, p.96
159 Ibid.. p. 106
160 Ibid.. p. 102
161 Ibid, p.95, 103
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Attitudes towards German Society
20
Reform Defence—  Revolution
There are two outstanding characteristics about these graphs. The first is the sudden 
decline in the number of people advocating a gradual reform of society from 
remarkably high levels of around 70% at the beginning of the 1970s. One explanation 
can be found in the receding intensity of the student protests of the late 1960s whose 
demands for social and political reform were supported by a broader, non-university 
political movement. Another explanation is logically connected with the second 
striking characteristic of fig. 1, namely the sudden rise in the number of Germans who 
felt it necessary to defend their society.
The fact that at times “defenders” even outnumber “reformers” surely has to do with 
the degeneration of the remaining protest movement into terrorism, most prominently 
organised in the so-called “Red Army Faction”. While the number of its participants 
and sympathisers was small (hence lower levels of revolutionary sentiment than in the 
UK), their activities were often characterised by extreme brutality and caused 
considerable human casualties and material damage. Since their assassinations and 
kidnappings were primarily targeted at the political and economic elite, many 
Germans felt the need to defend their political society against the explicit RAF goal of 
its violent overthrow. However, except for a series of high profile assassinations in 
1988/89, the peak of their activities lies in the late 1970s and the RAF has recently 
declared itself disbanded. These waves of activity broadly correspond with variations 
in the level of respondents seeking to defend German society.
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Qualitative indicators suggest that German attitudes towards society have by and large 
consolidated for the past decade at the stable level reached at the end of the 
Eurobarometer data series. There is no significant revolutionary organisation in the 
Federal Republic at the moment, and despite a more fragmented party landscape, none 
of the electorally significant political parties would fit Sartori’s famous definition of 
an “anti-system party” (a party which aims to change the system of government rather 
than just the incumbent). Even parties currently at the fringes of the political 
spectrum, such as the socialist PDS or the far-right Republican Party, tend to restrict 
their radicality to the policies they advocate rather than to wholesale constitutional 
reorganisation of the Federal Republic. However, the special case of the PDS will be 
discussed in more detail below. Finally, participation in general election at levels 
around or even above 80% of the German electorate are an additional indicator of 
considerable public faith in, and commitment to, the democratic system.164
When investigating German public attitudes towards particular aspects of the 
constitutional order or constitutional reality, levels of support are lower than for 
democracy as an abstract constitutional philosophy, despite considerable diffuse 
support for the Basic Law and its political institutions. One of the reasons is the 
critical evaluations of the way the concept of democracy has been translated into the 
constitutional order. For instance, on the occasion of a reform of the Basic Law in the 
wake of reunification respondents were interviewed about the reforms they would like 
to see adopted. 79% of East Germans and 66% of West Germans demanded the 
introduction of popular referenda - a wish that was not granted in the end.165
Frustration about the lacking ability to have a referendum on important political and 
constitutional issues came to a climax over the question of EMU. Despite consistent 
popular majorities against the introduction of EMU before and even subsequent to its 
adoption at Maastricht, the Federal Government and large parts of the opposition 
ruled out a referendum on the issue on the grounds that there was no constitutional
162 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. p.39f
163 Sartori, op. cit.. p,127ff
164 Source: House o f Commons Library. For more details, see: Fig.5.6. p. 193
165 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Kocher (eds.): Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 
1984-92. (Allensbach: Verlag fUr Demoskopie, 1993), p.567
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basis for such a move.166 However, 72% of West Germans and 83% of East Germans
• 1A7 .expressed their desire for exactly such a referendum in 1992. The same survey 
reflects an East German preference for a more egalitarian constitution, as is reflected 
in demands for incorporating into the Basic Law the right to housing (90%) and a 
right to work (85%).168 Notwithstanding these criticisms, when being asked what 
made them proud about their country, “the political system” was the East and West 
Germans’ second most popular response after “the economy.”169
There appears to be, therefore, a high degree of general felt legitimacy for the German 
political regime which goes hand in hand with more critical attitudes when it comes to 
particular aspects or institutions of the constitutional order. This hypothesis is borne 
out by a 1995 survey investigating whether Germans have a high, mixed or low
170opinion of a number of political institutions in the Federal Republic. The best result 
by far is achieved for the office of the Federal President of which 65% have a high 
opinion and another 26% a mixed one. Only six per-cent have a low opinion of the 
Presidency, and all these figures are only marginally lower if Eastern Germany is 
counted separately. The second most respected institution is the FCC of which 36% of 
all Germans have a high opinion and another 42% a mixed one, followed closely by 
the Bundesbank for which the respective data are 32% and 42%. Yet approval of the 
Bundesbank is sharply divergent between East and West. Only 24% of citizens in the 
new Lander admire the Bundesbank, as opposed to 35% of the Western compatriots, 
again pointing to different traditions of economic ideology.
All other federal political institutions such as the federal government, the Bundestag 
or the Bundesrat are not highly thought of by the German public in 1995 and, 
significantly, opinion fluctuates considerably over time. For instance, 42% of 
respondents had a high opinion of the Bundestag in 1985 which dropped to a value of 
24% in 1995. Most of the fluctuations occur between the categories of “high opinion” 
and “mixed opinion”. These characteristics may be a sign that respondents understand
166 See for instance: Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Bevolkerungsumfragen zur Europaischen 
Union. (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1997), p. 1-6
167 Noelle-Neumann and Kocher (93), op.cit.. p. 1041
168 Ibid., p.567
169 Peter R. Weilemann: Einstellungen zur Europaischen Union nach Maastricht, Interne Studie Nr. 
30/1992, (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1992), p.20
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Chapter Four 172
the survey question as referring to an output evaluation of the incumbents rather than 
to their diffuse support of the institution as such. This interpretation would also 
explain the high approval ratings of institutions with a consistently high track record 
(such as the Bundesbank) or offices whose functions and powers are largely symbolic 
(such as the Federal President).
Figure 4.2, which depicts public attitudes towards the reliability of political 
institutions, serves to demonstrate further the interaction between levels of specific 
and diffuse support below.
Reliability of German Political Institutions
1996 19971994 1995
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Despite the relatively short time frame, there is a clear and market deterioration in the 
perceived reliability of Germany’s political institutions. East Germans have become 
particularly disillusioned about the reliability of the Federal Government and the 
Bundestag. As in Britain, Parliament scores slightly better than the national 
government, but the difference is less pronounced than in the UK. This decline 
correlates with decreasing general approval of the performance of Chancellor Kohl’s 
government as well as declining levels of satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy. The two graphs depicting the reliability of government and parliament 
can therefore be expected to show an upward trend subsequent to the change in the 
federal government in autumn 1998.
171 Eurobarometer no.42, op. cit.. p.B28 and subsequent issues.
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In short, the design of the reliability survey seems to suffer from the all too common 
imprecision as far as the mode of support (specific versus diffuse) is concerned. As 
already discussed in the last chapter, it shares this features with the Eurobarometer 
survey on “satisfaction with the way democracy works” whose results are depicted 
below (fig.4.3).
Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works in Germany
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There are three striking features in this set of data. The first is a phenomenal doubling 
of satisfaction at the outset of the data series which will be very difficult to interpret 
due to the lack of knowledge about movements in satisfaction prior to 1973. The 
second trend is a rather sharp decline in support after reunification in 1990 from 
fluctuations around an average level of about 75% to 50% in the mid-nineties. One of 
the most important factors responsible for this decrease in satisfaction is the regional 
variation between the old and the new Lander.
Despite what might be described as “unification euphoria” in both parts of the country 
around the year 1990, East German satisfaction levels are lower right from the
1 71beginning where they hardly exceeded 50%. Once the unification effect wears off, 
East German become less satisfied in line with their Western compatriots, just as 
subsequent fluctuations largely occur in tandem between the two parts of the country. 
The big difference lies in the fact that even at the worst of times still roughly half of 
the West German population remains satisfied with the way democracy works,
172 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. p.22f, and subsequent issues.
173 Ibid.. p.22f, and subsequent issues.
■
Chapter Four 174
whereas the same applies to sometimes just a third of East Germans. The third 
striking feature is the sudden rise in satisfaction levels in 1999 which, while 
maintaining the East-West gap, occurs in parallel in both parts of the country.
To which extent is the marked East German dissatisfaction with democracy really 
directed at the political regime? How strongly is it influenced by low output support 
as a consequence of the economic difficulties facing the New Lander, such as low 
growth and high unemployment? In 1995, 77% of East Germans approved of the 
decision to introduce a liberal democratic order in their former country, only 17% 
disapproved of that change. But a rather more substantial 34% sometimes still hanker 
after the old German Democratic Republic, whereas 64% say they do not look back in 
nostalgia.174 Also, East Germans tend to feel less pride in the political regime of the 
FRG and the Basic Law in particular, and this tendency is particularly accentuated
1 7^amongst those who express support for the political regime of the old GDR. This is 
all evidence of lower regime support amongst East Germans, but the influence of 
output evaluations on the results of surveys about satisfaction with democracy should 
not be underestimated for either part of the country. That would help to explain the 
sudden rise in satisfaction levels in both East and West subsequent to the German 
general election in autumn 1998.
One measure of that influence is the impact of party allegiance on respondents’ 
evaluations. Fuchs et al calculate a comparatively low differential in satisfaction rates 
of 16.2 percentage points between government and opposition supporters (bearing in
1 lf\mind the value of 32.5 for the UK). This small gap, which is incidentally 
responsible for one of the highest overall satisfaction rates in Europe, is certainly 
related to the consensual political culture and policy-making style by which the 
Federal Republic is characterised. The relatively low ideological divide would also 
account for the difference to the UK during the 1980s. It should be borne in mind, 
though, that the calculations by Fuchs et al were accurate at the beginning of nineties 
and therefore cannot take account of developments since. It is to be expected that the
174 Politbarometer. no. 10, 1995, (Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1995), p.4
175 Westle (97), op. cit.. p.70-72
176 Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, op. cit.. p.345
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correlation between party allegiance and satisfaction with democracy has become 
stronger, for two reasons in particular.
First, with the emergence of the PDS, the successor to the former communist party of 
the GDR, as a political force strong enough to gain parliamentary representation the 
ideological divide has increased. Political support for the PDS is almost exclusively 
concentrated in the Eastern half of the country. Since it was argued above that many 
East Germans relate democracy to a different, more egalitarian constitutional order, 
satisfaction with democracy amongst supporters of the “Party of Democratic 
Socialism” can confidently be expected to be considerably below the levels recorded 
for supporters of other parties. This is confirmed by the finding that amongst all East 
Germans PDS supporters are least likely to be proud of the Basic Law and the
1 77political regime of the FRG. Similarly, Kaase and Kaase find a fairly strong 
correlation between individuals’ left-wing political orientations, dissatisfaction with 
democracy and favourable attitudes towards socialism.178
Second, the sixteen year-long reign of Chancellor Kohl will have fuelled the 
dissatisfaction with democracy amongst opposition supporters in a way not dissimilar 
to the attitudes of Labour supporters in Britain during the 1980s and for most of the 
nineties. The increasing deterioration in satisfaction levels, with a short exception 
around the 1994 federal election, throughout the years leading up to 1998 and the 
sharp rise after the election in September 1998 all seem to confirm that hypothesis, as 
the next section will demonstrate.
4.3.3 Political Authorities
Figure 4.4 below records Germans’ satisfaction with the performance of their federal 
government and the main opposition party on a scale from minus five to plus five. As 
one would expect, government satisfaction rallied in the months before and after the 
1994 election which saw the incumbent administration successfully re-elected. By 
contrast, government satisfaction remained low in the run-up to the 1998 election, but 
shot up when the former opposition assumed power. These movements roughly
177 Westle (97), op. cit.. p.72
178 Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, op.cit.. p. 19-21
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correlate with fluctuations in the graph about satisfaction with the way democracy 
works in Germany. Analysing a similar set of data over the same time period Kaase 
and Kaase argue that for East Germans “economic satisfaction and satisfaction with 
the concept and reality of democracy are closely related.”179
Satisfaction with German Government and Opposition
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This suggests a high dependence of diffuse regime support on specific output support, 
which can be read as a lack of a reservoir of entrenched system support that is 
independent of performance evaluations. That raises questions about the stability of
ini
East German diffuse support for the political regime of the Federal Republic. It will 
not have helped that East Germans’ acquaintance with liberal democracy coincided 
with the onset of a profound economic crisis in the East which has been reflected in
i n^
very low economic expectations for the future (see fig.4.5 below). Kaase and Kaase 
even believe to detect a weakening of diffuse support in the West caused by the
i n-}
emphasis on Germany’s economic problems. But the East clearly bears the brunt of 
the economic malaise. Given that East Germans have joined the FRG with very high 
expectations for a comprehensive welfare state, the current restructuring process has a
179 Ibid., p. 18
180 Politbarom eter. no.8, 1991, (Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1991), and subsequent issues.
181 Ibid.. p . l8 f
182 Oscar W. Gabriel: “Einleitung: Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im 
TransitionsprozeB”, in: Oscar W. Gabriel (ed.): Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im 
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particularly negative effect on East German specific support for the political 
authorities.184
If the performance of political authorities influences the level of satisfaction with the 
way democracy works, one would suspect the general economic mood of the nation to 
do likewise. The graphs below depicts how Germans felt about the situation of their 
own lives for the year ahead with a separate graph tracking East German responses 
(fig.4.5).
Future Expectations of Germans
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Correlating the results from this Eurobarometer survey with the survey about 
satisfaction with democracy, the conclusions are as ambiguous as in the British case 
in the last chapter. Up until around 1986 there appears to be no obvious relationship 
between the graphs from the two surveys. Subsequent to that date, however, both 
survey register similar fluctuations in the graphs depicting optimism for the year 
ahead and satisfaction with democracy. Both decline from high plateaux in the late 
1980s only to reach new heights in the wake of reunification. The 1990s are marked 
by two “waves” of deterioration followed by rallies at around the time of the general 
elections in 1994 and 1998.
While the perception of personal well-being certainly seems to have some influence 
on public satisfaction with German democracy, the evidence must remain partly
184 Gabriel (97a), o p . cit.. p.28
185 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. p .229f
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inconclusive. But the correlation with specific support for the political authorities as 
far as policy output is concerned cannot be denied. There is sound basis, therefore, for 
Goetz and Cullen’s assumption of at least a weak proportional relationship between 
East Germany’s economic fortunes and the level of acceptance of the Basic Law in 
the New Lander.186
4.4 Conclusion
Two conclusions from the last two chapters are worth bearing in mind. First, at a 
general level the German and British political systems reveal some similarities. The 
notion of representative government is central to formal legitimacy in both countries, 
and the felt legitimacy these formal arrangements enjoy in Britain and Germany 
exhibits
few  signs o f  a declining faith either in the legitimacy o f  democracy as an 
abstract principle, or in the way democracy works in particular countries,
1 87or in the major institutions o f society. ”
Second, from a West European perspective the two political systems are very different 
from each other. Germany’s constitutional philosophy is based on natural law 
jurisprudence and the European state tradition, to which the UK historically does not 
belong. As regards formal legitimacy, the German state is characterised by a vertical 
and horizontal diffusion of sovereignty and institutional pluralism, whereas the UK 
technically remains a unitary state whose sovereignty indivisibly rests in Parliament. 
German political culture is based on co-operation and consensus, while Britain has an 
adversarial, debate-oriented political culture. At the level of felt legitimacy the most 
striking difference concerns British and German conceptions of national identity. 
Britain’s national identity is based on historical developments that set it apart from 
continental Europe, and on a fusion of national and parliamentary sovereignty. British 
identity faces increasing internal and external challenges, while, once the effects of 
reunification have been absorbed, Germany’s national identity is likely to stabilise in 
the long-run. The latter continues to be strongly influenced by the country’s traumatic
186 Cullen and G oetz, op. cit.. p. 164
187 Max Kaase, Kenneth Newton and Elinor Scarbrough: “Beliefs in Government”, Politics, vol. 17, 
no.2, 1997, pp. 135
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historical experience which means that Germany’s post-war identity rejects traditional 
expressions of nationalism in favour of a post-national commitment to European 
unification.
These contrasts between Britain and Germany mean that their formal and felt 
legitimacies differ in the degree to which they are compatible with European 
integration. Whereas the German political system achieves a high degree of 
compatibility, the formal and felt legitimacy of the UK does not exhibit a good fit 
with the character of the EU. The disparities in formal and felt legitimacy and the 
ensuing differences of compatibility with the EU are more pronounced in the case of 
Britain and Germany than between other large member states. France and Italy, for 
example, occupy intermediate position with regard to the compatibility of their formal 
and felt legitimacy with the EU.188
The French and Italian political systems are both built on Roman law and the West
European state tradition, but they lack Germany’s emphasis on natural law
jurisprudence and do not divide sovereignty vertically and horizontally to the same
1 80extent as in the Federal Republic. Neither is a federal state, although both France 
and Italy have devolved powers to the regional level, and their state bureaucracies 
remain largely centralised. In France, political power is centralised in the executive 
which means that the courts and the national parliament play a more subordinate role 
than in Germany. While this has facilitated the institutional adaptation of the French 
political system to the challenge of EU membership, compatibility is to some extent 
hindered by a strong national identity.190 There is a long-standing tradition, reaching 
back to the French revolution, of locating state sovereignty in the nation, which is 
conceived as community o f  citizens and the source of all law. By diluting this 
principle European integration has a potential for conflicting with the political and 
intellectual foundations of France’s national identity.191
188 Katzenstein (97), op. cit.. pp.41ff
189 Dyson (80), op. cit., pp.33-36, 109ff
190 Bulmer (97), o p . c it .. p.77f
191 Christian Lequesne: “France”, in: Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels: The European Union 
and Member States - Towards Institutional Fusion?. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 
p .l8 5 f
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Italy represents the inverse case as far as compatibility with the EU is concerned. The
Italian political system has greater horizontal checks and balances than France, and
central government is in a comparatively weak position vis a vis the national
parliament and the constitutional court. The resulting lack of central co-ordination and
the slow pace of domestic institutional reform have meant that, Italy’s formal
legitimacy is less well adapted to, and has a slightly lower congruence with, the EU
than France or Germany.192 For example, Italian courts have been comparatively slow
10'!to adapt to the new supranational legal order. On the other hand, Italy’s felt 
legitimacy reveals some parallels with Germany. In both countries national unification 
was achieved only in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the nation- 
building process culminated in extreme nationalism in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Military defeat in the Second World War gave rise to a Europeanised 
national identity where national pride and attachment to national sovereignty are 
low.194
Both Italy and France therefore represent intermediate cases as far as the 
Europeanisation of their political systems is concerned. However, Italy differs 
fundamentally from all the other large member states because Italians tend to perceive 
the legitimacy of their domestic political system as severely deficient, resulting in 
very low levels of regime and output support by West European standards.195 This 
makes it very difficult to determine to which extent Italian felt legitimacy for the EU 
is positively related to the EU-compatibility of its national political system and to 
which degree it is merely a negative function of domestic state failure and public 
alienation.196
If, as this thesis argues, the legitimacy of the EU depends on the member state from 
whose perspective it is evaluated, this hypothesis is best tested by choosing as case
192 Marco Giuliani: “Italy”, in: Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels: The European Union and 
Member States - Towards Institutional Fusion?. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 
p.119
193 Hix (99), op. cit.. p.l 17
194 Roger Griffin: “Italy”, in: Roger Eatwell (ed.): European Political Cultures - Conflict or 
Convergence?. (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 139, 151
195 Guido Martinotti and Sonia Stefanizzi: “Europeans and the Nation State”, in: Oskar Niedermayer 
and Richard Sinnott (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp. 170-75
196 Ibid.. p. 178-82
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studies two well-legitimised member states where disparities in formal and felt 
legitimacy are proncounced and have therefore caused different degrees of 
compatibility with European integration. Among the larger member states, Britain and 
Germany represent opposite ends on this criterion. The differences in the formal and 
felt legitimacy of Britain and Germany will therefore help to explain distinct national 
perspectives on the legitimacy of the EU to which the discussion now turns.
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Chapter Five: Formal and Felt Legitimacy of the EU
5.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses the formal and felt legitimacy of the EU from the perspective of 
the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. The first part analyses the EU’s formal 
legitimacy, paying particular attention to the distinct interpretations of its 
constitutional philosophy by the ECJ, British and German courts. After an empirical 
analysis of the EU’s felt legitimacy in the second section, the chapter concludes by 
discussing whether the EU suffers from a relative legitimacy deficit from a British or 
German perspective.
5.2.1 Formal Legitimacy: Constitutional Philosophy
The constitutional philosophy of the EU is difficult to determine. In the absence of a 
European constitution, recourse must be taken to the Treaties of Rome, on which the 
EC was constituted in 1957, and their subsequent amendments.1 The Treaties identify
'y
the institutional structure of the Communities. They enumerate the various 
legislative, administrative, regulative and judicial powers which enable EU 
institutions to translate the general principles of the Treaties into binding rules, some 
of which (regulations) are even directly applicable. Legislation is restricted in its 
scope to the list of competencies laid down in the Treaties which is predominantly 
confined to economic activities.4 The Treaties do not confer the power for EU 
institutions to determine which matters fall within their own competence, but they 
remain rather vague about the exact relationship with national constitutions. As the 
EU gradually evolved from an “ordinary” international organisation into a unique
1 The most important amendments are the Single European Act of 1987, the Treaty on European Union 
of 1992, and the Treaty o f Amsterdam of 1997. The TEU saw the introduction o f two additional 
“pillars” next to the EC, namely a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. These two pillars are still largely intergovernmental in character, and the 
subsequent discussion mainly concentrates on the dominating EC pillar.
2 Art.4 and Art.l37ff (Part Five) EC
3 Regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions, whereby the last two are o f non­
binding character. See Art. 189 EC
4 Art.3 EC
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political system with ever expanding competencies, so its constitutional philosophy 
changed as well.
The central problem in determining its constitutional philosophy is to identify the 
ultimate sources of legitimacy in the EU. If regarded as a treaty organisation, the EU’s 
legitimacy will ultimately flow from the member states. Alternatively, if its nature is 
closer to that of a state, it must develop its own legitimising principles. To use Hart’s 
terminology, the EU appears to represent a case where the rule of recognition is 
uncertain and so are “the ultimate criteria used by courts in identifying valid rules of 
law.”5 Because the EU’s formal legitimacy is closely intertwined with that of its 
member states and embedded in their very different national constitutional structures, 
the interpretation of its formal legitimacy differs not only between the ECJ and 
national courts, but also among member states themselves. To clarify the EU’s 
constitutional philosophy, the next section analyses the general judicial interpretation 
of the Treaties by their ultimate legal arbiters, the ECJ and the courts in Britain and 
Germany.
The European Court of Justice
The ECJ never directly concerned itself in any of its judgements with the
constitutional philosophy underlying the EU, but one can draw some inferences from
judicial precedents and the general jurisprudence of the Court. As regards the status of 
the EU’s political system, the 1962 Van Gend en Loos case represents a landmark 
decision, since the ECJ held that the EC possesses its own separate system of law. The 
ECJ argued that
“the Community constitutes a new legal order o f international law for the 
benefit o f which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, and the subjects o f which comprise not only the
Member States but also their nationals. ”6
5 Hart, op. cit.. p. 148. As the discussion below will show, the uncertainty mainly pertains to the 
diversity o f opinions in the academic debate. The courts, while shifting their interpretation over time, do 
normally adhere to a fairly clear rule of recognition at any one point in time.
6 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administraitie der Belastingen (19631 ECR 1 at 12
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It also held that much EU legislation has direct effect by conferring rights or imposing 
obligations on individuals which national courts are bound to recognise and enforce. 
Just two years after Van Gend en Loos the Court reinforced its message by ruling that 
“the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source o f law, could 
not because o f its special and original nature be overridden by domestic 
legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived o f its character 
as Community law and without the legal basis o f the Community itself
n
being called into question. ”
In its verdict, the Court in effect inferred from the Treaties an obligation on national 
law to recognise the supremacy of Community law. Some years later, the Court 
further clarified its position by emphasising that provisions of the Treaties and EC 
legislation
“...not only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any 
conflicting provisions o f current national law but... also preclude the valid 
adoption o f new national legislative measures to the extent to which they
o
would be incompatible with Community provisions. ”
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft the ECJ went another step further by declaring 
that Community law overrides even fundamental rights of national constitutions or 
national constitutional principles.9 This precedent is complemented by the so-called 
“Simmenthal doctrine” according to which national legal systems are only compatible 
with Community law if they allow courts to refuse to apply subsequent inconsistent 
domestic legislation.10 Rather, a national court is under the duty to refuse
“o f its own motion to apply any conflicting provisions o f national 
legislation, even i f  adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the 
court to request or await the prior setting aside o f such provisions by 
legislative or other constitutional means. ”1}
7 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL H964) ECR 585 at 586
8 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal S. p. A. n978) ECR 629 at 
629-30
9 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfiihr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel 0 9 7 0 ) ECR 1125 at 1125-26
10 Collins, op. cit.. p.20
11 Simmenthal, op. cit.. ECR 629 at 630
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The ECJ thus perceives the EU as an independent supranational system of law which 
confers rights and imposes responsibilities on individuals and member states. The 
Court recognises the EU’s roots in international law with the member states remaining 
the ultimately sovereign High Contracting Parties. While the Union has a separate, 
independent body of law over which the ECJ enjoys ultimate jurisdiction and which is 
superior to all forms of national law, the EU is not based on a European pouvoir 
constituant as would be the case with a fully sovereign state.
However, the Court’s jurisprudence appears to be veering towards the creation of an
independent and distinct constitutional philosophy for the EU. The underlying
political integrationist agenda, which is justified with reference to the teleological
11objectives of the Treaties, is indirectly acknowledged by some of its judges. Starting 
from the premise that, as an independent legal system, the EU must develop its own 
general legal principles, the Court has gradually created what amounts to a body of 
constitutional law and occasionally refers to the Treaties as a European constitution.14
This development has been particularly pronounced in the area of fundamental rights 
which the Court increasingly considers itself bound to protect.15 The TEU formalised 
this development by declaring that the EU shall respect fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the European Convention, the constitutional traditions of the member 
states and “the general principles of Community law”.16 The TA reinforces the EU’s 
commitment to “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” and empowers the ECJ, together with the Council and the EP, 
to proceed against Union institutions or member states which are deemed in breach of
1 7these principles.
Most recently, the European Council has set up a committee to draft a “European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights” for adoption at the conclusion of the current IGC
12 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste, Les Verts v Parliament (1986) ECR 1339 at 1365
13 Fernand Schockweiler: “Die richterliche Kontrollfunktion: Umfang und Grenzen in Bezug auf den 
Europaischen Gerichtshof’, Europarecht, vol.30, no.3, 1995, p. 193
14 For example, the ECJ referred to the TEU as a “constitutional charter”: Opinion 1/91 (1991) ECR 1- 
6084
15 See for instance: Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. op. cit., ECR 1125a Case 4/73 Nold v 
Commission of the European Communities (1974) ECR 491
16 Art.F.2 TEU
17 Art.6,7 TA
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1 Rtowards the end of 2000. Although its precise legal status remains to be decided, the 
Charter is likely to accelerate the constitutionalisation of the Treaties and, by making 
it justiciable in the ECJ, transform the latter into a de facto constitutional court of the 
EU. The Charter may even become the bill o f rights of a future European constitution. 
This interpretation would be confirmed if the proposed separation of the Treaties into 
a constitutional core, to be amended by unanimity, and more general provisions, to be 
amended by QMV, were to be adopted at the current IGC.19
Although there is at present no indication that the Court may soon be prepared to 
challenge the member states’ ultimate authority over the Treaties, the above 
developments could result in a gradual transformation of the legal grundnorm of the 
EU. Eventually the ECJ would certainly be inclined to regard European sources of 
legitimacy, for example derived from the EP or a European bill of rights, on par with 
the legitimacy conferred on the Treaties by the High Contracting Parties. If that were 
to happen, the EU would have to replace its indirect democratic legitimisation through 
the member states with a distinct, self-generated form of popular sovereignty. The 
ECJ has started to prepare the ground for such a European-based source of 
(democratic) legitimacy since the 1960s. Mindful that the preamble to the Treaties 
refers to the peoples in the member states as well as their governments, the judges 
urged
“that the nationals o f the states brought together in the Community are 
called upon to co-operate in the functioning o f this Community through 
the intermediary o f the European Parliament and the Economic and
JfiSocial Committee. ”
In another judgement the Court reinforced this view by claiming that the Treaties 
intend the EP
“to play an actual part in the legislative process o f  the Community. Such 
power represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended 
by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects at Community level the 
fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the
18 “Necessary? The EU and Human Rights”, The Economist, vol.354, no.8156, 5/2/2000, p.42
19 Ibid, p.42
20 Van Gend en Loos, op. cit.. ECR 1 at 12
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exercise o f power through the intermediary o f a representative
01assembly. ”
A few years later the Court claimed for itself the right to protect Parliament’s
00prerogatives and ensure the inter-institutional balance is maintained. These examples 
illustrate that the judges ascribe a significant legitimising role to parliamentary 
democracy at the European level, although that role is not explicitly reflected in the 
text of the Treaties of Rome. The preamble to the new TEU merely speaks of the 
desire “to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions”. 
While this leaves open whether parliamentary legitimacy has to be national or 
supranational in nature, the Court has made clear its preference for the latter by 
explicitly stressing the significance of the EP for the democratic legitimation of the 
EU.
British Courts
British judges have devoted little time to the question of the EU’s legitimacy. The 
notion has certainly never played a direct role in any of the court cases dealing with 
the EU. This is for mainly two reasons. British judges have no authority to pronounce 
upon the constitutionality of legislation. Most of the German cases discussed below 
would simply not have been admitted to British courts. Second, when reaching 
judgements, British courts confine their pronouncements to the case in question and 
rarely engage in continental-style deliberations on general principles of law with 
repercussions for future constitutional developments. Nevertheless, inferences about 
the judiciary’s implicit view of the constitutional philosophy of the EU can be drawn 
from their interpretation of the status of the European legal system.
As argued in chapter three, the 1972 European Communities Act, which implemented 
the Treaties into British law, recognises the distinctness of the European legal system 
and gives direct legal force within the UK to past and future EU law. Legal disputes 
are to be decided by the ECJ, and in cases of conflict between EU law and an Act of 
Parliament the former is to prevail. While British courts soon recognised the
21 Case 139/79 Maizena GmbH v Council o f the European Communities (1980) ECR 3393 at 3424
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supremacy of Community law in principle, the validity of the Simmenthal doctrine 
remained contested, as demonstrated by the different judicial decisions made in the 
Factortame case.23
However, even after Factortame, judges will only be able to declare legislation 
inapplicable if they are satisfied that Parliament has no intention to depart from the 
principles established by s 2 (1) and s 2 (4) of the 1972 European Communities Act. 
Should that condition not obtain, then judges appear to be required to give effect to 
subsequent United Kingdom legislation, even if it turns out to be inconsistent with EU 
law. Since such a case has not yet occurred the exact position English courts will take 
on this matter can only be predicted. Ultimately, therefore, the preservation of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty hinges on judicial behaviour. Orthodox 
constitutional theory certainly suggests the above solution. After all, it has rightly been 
pointed out that
“the only theoretical basis for the notion that future inconsistent 
legislation could be held to be invalid would be that o f  a legal revolution, 
in the sense o f a fundamental change in the legal order, or a change in the 
grundnorm. ”24
Even short of such an open defiance of the supremacy of EU law, the practice of 
taking Parliament’s intention into account when applying European law can be
9 cconstrued as contravening the Simmenthal principle. Since the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty remains the supreme rule by which United Kingdom courts 
identify valid law, whether British or European, British courts will continue to regard 
the EU as nothing more than a treaty organisation firmly rooted in international law.
This has significant implications for the interpretation of the EU’s constitutional 
philosophy by British courts. The courts have consistently justified the powers 
exercised by the European political system with reference to the terms under which 
the United Kingdom acceded to the Community. Britain’s membership was negotiated
22 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council o f the European Communities (1990) ECR 2067
23 See: Chapter 3. pp.99ff
24 Collins, op. cit.. p.29, also: Joseph Weiler: “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supra- 
Nationalism”, Yearbook o f European Law, vol.l, 1981, p.275
25 Collins, op. cit.. p.39
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and signed under the treaty-making prerogatives of the Crown, and the provisions of 
the Treaties were given legal effect by the 1972 European Communities Act. Each of 
these actions was, respectively, an exercise of the royal prerogative and of 
parliamentary sovereignty.26 This orthodox position prevails for the time being:
“I f  the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act 
with the intention o f repudiating the Treaty or any provisions in it or 
intentionally o f acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms 
then I  should have thought that it would be the duty o f our courts to follow
77
the statute o f our Parliament. ”
To conclude, from a British constitutional perspective the EU is a treaty-based 
political system of international law whose legitimacy must be derived from another 
legal system. In Britain this has occurred through Parliament by its passage of the 
1972 Act. As the UK government remains one of the High Contracting Parties, and 
hence able to amend the Treaties, subject to parliamentary ratification, the question 
which legitimising principles apply within the EU is not justiciable in the courts and
70
has therefore not been dealt with by them. But any legitimising principles guiding 
the internal distribution of powers within the EU must remain subordinate to the 
indirect legitimation via the Council of Ministers and the Westminster Parliament.
The German Federal Constitutional Court
German courts have devoted more effort to the issue of the EU’s legal status and its 
constitutional philosophy. Pronouncements of an empirical nature upon how the EU 
currently is legitimised were often embedded in the normative context of how it must 
be legitimised if it is to draw on its own, independent sources of legitimacy. In 
particular, the FCC spelled out the conditions for a European parliamentary 
democracy and the protection of fundamental rights by the EU.
The FCC held in 1967 that the EC, while not itself a state, was a new supranational 
and independent public authority clearly distinct from the state authority of the
26 Blackburn, op. cit.. 2 All ER 1380 (CA)
27 Macarthys Ltd v Smith (1979). 3 All ER 325 at 329 (CA)
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member states which have transferred to it certain sovereign rights. This has been 
effected by the Treaties which “constitute some form of constitution of the 
Community”.29 Secondary law of the EC constitutes a discrete legal order emanating 
from an autonomous source of law, since its norms derive neither from international, 
nor national law. While recognising the ECJ’s power of adjudicating European law, 
the FCC also paved the way for future conflicts by declaring an open question whether 
(and to what extent) it could itself review Community law against fundamental legal 
principles of the German constitution.30
This open question was answered in the affirmative in 1974 when the FCC had to rule 
on the relationship between these two legal orders. The Court denied any automatic 
supremacy of either primary or secondary EC law over the fundamental structure of 
the Basic Law as protected by Art.79/3 BL.31 In particular, the FCC considered itself 
entitled to rule on the compatibility of Community law with these fundamental laws 
as long as the European legal system did not contain a Bill of Rights comparable in its 
quality to the protection of fundamental rights by the Basic Law.
This controversial decision amounted to an open defiance of the principles contained 
in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Simmenthal case. To solve this 
inconsistency, the FCC reappraised its former verdict in 1986 by inverting the 
conditionality under which the Court would become active. The FCC noted 
approvingly34 that the ECJ now regarded itself bound to respect fundamental rights as
i  r
one of the general principles of law to be derived from the member states’
1 c
constitutional tradition. The FCC concluded, with explicit reference to its 1974 
decision, that these developments had raised the standard of protection for 
fundamental rights in the European Community to become equivalent to the
28 On a similar point see: R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees 
Mogg (1994). 1 All ER 457 at 469 tOBD DC)
29 BVerfGE. 67. 293 at 296
30 Ibid.. at 295-96
31 BVerfGE 74. 271 at 278-79
32 This is the so-called “Solange I” judgement, see: Ibid., at 277-78
33 Simmenthal, op. cit., ECR 629 at 644
34 BVerfGE 86. 339 at 379
35 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, op. cit., ECR 1125 at 1125-26
36 Nold, op. cit.. ECR 491 at 491
Chapter Five 191
provisions of the Basic Law.37 As long as this condition obtained, the FCC would 
refrain from adjudicating secondary EC law upon its compatibility with the German
38constitution.
This clarification was cast into renewed doubt in the 1993 “Maastricht judgement”. 
The Court argued the newly-founded EU had remained a “supranational organisation” 
while also styling it a “European federation of states.”39 However, the Union is not a 
European state because, amongst other things, it lacks the power to determine the 
scope of its own competencies.40 The FCC believes the foundation of a “United States 
of Europe” is politically not intended for the time being, and it therefore refused to 
speculate whether German membership in such a European state would be compatible 
with the Basic Law 41 Instead, it reaffirmed Germany’s sovereign position as one of 
the High Contracting Parties to the Treaties.
The Maastricht judgement takes a surprisingly assertive stance with respect to the 
relationship between the two legal orders. The Court reinterpreted its own 1986 
decisions to the effect that both the ECJ and the FCC “co-operatively” protect 
fundamental rights, although the FCC will only act as a general guarantor of last 
resort.42 An even more significant usurpation of the ECJ’s prerogatives occurred when 
the Court deemed itself authorised to declare ultra vires any EU law which transcends 
the boundaries of European integration as demarcated by the Maastricht Treaty. 
According to the Court, such laws will not be covered by the German implementing 
legislation and hence be inapplicable in Germany 43
In the Maastricht judgement, the Constitutional Court presented for the first time a 
detailed interpretation of the legitimising principles on which the EU is based. The 
judges argued the EU rests on a dual legitimacy. They held that, ultimately, legitimacy 
is provided by the national implementing legislation of the Treaties the repeal o f
37 BVerfGE 86. 339 at 378
38 This has come to be known as “Solange II”, see: Ibid.. at 387
39 BVerfGE 93. 155 at 181
40 Ibid.. at 181
41 Ibid.. at 188f
42 Ibid.. at 175
43 Ibid.. at 188
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which would terminate Germany’s membership of the EU.44 The EP provides 
additional legitimacy for the Union, albeit only of a “supportive nature” subordinate to 
the national chains of legitimacy.45 The reason for this subordination lies in the 
absence of the conditions necessary for European-wide popular sovereignty, namely a 
single European people with a reasonably high degree of socio-cultural homogeneity 
(“Staatsvolk”). A supranational confederation of nations such as the EU must 
therefore remain primarily legitimised through the peoples of the member states as 
represented in their national parliaments.46
The Court noted that the continuing process of European integration might help to 
create the pre-legal conditions under which supranational constitutional democracy 
can effectively operate one day. They include a continuous free public discourse in 
which parties, organised interests and the media fully participate and which 
culminates in the formation of a public opinion expressing a particular political will. If 
the peoples of Europe gradually grow into a demos, thereby fulfilling the above 
conditions, the EU can be increasingly legitimised through the EP expressing a truly 
European public opinion. While the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that majority 
decisions in the Council undermine the people-based democratic principle, it stressed 
the limits to further integration in the future as long as the member states are the main 
providers of legitimacy to the EU.47
In conclusion, German courts have dealt comprehensively with the question of the 
constitutional philosophy of the EU. The FCC is willing to contemplate a 
transformation of the ultimate principles by which the EU is legitimised, but the 
judges tie their jurisprudential flexibility to very strict conditions. The most important 
of these is that any European legitimising principles have to resemble those of the 
Basic Law, in particular with respect to fundamental rights and democracy. German 
judges have been realistic in their assessment of the difficulties to meet these 
conditions. For the time being, therefore, they continue to regard the EU as an 
international treaty organisation which partly rests on a dual legitimacy.
44 Ibid.. at 184, 190
45 Ibid.. at 185f
46 Ibid.. at 184
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Summary
British and German courts have taken a different perspective on the past and future 
evolution of the legal status and the constitutional philosophy of the EU because their 
approach is conditioned by distinct national constitutional structures. British courts are 
willing to acknowledge the unique character of the EU as a discrete political system, 
but they continue to classify the EU as an essentially treaty-based organisation of 
international law which is legitimised through the member states. There has been a 
reluctance to contemplate a dual legitimacy of the EU because the British doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is ultimately incompatible with the supremacy of EU law. 
A fundamental constitutional conflict could still erupt in the UK if future European 
integration were to weaken the sovereign legal position of the High Contracting 
Parties or the degree to which the EU is still based in international law, for instance by 
awarding the EU its own, independent sources of legitimacy.
Although the FCC’s jurisprudence also treats the EU as an international organisation, 
Germany’s formal legitimacy is more compatible with a development of the EU’s 
constitutional philosophy towards its own legitimising principles. Because the 
German constitution is “integration-geared”, the FCC has shown itself willing to 
subscribe to a version of the dual legitimacy theory, according to which the EU draws 
its formal legitimacy partly from its own sources and partly from the member states. 
German courts have stressed the legitimising function of the EP and the role of the 
ECJ as guardian of the rule of law and fundamental rights. While the FCC has been 
more assertive than British courts in defending its own adjudicative competencies and 
protecting the core of the Basic Law, this has created only a conditional 
incompatibility between Germany’s formal legitimacy and the EU. The future 
development of the EU’s constitutional philosophy is constrained as long as member 
states remain the principal providers of democratic legitimacy and guarantors of 
fundamental rights. The planned adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights may 
therefore help to reduce this conditional incompatibility between the two legal 
systems.
47 Ibid.. at 183
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Despite the FCC’s struggle with the ECJ for ultimate jurisdictional supremacy and its 
insistence on classifying the EU as an international treaty organisation, German 
jurisprudence remains in principle, and subject to certain conditions, open to a future 
transformation of the EU constitutional philosophy. Compared with Britain, the 
German perspective is therefore arguably closer to, and more compatible with, the 
ECJ’s own interpretation of the constitutional philosophy of the EU. The ECJ, whose 
jurisprudence has already greatly enhanced the status of EU law, acknowledges that 
the European legal system operates only within the limits imposed by the Treaties, but
JO
it has gradually sought to advance the constitutionalisation of the Treaties.
5.2.2 Formal Legitimacy: Constitutional Order and Constitutional Reality 
The Legitimation of Executive Governance
The institutional structure of the EU is characterised by a horizontal and vertical 
diffusion of executive powers. The EU lacks one of the most important features 
customarily associated with states, namely one obvious agenda-setting and co­
ordinating executive centre of government. The closest approximation to a core 
executive in the EU is the European Commission which is organised similar to 
domestic governments.49 Its 20 members, including a President as primus inter pares, 
reach decisions by simple majority and are appointed for five-year terms by the 
member states.50 Commissioners are legally obliged to be completely independent of 
their national governments and to act only in the interest of the EU.51 In practice, 
Commissioners tend to have made a political career in their respective home country 
before being appointed to Brussels which makes a radical detachment from their 
national political arena often difficult to accomplish. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, 
Commissioners must follow the political guidance of the President who decides on 
their appointment by common accord with the member states.52 Upon being appointed 
Commission President in 1999, Romano Prodi substantially extended the informal
48 For a discussion, see: Weiler (99), op. cit.. pp.292-98
49 Hix (99), op. cit., p.32
50 Art. 158 EC
51 Art. 157 EC
52 Art.214 and 219 TA
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powers of the Presidency by demanding written promises from every Commissioner to 
resign on his request.
The Treaties award the Commission the exclusive right to develop policies and draft 
legislation.54 The Council of Ministers and the EP can only request the Commission 
to propose legislation in a particular area, but cannot do the drafting or initiating 
themselves.55 The Commission manages the EU budget, issues legislative instruments 
(on which the EP is not even consulted) and plays an important role in representing 
and negotiating for the EU externally, especially in conducting EU trade and co­
operation negotiations.56 The Commission also exercises important regulative and 
even judicial functions. Two of the most important policy areas within the EU, the 
CAP and the SEM, require an extensive degree of regulatory supervision which forms 
an increasingly prominent part of the Commission’s duties with far-reaching
cn
economic and political consequences in the member states. Despite the 
Commission’s numerous powers and functions, the European policy process has often 
been dubbed governance without government because the Commission is for a 
number of reasons far less in control of this process than national governments are
fO
with regard to domestic policy-making.
First, the European Council has de facto gradually assumed the Commission’s role as 
a policy-initiator and dispenser of policy-guidelines, especially on major policy 
initiatives which change the systemic character of the EU. Although the SEM was a 
Commission initiative, it could only be launched after the European Council had 
prompted and endorsed the publication of the White Paper on the Single Market.59 As 
the highest authority of the EU, the European Council meets bi-anually and consists of 
each member state’s head of government and foreign minister as well the President of
53 “Prodi Imperator”, The Economist, vol.352, no.8137, 18/9/1999, pp.56-58
54 Art. 155 EC. Legislation takes the form of either regulations and decisions (directly applicable in 
member states) or directives (which are only binding in “the result to be achieved”).
55 Art. 152 and 138b EC, respectively. Between 1993 and 1998 the EP has only twice requested 
legislative initiatives, see: Martin Westlake: “The European Parliament’s Emerging Powers of 
Appointment”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol.36, no.3, 1998, p.441
56 Art. 113 EC
57 Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, op. cit., p.26
58 Rosenau and Czempiel, op. cit..
59 Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit.. p.74
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the Commission.60 It is mainly an intergovernmental forum at the highest political 
level with the aim to enhance political co-ordination, to identify medium- and long­
term policy-goals and to act as an informal “court of appeal” for policy arbitration 
among member states.61 The backing of the European Council is vital for the effective 
exercise of the Commission’s legislative powers, since the support of member states is
f f lneeded for the successful adoption and implementation of EU legislation. Major 
political decisions are therefore increasingly being taken by the European Council, and 
its demands for particular policy proposals are usually being met by the Commission. 
Despite its great “political clout”, the powers of the European Council are hardly 
reflected in the very general and tenuous definition of its role. It has only become 
formally institutionalised with the SEA and the TEU which have given it a quasi-legal 
base outside the Community Treaties, thus escaping the full jurisdiction of the ECJ.63
Second, the Commission lacks the administrative resources to formulate and initiate 
policies on its own. In exercising its legislative prerogatives, the Commission 
therefore depends on an extensive and important network of expert and consultative 
committees representing national civil servants and sectional interests.64 These direct 
relationships with interlocutors in the member states and the clients of policies are 
generally known as comitology. As far as these are formalised at all, they can be 
roughly divided into two types of committees. Expert committees consist of national 
officials and experts in the area where legislation is proposed. Their members are 
nominated by national governments and some of them are constituted on an ad hoc 
basis. Consultative committees represent sectional interests, in particular from the 
agricultural sector. Such policy networks are an indispensable tool in the 
Commission’s efforts to muster sufficient support for legislation to pass all the 
complex hurdles of a policy-making process over which it has only limited control. 
The influence of these networks generally depends on the degree to which the 
Commission requires outside expertise and the extent to which it has to co-opt the 
affected interest groups in order to overcome resistance to its adoption.
60 Art.D TEU
61 Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels: The European Council: Decision-Making in European Politics 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp.75-102
62 Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit.. p.74
63 Bulmer and Wessels, op. cit.. pp. 118-20
64 Neill Nugent: The Government and Politics o f the European Union, (London: Macmillan, 3rd ed. 
1994)iPP.101-103
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Third, at the end of the legislative cycle, the Commission enjoys responsibilities in the 
management, supervision and implementation of policies and legislation, but hardly 
implements policies directly. Most of the actual policy implementation is delegated to 
an elaborate network of national or even regional agencies.65 Implementation therefore 
differs amongst member states, and it may often vary in terms of procedure and 
implementing agents even within member states, especially federal ones like 
Germany. These arrangements carry an inherent risk of policies not being applied 
reasonably uniformly across the EU, but for lack of financial and human resources the 
Commission must more or less fully rely on the array of national and subnational 
bodies to implement EU law for it. Because of the sheer complexity of EU law and an 
occasional reluctance to implement regulations with an adverse domestic effect, 
compliance with the Commission’s orders for implementation cannot always be taken 
for granted.66
Since the Commission has few means to enforce centrally the implementation of 
European legislation in the member states, let alone supervise enforcement, there has 
been a continuous increase in the number of reported infractions brought before the 
ECJ. Schmitter considers this “implementation deficit” an ever more important 
obstacle to the scope and efficiency of Community action as EU policies increasingly
• • • A7touch upon nationally sensitive political issues. Such a portrayal seems to exaggerate 
the Commission’s impotence. After all, the Commission acts as guardian of the legal 
frameworks according to Art. 155 EC, in co-operation with the ECJ. In this capacity 
the Commission may bring member states before the Court for non-compliance with
/Q
the Treaties provisions or failure to apply EU law. Since Maastricht, the 
Commission may even recommend to the Court a specific financial penalty payable by 
the non-compliant member state, especially in the areas of competition policy and
65 Wessels and Rometsch, op. cit., pp.328-65
66 For instance, in 1998 the French Parliament deliberately defied an EU directive on migratory birds. 
See: “Paris Vote Gives Brussels the Bird”, Financial Times. 23/6/1998, p.3
67 Philippe C. Schmitter: “Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help o f New Concepts”, in: 
Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.): Governance in the 
European Union. (London: Sage, 1996), p. 139
68 Art. 169 EC
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state aid for industry.69 In the light of the enhanced judicial role of the Commission 
and the ECJ one can therefore expect legal action against infringements to increase.
There is no doubt that the Commission’s role as a legal watchdog remains an 
insufficient substitute for an EU-wide policy-implementation mechanism. The 
Commission often lacks the resources effectively to investigate possible illegalities 
which may have been committed or covered up by national governments. 
Nevertheless, the Commission does have at its disposal an ultimate, if not always 
effective, sanction to ensure full implementation and application of EU law in the 
member states.
The Legitimation of the Legislative Process
Just as the EU lacks one centralised executive government, so the Union’s legislative 
authority is diffused among different institutions. The European Parliament does not 
exercise the full range of powers vested in the legislatures of most EU member states, 
as the following examples demonstrate.
First, the EP has comparatively limited powers of executive supervision because the 
Commission does not depend on parliamentary support to the same extent as national 
governments do. The EP plays no formal role in the nomination of Commissioners 
who are chosen by the member states and whose political affiliations may not fully 
reflect the party-political balance in the EP. But it must be consulted on, and approve 
of, the appointment of a new President of the Commission, and the new College of 
Commissioners is collectively subject to parliamentary approval.70 The appointment 
of a new Commission in 1994 saw the introduction of parliamentary hearings of 
individual prospective Commissioners - a practice since institutionalised in Art.214 
TA. In addition, the EP can dismiss the entire College of Commissioners by carrying a 
motion of censure by a two-thirds majority.71 However, this power has never been 
successfully used so far, and it is still a long way from being comparable to the votes
69 Nugent (94), op. cit., pp. 114-15
70 Art.214 TA
71 Art. 144 EC
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of no-confidence common to national political systems.72 The most recent motion of 
censure was moved in January 1999 and recorded the highest vote ever in favour of 
censure (42% of MEP). Despite serious allegations of fraud and mismanagement, 
the Commission initially refused to resign because it could argue that the censure 
motion had technically failed. Only the subsequent publication of a highly critical 
report by a Committee of Independent Experts made the Commission’s position 
untenable, and it resigned collectively in March 1999.74
The EP can also table written and oral questions to the Commission, and its standing 
committees, amongst them the Committee of Inquiry , have remits broad enough to
7 f \exercise a supervisory function, albeit limited in scale by poor resources. 
Furthermore, Art. 138e EC introduces a parliamentary ombudsman who can 
investigate allegations of maladministration brought by citizens. The EP must be 
consulted in the appointment of the President and the Executive Board of the ECB, 
and it has already established an informal tradition for public parliamentary hearings 
of candidates.77 The ECB President delivers an annual report for debate in the EP 
which can also request the President or members of the Executive Board to appear
7Rbefore one of its committees. Parliamentary scrutiny of the Council of Ministers or 
the European Council is marginal to non-existent and largely depends on the attitude
70of the country holding the presidency. The EP’s influence on decisions by the 
European Council remains “tangential”, and it only receives a verbal report on each
OA
summit meeting by the President of the European Council.
Second, the EP has limited budgetary powers which it must share with the Council of 
Ministers. The Union’s budget is drafted by the Commission after which the EP and
• R1the Council formally enjoy joined decision-making power for its adoption. The EP 
may table amendments to the budget, but this right is circumscribed for all
72 Martin Westlake: A Modem Guide to the European Parliament. (London: Pinter, 1994), p.l 15
73 The Resignation o f the European Commission. (London: House o f Commons Research Paper 99/32, 
1999), p. 12
74 Ibid, p.9-14
75 Art. 13 8c TEU
76 Nugent (94), op. cit., p. 184
77 Art.l 12 TA. See also: Westlake (98), op. cit., pp.434-37
78 Art.l 13 TA
79 Nugent (94), op. cit.. p. 185
80 Westlake (94), op. cit., p.33
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“compulsory expenditure” (principally the CAP) which makes up the vast bulk of the 
budget.82 The EP can reject the entire final draft of the budget only with an overall 
two-thirds majority, as occurred in 1979 and 1984.
Parliamentary influence on the budget has been somewhat increased by the 
introduction of five-yearly “financial perspectives” in 1988 which by convention
o4
require the EP’s endorsement. The EP has also benefited from the publication of an 
annual report by the European Court of Auditors which operates autonomously from 
the other EU institutions. The EC A scrutinises EU finances and audits the accounts of 
all EU institutions as well as national, regional and local administrations involved in
oc
the management of EU funds. The Commission must implement the budget within 
its approved scope, since the EU is not legally permitted to run a budget deficit. The 
accounts of the preceding financial year are then submitted to Council and EP which
o/
must both discharge the Commission for its implementation of the budget. The 
increasing importance of this power was illustrated in December 1998 when the EP 
refused discharge of the Union’s budget because it felt the Commission had failed to
07
dispel serious allegations of fraud. The refusal to grant parliamentary discharge led 
to a high-profile official investigation into EU finances which ultimately resulted in 
the collective resignation of the Commission.
Third, the EP’s legislative powers are shared with the Council of Ministers in a
00
bicameral system in which the Council remains the ultimate legislator. Legislative 
proposals from the Commission are presented first to the Council which comprises 
ministerial representatives of the different policy-sectors from each of the EU’s fifteen
on
member states. Their decisions are prepared in detail by the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) which itself draws on the advice of various 
Council committees. Such an extended period of inter-governmental consultation and 
drafting has moulded a very consensual policy-making style in the Council, but it also
81 Art.203 EC
82 Westlake (94), op. cit., p. 123
83 Art.203/8 EC
84 Westlake (94), op. cit.. p .l25ff
85 Art.247,248 TA
86 Art.206 EC
87 HC Research Paper 99/32, op. cit.. p .l If
88 Hix (99), op. cit.. p.61ff
89 Art. 146 EC
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limits the ability of the EP to influence the Council’s policy position in its formative 
stages.90 By the time decisions are taken in the Council most disputes have already 
been settled so that Council votes are rarely taken even when the case has to be 
decided by majority rather than unanimity.91
After legislation has been initially passed by the Council, a number of different 
procedures apply for the involvement of the EP, which is directly elected by universal 
suffrage from all the member states for five-year terms. Originally, the EP only had 
to be consulted on a bill proposed by the Commission, but the Council as the ultimate 
legislator was undeTno constitutional obligation foTakelherParliament’s opinion into 
account.93 Today, only few areas remain where this “consultation procedure” applies 
(most importantly in CAP and in the EU’s second and third pillar). Yet it is worth 
noting that in some areas such as large parts of EMU or external trade agreements 
under Art.l 13 the EP is not consulted at all.94 With respect to primary law (Treaties 
revisions) the EP’s formal role is confined to non-binding consultation by the Council 
upon the convening of Intergovernmental Conferences.95
The SEA introduced two constitutional innovations with regard to parliamentary 
legislative involvement, the “co-operation procedure” and the “legislative assent 
procedure”. Since Amsterdam, the latter applies to the accession of new member 
states, association and trade agreements, breach of fundamental rights by member 
states, and structural funds. For legislation in these areas the assent by an absolute 
majority of MEPs is required.96 In order to simplify legislative procedures, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam has reduced the application of the co-operation procedure principally to 
some areas of Economic and Monetary Policy.
Most decisions involving parliamentary co-operation are now being taken under the
07“co-decision” procedure first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty of
90 Bulmer (97), op. cit.. p.55
91 F. Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace: The Council o f Ministers. (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 18- 
19
92 Art. 138.1 EC
93 Westlake (94), op. cit.. p. 136
94 Ibid.. pp.l59f, 169-72
95 Art.Nl TEU
96 Westlake (94), op. cit., p. 151
97 Art. 189 TEU
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Amsterdam has slightly simplified the co-decision procedure and roughly doubled the 
number of policy areas where it becomes applicable. Previously, co-decision was 
applicable to about a quarter of all European legislation, and the EP now expects half
QO
its legislative timetable to be consumed with co-decision procedures. In the course 
of its three reading stages, the Council or Parliament can refer the bill under 
consideration to a “conciliation committee” made up of an equal numbers of members 
from each of the two bodies. If no agreement ensues, the EP can reject the proposal by 
an absolute majority of its members. Under both co-operation and co-decision, the 
Commission remains involved in the legislative process if its legislative proposal is 
amended by the EP.
This bewildering variety of institutional procedures as well as their perpetual 
adaptation makes the actual influence of the EP hardly amenable to any generalised 
quantification." For instance, the strong convention of Council consensus, which has 
by and large defied the growth of qualified majority voting, stifles many attempts by 
the EP to influence legislation because it cannot exploit divisions among member 
states in the Council.100 Yet the EP has successfully nurtured its inter-institutional 
relations which grant it an informal voice in the formal Council-Commission 
dialogue. Since 1992, EP committees have also been given the right to submit 
opinions on the Commission’s pre-legislative consultation documents, thus gaining 
some influence on policy initiation.101 The constant pressure for credibility and the 
high formal threshold for many voting procedures have produced a unique political
1 09culture of far-reaching cross-party consensus.
The success of inter-party co-operation has given rise to the argument that the EP 
exerts more influence on the law-making process in certain policy areas (measured in 
terms of amendments accepted, for instance) than national parliaments within their
i mmember states. However, this view does not represent an academic consensus and
98 Hix (99), op. cit., p.88
99 David Judge, David Eamshaw and Ngaire Cowan: “Ripples or Waves: The European Parliament in 
the EC Policy Process”, in: Journal o f European Public Policy, vol.l, no.l, 1994, p.28
100 Ibid.. p.44
101 Ibid.. pp.45-46
102 Westlake (94), op. cit.. pp. 110-11
103 Of all First Reading amendments by the EP up to 1997, the Council has accepted 41% under the co­
operation procedure and 43% under the co-decision procedure, Hix (99), op. cit.. p.96
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has to be treated as just one possible interpretation.104 It has been equally argued that 
Council and Commission have been reluctant to make major qualitative concessions 
to their bills while buying off Parliamentary agreement by accepting a large number of 
less consequential amendments.105
At the end of the legislative process, the Council alone has the power to enact
legislative proposals.106 Since the Amsterdam Treaty Qualified Majority Voting
applies for most policy areas. It allocates votes in the Council according to the
1
member state’s size and requires 62 out of 87 votes for a decision to be adopted. 
Unanimity is stipulated for various financial matters and all primary law-making 
(Treaties amendments), to much of the second and third pillar of the EU and to a 
number of policy areas in the first pillar, in particular taxation, some aspects of 
industrial policy, regional and social funds. Unanimity is also required for 
amendments of bills against the Commission’s wishes under the co-decision 
procedure.
The Legitimation of Judicial Review
The various executive and legislative powers of EU institutions are subject to judicial 
review by the ECJ. It consists of one judge from each member state appointed “by 
common accord of the governments of the member states for a term of six years”.108 
The Court can, amongst other things, judge whether member states fulfil their 
obligations under the Treaties (infringement proceedings^ ', and it can review the 
legality of Community legislation.110 But the largest category of cases that come 
before the Court are references for preliminary ruling from national courts. When 
adjudicating cases involving Community law, national courts sometimes must seek 
these references which require the ECJ to provide an authoritative and binding 
interpretation of certain aspects of primary or secondary EU law.111 However, the ECJ
104 For a survey, see: Judge, Eamshaw and Cowan, op. cit., p.28
105 Westlake (94), op. cit.. p. 142
106 Art. 145 EC
107 Art. 148 EC
108 Art. 167 EC
109 Art. 169, 170 EC
110 Art. 173 EC
111 Art. 177 EC
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has made clear that it has no jurisdiction to interpret or apply national law and does
1 19therefore not function as the highest appeal court for national legislation.
Art. 173 EC entrusts the Court with the judicial review of EU legislation for which 
application can be made by a member state, the Council, the Commission or, where its 
prerogative is concerned, the EP. Even natural or legal persons may apply for
1 n
annulment, although only on a basis largely restricted to economic matters. The 
Court is empowered to declare acts void114, and the Treaties imply that in its ruling the 
Court may refer to general principles of law where relevant.115 The Court of Justice 
therefore decided to develop its own body of legal principles from which it can draw 
in its rulings.116
So far, the Court has for instance applied the principles of proportionality, non­
discrimination, adherence to legality and respect for procedural and fundamental
117human rights. The ECJ has also tried to fill open-textured spaces in the Treaties “by 
reference to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and the
1 1 ftcase-law of the member states”. The Court empowered itself to take into account 
the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those provisions when adjudicating 
the Treaties.119 This greatly enhances its powers to establish new legal principles. A 
good early example which reflects the ethos of the Court as a pivotal integrationist 
actor is the interpretation of Art. 8 8 EC as providing “the ultima ratio enabling the 
Community interests enshrined in the Treaty to prevail over the inertia and resistance 
of the member states”.120
As a result of its jurisprudence, the Court has come to play a much more central role 
in the political system of the EU than formally envisaged in the Treaties. Because EU
112 Joint Cases 36. 37. 38 and 40/59 President Ruhrkohlen Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH et al. v High 
Authority o f the European Coal and Steel Community (1960) ECR 423 at 423
1,3 Art. 173 EC
114 Art. 174 EC
115 Art. 164, 173, 215 EC
116 President, op. cit.. ECR 423 at 423
117 Nugent (94), op. cit.. p.216
118 Joint Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/56 Dineke Algera et al. v Common Assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (1957) ECR 39
119 Van Gend en Loos, op. cit.. ECR 1 at 12
120 Case 25/59 Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v High Authority o f the European Coal 
and Steel Community (1960) ECR 355 at 374
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law is often ambiguous and incomplete, the rulings of the Court have not only 
clarified existing legislation, but also effectively created new law. This has occurred 
most noticeably with respect to EU policy competencies and the inter-institutional 
balance of powers. One of the best-known examples for the Court’s political
191importance is the Cassis de Dijon judgement in 1979. Based on the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions on imports (art.30 EC), the ECJ created the principle of 
mutual recognition of product standards across the EU which subsequently became 
one of the basic principles in establishing the Single Market.
The ECJ has therefore become an essential institutional and political innovator, since 
the open texture of EU law enabled it to adopt a very broad remit in its interpretation 
of primary and secondary Community law. As discussed above, the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence has also contributed to enhancing the Court’s own status by making it 
effectively a constitutional court for the EU, and it has aided the gradual 
constitutionalisation of the Treaties themselves - two developments that will be 
reinforced by the proposed adoption of a European Charter of Fundamental Rights.122
Political Culture
The evolutionary character of the EU has made for an institutional structure and
199decision-making procedures which are fluid and dynamic over time. The border 
between legal constitutional rules and informal political practices is frequently 
imprecise and many powers are shared between institutions. The diffusion of political 
authority between the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the EP and the European 
Council, is often blurred or overlapping and not necessarily fully reflected in the 
formal provisions.124 Of equal importance are the EU’s many non-constitutional, 
informal political arrangements, its norms and political culture which require any 
analysis of the formal legitimacy of the EU to pay particular attention to constitutional 
reality}25
121 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (1979) ECR649
122 See p,185f above.
123 Helen Wallace (96b), op. cit.. pp.40ff
124 Ibid.. pp.41ff
125 Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit.. p.68
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For instance, formal amendments of the Treaties to extend the use of QMV do not 
necessarily signal a departure from the practice of searching for unanimous consent 
and solidarity in the actual voting procedure of the Council. QMV is often merely 
used as a threat against obstructionist national governments, and significant minorities
1 Oftare rarely overruled in the Council. Similarly, broadly proportional national 
electoral systems and the frequent requirement for absolute majorities to amend and 
veto legislation have contributed to widespread cross-party co-operation in the EP and 
a consensual rather than confrontational style of political debate. In both the EP and 
the Council national interests are often “clothed” in European rhetoric, and there is a 
general reluctance among all EU institutions to challenge in any fundamental way the
127existing policy inheritance {acquis communautaire) of the EU.
There are at least two important reasons for the EU’s highly consensual political 
culture. First, consensual policy-making helps to build mutual trust among political 
actors within a multi-national political system. The need for trust-building also helps 
to explain the predominantly legal and rule-governed character of (particularly) 
regulatory policy-making, which contrasts for example with the British tradition of 
voluntary self-regulation. Second, the multi-level character of EU governance 
requires a broad-based consensus in order to ensure the successful co-operation of all 
the institutions throughout the various stages of the policy-making process. For 
instance, if member states are outvoted in the Council they may seek to obstruct the 
national implementation and compliance with the EU law in question.
Another feature of the political culture of the EU is the (partly institutionalised) 
integration of outside interests and technical expertise into the policy-making process. 
This approach is partly necessitated by the small size of the EU’s administrative 
apparatus, but it also reflects a general normative commitment to economic and social 
cohesion. The clearest institutional example of this neo-corporatist tradition is the 
Economic and Social Committee which represents organised employers, workers and
126 Nugent (94), op. cit., p. 142-48
127 Bulmer (97), op. cit.. p.57
128 Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit., p.68
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interest groups and has to be consulted on proposed legislation where the Treaties so 
provides.129
The Commission has also been keen to co-operate closely with subnational 
governments for the administration and disbursement of structural funds. This 
dialogue is aided by a whole range of informal channels as well as the Consultative
1 TOCouncil of Regional and Local Authorities attached to the Commission. The TEU
i n i
institutionalised this “subnational mobilisation” within the EU by establishing a 
Committee of the Regions, whose members consist of representatives of regional and
1 T9local bodies of the member states. But it is easy to overestimate this development, 
since the Treaty of Amsterdam, despite intensive lobbying, did not expand the CoR’s 
powers which are strictly confined to advisory and consultative functions. Even 
Hooghe concedes that influence is mostly restricted to the rather small field of 
regional policy, and the impact of subnational government on the political process of 
the EU fluctuates in proportion with the power of regions within the domestic political
133system.
5.2.3 Comparative Evaluation of the Formal Legitimacy of the EU
The above discussion of the main characteristics of the EU’s formal legitimacy can be 
summarised as follows. First, the EU is marked by institutional complexity and a 
strong horizontal diffusion of powers. Instead of a central government capable of 
policy leadership and co-ordination, there are two executive organs (Commission and 
European Council) and two legislative bodies (EP and Council of Ministers) which 
must co-operate in the exercise of their sometimes overlapping powers. The ECJ has 
gradually developed its strong powers of judicial review and established new 
jurisprudential doctrines and precedents in areas where the Treaties are vague or even 
silent. Its future role in adjudicating the proposed Charter of Fundamental Rights will 
accelerate the ECJ’s transformation into a de-facto constitutional court of the Union.
129 Art. 198 EC
130 Liesbet Hooghe: “Subnational Mobilisation in the European Union”, West European Politics, vol. 18, 
no.3, 1995, p.181
131 Ibid.. p. 177
132 Art. 198a,c EC
133 For a critical assessment of the CoR’s representative character, see: Lisbet Hooghe, op. cit.. pp. 175- 
98, esp. p .l91f
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Second, there is also a strong vertical diffusion of powers. There are few policy areas 
where the EU enjoys exclusive competence and its budgetary and administrative 
resources are very limited. Policy-making displays the characteristics of “co-operative 
federalism” because the Commission depends on member states participation at all 
stages of the policy-making process (preparation, legislation, implementation).134 This 
form of multi-level governance and the predominance of regulatory policy both 
privilege the executive and hampers democratic control by parliamentary bodies. Two 
innovations of the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity and the Committee 
of the Regions, enhance the federal separation of powers (horizontally in the case of 
the CoR and vertically in the case of subsidiarity), but they need to mature a little 
longer before their legitimising capacity can be assessed more accurately.
Third, the formal legitimacy of the EU is not based on the principle of representative 
government. The Commission as the EU’s main executive organ is sustained by the 
legislature to a very limited extend only, and it certainly does not emanate from it. 
Indeed, there does not exist a “government” in the traditional sense of the word. While 
the EP does have a genuine legislative role in most cases, it still does not carry the
tor
“full constitutional authority” assigned to parliaments in the member states. With 
the Commission as the initiator and implementor of legislation, the Council (while 
under increasing constraints from the EP) remains the ultimate legislative organ of the 
EU. The Parliament cannot by itself make laws or impose taxes and its strongest 
legislative power is the veto.
Fourth, at an informal level the EU is characterised by a very consensual policy­
making style. Decision-making in the Council is marked by a search for broad 
agreement and solidarity, even when QMV is provided for. Significant minorities are 
rarely outvoted, not least in order to ensure subsequent national compliance with EU 
legislation. The political culture of the EP is characterised by a consensual rather than 
adversarial style of political debate and the practice of frequent co-operation among 
the various party groups. ECOSOC and the Commission’s network of advisory 
committees represent a weak example of a corporatist model of legitimacy. They are
134 For the parallels and differences to the German federal system, see: Scharpf (88) op. cit.. pp.239-78
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designed to co-opt all interests involved into a legislative process still heavily 
dominated by economic issues such as the Single Market with the aim of achieving 
broad-based support for the policies adopted.
A comparison of these four core characteristics of the EU’s formal legitimacy with the
legitimising principles of the British and German political systems confirms that the
1 ^EU has a much closer “constitutional fit” with Germany than with Britain. Both 
political systems are characterised by versions of co-operative federalism, a strong 
horizontal and vertical diffusion of political powers, a powerful judiciary and a 
legalistic, consensual and depoliticised political culture. This stands in marked 
contrast to the UK whose political system is characterised by the unitary doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, a strong central executive, weak judicial and subnational 
power centres and an non-legalistic and adversarial political culture. As argued in 
chapters three and four, these differences result in varying degrees of compatibility 
between the formal legitimacy of the EU and national constitutional structures. EU 
membership poses country-specific constitutional challenges which are at a 
fundamental level more severe for the UK than for the FRG.
But there is also one important feature which distinguishes the formal legitimacy of 
the EU from that of its member states: the EU is not a representative democracy. This 
gains significance because chapters three and four have recorded high levels of public 
support for the principle of democracy. Only democratic political systems can 
command felt legitimacy in contemporary West European societies. But the options 
for solving this problem depend on the country-specific evaluations of the EU’s 
constitutional philosophy. As discussed above, from a British perspective the EU is 
primarily legitimised indirectly through its member states. A development of the EU 
into a representative democracy with its own sources of legitimacy would weaken its 
character as a treaty-based international organisation and undermine the sovereign 
legal status of the member states. It would therefore be incompatible with the central 
doctrine of Britain’s formal legitimacy which stipulates that the EU’s ultimate 
democratic legitimacy derives from the sovereign Westminster Parliament.
135 Nugent (94), op. cit.. p. 178
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German courts, on the other hand, have argued that the EU rests on a dual legitimacy. 
A democratisation of the EU would potentially represent less of a challenge to 
Germany’s formal legitimacy because it can, subject to certain conditions of the FCC 
being met, accommodate a diffusion of sovereignty to supranational institutions. To 
conclude, both Britain and Germany are primarily legitimised by the principle of 
representative government, but national perspectives on the lack of democratic 
legitimation at the European level are shaped by distinct constitutional traditions and 
their degree of compatibility with the supranational political system of the EU. These 
factors also help to explain national perspectives on the felt legitimacy of the EU to 
which the discussion now turns.
5.3 Felt Legitimacy
The analysis of felt legitimacy in the EU must draw an initial distinction between 
public support for international co-operation in Europe generally and public support 
for any particular aspects of the EU, such as its political regime, its political
1 T7
authorities or its political community. Rather than criticising for example the lack 
of democracy in the EU, people may reject the supranational system as a whole. 
General support for the EU as an international political system therefore depends on 
attitudes towards the vertical balance of powers between the supranational and 
national political systems. Here citizens choose between two different levels of 
political action, namely international co-operation on one side or individual national 
action on the other.
5.3.1 General Support for the Political System of the EU
Two Eurobarometer surveys are particularly well suited to measure general support 
for international co-operation within the framework of the EU. The first one asks 
respondents whether, generally speaking, they think their country’s membership in the 
EU is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad. The data for Britain and 
Germany are depicted separately below (figs.5.1 and 5.2). It remains disputed among 
scholars whether this survey measures diffuse or specific support for the EU. Some
136 Bulmer (97), op. cit., pp.61-78
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maintain that citizens engage in calculated appraisal of the costs and benefits that 
membership entails, which would suggest the survey measures specific output support
1 TO
for the EU. Others argue that citizens’ responses reflect diffuse support towards 
European integration in general without any clear idea as to why membership is good 
or bad. This discussion agrees with the latter view because the survey question is 
loosely phrased and does not make any explicit reference to the benefits derived from 
membership.139
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137 Niedermayer (91), op. cit.. p.325f
138 For a brief overview o f  the different arguments see: Ibid., p.329
139 I b id ,  p .3 29
140 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. pp.73-86, and subsequent issues.
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Interpreting the above data, one can instantly identify a significant gap between British 
and German levels of support for EU membership. The number of europhile Germans 
consistently exceeds the number of those who believe membership is a bad thing, 
whereas the same does not apply for the United Kingdom. German support lies 
roughly fifteen percentage points above the British level throughout the data series. 
However, since 1987 British opponents of the EU have been consistently 
outnumbered by those who believe British membership in the EU is a good thing. 
Both countries reach the climax in their levels of EU support just prior to the 
conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. At that time German support tops 70% 
whereas British support never exceeds 60%. For both countries the margin of 
supporters over opponents has narrowed in the course of the 1990s, reaching on 
occasions less than 20 percentage points in the Federal Republic and a mere 5-10 
points in the United Kingdom. Since 1996 support for EU membership has sunk 
below 50% in Germany, but, unlike in Britain, this decline in support has not led to a 
significant rise in the numbers of people opposing membership. German support for 
EU membership has evaporated most dramatically in the East which has witnessed a 
decline by almost sixty per-cent over the course of this decade.
The 1990s have witnessed a general decline in support for membership across Europe 
to below 50%. But both Britain and Germany deviate from the EU-wide average in 
opposite directions, although the difference is smaller in the German case where the 
most noticeable positive deviation from the European average is the lower number of 
opponents to EU membership (see fig.5.3). Among other large member states, French 
support fluctuates closely around the European average, exceeding it slightly during 
the 1980s and sinking below it during the 90s. Italian support, although declining in 
the 1990s, is consistently ahead of the EU average by between ten to fifteen 
percentage points which makes Italians are the strongest supporters of membership 
among the group of large EU countries.142
142 For long-term EU average and country trends see: Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.50, 
(Brussels: European Commission, 1999), pp.27-29
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Support for EU Membership (EU Average)
EU Approval — EU Disapproval
A useful way to determine the underlying intensity of public support for EU 
membership is to cross-check the accuracy of these data with another Eurobarometer 
survey which Niedermayer considers a good reflection of public diffuse support 
towards European integration in general.144 This time, respondents were requested to 
imagine they were told tomorrow that the EU had been scrapped. They were being 
asked whether this news would make them “very sorry”, “relieved” or whether they 
would react “indifferently”. The results are depicted in the graphs below (fig.5.4 and 
fig.5.5).
143 Ibid.
144 Niedermayer (91), op. cit.. p.329
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When extrapolating the strength of diffuse support for European integration from this 
set of data, the picture looks markedly different from the first Eurobarometer survey. 
Respondents expressing indifference or even relief at the hypothetical dissolution of 
the EU have been grouped in one graph (non-regret), since only respondents who 
regret the EU’s dissolution can be considered committed in their support to the EU. 
Turning to British attitudes first, a consistent majority would be either indifferent or 
even relieved to hear that the EU had been scrapped. Only by the time of the late 
1980s does the number of people reacting indifferently to this hypothetical news 
noticeably exceed those feeling relief. Even then roughly as many people would be
145 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit., pp. 101-111, and subsequent issues.
146 Ibid.. pp. 101 -111, and subsequent issues.
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relieved as there are people who would regret hearing about the EU’s demise. Most 
recently, the number of Britons expressing regret has fallen below 20%, while almost 
a quarter of Britons would be very relieved.147
By contrast, the number of Germans feeling either relief or indifference has rarely 
exceeded the percentage of respondents who would feel very sorry if the EU ceased to 
exist, although this has changed in the second half of the 1990s. Recent years have 
witnessed a shift away from indifference about the EU’s continued existence towards 
a noticeable increase in people expressing relief if the EU were scrapped. This trend is 
especially pronounced in Eastern Germany where as many people would be relieved 
as would feel very sorry (21%). Whereas in 1992 41% of Germans recorded their 
regret, 33% were indifferent, and 15% signalled relief about the imaginary dissolution 
of the EU, these numbers changed to 33%, 34% and 16% in 1998.148
This relatively recent trend of increasing indifference, or even hostility, towards the 
EU is also reflected in data for the European average, whose levels of regret and non­
regret had been roughly equally strong during the 70s and 80s. Again, Britain and 
German deviate from this average in opposite directions by recording consistently 
higher than average levels of regret (FRG) or non-regret (UK) over the entire time 
span. Among the other major member states, French and Italian opinion fluctuates 
closely around the European average, but during the course of the 1990s the number 
of Italians who would regret a dissolution of the EU has risen to more than ten 
percentage points above the European average.149
147 Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit.. p.B24
148 Ib]d., p.B24
149 For long-term EU average and country trends see: Ibid.. p.38, B17
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Reaction to Hypothetical Dissolution of the EU 
(EU Average)
EU Regret - 9 — EU Non-Regret
An overall evaluation of the first Eurobarometer survey reveals that in both Britain 
and Germany diffuse support for EU membership remains volatile and has weakened 
over the last decade. This is particularly true for East Germany where the initial 
enthusiasm for the EU has disappeared rapidly. The hypothesis about relatively 
unsettled and hence superficial levels of public support for the EU is confirmed by the 
second Eurobarometer survey which measures the intensity of this support.151 There 
have been clear signs of a “^nationalisation” of public opinion in most member states 
since the early 1990s whose most striking features are the emergence of strengthened 
opposition to the EU rather than indifference.152
But what stands out are the differences in public attitudes between Britain and 
Germany. In the UK support for EU membership is consistently weaker and of lower 
intensity than in other large member states, whereas Germans support is stronger and 
more intense than on the European average. As suggested in chapters three and four, 
these differences in the level of diffuse EU support can to some extent be traced to the 
degree of elite consensus on European integration.153 General elite support for EU 
membership is significantly lower in Britain than in Germany, Italy or France, and the 
cleavage among political parties and the media in the UK has resulted in continued
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p.44
152 Oskar Niedermayer: “Trends and Contrasts” in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnot (eds.): Public 
Opinion and Internationalised Governance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995a), pp.69-71
153 See: Chapter 3. p. 107f, Chapter 4 , p. 159
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and widespread political mobilisation both for and against European integration.154 By 
contrast, Germany has one of the highest levels of elite support for European 
integration among the major member states.155 The strong elite consensus among 
political parties and the media in favour of EU membership, and the lack of any 
significant counter-mobilisation, has left greater scope for an active legitimation of the 
EU which is reflected in stronger German mass support for European integration.
While elite attitudes towards the EU contribute towards, and amplify, national 
variations in mass support for the EU, they do not fully explain the sources of these 
country-specific differences. Consequently, levels of both elite and mass support need 
to be analysed in terms of a more detailed discussion which disaggregates felt 
legitimacy into its three components, starting with the political regime of the EU.
5.3.2 Political Regime
While a distinction between the three different sub-categories of the political regime, 
namely constitutional philosophy, constitutional order and constitutional reality is 
again useful to make, there is no need to discuss at any length public attitudes towards 
the constitutional philosophy component. The last two chapters have shown the 
British and the German public almost unanimously endorse the abstract idea of 
democracy as a constitutional philosophy. A slightly smaller, but still overwhelming 
majority in both countries also considers democracy always to be the best form of 
government. It seems safe to assume that, at such a high level of generality, these 
beliefs can be extended to the European political system, although respondents were 
probably formulating their attitudes with member states in mind. One can therefore 
validly argue that even with regard to the EU, German and British citizens favour 
democracy as its central constitutional philosophy.
However, the first part of this chapter has also shown that democracy, or more 
specifically representative government, is not a central concept by which the EU is 
formally legitimised. This suggests that the German and British public favour a 
constitutional philosophy different from the one operating in the EU. This hypothesis
154 Bernard Wessels, op. cit.. pp.MOff, 153
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is confirmed by a range of surveys which indicate that German and the British citizens 
do not believe the EU’s formal legitimacy conforms to their ideal of a representative 
democracy. In 1989 only 6% of Britons and 20% of Germans considered the way the 
EC worked “completely democratic”, while 17% in Germany and 20% in the UK 
thought the EC was to a very little or no extent democratic.156 Nonetheless, nearly half 
the respondents (UK: 46%, FRG: 51%) considered the EC to some extent democratic, 
so no definite conclusions can be reached on this evidence alone. Another survey from 
1992 reveals that only 7% of British respondents (15% of Germans) felt that citizens 
had sufficient democratic influence in EU decision-making, while overwhelming
1 S7majorities (UK: 84%, FRG: 69%) reached the opposite conclusion.
These findings are exacerbated by the fact that Europeans tend to have an inflated 
conception of the powers of the EP because they equate its functions and powers with 
those of national parliaments. Despite the different wording in the two 
Eurobarometers above, there seems to be evidence for a disillusionment with the 
democratic quality of the EU between 1989 and 1992. Since public opinion on the role 
of the different European institutions also is rather uninformed, the extensive media 
coverage about the EU’s institutional deficiencies in the wake of the Maastricht 
debate may have contributed to this increasingly critical assessment.159
The extension of the EP’s powers in the wake of the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties does not seem to have transformed public attitudes in any substantial way. A 
plurality of Germans and Britons still agree that the EP has insufficient control over 
the European Commission and EU officials in general.160 However, attention must be 
drawn to the large number of respondents from both countries (more than a fifth 
throughout) who could not decide how to answer either of these questions which again 
indicates a lack of public knowledge about EU institutions.
155 Ibid, pp. 141-43
156 Eurobarometer: StandardEurobarometer no. 31 a, (Brussels: European Commission, 1989), p.B15
157 Eurobarometer: StandardEurobarometer no.38, (Brussels: European Commission, 1992), p.B29
158 Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnot: “Democratic Legitimacy and the European Parliament”, in: 
Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnot (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.288-294
159 Ibid.. pp.286-92
160 Eurobarometer no.42, op. cit.. p.B27
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A closer look at some of the other Eurobarometer surveys reveals important country- 
specific differences with regard to the issue of democracy in Europe. 50% of 
Germans, but only a third of British respondents approved of the additional EP powers 
granted by the Maastricht Treaty (5% and 26% respectively disapproved). In summer 
1999, 35% of Germans, compared with 28% of Britons, demanded greater powers for 
the EP.161 A cross-reference of these data with how respondents have answered related 
survey questions explains why the British are more reluctant to endorse more powers 
for the EP. The public’s desired role for the EP depends considerably on how people 
feel about the EU in general. For instance, only 35% of those Europeans who feel their 
country has not benefited from EU membership wish to strengthen the powers of the 
EP, whereas 55% of respondents who believe EU membership has been beneficial 
wish to see a stronger Parliament. Similarly, 56% of Europeans who also feel their 
country’s membership in the EU has been a good thing are in favour of more EP 
powers, but only 26% of those agree who think their country’s membership has been
169bad. Since UK respondents are generally more critical regarding the value and the 
benefit of their country’s membership in the EU, they tend to be less favourably 
inclined towards proposals to widen the competencies of the EP.
This does not yet sufficiently explain why Britons show nearly the same enthusiasm as 
Germans (FRG:73%, UK:70%) for the proposal that the President and the members of 
the European Commission should resign if they loose the support of the majority of 
MEPs. Clearly, both Britons and Germans are concerned about the lack of democratic 
accountability in the EU, and 90% and 83% respectively considered it very or fairly
1 63important to reform the way the EU works at the 1997 IGC. Yet the desired 
solutions differ between respondents from the two countries. For example, barely a 
majority amongst Germans (51%) and only 45% of Britons are prepared to put the EP 
on an equal footing with the Council in all matters of EU legislation, taxation and 
expenditure.164 Even Germans, therefore, seem to be less enthusiastic supporter of the 
EP when such support requires a relative loss of influence for the representatives from 
each member state in the Council. British opposition to supranational democracy is
161 Eurobarometer no.51, op. cit.. p.B61. However, 25% of Germans and 36% of Britons were unable to 
opine on the issue.
162 Ibid., p.73
163 Eurobarometer: British Public Opinion, op. cit., p.24
164 Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.45. (Brussels: European Commission, 1996), p.B56f
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more consistent, however. When asked to indicate their preferences for the voting 
procedure in the Council, a majority in the United Kingdom (53%) desires more 
unanimous decision-making with the possibility for member states to wield their veto. 
Amongst Germans, only 35% favour this option, whereas a slim majority of 51% 
argue for even greater use of qualified majority voting in the Council.165
These survey results suggest the following interpretation. There is little diffuse 
support for the political regime of the EU, primarily because Britons and Germans are 
dissatisfied with its (lack of) democracy (see fig.5.8 below). But the analysis of 
chapters three and four suggests that the preferred solutions to the “democratic deficit” 
differ among member states. Germany’s formal legitimacy and national identity are 
“integration-geared” because they can accommodate the diffusion of sovereignty to a 
supranational EU. Germans exhibit strong diffuse support for European integration in 
general, and they are therefore inclined to make the EP the central democratic 
institution of the Union. They are at least partially prepared to acknowledge that such 
a reform will reduce the influence of the Council and hence weaken the EU’s indirect 
legitimation through the member states.
Their generally more euro-sceptic British neighbours are less keen on such a 
supranational solution to the “democratic deficit”. Democracy is primarily associated 
with Westminster, and the notion of the sovereignty of Parliament has played an 
important role in the formation of Britain’s national identity. Consequently, Britons 
generally prefer to democratise the EU by strengthening national chains of 
legitimation, thus protecting parliamentary sovereignty. When given the direct choice 
British respondents prefer to give more powers to national parliaments (55%) rather 
than to the EP (29%). Only 36% of Germans would favour such a course of action.166 
Whereas Germans are ambiguous about surrendering their country’s right of veto in 
the Council (49% in favour, 42% opposed), Britons are adamantly opposed to losing
1 f s lthe national veto by a margin of two to one. A majority of Germans would support
165 Eurobarometer: British Public Opinion, op. cit.. p.48
166 IU d, p.28
167 Europinion no.l 1. (Brussels: European Commission, 1997), p.36
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the formation of a European government responsible to the EP (24% are opposed), but
1 fiRa plurality of Britons remains opposed to it (43%).
Again, Britain and Germany represent opposite ends in the range of attitudes among 
the larger member states (see fig.5.7).
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On average, Europeans are almost equally divided over their country’s right of veto 
and on the question of whether more power should be given to national parliaments or 
the EP. While French opinion is close to the European average on the second 
question, there is an above-average concern with retaining the national veto in the 
Council, which probably reflects a country-specific concern with national sovereignty. 
Italy, on the other hand, is the member state with the largest majority in favour of 
empowering the EP rather than their national parliament, and 59% of Italians support 
more majority voting in the Council.170 The Italian data can be best explained as an 
indirect function of low levels of felt legitimacy for the domestic political system.171 
Only about a third of Italians are satisfied with the way democracy works in their 
country, significantly below the level in France (59%) and the European average 
(60%). Indeed, Italy is the only member state where citizens are more satisfied with 
European democracy (43%, just as in France) than with their national democratic
168 Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.46. (Brussels: European Commission, 1997), p.B 26f
169 For long-term EU average and country trends see: Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit.. pp.38ff, B17ff
170 Eurobarometer: British Public Opinion, op. cit.. pp.28, 48
171 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p .86
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institutions (35%).172 The corresponding data for British and German satisfaction with 
democracy in the EU are depicted below (fig.5.8).
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Two features are striking about these data which reaffirm the findings of the surveys 
discussed above. First, throughout the entire data series Germans and Britons are 
noticeably less satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU than they are with 
the way their national democracies work.174 Second, the level of dissatisfaction almost 
consistently exceeds the level of satisfaction with European democracy among 
Germans and Britons. If this survey represented the summarised attitudes towards the 
political regime of the EU, then its felt legitimacy must be very weak. It is therefore 
worthwhile to examine a few qualitative indicators of diffuse regime support.
Anti-system parties which oppose EU membership exist in both countries, but only in 
Britain have they any political significance. In the 1999 EP elections the UK 
Independence Party won 7% of the vote and secured three seats in Strasbourg, while 
in Germany no anti-European party secured more than 4% of the national vote.175 The 
UK also has the greatest polarisation of party attitudes towards the EU among the 
major member states, which is a reflection of the continued elite cleavage among 
Britain’s political parties and the media.176 This helps to explain why political
172 Eurobarometer no.51, op. cit.. p.B 6f
173 Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.41. (Brussels: European Commission, 1994), p.A
174 See Chapter 3 . p .l 10 and Chapter 4 . p. 142
175 Source: House o f Commons Library
176 Bernard Wessels, op. cit.. p. 152f
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mobilisation against further European integration helped the Conservatives win the 
largest share of the British vote in the 1999 EP elections. However, these results are 
based on a historically low voter turnout, as fig.5.9 illustrates below. European 
elections exhibit significantly and consistently lower voter participation than national 
general elections do, and turnout rates have also declined over time to reach a historic 
low in Britain and Germany in 1999. Less than half of the Germany electorate and less 
than a quarter of the British one exercised their right to vote at the last EP election. 
Similarly, average voter turnout across Europe declined from 63% in 1979 to just 49% 
in 1999, the lowest turnout ever.177
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Most people probably considered the elections irrelevant, which would explain why 
British and German respondents both consider their parties’ programmes on national 
(rather than European) issues the most important factor in their decision how to 
vote.179 Among people who decided not to vote 55% of Germans and 52% of Britons 
said they were not interested in European elections, although a majority in both 
countries acknowledges the importance of the EP’s role in the EU (FRG: 60%, UK:
I RO54%). But few Germans and Britons feel they can rely on the EP to represent their 
interests (fig.5.10).
177 Source: House of Commons Library
178 Source: House of Commons Library
179 Eurobarometer no.51, op. cit.. p.B56f
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The number of Germans and Britons who feel they can rely on the EP or the 
Commission is on average between ten and twenty percentage points below the figure 
recorded for national governments and parliaments. It rarely exceeds 35% of 
respondents. It is particularly noteworthy that Germans tend to regard European 
institutions as even less reliable than Britons do, which is largely explained by the
101
particular distrust displayed by East German respondents.
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Do these quantitative and qualitative data signify a lack of diffuse support for the 
political regime of the EU? Three further factors have to be considered before this 
interpretation can be confirmed. First, it is sometimes argued that the protection of 
fundamental rights could become a second pillar next to democracy on which the 
Union’s formal legitimacy rests. But making the ECJ a the guardian of a new Charter 
of Fundamental Rights will do little to bolster the felt legitimacy of the EU as a whole, 
at least in some member states. A plurality of Britons (36%), but only 27% of 
Germans, believe the ECJ has already too much rather than too little power. 
Consequently, 40% of Britons feel the court’s right to rule on controversial cases 
should be reduced, whereas only 32% of Germans agree. These cross-national 
differences can be explained with reference to the discussion in chapters three and 
four. The UK has a less judicialised political culture than the Federal Republic and 
lacks a domestic constitutional court. ECJ judgements, and their interpretations by 
British courts, are therefore more likely to be perceived as (undesirable) challenges to
180 Ibid., p.B58f, B60
181 Eurobarometer no.42, op. cit.. p.B28, and subsequent issues.
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the sovereign law-making powers of Parliament, as could be seen in the public 
controversy surrounding the Factortame case.
While Germans seem more supportive of the principle of judicial review by powerful 
courts, their support for the ECJ is far more conditional than the legitimacy accorded 
to the FCC. For example, a remarkable 56% of Germans and 58% of Britons agree 
strongly or to some extent with the statement that “if the ECJ started making a lot of 
decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Court 
altogether.” While the Court is unlikely ever to become so insensitive to public 
opinion, making the ECJ the guardian over a European Charter of Rights will certainly 
increase public awareness of the court’s powers. Such a reform is also likely to 
confront the ECJ with more controversial issues to adjudicate, thus polarising public 
opinion about its role.
Second, it is important to return once more to the diagram illustrating satisfaction with 
the way democracy works in the EU. Just as in the previous two chapters, one must 
ascertain to which degree respondents were confused about the object of support they 
were interviewed about. Niedermayer and Sinnot fear that respondents may 
inadvertently have assessed how democracy works in general, thus confounding the
1 fidnational with the European political arena. Fluctuations in the level of satisfaction 
with European democracy must therefore be compared with similar fluctuations at the 
national level. Such a comparison yields no obvious correspondence between German 
and British evaluations of European democracy and their own national 
democracies.185
To recall the results of the last two chapters: British satisfaction remains stable over 
the first three years for which the surveys overlap, before leaping upwards in 1998. Its 
German equivalent is characterised by a gradual decline during the 1990s before rising 
sharply in 1999. It follows that the results of neither of these two domestic surveys 
correspond with the data collected for the European level. There is little sign that the 
survey question has elicited evaluations of national rather than European democracy.
182 Ibid.. p.B28, and subsequent issues.
183 Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.40. (Brussels: European Commission, 1993), p.A74f
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Third, the wording of the question about satisfaction with democracy in the EU (“how 
democracy works”) may have caused answers to be influenced by specific output 
support for the political authorities of the EU.
5.3.3 Political Authorities
A possible influence on satisfaction levels from considerations of specific output 
support can be best revealed by contrasting satisfaction with EU democracy with a 
Eurobarometer survey recording the extent to which respondents feel their own 
country has benefited from membership in the EU. First the British result (fig.5.11). 
As one would expect, there seems to be some correlation between domestic and 
European specific output support. Citizens who believe Britain has benefited from its 
membership in the EU begin to outnumber their more sceptical compatriots towards 
the end of the economic boom in the second half of the 1980s, only for this trend to be 
reversed with the onset of the domestic recession of the early nineties. Of late, EU 
membership is again perceived increasingly beneficial up to a point where both 
opinions are equally represented in the British public.
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However, there seems to be no direct correspondence with the graph depicting British 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU. The ten per-cent decline in satisfaction levels 
between 1994 and 1995 precedes a similar decline in the number of Britons who 
perceive membership as beneficial in the second half of 1995. That means the latter 
cannot be causally responsible for the decline in satisfaction levels. What about the 
corresponding German data (fig.5.12)?
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Here the influence of domestic factors in the evaluation of German benefits from 
membership is most pronounced in the Eastern part of the country. Starting with 
inflated expectations about how beneficial the rapidly negotiated accession to full EU 
membership would be, East German opinion has swung violently towards pessimism 
as its economic situation gradually deteriorated. Over the period from the beginning of
1990 to the end of 1993 the number of East Germans who considered EU membership
1 80beneficial has declined from 78% to 38%. The temporary surge in beneficial 
evaluations around the year 1994 again coincides with an improvement of the 
economic situation, particularly in Western Germany. This short-lived period just 
precedes, and could therefore have influenced, a similar temporary rise in German 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU at around 1995/96.
A direct comparison of German and British perceptions of the benefits from EU 
membership again reveals important country-specific differences (see fig.5.13). Until
188 Ibid.. p.9 If, and subsequent issues.
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the mid-1990s German output support is on balance positive and consistently stronger 
than in Britain where in most years a plurality of respondents believed the UK had not 
benefited from membership. Also, fluctuations in the level of output support seem to 
follow different cycles in the two countries. Compared with other large member states, 
Britain and (to a lesser extent) Germany deviate from the average in opposite 
directions, although the rapid decline in East German output support pushes the level 
for the whole of Germany below the European average for the first time in the mid- 
1990s. French attitudes are marginally above the European average during the 80s and 
fall slightly below the average during the early 90s, whereas Italian output support 
gradually declines towards the average after having exceeded it by up to fifteen 
percentage points during the 1980s.190
Benefit from EU Membership (EU Average)
60
40
EU Benefitted EU Not Benefitted
One possible explanation for the differences in output support between Britain and 
Germany emphasises distinct structural and cultural factors in the UK, such as the 
centralisation of powers on the Government and the absence of a consensual, 
gradualist policy-making style. These factors enable a comparatively swift and 
comprehensive implementation of new political ideas and belief systems, as for 
example the neo-liberalism of the Thatcher years. As a consequence, “the UK may be
189 Ibid., p.92
190 For long-term EU average and country trends see: Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit., pp.27-29
191 Ibid.
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institutionally predisposed to holding beliefs and values out of synchronisation with 
its EU partners”.192
Such differences in economic ideology have caused variations in specific support for
particular EU policies right from the beginning of Britain’s membership. The best
known example is of course the CAP whose protectionist and producer-oriented
policies contrast with Britain’s policy heritage and preference for lower consumer
1 0^prices and a more market-based approach to agriculture. The CAP still absorbs 
around 42% of the entire EU budget, making it by far the biggest single spending 
programme. But the UK derives comparatively little financial benefit from this policy 
because Britain’s agricultural industry represents a much smaller share of GDP and 
employment than in Germany, France or the Mediterranean countries. Widespread 
British hostility towards the CAP has fuelled a long-running political dispute over the 
size of national contributions to the EU budgets, culminating in the budget rebate 
negotiated in 1984, and has negatively affected public perceptions of the benefits of 
EU membership.194 Among the large member states, the UK ranks as the country with 
the lowest level of public support for the CAP, and 54% of Britons feel the EU “is 
doing a bad job in the area of agriculture.”195 France, Germany and Italy, on the other 
hand, have recorded above-average levels of public support for the CAP.
More recently, EMU stands out as the major policy innovation of the late 1990s. On 
the eve of its commencement, German public scepticism towards the project was 
finally receding, not least in response to an extended period of active elite legitimation 
of the Single Currency. A majority of Germans support the introduction of the EURO 
(57%), while 33% still remain opposed.196 German support for the Single Currency 
does not exceed the EU average, partly because the Deutschmark, which symbolises 
Germany’s post-war economic recovery, has been exchanged against a new currency 
without proven track record. EMU support in France (65%) is close to the European 
average (61%), but Italians are most committed to the Single Currency (84%) among 
the big member states, arguably reflecting the weak and inflation-prone performance
192 Armstrong and Bulmer (95), op. cit.. p.258
193 Bulmer (92), op. cit.. p.20
194 Nugent (92), op. cit.. pp. 187, 191
195 Eurobarometer: British Public Opinion, op. cit.. pp. 16, 29
196 Eurobarometer no.51. op. cit.,p.B42
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of the Italian lira. The UK, which has an opt-out from membership in the single 
currency, again deviates negatively from the European trend. The lack of economic 
convergence with the Euro-zone, a perception of the national currency as a symbol of 
economic sovereignty and the persisting elite cleavage over both the EURO and 
European integration all contribute towards strong public opposition to EMU (55%),
107although the number of supporters (28%) has fluctuated in the last years.
Another well-known EU policy is the Single European Market which came into 
existence at the beginning of 1993. Its emphasis on economic liberalisation and 
deregulation has been much closer aligned with Britain’s domestic policy ethos, and 
British public opinion has been more positively oriented towards the SEM than 
French or Italian publics. The launch of the SEM was accompanied by a surge in the 
positive British evaluation of EU membership, and for a number of years approval of
10Kthe Single Market was even stronger in Britain than in Germany. But the number of 
respondents considering the Single Market a good thing has declined in both countries 
in the years up to 1992, especially again in East Germany, and it did not exceed 40% 
in either country in the two polls conducted in the “recessionist” year 1992.
The roughly cyclical fluctuations in specific support and the build-up of expectations 
towards, and subsequent disappointment with, the Maastricht Treaty also help to 
explain variation in specific support for the incumbents of political offices. The 
European Commission as the most prominent institution of the EU has enjoyed a peak 
of favourable public impression in 1990 in both Britain (54%) and Germany (50%). 
Yet the number of people holding such a positive opinion about the Commission had 
dwindled to between only a quarter and a third of the British and German public in 
1993.199
Country-specific fluctuations in the levels of support, which can also be observed in 
figs.5.11 and 5.12, are probably best explained in terms of distinct domestic economic 
cycles. This hypothesis is confirmed by revisiting the “feel-good factor” surveys from 
chapters three and four. In the 1980s, public economic optimism about the year ahead
197 Ibid..p.B42
198 Eurobarometer: Trends, op. cit.. pp.96f, 199, 204
199 Ibid.. pp.221-26
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rebounds earlier and less strongly in Germany (1983) than in the UK (1985), whereas 
the reverse timing can be observed after the economic recession of the early 1990s.200 
Whereas Britons regain their economic optimism during 1996, the German feel-good 
factor remains subdued right up to 1998. In 1997 Eurobarometer asked citizens for the 
last time whether the Single Market made them feel hopeful or fearful. Reflecting the 
different positions in their respective economic cycle, British respondents were more 
upbeat than their German neighbours, with 51% (FRG: 42%) either very or rather 
hopeful and only 36% (FRG: 41%) rather or very fearful.
5.3.4 Political Community
Public diffuse support for the European political community can be analysed with the 
help of a whole range of survey indicators. One way of measuring the level of support 
is to examine the degree of public attachment towards the EU. A series of 
Eurobarometer surveys compares national levels of attachment towards the various 
layers of government (town, region, country, EU). When respondents were asked to 
rank their attachments, Europe scored the lowest preference in the EU average. In all 
member states “country” and “town” were either first or second preference among at 
least two-thirds of respondents. While in Germany a plurality of people chose “town” 
ahead of “country” as their first preference, most Britons felt primarily attached to
909their country, followed by region and town. When a similar Eurobarometer survey 
on attachment was conducted in 1996, the situation had hardly changed. 86% of 
Germans and 87% of Britons felt very or fairly attached to their own country, but a 
clear majority of Germans (56%) and Britons (68%) felt not very, or not at all attached 
to the EU.203
Closely related to attachment is the crucial question of trust in the people that make up 
one’s political community. Based on a wealth of statistical data, Niedermayer has 
devised a trust scale ranging from 0 (no trust) to 3 (complete trust) with 1.5 denoting 
the mid-point above which, on average, people within a political community can be
200 IbkL, pp.229-234
201 Sophie Duchesne and Andre-Paul Frognier: “Is there a European Identity?”, in: Oskar Niedermayer 
and Richard Sinnott (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 195
202 Ibid.. p. 195-97
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said to trust each other.204 Based on the nine member states that had joined the EC 
prior to its Southern enlargement, the study revealed an average level of trust in the 
respondents’ own people of 2.39 compared with an overall level of mutual trust 
towards the people of other EC states reaching 1.75 in 1990.205 In that year both 
Germans and Britain displayed a mean level of trust in other Europeans of 1.8.
Interestingly, EC-wide trust in other Europeans seems to have increased steadily from 
a rather low point of 1.55 in 1976 that came within a whisker of the lower threshold at 
which mistrust prevails over trust. Niedermayer concludes that increasing levels of 
mutual trust reveal an emerging, but weak sense of community among the peoples of 
the European Community. Yet, this conclusion is in need of some qualification, as he 
himself acknowledges. The data available to him are too old to take account of the 
(negative) public reaction to the Maastricht Treaty, and there is little evidence of a 
generation gap in attitudes, whose existence might have been indicative of future 
continued improvements in the levels of mutual trust.207
Duchesne and Frognier even diagnose a decline in European identity, measured in 
terms of how often it occurred to respondents that they were European citizens as well 
as nationals of their own country. Over the course of the 1980s the number of 
Germans to whom it occurred “sometimes” or “often” that they were citizens of 
Europe declined, and the same happened in Britain between 1988 and 1991. On the 
other hand, the proportion of Germans who “never” consider themselves European 
citizens rose from 31% in 1982 to a remarkable 58% in 1992, while consistently more 
than 60% of Britons lacked a feeling of European citizenship.208 Throughout the years, 
the level of European identity is by far the lowest of all the major Eurobarometer 
indicators of EU support discussed in this chapter.209 Duchesne and Frognier argue
203 Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.44. (Brussels: European Commission, 1996), pp.B92-94
204 Oskar Niedermayer: “Trust and Sense of Community”, in: Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott 
(eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995b), 
p.232
205 Ibid, p.237
206 Ibid, p.244
207 Ibid.. p.241
208 Duchesne and Frognier, op. cit.. p. 199
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that these results disprove the widespread assumption that the sense of European
9 i nidentity depends on, and increases with, the length of EU membership.
Statistical evidence for the hypothesis that the emergence of a European identity 
depends on generational factors is also contradictory. With increasing age, 
respondents are more likely to identify as nationals only, and fewer elderly
911respondents feel British or German first and European second. However, Duchesne 
and Frognier conclude from their study of the period 1983-91 that “age is not
919perceptibly related to feelings about European identity” and belongingness. Indeed, 
even in recent surveys the number of people who feel primarily or even exclusively
9  i ^
European remains small right across the different age groups. Moreover, the 
temporal surge in Europeanness across member states in the wake of the Maastricht 
debate in 1991 suggests that answers were to some degree affected merely by the 
amount of press coverage, thus overstating the degree of genuine affective feelings of 
being European.214
Although Britons and Germans, just like the citizens of most other member states, 
lack a clear sense of European identity, there are once again important country- 
specific differences worth noting. In the 1999 Eurobarometer survey on national and 
European identity, 46% of Germans identified themselves only with their own 
nationality, compared to 62% of Britons. The contrast becomes even stronger when 
Eastern and Western Germany are counted separately because the proportion of 
respondents who feel exclusively German is far higher in Eastern Germany (57%) 
than in the West (43%). While the West German result is identical to the European 
average, the French (35%) and particularly the Italians (29%) have an below-average 
propensity to identify themselves exclusively with their own nationality.215
Since the legitimacy of the EU is perceived from the domestic context of each 
member state, the above differences in identification with Europe must be analysed 
from the perspective of Britain’s and Germany’s national identity as discussed in
210 Ibid.. p.201
211 Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit.. p.B39
212 Duchesne and Frognier, op. cit.. pp.210-213
213 Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit.. p.B40
214 Ibid.. p.201
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chapters three and four. The two key factors are the strength of national identity or 
pride and its compatibility with a European identity. As chapter four argued, for 
historical reasons levels of national pride are low in Germany, and its post-war 
national identity has incorporated a European dimension which facilitates the 
emergence of a European identity in the FRG. However, the weaker socialisation into 
this post-war identity makes East Germans less likely than their Western compatriots 
to subscribe to a “post-national” German identity, which is reflected in a less idealistic
91 (\commitment to the EU and higher levels of national pride.
In the UK, national identity has historically been defined against the hostile Other and 
is partly based on the (con-)fusion between parliamentary and national sovereignty. 
Consequently, Britain’s national identity cannot easily accommodate identification 
with the EU which is perceived as threatening rather than complementing 
“Britishness”. Despite a renaissance of pre-British identities and ethnic as well as 
generational change, levels of national pride remain high and the traditional sense of 
British identity still resonates strongly.217 For example, only 3% of Scots and 5% of 
Welsh citizens identify least with Britain, but 31% and 24% respectively identify least 
with the EU. Positive identification with the EU and the European flag is even lower
9 1 Rin Scotland and Wales than it is in England. Britons as a whole feel no closer to 
fellow Europeans from the Continent than to people from the Commonwealth,
9 1 Qaccording to a survey quoted by Nugent. Interestingly, there is evidence for an 
above-(EU)average correlation between party identification and Europeanness which 
suggests that Britain’s elite cleavage on the EU, and the polarised political 
mobilisation it produces, may contribute to lower identification with Europe in the 
U K 220
Statistical research by Duchesne and Frognier confirms the hypothesis that the 
relationship between national and European identity differs among member states. 
They detect a positive relationship between a lack of national pride and feeling 
European which would explain higher levels of identification with Europe in Western
215 Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit.. p.B39
216 See: Chapter 4 , pp.l61ff
217 See: Chapter 3. pp.l20ff
218 MORI (9/99), op. cit.. p.3
219 Nugent (92), op. cit.. p. 193
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Germany and Italy, where more people lack national pride than in Eastern Germany 
and in Britain.221 But even among countries where national pride is strong, such as 
France or Britain, its compatibility with a supranational identity varies. In Britain the
99 9variables measuring national pride and Europeanness are negatively related. This 
explains why 42% of Germans, but more than two-thirds of Britons (68%), fear for the
* 99 9loss of their national identity and culture if European integration continues. Another
28% of Germans and 37% of Britons even fear that their own country will not exist
• * 994.any longer if European integration continues.
By contrast, the variables for national pride and European identity exhibit a positive
99   ^ #correlation in France. Post-war French national identity has sought to combine 
strong and widespread national pride with a commitment to maintaining la gloire de
99  6la France through Europe. However, as the EU becomes increasingly supranational 
and begins to challenge the sovereignty of its member states, some conflicts between 
the two levels of identification begin to arise. Despite slightly higher levels of 
Europeanness than in Germany, French respondents are more concerned than 
Germans about the loss of their national identity (49%) and language (54%, FRG: 
41%).227
Another factor hindering higher levels of attachment to, and identification with the EU 
may be the cultural barriers between its member states, most clearly reflected in the 
great number of different languages spoken within the EU. Once again, the data vary 
considerably between member states. Almost a third of the German population (32%) 
is unable to converse in any foreign language, but that number roughly doubles in the 
cases of France (55%), the UK and Italy (each 65%).228 Yet the failure of a sense of
political community to emerge in the EU is not entirely to blame on the linguistic
incompetence amongst its citizens. The lack of an accessible and deeply rooted 
cultural identity seems to be equally important. In 1999, 44% of Germans and 57% of
220 Duchesne and Frognier, op. cit.. p.216
221 Ibid., p.204, 222f
222 Ibid, p.208
223 Eurobarometer no.51, op. cit.. p.B31
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Britons thought there was no European cultural identity shared by all citizens of the 
EU (France: 53%, Italy: 45%).229 Interestingly, answers to this survey were hardly 
influenced by generational factors, thus ruling out the interpretation that younger 
people are much more likely to perceive a common European identity than their 
elders.230
By increasing the EU’s cultural and linguistic diversity, the forthcoming Eastern 
enlargement may dilute, rather than strengthen, the public perception of a common 
identity in Europe. When calculating the average level of support for the admission of 
all twelve applicant countries, 44% of Britons but only 34% of Germans support 
enlargement (29% and 22% respectively “do not know”). These differences once 
again reflect country-specific factors. Greater geographical proximity to the applicant 
countries makes Germans particularly worried about rising unemployment as a result 
of enlargement (46%), especially in East Germany (58%) where support for 
enlargement is also lower than in the West. Britons, on the other hand, are more 
concerned about their country losing influence within an enlarged EU (51%), possibly 
reflecting a fear about the likely demise of the national veto as a result of 
enlargement. Finally, respondents from both countries worry equally about the loss 
of EU funds to their own country (UK: 49%, FRG: 51 %) and the need for further 
reform of EU institutions (UK: 54%, FRG: 49%).
5.4 Conclusion: The Legitimacy Deficit of the European Union
This chapter has shown how the formal and felt legitimacy of the EU is contingent 
upon the member states from whose perspective it is evaluated. The first part has 
demonstrated that the formal legitimacy of the EU has a much better constitutional fit 
with Germany than with Britain which has implications for the compatibility of 
national constitutional orders with European integration. Despite an on-going dispute 
about the competencies of the FCC, especially with respect to the core of the Basic 
Law, Germany’s formal legitimacy can accommodate the diffusion of sovereignty to a
229 Eurobarometer no.50, op. cit.. p.B41
230 Ibid,, p.B41
231 Ibid.. p.89 These figures disguise large variations in support for enlargement to particular countries. 
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supranational EU. By contrast, Britain’s constitutional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is at a fundamental level incompatible with the formal legitimacy of the 
EU.
The different constitutional impact of EU membership also shapes national 
approaches to the problem that the EU has only partially adopted the legitimising 
principle of representative government. Democratic legitimation lies at the core of 
Britain’s and Germany’s formal legitimacy and enjoys near-unanimous felt legitimacy 
across Europe. Whereas from a British constitutional perspective, democratic 
legitimacy for the EU must be provided primarily through the member states, German 
courts have argued that the EU rests on a dual legitimacy, opening the possibility of a 
democratic legitimation at the European level.
These differences are equally reflected at the level of felt legitimacy where for all 
modes and objects of support British levels of support for the EU are almost 
consistently lower than in Germany. This has been amplified by the prevailing elite 
cleavage in the UK where political parties and the media continue to mobilise mass 
opinion both in favour and against European integration. By contrast, high levels of 
elite support for the EU, which are reflected in a broad political consensus among 
parties and the media, have facilitated the active legitimation of the EU in the Federal 
Republic. However, the origins of country-specific variations in both elite and mass 
support for the EU can only be explained by analysing the disaggregated components 
of felt legitimacy.
Diffuse support for the political regime is low among both Britons and Germans 
because they consider the EU undemocratic and feel they cannot rely on its 
institutions to represent their interests. But their preferred solutions to this problem 
differ. Germans are willing to contemplate further institutional integration with the 
aim of strengthening the EU’s own sources of democratic legitimacy. Widespread 
support for empowering the EP is not constrained by a fusion of democracy with 
parliamentary sovereignty, as in the UK. Britons oppose strengthening the EP at the 
expense of the Council and instead prefer to give more powers to national 
parliaments.
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Specific support for the political authorities fluctuates to a considerable extent in line 
with the distinct economic cycles in both countries and as a reflection of national 
policy preferences. British support for the Single Market is sometimes even stronger 
than in the Federal Republic and has temporarily raised the perception of EU 
membership as beneficial to the UK. However, widespread British opposition to some 
EU policies, such as the CAP or EMU, have meant that specific output support is on 
average lower in the UK than in Germany.
Diffuse support for the political community is also weaker in the UK than in the FRG. 
High levels of national pride and a strong national identity which is less compatible 
with European integration than in Germany mean that significantly fewer Britons than 
Germans identify themselves as (at least partly) European. Many Britons perceive the 
EU as a threat to their national identity, and two-thirds of the population cannot speak 
any other European languages. By contrast, Germany’s post-war national identity is 
partly built on a normative commitment to European integration, and Germans are 
more likely than Britons to speak other EU languages and perceive a European 
cultural identity.
Germany and Britain have been particularly interesting and suitable case studies to 
illustrate one of the central arguments of this thesis - that the legitimacy of the EU is 
contingent on its member states. Both countries have a well-legitimised domestic 
political system, but their distinct national perspectives on the formal and felt 
legitimacy of the EU represent opposite deviations from the European average. This is 
because Germany’s formal and felt legitimacy is highly compatible with EU 
membership, whereas Britain’s compatibility is lower than in any other large member 
state. France’s formal and felt legitimacy shows a medium degree of compatibility 
close to the European average. Italy represents an exceptional case because its 
domestic political system suffers from a severe legitimacy deficit of its own. This has 
caused above-average levels of support for the EU, despite the below-average 
constitutional fit of Italy’s formal legitimacy with EU membership. Although the 
unusual case of Italy confirms the central argument of this thesis, the choice of Britain 
and Germany as case studies was intended to demonstrate that the formal and felt
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legitimacy of the EU can vary considerably even among countries which are 
themselves both well legitimised.
However, this chapter has also shown that the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit, 
despite country-specific differences in its nature and severity, relative to the well- 
legitimised domestic political systems of both Britain and Germany. At the level of 
formal legitimacy, lingering or dormant incompatibilities might one day erupt into 
larger constitutional conflicts. Even if the EU should win such a hypothetical 
competition for constitutional supremacy, high diffuse support for national 
constitutional orders could mean that such an outcome will enjoy little felt legitimacy. 
In cases of constitutional conflict between member states and the EU public 
attachment to the former is likely to be stronger.
The weakest component of felt legitimacy is the underdeveloped sense o f political 
community amongst the peoples of the EU. Neither Britons nor Germans feel 
particularly attached to the EU or identify themselves as Europeans. There is much 
less trust amongst the people from different member states than there is within 
countries. This is at least partly caused by the lack of a common cultural identity and 
significant linguistic barriers across Europe.
Both Germans and Britons support a legitimising ideology, representative democracy, 
which differs from the constitutional philosophy and constitutional order of EU. This 
difference does not remain unnoticed - hence the very low diffuse support for the 
political regime of the EU. The weakness of diffuse support for the EU means that 
its felt legitimacy depends heavily on public attitudes about the benefits from EU 
policies and membership in general. In the long-run, a high level of specific support 
will spill over into diffuse regime support, thus enhancing the felt legitimacy of the 
political regime. For much of the 1990s this spill-over was suspended because a 
plurality of Germans and Britons considered EU membership unbeneflcial for their 
country. To conclude, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit relative to the political 
systems of Britain and Germany, but the nature and severity of this deficit differs 
considerably between these two countries.
233 Niedermayer and Sinnot, op. cit.. p.286
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Chapter Six: Strategies for Solving the Legitimacy Deficit o f the
EU
6.1 Introduction
The thesis opened by presenting two research questions. At the end of the preceding 
chapter, the first research question - whether the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit - 
has been answered in the affirmative and the precise nature of this deficit was defined. 
That leaves the second question to be answered: Is the legitimacy deficit susceptible 
of resolution?
Addressing this question shifts the emphasis from analysing legitimacy to assessing 
the potential for political leadership to influence the dynamics of legitimation} Just as 
the first chapter discussed different diagnoses of the EU’s legitimacy deficit, this 
chapter examines the legitimation potential of fives possible remedial strategies which 
Europe’s political elites could pursue (containment, constitutionalism, 
mcrementalism, new governance and communitarianism). These strategies vary 
widely in their solutions and target different components of the dual concept of 
legitimacy. The diagram below illustrates how the five remedial strategies relate to 
each other and to the dual concept of legitimacy (fig. 6.1).
The chapter offers two criteria, a pertinence and a feasibility criterion, to provide 
benchmarks for measuring the potential for success of different strategies aimed at 
remedying the legitimacy deficit. The pertinence criterion assesses whether remedial 
strategies adequately address the exact nature of the legitimacy deficit. Using the dual 
concept of legitimacy, the last chapter diagnosed that diffuse support for the EU’s 
political community is the weakest component of legitimacy. On average, nearly 
every second European does not feel any sense o f  community with the EU, either 
social or political. This lack of a European identity is the greatest obstacle to 
overcoming the legitimacy deficit, ranking even above low support for the EU’s
1 See: Chapter 2. pp.82ff
2 These broadly correspond with the five different academic approaches to analysing the EU’s 
legitimacy discussed in the first chapter.
Chapter Six 241
political regime. The pertinence criterion for any successful remedial strategy must 
therefore be its ability to enhance diffuse support for Europe’s political community.
That does not require remedial strategies to address the lack of a European identity 
directly, as communitarianism does. Constitutionalists and incrementalists both claim 
that their respective approaches (institutionalism and functionalism) generate 
sufficient felt legitimacy within other components of the dual concept to spill over 
into a sense of political community. This chapter evaluates whether there can be such 
indirect functionalist or institutionalist spill-overs from output performance or 
institutional engineering, or whether the problem requires straightforward identity- 
building.
The pertinence criterion must also take account of the country-specific nature of the 
legitimacy deficit. Although there is some normative consensus across Europe about 
what constitutes a legitimate political system (for instance, that it must conform to the 
principles of representative democracy), member states often adopt quite different 
views of how the political regime, the political community and the political 
authorities should be organised in order to enjoy felt legitimacy. Potential solutions 
must therefore be designed with particular member states in mind, while ensuring that 
remedies for one member state do not aggravate the legitimacy deficit in others.
The feasibility criterion evaluates the extent to which the proposed remedies are 
supported by the political elites in Brussels and the member states. The feasibility 
criterion recognises the importance of the two-fold role of political elites for the 
legitimation of the EU. First, the value of a particular reform strategy will be greatly 
diminished if it is capable of solving the legitimacy deficit in theory, but is unlikely 
ever to be acceptable to the political actors who alone have the power to implement it. 
Second, political elites play an important role in mobilising public support for a 
political system.3 The legitimacy deficit cannot be remedied unless political elites 
pursue active legitimation strategies. Because the EU depends on legitimacy, political 
elites have to make an effort to secure it. If a remedial strategy does not enjoy the
3 See: Chapter 2. pp.82ff
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broad backing of Europe’s political elites, it will fail the feasibility criterion for 
solving the legitimacy deficit.4
Strategies for Solving 
the Legitimacy Deficit
Reducing the Need 
for Legitimacy Improving Legitimacy
1
Containment
Communitarianism Constitutionalism New Governance Incrementalism
Formal Political Political Political
Legitimacy Community Regime Authorities
Fig.6.1
Strategies for reform are initially faced with a fundamental choice as symbolised by 
the bold arrows in the upper part of fig.6.1. Either attempts are made to enhance the 
legitimacy of the EU, or alternatively the European political system itself is scaled 
back, thus reducing the need for its legitimation. The choice between these opposite
4 Note that the feasibility criterion has been designed primarily to indicate whether, rather than why, 
political Elites support particular legitimation strategies. The latter question is more concerned with the 
preferences and constraints of the various political actors in the integration process a detailed 
examination o f which goes beyond the scope o f this thesis. See for example: Moravcsik, op. cit.
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alternatives depends on different normative premises about European integration. In 
the absence of a underlying commitment to “ever closer Union”, one might decide 
that a partial reversal of European integration to pre-Amsterdam or even pre- 
Maastricht levels is the best and quickest way of ensuring that the EU no longer 
suffers from “legitimacy overstretch.” However, those for whom a politically 
integrated Europe constitutes a valuable end in itself will treat the legitimacy problem 
merely as a difficulty on the way to achieving this end.
This fundamental choice is rarely clearly identified in the academic literature, yet 
normative attitudes towards European integration underlie and shape the different 
individual approaches to the legitimacy deficit. As has become apparent in the first 
chapter, the great majority of participants in the debate are positively oriented towards 
the EU. When choosing a remedial strategy they prefer to improve the legitimacy of 
the EU rather than reducing its need for legitimacy. The next four approaches to 
reform are therefore broadly based on the premise that European integration is a 
desirable end in itself coupled with an underlying endorsement of “ever closer Union” 
or, at least, the status quo.
6.2 Incrementalism
6.2.1 The Approach
Incrementalism essentially entails a continuation of current political practice. The 
Treaties of Rome are periodically modified by gradually increasing the powers of the 
EP, the policy areas for which the EU has responsibility and the geographical size of 
the Union. Conceptually, incrementalism proceeds as a twin-track strategy. It accepts 
the constitutionalist tenet that felt legitimacy for the political regime can only be 
increased by democratising the EU, but it slows down this process in order to make it 
politically more acceptable and to avoid overstretching Europe’s fragile sense o f  
political community.
Its attraction lies in the fact that, unlike constitutionalism, it is not premised on the 
existence of a demos. Incrementalism acknowledges that a common European identity 
will take a long time to develop. As a substitute for constitutionalising the EU,
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incrementalists seek to maximise specific output support because they hope this will 
spill over into the other components of felt legitimacy. The strategy of legitimising the 
EU primarily through the policy output it produces, coupled with gradual institutional 
reforms, is closely associated with the academic school of neo-functionalism, and this 
has traditionally been the predominant political approach to the problem.
To meet the pertinence criterion, incrementalism has to prove two things. First, 
because its functionalist analytic perspective does not address low diffuse support for 
Europe’s political community directly, it has to compensate this drawback by 
generating high and durable specific support for the political authorities. Second, the 
specific output support thus created must demonstrably spill over into a sense of 
political community. Incrementalism must prove that the generation of high output 
support is an adequate alternative to communitarianism or constitutionalism. Finally, 
incrementalism must meet the feasibility criterion of standing a realistic chance of 
being adopted as a strategy by Europe’s political elites.
6.2.2 Can Incrementalism Generate Stable Output Support?
For a long time European policy-makers have closely followed the neo-functionalist 
paradigm which assumed the creation of efficient European institutions generating 
maximal economic welfare and prosperity would spill over into higher diffuse 
support. Past political action has primarily focused on enhancing specific support for 
the political authorities, in other words the utilitarian evaluation of policy outputs. 
Undoubtedly one of the most prominent examples of such an output-oriented 
approach is the Single Market project designed to enable the free movement of goods, 
people, services and capital across the Union.
The assumption that the Single Market has been very successful in generating specific 
support for the EU was borne out by the empirical evidence discussed in chapter five. 
As a policy, the Single Market seems to have had a positive effect on national output 
evaluations of the European political authorities. It is often viewed more positively in 
both countries than the overall balance of benefits from membership.5 This is
5 Eurobarometer no.45, op. cit., p.B2f, B16f
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particularly true for the UK where the emergence of the Single Market project 
coincides with a positive breakthrough in support for EU membership in general. 
Since British attitudes towards the EU tend to be largely utilitarian, positive output 
support for particular policies plays a comparatively greater role in raising felt 
legitimacy for the EU than in Germany where a greater degree of underlying diffuse 
support for European integration can be found.
As the impact of EU policies becomes more noticeable, public support for them varies 
increasingly among individual member states. The phase of “negative” integration 
culminating in the Single Market may still have generated specific output support 
across the EU, but the recent tendency has been towards “positive” integration via 
substantive European policy-making.6 This has resulted in more visible and more 
contentious policy outputs which may no longer command broad specific support 
across the political spectrum, thus reducing the potential for spill-overs into diffuse 
support.7 Positive integration opens a general left-right policy cleavage at EU level 
which may break up the solidarity amongst integrationists on the pro-anti EU 
cleavage.8 In other cases, geographical cleavages may emerge. One example would be 
the structural and regional funds designed to complement the SEM whose potential 
for raising regional output support has been hampered by increasing political 
controversy about their budget and regional allocation across member states.9
Positive integration also confronts different national models of welfare states and 
capitalism, such as the “Rheinish” or the “Anglo-Saxon” models operating in 
Germany and Britain respectively.10 These problems are generally ignored by those 
who argue that a fully-fledged European social policy could help to legitimise the EU 
by fostering “social inclusion”.11 On the contrary, the imposition of a centralised 
European social policy would undermine unique national traditions and value
6 Fritz W. Scharpf: “Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy o f European Welfare 
States”, in: Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.) : 
Governance in the European Union. (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 15-39
7 “European Business Groups Oppose Tax Harmony Calls”, Financial Times. 1/3/1999, p.20
8 Hix (99), on. cit.. pp. 158-63
9 Agusti Bosch and Kenneth Newton: “Economic Calculus or Familiarity Breeds Content?”, in: Oskar 
Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised Governance. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.81-88
10 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p .l0 6 f
11 For example: Garcia, op. cit.. pp.9, 17-19, Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. pp.104-112
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judgements about what constitutes equitable and affordable welfare policies in each
i  j
member states.
For instance, policy initiatives on employment and taxation, may well have opposite
national effects on support for the European political authorities. While largely
popular in Germany, the current proposals for positive integration may have a
delegitimising effect on the EU in Britain. Not only the policies themselves, but also
the vertical redistribution of additional powers towards Brussels tend to be very
1 ^contentious in the UK. For example, a narrow majority of Britons agrees with key 
policies from the EU Social Chapter, but 59% believe the EU has no right to impose 
them upon Britain.14 Incrementalism ignores that the legitimising potential of positive 
integration is hampered by the variety of national views about what constitutes 
desirable (or legitimate) policy outputs.15
This problem is most clearly illustrated in the case of EMU which has sometimes 
been perceived as the natural corollary to the Single Market. As chapter five has 
demonstrated, support for EMU membership varies considerably among member 
states, although it was initially opposed by a majority of both Britons as well as 
Germans. In both countries opposition to EMU has focused only partly on doubts 
about the economic benefits of the Single Currency. This suggests that the recent 
gradual shift in German public opinion towards supporting EMU is less attributable to 
a more positive perception of its economic benefits than to the ability of Germany’s 
political elites to mount a successful legitimation campaign. Active legitimation by 
political leadership will be more difficult to achieve in the UK where an elite cleavage
over EMU persists. To which extent future economic success of the single currency
could mitigate widespread mass and elite opposition in Britain and even contribute to 
the generation of specific support for the EU as a whole remains to be seen.
It is similarly difficult to anticipate whether low specific support as a consequence of 
an unsuccessful operation could be restricted to EMU alone rather than causing a 
negative backlash against the EU in general. In the absence of a European demos,
12 Majone (99), op. cit.. p.20f
13 “Working Time Law Sparks Row”, Financial Times. 11/2/1999, p.l
14 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol. 19, no. 10, 1996, p.5
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citizens feel little trans-European social responsibility and solidarity which could be 
activated in the event of asymmetric economic shocks in the “Euro-zone”.16 It seems 
only safe to predict that EMU represents a gamble for EU legitimacy, since current
1 7levels of specific support may well change radically for the better or worse. The 
effect of EMU on specific output support will also vary among member states 
according to how much they are perceived to benefit or suffer economically vis a vis 
the other participating countries.
Finally, a potentially significant future source of specific output support could emerge 
if the CFSP were to transform the EU into a security provider in its own right. The 
Amsterdam Treaty reflects this ambition by introducing majority voting on policy 
implementation in the CFSP pillar and creating the post of Secretary-General of the
1 ftCouncil to act as High Representative responsible for the common policy. The 1999 
EU summit in Cologne agreed to integrate the WEU into the EU to enable the Union 
to carry out peace-keeping, crisis management and humanitarian tasks, while 
Europe’s strategic security would remain rooted in NATO.19
However, the recent Balkan crises have demonstrated the constraints on the potential 
for CFSP (or the WEU) to generate noticeable output support for the EU. In terms of 
military operations, it was often confined to co-ordinating EU policy that was then
7 0  •executed by NATO and the UN. Recent reforms notwithstanding, the EU still 
suffers from a “capability - expectations gap” because it lacks the institutional 
resources and political legitimacy to assume an active role in pursuing a foreign and
71defence policy for Europe. As regards resources, the EU would need autonomous 
military forces to be able to operate independently of NATO. Despite recent policy 
initiatives like the “St Malo agreement”, such a development still seems some way off
15 Helen Wallace (97), op. cit.. p.227f
16 Helen Wallace (97), op. cit.. p.226
17 Timothy Garton-Ash: “Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order”, Foreign Affairs, vol.77, no.2, 1998, 
p.58f
18 Articles 11-28. Title V. TA
19 “Defence Co-operation Agreed”, Financial Times. 4/6/1999, p.3
20 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p. 103
21 Christopher Hill: “The Capability - Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International 
Role”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol.3, no.3, 1993, pp.305-28
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and may be resisted by some member states, either because of their military neutrality
9 9or because they fear the potential of creating a rival rather than a partner for NATO.
As regards felt legitimacy, the creation of European armed forces implies the shift of 
a core function of states, namely the provision of external security to its citizens, to 
the EU. In the event of an external threat to Europe’s security, the security function 
could serve as a potentially powerful legitimation for the EU itself, rallying EU
99citizens behind a unifying cause. But this potential is premised on prior public 
legitimation of the EU as the appropriate source of military authority (as opposed to, 
or together with, NATO). Unless the peoples of Europe accept that the EU should be 
a security provider in the first place, and unless they display sufficient mutual trust 
and solidarity, the creation of a single European army may be a divisive rather than 
unifying endeavour. The last chapter has shown the EU arguably still lacks the 
necessary sense of political community and general public support to realise the 
legitimising potential from a transfer of the provision of external security to the EU.24
6.2.3 Can Incrementalism Enhance Community or Regime Support?
These predicaments are indicative of the theoretical flaws of neo-functionalism 
discussed in chapter one. Decades of ever increasing economic and political 
integration have failed to “spill over” into a sustainable European sense of identity. 
The functionalist “myth” of depoliticised modernity and universal rationalism is 
incapable on its own of creating a viable sense of political community because 
political legitimacy has not “adapted according to the economic and political
9 ^calculations made by functionalists.” This lack of diffuse support for the EU cannot
9 f \simply be compensated for with further positive policy integration. Far from forging 
a European identity, positive integration and redistributive policies are even
22 On the development o f the St Malo agreement see for example: “France and Germany in Defence 
Talks”, Financial Times. 29/5/99, p.2
23 William Wallace (90), op. cit.. p. 105
24 Anthony Smith (92), op. cit.. p.73
25 Lene Hansen and Michael Williams: “The Myths o f Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the Crisis 
o f the EU”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol.37, no.2, 1999, p.245
26 See media coverage of confidential Commission report: “EU Mania for Laws Turns off its Citizens”, 
The Guardian. 4/8/1999, p. 12
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predicated upon a demos because they rely heavily on a sense of mutual social
97responsibility between the peoples of Europe.
The EU cannot be legitimised through specific support alone because specific support 
is by its very nature volatile. Support for the widely popular Single Market can 
fluctuate considerably with changes in the overall economic climate, as witnessed in 
Britain in the early nineties and Eastern Germany in the years since unification. Even 
more sobering is the example of the closure of the Renault car factory at Vilvoorde in 
Belgium in spring 1997. The transfer of production to France was widely perceived as
9o
unfair and generated temporary anti-EU sentiment in Belgium. By autumn 1997, 
only 36% of the normally staunchly pro-European Belgians thought their country 
benefited from EU membership, as opposed to 41% who believed Belgium did not 
benefit. Compared to autumn 1995, support for membership plummeted by fourteen
9 0percentage points to 42%. Satisfaction with democracy in the EU fell by twenty-one 
percentage points, perhaps because 58% of Belgians had no trust in EU institutions.30 
Significantly, there was also a marked decline in the number of Belgians identifying 
themselves as partly or wholly European, with more respondents regarding
O 1
themselves as exclusively Belgian.
If output support is by definition unstable, and if it does not to any significant degree 
translate into a sense of political community, incrementalism must focus on the two 
remaining components of the dual concept: the political regime and formal 
legitimacy. Yet one of the greatest weaknesses of incrementalism is its lack of a clear 
vision for the final institutional shape and status of the EU. A rather eclectic and 
impromptu approach towards legitimising the EU prevails which is to some extent 
inherent in the notion of seeking incremental reform based on consensus among the 
member states. Although politically expedient, the periodical tinkering with the 
Treaties of Rome can at times produce incoherent reforms that leave EU institutions 
in a constitutional half-way house where short-term considerations and political
27 Majone (99), o p . c it . . p.20f
28 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p. 110
29 Eurobarometer no.44, op. cit.. p.B8,
Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer no.48. (Brussels: European Commission, 1998), p.B28
30 Ibid, p.B2, B4
31 Eurobarometer no.47, op. cit.. p.B74
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compromise shape their future almost as much as a consistent constitutional strategy. 
The recent events surrounding the issue of EU fraud serve as a good case in point.
Upon publication of a Court of Auditors report into financial irregularities relating to 
the 1996 EU budget, the public expected the EP to call the Commission to account. 
The EP formally possesses the constitutional powers to do so, but it could never hope 
to muster the necessary two-thirds majority. None of the national parliaments in the 
member states faces quite such a high numerical threshold for removing a failing 
executive. It appears inconsistent to equip the EP with the censure instrument, thus 
raising public expectations about executive accountability to the legislature, but then 
putting in place almost insurmountable obstacles to its application.
It could be argued that the Commission is not a European government, and its 
relationship with the EP remains hybrid for that reason. As long as the Commission 
acts as a European civil service rather than a parliamentary government, the censure 
motion remains difficult to defend on principle. That is presumably the reason why, 
once the censure motion failed, the inquiry into EU fraud was removed from the EP 
committee which had started the investigation and transferred instead to an
to
impromptu “Committee of Experts”. But the creation of a new body with no 
apparent connection to the existing institutional framework of the EU is ill-conceived 
because it blunts parliamentary scrutiny powers over the Commission. In conclusion, 
the confusion and apparent inconsistency surrounding recent political developments 
can be attributed to the unresolved question about the proper roles of European 
institutions. By its very nature, incremental reform cannot resolve these deep-seated 
problems regarding the current hybrid distribution of powers in the EU.
If incrementalism cannot deliver significant improvements in public diffuse support 
for the political regime, it might at least soften the emerging incompatibilities 
between the European and national systems of formal legitimacy. The slow pace of 
reform should enable national political systems to adapt their formal legitimacy 
accordingly, and it allows national judiciaries to render legal doctrines compatible 
with the formal legitimising principles of the Treaties as interpreted by the ECJ,
32 HC Research Paper 99/32, o p . cit.. p. 11-14
33 Ibid, p. 13
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Whereas constitutionalism amounts to a head-on confrontation with the formal 
legitimacy of the member states (such as the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in 
Britain or the fundamental provisions of the Basic Law in Germany), incrementalism 
leaves room for a compromise. Since chapters three and four have shown British and 
German systems of formal legitimacy to enjoy high levels of felt legitimacy, any overt 
challenge to them may well provoke a public backlash in the shape of lower support 
for the EU.
However, constitutional conflicts will arise even with an incremental approach to 
reform, as the discussion of the British “Factortame” case and various FCC cases in 
the last chapter has demonstrated. Enduring decades of recurring constitutional battles 
over emerging incompatibilities between the European and national systems of formal 
legitimacy may arguably have a worse impact on public support for the EU than 
settling the relationship conclusively once and for all. An incrementalist strategy does 
not result in a marked improvement on public regime support or a better compatibility 
of formal legitimacies.
6.2.4 Summary
Incrementalism only passes one of the two criteria for solving the legitimacy deficit. 
The biggest advantage of an incremental strategy lies in its pragmatism about the 
realistic options for reform available in the current political climate in Europe. The 
monopoly over primary (Treaty) law is held by the member states which must reach a 
unanimous compromise on the basis of sometimes very different, country-specific 
preferences for EU reform. Given a widespread unwillingness among European 
governments to contemplate sacrificing political influence and power for the sake of a 
radical democratisation of the Union, incrementalism remains almost the only 
politically feasible strategy for improving EU legitimacy. It therefore passes the 
feasibility criterion and could be termed “constitutionalism by stealth”.
However, incrementalism fails the pertinence criterion. First, the gradualist approach 
to institutional reforms advocated by incrementalists does not offer a coherent 
institutional vision for the EU which would meet public expectations for democratic
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government in Europe.34 Second, the strategy of enhancing the EU’s legitimacy 
primarily by way of spill-overs from specific output support has diminishing returns 
of scale and no longer provides an effective remedy against the legitimacy deficit. The 
more EU policies shift from negative to positive integration, thereby increasing their 
visible political impact, the more their ability to generate specific support for the EU 
varies among member states. Positive integration is also politically more contentious 
along the left-right cleavage within member states. Third, incrementalism misjudges 
the dynamics of identity-formation because positive spill-over from policy outputs 
and gradual institutional reform are insufficient to generate a European identity whose 
absence lies at the heart of the legitimacy deficit.
Such a pessimistic conclusion is bome out by historical evidence. After all, 
incrementalism has been pursued for decades by Europe’s political leaders, but the 
legitimacy deficit has persisted. Chapter five has detected no indisputable evidence of 
strongly growing felt legitimacy in Germany and Britain over recent years which 
could validate the incremental approach. For obvious reasons, incremental reforms 
can only produce incremental improvements, which is why this strategy fails to pass 
the pertinence criterion for solving the legitimacy deficit. Maybe a more radical 
strategy is needed to tackle the EU’s legitimacy deficit, such as constitutionalism.
6.3 Constitutionalism
6.3.1 The Approach
To summarise from chapter one, constitutionalists believe low felt legitimacy is 
mainly a consequence of public dissatisfaction with the political regime of the EU, in 
particular its perceived lack of representative democracy. They correctly identify this 
as the constitutional philosophy nearly unanimously favoured among the peoples of 
Europe. Public dissatisfaction, constitutionalists argue, arose from the growing 
discrepancies between the institutional structure of an intergovernmental international 
organisation and a degree of integration which has made the EU resemble a state in 
terms of the political powers and policy responsibilities it has acquired. If a new
34 Helen Wallace (97), op. cit.. p.218f, 233
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democratic institutional structure were to reflect that transformation, the old 
discrepancies would disappear. The public would become confident, reflected in 
higher diffuse support for the European political regime, that the EU operates under a 
form of government which they consider legitimate. Consequently, traditional 
constitutionalist solutions entail an adaptation of the key ingredients of liberal 
democracy, such as parliamentary government, separation of powers and the
o c
protection of human rights, to the EU. Many conceive of the Commission as the 
nucleus for a European government responsible to a two-chamber parliament 
consisting of the EP and the Council.
Constitutionalism employs an institutionalist analysis both for its diagnosis of the 
problem as well as its solution. The EU’s institutional structure is regarded as the 
main reason for the legitimacy deficit. The deficit can be remedied through 
institutional engineering by democratising the EU. Raising the political profile and 
electoral importance of the EP would help to generate a pan-European political 
discourse which in turn would contribute to a sense o f political community among the 
peoples of Europe. Institutional reform will therefore produce a spill-over into the 
identity component of felt legitimacy, since it removes the structural obstacles which 
have so far impeded the growth of a strong sense of European political community.
Can the constitutionalist strategy achieve its aims, and does it offer a workable 
solution to the legitimacy deficit? Since constitutionalism does not address low 
community support directly, it must prove three things to fulfil the pertinence 
criterion. First, it needs to show that its strategy does really enhance diffuse regime 
support, and second that such institutional engineering will spill over into diffuse 
community support as well. Third, constitutionalism must offer an institutional design 
which is considered legitimate across the different member states. Last not least, 
constitutionalists have to demonstrate the political viability of their reform strategy in 
order to meet the feasibility criterion.
35 For instance: Weidenfeld (95), op. cit.. Raworth, op. cit.. pp. 16-33
36 See for example: Weidenfeld (94), op. cit.
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6.3.2 Can Constitutionalism Enhance Regime Support?
The analytical confusion between democracy and legitimacy criticised in chapter one 
resurfaces in the practical institutional reforms proposed by constitutionalists. They 
rarely take much interest in the details of the constitutional structure to be designed 
and tend to overlook the political and institutional implications this will create. By 
failing to consider the wider institutional balance, constitutionalists have unwittingly 
drawn attention to the complexities and side-effects associated with implementing 
their strategy.
For instance, very few scholars have considered the vertical balance of powers 
between the national and the European level. Concerned about the centralising effects 
of the creation of a European parliamentary government, some have proposed a clear 
vertical allocation of competencies to be enshrined in the Treaties. Recalling 
historical instances of federal states facing creeping centralisation, such as the United 
States or post-war Germany, Scharpf remains sceptical about the effectiveness of such 
a legally entrenched vertical separation of powers. Even America’s one-time doctrine 
of “dual federalism”, which was designed to protect State’s reserve powers, ultimately 
collapsed under the difficulties of balancing the demands of a united economic market 
against the autonomous powers of the States.
The only effective barrier against the centralising consequences of a European 
parliamentarisation might be a political culture of judicial respect for the autonomous 
policy-making powers of the national and the European institutions. To create such 
a jurisprudential doctrine will be difficult, as Scharpf acknowledges, and whether it 
could be preserved in the long-run must appear even more doubtful from a 
comparative historical perspective. Apart from the occasional rhetorical commitment 
to subsidiarity, few constitutionalists acknowledge the danger of centralisation 
inherent in their strategy for solving the legitimacy deficit.
37 Lepsius, o p . cit.. p.36, Wieland, o p . cit.. pp.445-52
38 Fritz W. Scharpf: “Kann es in Europa eine stabile foderale Balance geben? (Thesen), in: Rudolf 
Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen fur eine Europaische Union. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1991), p.422
39 Ibid, p.424
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Others have concentrated on problems related to the horizontal distribution of powers 
at the European level. Based on her argument that the lack of transparency is one of 
the core problems of EU legitimacy, Lodge calls for an end to the secrecy surrounding 
Council of Ministers meetings which prevents the EP from having greater influence 
on the legislative process.40 The Council has recently started to open up some of its 
proceedings, and the Amsterdam Treaty has established a general right of access to 
EP, Council and Commission documents. This goes some way towards addressing 
this “transparency deficit”.41 Although more far-reaching reforms remain desirable 
(such as further simplification of the decision-making rules for EP, Commission and 
Council), European multi-level governance will for structural reasons probably 
always remain rather opaque to the average European citizen. The prospect of a 
flexible multi-speed Europe only complicates the picture further. That makes the issue 
of proper accountability of European institutions all the more salient.
Bogdanor and Woodcock have emphasised the need for improved democratic 
accountability of the Council and the Commission, for instance by having the latter 
directly elected and by introducing EU-wide referenda.42 But their proposals are not 
based on a proper overall institutional design. Bogdanor and Woodcock seem unsure 
about whether they favour a presidential or a parliamentary system for Europe, since 
they also wish to strengthen the scrutiny powers of both the European and national 
parliaments 43 Such confusion is indicative of the rarity with which the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various constitutional options are properly discussed.
Few reformers account for the fact that the Commission is not a unitary actor. 
Christiansen identifies a “parliamentary”, a “technocratic” and a “diplomatic” 
Commission.44 What would happen to the civil service functions of the Commission if 
it were to become a governmental executive body? A democratisation of the EU 
would also jeopardise the Commission’s current role as an independent mediator 
among national interests which enjoys high felt legitimacy by some of the smaller
40 Lodge (94), op. cit.. pp.345-56
41 Art.255 TA
42 Bogdanor and Woodcock, op. cit.. p.489
43 Ibid, p.484
44 Thomas Christiansen: “Legitimacy Dilemmas of Supranational Governance”, in: Albert Weale and 
Michael Nentwich (eds.): Political Theory and the European Union - Legitimacy, Constitutional 
Choice and Citizenship. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 109
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member states.45 It seems equally doubtful whether the national quota system could 
survive which currently allocates Commissioner posts and which safeguards national 
representation. The inevitable reduction in the number of Commissioners prior to 
Eastern enlargement will further undermine the notion that every member states 
should be represented by a Commissioner. But replacing the principle of territorial 
representation in the Commission with popular representation is problematic because 
Europe can only become a “nationalities state” (rather than a nation state) whose 
nations are each in a structural minority and hence in need of constitutional 
protection 46 Smaller member states might experience a negative legitimacy backlash 
if they were rarely able to secure representation in a European government.
These considerations raise another rarely addressed question. Could such minority 
protection be better ensured with a presidential or with a parliamentary system? The 
answer depends on the ability of institutions to contain the potential for ideological 
and communal polarisation which could endanger public support for integration itself. 
Beetham and Lord argue in favour of a presidential model which would give the EP 
additional financial and law-making powers, but would deny it the powers of 
government formation. Freed from executive domination, the EP could concentrate on 
representing the EU’s diverse interests and communities.47
But that would not solve the question of how a European government could be held to 
account. Hix supports the idea of a directly elected European executive on the 
grounds that the politicisation of executive power resulting from “presidential”
A O
elections of the Commission is a necessary prerequisite of political accountability. 
He believes that under a parliamentary system national parties and governments 
would retain their ability to impose their wishes on the EP in the executive selection
49process.
45 Dehousse, op. cit.. p. 129
46 Lepsius, op. cit.. p.36
47 Beetham and Lord, op. cit., p.79f
48 Simon Hix: “Executive Selection in the European Union: Does the Commission President Investiture 
Procedure Reduce the Democratic Deficit?”, European Integration Online Papers, vol.l, no.21, 1997, 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/l 997-021 a.htm., p. 10
49 Ibid, p.6
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Three objections can be raised against a presidential system at EU level. First, a 
presidential system is (with the exception of France, perhaps) alien to modem West 
European constitutional tradition and its felt legitimacy hence questionable. Second, 
parliamentary government would not only mirror more closely national models of 
formal legitimacy, it could also ensure political accountability. It would require 
Commissioners to sit in the EP on whose confidence they depend. Commission 
President Prodi’s newly won right to dismiss Commissioners has already been 
interpreted as a first step towards prime-ministerial government.50 Such a 
parliamentary system would necessitate changes to Art.213.2 TA which prohibits 
Commissioners from engaging “in any other occupation, whether gainful or not.” 
Third, the radical politicisation that Hix hopes to achieve with a presidential model 
has potentially detrimental consequences for centre-periphery relations in a federation 
like the EU which is based on a double legitimacy.51 By diminishing representation of 
the political sub-units, a presidential system would undermine national legitimising 
chains more radically than a parliamentary form of government.
A more general problem is that current diffuse support for the EU’s political 
community would probably be too weak to cope with the tensions that the 
introduction of any form of majoritarian representative democracy might unleash. 
Constitutionalists will of course refer to the spill-over effects of institutional reform 
on diffuse community support. This argument is considered in more detail below, but 
a strong European identity may well have to precede these institutional reforms rather 
than result from them. One solution might be to couple parliamentary democracy with 
what Dehousse calls an “alarm bell mechanism” whereby a significant minority of 
states could block legislative proposals which could be shown to threaten their vital 
interests.52
Finally, there remains the question over how the democratisation of Europe is to 
proceed, once its content has been agreed on. The 1994 Draft Constitution by the EP 
proposed that the EP and national parliaments should prepare a detailed constitutional 
blueprint for submission to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Upon adoption,
50 “The New Team for Europe”, The Economist, vol.352, no.8128, 17/7/1999, p.33
51 Dehousse, op. cit.. p .l 19
52 Ibid, p. 133
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the constitution would come into force when ratified by “a majority of member states 
representing four-fifths of the total population.”
Others prefer a more radical approach. Appealing for a new European constitution to 
receive “democratic baptism”, Weale rejects the traditional method of Treaty revision 
by the High Contracting Parties on the grounds of not representing the broader 
“public interests” of the peoples of Europe.54 Modelled on the constitutional 
convention in Philadelphia in 1787, he suggests that representatives for such an 
assembly should be drawn from the member states, subnational government and the 
EP. Ratification would occur through a series of national referenda or a single pan- 
European referendum.55 Apart from considerable legal difficulties with constitution- 
making, such as transforming an international treaty organisation into a sovereign 
federation, even the less radical EP proposal remains utopian in the current political 
climate.
As long as Europe’s political elites remain reluctant to endorse the constitutionalist 
agenda, such a debate would fail to assume the public dimension necessary for a 
broad societal participation in the constitution building process.56 Although Weale 
somewhat defiantly refuses to be “bound by the supposed realities of the present 
situation” , he should not assume institutional altruism on the part of established 
institutional interests in Europe. It is unrealistic to expect a European constitution to 
emerge with less than unanimous agreement of all the member states. These 
considerations cast doubt over the ability of constitutionalist strategies to pass the 
feasibility criterion, as will be discussed in greater detail below.
Despite adopting a more differentiated view of the institutional reforms necessary to 
reduce Europe’s legitimacy deficit, even the more sophisticated versions of 
constitutionalism simply devise a system of democracy in the abstract. They ignore
53 European Parliament: “Resolution on the Constitution o f the European Union”, Official Journal of 
the European Communities. A3-0064/94, p. 156, 166
54 Albert Weale: “Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution o f Europe”, in: Richard Bellamy,
Vittorio Bufacchi and Dario Castiglione (eds.): Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union o f  
Europe. (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995), p.90
55 Ibid., p.92f
56 Lary A. Siedentop: “The Birmingham Summit: Where are our Madisons?”, Financial Times. 
16/10/1992, p.21
57 Weale (95), op. cit.. p.93
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the contingency of Europe’s formal and felt legitimacy on the member states’ national 
perspective to which the discussion now turns.
6.3.3 Constitutionalism Ignores National Differences
This contingency is the second important reason why constitutionalism is unlikely to 
enhance diffuse regime support for the EU. Some of the reforms appear to be counter­
productive as far as their national legitimising potential is concerned. For example, 
the above discussion about the respective merits of a presidential versus a 
parliamentary model for electing the Commission pays little attention to how 
executive powers are formally legitimised within each of the member states. This 
illustrates the importance of a comparative study of the EU’s legitimacy.
For instance, the comparison with national systems of formal and felt legitimacy 
reveals that, with the exception of France, the presidential system of government is 
alien to most national political systems. In Britain and Germany its adoption would 
constitute a break with constitutional tradition and might thus receive lower felt 
legitimacy in these two countries than a parliamentary solution which would make a 
“European government” responsible to the EP. On the other hand, to model a 
European government on the British and (similar) German concept of ministerial 
responsibility with ministers being drawn from parliament would conflict with French 
and Dutch systems of formal legitimacy that bar members of the government from 
holding parliamentary seats.
More serious variations in the legitimising potential of constitutionalism can be found 
between Britain and Germany. The last chapter revealed that a majority of Britons and 
Germans consider the EU insufficiently democratic and believe they cannot rely on
co
the EP to represent their interests adequately. But the same analysis also revealed 
greater British reluctance to strengthen the EP at the expense of the Council or 
national parliaments. It follows that constitutionalist reforms might be able to increase 
German diffuse support for the political regime, but will have exactly the opposite 
effect in the UK. They would not only be rejected on the grounds of creating some
58 Chapter 5. p.224
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kind of European federal government (which 65% of Britons oppose)59, but also 
because a full-blown parliamentarisation of the EU would undermine the Council 
whose role in the formal and felt legitimisation of the EU is far more important in the 
UK than it is in the Federal Republic.60 Such a reform might not only reduce diffuse 
regime support for the EU in Britain, it may also accentuate the ultimate 
incompatibility of the British and the European systems of formal legitimacy.
However, current incompatibilities between the European and national systems of 
formal legitimacy might be overcome by determined constitutional reform within 
each member state. For instance, chapter three argued that the constitutional reforms 
pursued by the 1997 Labour Government amount to a Europeanisation of Britain’s 
formal legitimacy which would entrench “continental” legitimising principle on the 
status of law and the courts.61 In principle, therefore, the existence of fifteen (and 
soon even more) different national systems of formal legitimacy should be no obstacle 
to the emergence of a European formal legitimacy with which each of them becomes 
reasonably compatible in the long-run.
This presupposes a considerable degree of flexibility and determination on the part of 
political elites in the member states who must seek to adapt their national legitimising 
principles to make them “euro-compatible”. This has been easier to achieve in the 
FRG than in the UK because Germany’s formal legitimacy is already institutionally 
programmed towards European integration. Moreover, a broad elite consensus in 
favour of “ever closer Union” will facilitate the political legitimation of any necessary 
future adjustments of Germany’s constitutional structure. By contrast, Britain’s 
formal legitimacy has had a low constitutional fit with the EU which means it still 
requires far more radical adjustment in order to become fully compatible with 
supranational integration. An adversarial political culture and an important elite 
cleavage over European integration both complicate the political legitimation of such 
an adjustment. As chapter three suggested, if the necessary reforms are widely 
perceived as an alien intrusion into established national constitutional orders, there 
may be a public backlash of lower diffuse support for the national regime as well as
59 MORI: British Public Opinion, vol.21, no.5, 1998, p.6
60 Chapter 5. p.209
61 Chapter 3. p . l l7 f
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lower felt legitimacy for the EU.62 Constitutionalists rarely acknowledge this degree 
to which the EU’s formal and felt legitimacy is interlocked with that of its member 
states. As a result, constitutionalist proposals for reform are not tailored to country- 
specific legitimacy “weaknesses”.
To summarise, most constitutionalists do not conduct a thorough constitutional debate 
which acknowledges the full implications of their proposals. They rarely offer a 
comprehensive review of the side-effects their reforms will cause for other aspects of 
the political regime (or other components of felt legitimacy). Constitutionalism 
similarly neglects to consider how national variations in the legitimacy deficit of the 
EU require solutions to be tailored to each member state. For these reasons, the 
legitimising potential for diffuse EU regime support that existing constitutionalist 
strategies could provide must at least appear questionable. But the key to alleviating 
the EU’s legitimacy deficit depends on the potential of constitutionalism to generate a 
European identity. This potential will be assessed in next.
6.3.4 Can Constitutionalism Enhance Community Support ?
The question whether institutional engineering can generate a strong sense of political 
community gains additional importance given that constitutionalism aims to transform 
the EU into a representative democracy. There is currently no European demos which 
the EP could validly claim to represent and which would warrant its institutional 
elevation next to, or even above the Council. As long as primary loyalties in most 
member states continue to lie with national identities and the EU remains at least 
partly legitimised indirectly through the member states, the viability of 
constitutionalism must remain in doubt. Any legitimacy improvement achieved by 
democratising the EU runs the risk of being eroded in the absence of sufficient social 
attachment and a strong feeling of identity towards the EU.64 In the absence of a 
European demos, constitutionalism may even exacerbate the legitimacy deficit.65
62 Chapter 3. p. 118f
63 Rudolf Hrbek: “Federal Balance and the Problem o f Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union”, 
Aussenwirtschaft, vol.50, no.l, 1995, p.64
64 Fritz W. Scharpf: Governing in Europe - Effective and Democratic?. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p.88
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Eastward enlargement of the EU will throw this dilemma into sharp relief. On the one 
hand, the need for a demos will increase because in a Union with around twenty 
members more decisions must be taken by majority than at present.66 On the other 
hand, the constitutionalist dilemma (the need for mature democratic institutions 
versus an insufficiently low degree of diffuse support for the European political 
community) is likely to become most accentuated in the new Eastern member states. 
Notwithstanding their genuine cultural reorientation towards the West, their 
overwhelming desire to accede to the EU is mostly driven by functionalist motives, 
most importantly full access to the Single Market and the political stability which 
membership will bring to the region of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. The 
region’s prolonged struggle against outside domination has reinforced public 
attachment to national identities which may not be easily compatible with attempts to 
forge a European identity. This means that for the EU as a whole the staged process of 
enlargement creates a Union composed of member states whose sense o f  political 
community is very unequally developed.
Wallace and Smith agree that Eastern enlargement “will make it more difficult to 
foster a sufficiently strong sense of community to provide popular consent for a more 
integrated EU”, but they nonetheless argue in favour of empowering the EP. Indeed, 
most constitutionalists believe that presence of democratic institutions will itself 
contribute to the emergence of a European demos. Which causal connections must 
obtain for the institutional reforms advocated by constitutionalism to translate into a 
sense of political community? Is the communitarian charge against the constitutional 
approach (that it ignores the dependence of the regime on the community component 
of felt legitimacy) really justified?
Constitutionalists argue that reforming the institutional structure of the EU into a 
parliamentary democracy will have two effects. First, granting additional powers to 
the EP will enhance the political significance of the assembly. If the EP can 
effectively determine the composition and general political direction of a future 
European administration, the pressure and incentives for greater intra-party cohesion
65 Scharpf (94), op. cit.. p.293, Weiler (92), op. cit.. p.411
66 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes: Eastward Enlargement of the European Union. (London: The 
Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1998), p.46f
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as well as inter-party competition will be enhanced. Constitutionalist reforms will 
thus create the momentum for a truly European party system to develop whose 
participants are ideologically and structurally less dependent on the national parties 
from which they emerged.69
As a second effect, such a pan-European party system, by making more effective use 
of the additional parliamentary powers to be granted, would place the European 
political debate at the centre of public and media attention and generate higher 
turnouts in European elections. These developments may in turn persuade voters to
70shift their loyalties from the national to the European arena. Institutional engineering 
can thus help create what Neunreither has termed “transmission structures.” These 
encompass political organisations, interest groups and the media, and they ensure a
71permanent dialogue between political decision-makers and their citizens. 
Neunreither maintains that transmission structures are an essential prerequisite for a 
European demos which in turn helps to legitimise the substantial decision-making
77powers invested in the EU.
If institutional engineering could create these transmission structures,
constitutionalism would successfully address the problem of low diffuse support for 
Europe’s political community. Two causalities must obtain for this argument to hold. 
First, there must be a causal relationship between the constitutional importance of the 
EP and public interest in its deliberations (measured most visibly in terms of voter 
participation in European elections). Second, the political transmission structures thus 
created must themselves generate a European demos.
Postulating the first of these two causal relationships, Reif famously labelled 
European elections “second-order” national elections on the grounds that they are, 
unlike (national parliamentary) first-order elections, not primarily concerned with
67 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 153f
68 Neunreither, op. cit.. p. 109
69 Hix (97), op. cit., pp.7-10
70 Michael Greven: “Political Parties between National Identity and Eurofication”, in: Brian Nelson, 
David Roberts and Walter Veit (eds.): The Idea o f Europe. (Oxford: Berg, 1992), pp.75-95
71 I b ii ,  p.101
72 Ibid.. p .!06ff
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7^  t •power distribution and government formation. Second-order elections, which also 
include local elections, are characterised by low levels of electoral participation and 
low-profile campaigns. According to Reif s theory, European elections have a second- 
order status precisely because no significant political power is at stake.
While R eifs theory has been widely considered plausible, it has not remained 
unchallenged.74 It is sometimes argued that European politics is largely technical in 
nature and therefore not easily susceptible to ideological divisions along party- 
political lines.75 Even the transmission structures themselves differ from their national
7 f \equivalents, as the predominance of multi-level network structures testifies. Others 
maintain that linguistic barriers militate against attempts to elevate European elections 
to first-order status because democracy requires full linguistic competence to 
participate in the political dialogue.77 Belgium and Switzerland may prove multi­
lingual democracies possible, but these countries have far fewer languages each and 
their populations display far greater linguistic competence. As the last chapter has
• • •  70demonstrated, significant linguistic barriers still exist in the EU for the time being.
Even if R eifs argument is accepted in principle, it has to remain an untested 
hypothesis as long as EP elections are empirically characterised by his second-order 
criteria. Since the last chapter has shown that EU citizens have an inflated view of the 
EP’s powers, election turnouts might even decline if voters learnt that the EP is even 
less powerful than they imagined. Moreover, the EP’s growing importance and 
influence should have caused a gradual shift towards first-order status for European 
election, but such a shift has not occurred. Voter turnout has been in continuous 
decline in the European average over the past two decades.79 Despite their argument 
that the EU has made some progress towards a “Europe des partis” (notably in terms 
of party discipline amongst the EP’s transnational party groups), Hix and Lord have to
73 Reif and Schmitt, op. cit.. pp.3-44
74 For a recent critique see: Jean Blondel, Richard Sinnot and Palle Svensson: People and Parliament in 
the European Union. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), esp. pp.242-57
75 Ibid, p.254
76Helen Wallace: “Politics and Policy in the EU: The Challenge o f Governance”, in: Helen Wallace and 
William Wallace (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), p.31
77 Lepsius, op. cit.. p.27
78 Chapter 5. p.202
79 Julie Smith: “The 1994 European Election: Twelve into One Won’t Go”, Jack Hayward (ed.): The 
Crisis o f Representation in Europe, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp.210-215
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• 80admit that “EP elections have contributed little to the legitimacy of EU parties.” One
problem may be that the prevailing second-order status of European election may be
self-reinforcing. Each additional election reinforces ingrained public assumptions
about their lack of importance and thwarts the evolution of electoral participation and
81public knowledge about Europe’s representative structures.
The second causality assumes that elevating European elections to first-order status 
will translate into rising diffuse support for the political community. Hix and Lord 
suggest that, as a nascent political system, the EU has developed institutionally to a
89point where political parties rather than national identities align European citizens. 
The emergence of transnational European parties is merely hindered by the current 
institutional structure. Because European elections are not about winning government 
office, parties compete largely on national issues.
But political identities cannot simply be created by institutional design, and the 
emergence of a “Europe des partis” is not simply obscured by scholars who analyse 
the EU from an inappropriate IR perspective, as Hix and Lord seem to believe.84 Even 
on one of their own criteria for a European party system - the degree of party 
discipline among the transnational party families - the reverse causality asserts itself. 
In the various motions of censure against the Commission in spring 1999 voting 
patterns among MEPs frequently defied party lines. Instead, parliamentarians were 
influenced at least as much by a cultural north-south divide in attitudes towards the 
alleged failings of the Commission, or quite simply by national loyalties towards 
“their own” Commissioner.85
Arguably the EP remains in the grip of national parties and domestic policy goals 
because genuinely pan-European parties lack electoral appeal in a transnational and 
multilingual union of fifteen demoi and 370 million people. The frequent reference to 
multilingual democracies like Switzerland is misleading, since they are based on
80 Simon Hix and Christopher Lord: Political Parties in the European Union. (London: Macmillan,
1997), p.210,213
81 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.78
82 Hix and Lord, op. cit.. p.200-03
83 Hix (97), o p . cit.. p.9
84 Hix and Lord, op. cit.. p.202f
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fewer languages and deeply entrenched political identities. The EU rather mirrors 
countries with a divided political community, such as Belgium, whose party systems 
typically fragment into separate parties for each distinct community.
While representative democracy does not presuppose a “European ethnos” with a 
deeply entrenched structure of social or even ethnic identity, one can validly argue 
that the EU lacks sufficient social cement and cultural homogeneity to enable a
or
majoritarian democracy to function successfully. In their absence, the 
implementation of the constitutionalist agenda, far from creating a sense o f  political 
community, may well have the opposite effect of destroying it. As long as the question 
about the appropriate degree of European integration remains an important ideological 
cleavage in the EU, a premature politicisation of its institutions will only undermine
O'?
the fragile popular consent to its rule. Far from being the natural product of a 
European party system, a strong sense of European identity must logically precede
00
it. The causal connection between institutions and identity works in the opposite 
way to the one postulated by constitutionalism: i f  people no longer identify with their 
national interest, then there may be pressure for pan-European democratic institutions.
The relationship between Europe’s political regime and its political community may 
even be circular: “the politics of identity shape the EU’s political system and the EU’s
OQ
political system has its own consequences for patterns of European identity.” Easton 
similarly argues that “the facts of sharing political processes, participating in 
interdependent political roles and partaking in the same communication network will 
in themselves contribute to perpetuating the need to do so.”90 But he also stresses that, 
unless supplemented with a communal ideology, pressures of output failure or severe 
cleavages may quickly override such political interdependence.91 The communitarian 
challenge still stands: constitutionalists fail to acknowledge that their remedy to the
85 “The Slow March To Greater Bonding”, The Economist, vol.350, no.8109, 6/3/1999, p.47, also:
Peel, op. cit.. p.26
86 Albert Weale: “Between Representation and Constitutionalism in the European Union”, in: Albert 
Weale and Michael Nentwich (eds.): Political Theory and the European Union - Legitimacy. 
Constitutional Choice and Citizenship. (London: Routledge, 1998), p.52. Also: Grimm (94), op. cit.. 
p.38ff
7 Blondel, Sinnot and Svensson, op. cit.. p.254
88 Weale (98), o p . c it . . p.50
89 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.56
90 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.327
91 Ibid., p.327ff
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legitimacy deficit is contingent on the prior existence of strong diffuse support for the 
political community.
In conclusion, institutional engineering fails to spill over into creating a European
demos which could remedy the legitimacy deficit. Even if one accepts the (contested)
assumption that a the introduction of parliamentary government will generate a
European party system, such a system might endanger rather than improve levels of
felt legitimacy. At most, institutional reform will be a necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for the emergence of a European identity. To quote Beetham and Lord:
“Many political systems have been pieced together from multicultural
communities. The question is not whether such an approach is possible,
but o f  how to create the right mix between institutional order, social
compromise and political culture as to ground a successful identity,
rather than a dysfunctional one. ”
Constitutionalists fail to understand that
" ...the second-order pattern goes deeper than the assignment ofpolitical
powers to this or that level o f democratic competition. It has to do with
0 ?cultural features that limit the formation o f a European demos. "
6.3.5 Is Constitutionalism Politically Feasible?
That leaves the political viability of the constitutionalist strategy for reform to be 
considered. Past policies affecting the political regime component of legitimacy have 
so far failed to generate a dramatic impact on diffuse support. Constitutionalists 
would blame this failure on European governments which have always shunned the 
kind of radical institutional reform advocated by constitutionalism. Whenever the EP 
tabled proposals for a wholesale constitutional reform (for instance the 1984 “Draft 
Treaty Establishing the European Union”94 or the 1994 “Resolution on the
92 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.40
93 Ibid., p.78f
94 European Parliament: Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union. (Luxembourg: Directorate 
General for Information and Public Relations, 1984)
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Constitution of the European Union”95), its recommendations were generally politely 
ignored and filed away.96
Although the Draft Treaty and the Resolution remained blueprints, they provided a 
reference point against which the degree of the democratic deficit of the actual 
institutional arrangements could be measured and from which subsequent Treaty 
reforms took inspiration. Under pressure from national electorates dissatisfied with 
the status quo and increasingly aware of the causal link between democratisation and 
public acceptance of European integration, Europe’s political leaders started to 
embrace the constitutionalist paradigm in the late 1970s. Albeit substantial, the 
institutional reforms undertaken so far fell well short of the institutional design 
envisaged by the EP.
While such meagre impact on diffuse support for the European political regime can at 
least partly be explained away by the timidity of past political reforms, the lack of 
reformist zeal among many of Europe’s political leaders suggests another obstacle to 
the constitutional agenda for reform. If fully implemented, a European parliamentary 
democracy would significantly alter the balance of power between the Union and its 
member states at the expense of the latter. It would presumably also put this 
relationship on an entirely different legal footing, whereby the High Contracting 
Parties would cease to be the EU’s collective constitutional sovereigns.
Such a departure from the treaty-based origins of European integration would signify 
a radical diminution of member state sovereignty. Few governments seem currently 
prepared to sacrifice their influence over European politics “merely” to make the EU 
more legitimate, although important country-specific differences are again
0 7perceptible. The German government is at least rhetorically committed to political 
union, and Foreign Minister Fischer has recently advocated a constitutionalist 
approach towards further integration, but these proposals have found little support in
95 European Parliament: “Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union”, Official Journal of 
the European Communities. A3-0064/94, pp. 155-170
96 For a discussion o f the latter see: Emst-Ulrich Petersmann: “How Can the European Union be 
Constitutionalised? The European Parliament’s 1994 Proposal for a Constitution for the European 
Union”, Aussenwirtschaft, vol.50, no.l, 1995, pp.171-220
97 Scharpf (91), op. cit.. p.417
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most other member states, including France. The British government in particular 
remains opposed to a constitutionalisation of the EU ." This position mirrors the 
greater degree of opposition to further institutional integration among British elite and 
mass opinion than among Germans.100 At the elite level over the past decades a 
significant section of the British media and at least one of the two main political 
parties has been hostile towards the idea of solving the legitimacy deficit by means of 
a constitutionalisation of the EU.101 If constitutionalism does not enjoy support among 
Europe’s current political leaders, its political implementation remains unrealistic for
1 C\0the time being. Yet constitutionalists rarely provide realistic strategies for 
overcoming potential hostility to their ideas amongst member states whose unanimous 
support must be secured and backed up by substantial national constitutional 
changes. In short, constitutionalism fails the feasibility criterion for solving the 
legitimacy deficit.
6.3.6 Summary
Of the two criteria for measuring successful legitimising strategies constitutionalism 
superficially fulfils the pertinence criterion. It advocates changes to Europe’s political 
regime (primarily the introduction of a parliamentary democracy) which enjoy a high 
degree of felt legitimacy across the peoples of Europe. However, at a more detailed 
level most existing constitutionalist theories fail to offer a coherent and detailed 
overall institutional design. They also overlook the contingency of the EU’s 
legitimacy on the perspective of its member states. As a legitimising strategy, 
constitutionalism is likely to be more effective in Germany than in the UK, where the 
creation of a European government would not enjoy much diffuse support, not least 
because it would conflict with Britain’s formal legitimacy. Constitutionalism thus
98 “Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Flighty Foreign Minister”, The Economist, vol. 355, no.8171, 
20/5/2000, p.68, Joschka Fischer: Speech to the European Parliament. 12/1/1999, (http://www. 
auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/R990112a.htm). See also: “Schroder Aims to Use Euro in Drive for 
Political Union”, Financial Times. 31/8/99
99 Prime Minister Blair remains “hesitant about trying to draw up a new constitution for the whole of 
Europe and the right hon. Gentleman would find that other countries would also be hesitant”, House of  
Commons: Parliamentary Debates. 17th of March, 1999, Hansard, vol.327, no.56, col.l 118
100 Chapter 5. pp.210ff
101 Bernard Wessels, op. cit.. p. 143
102 “Greece’s Constitutional Study Fails to Impress”, Financial Times. 22/12/1993, p.2
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ignores the significant variations in national political values and traditions about how 
political systems should be legitimised.
These failings raise a question mark over whether constitutionalism could even raise 
diffuse regime support. More significantly, constitutionalism misjudges the dynamics 
of legitimation because it wrongly assumes that a strong European identity can be 
created simply by means of institutional engineering. It therefore fails the pertinence 
criterion for solving the legitimacy deficit. Given the varying objectives of political 
elites in the member states, constitutionalism may currently prove politically 
unrealistic to implement, thus failing the second, feasibility criterion. This does not 
mean that constitutionalism must be written off entirely as a strategy for solving the 
legitimacy deficit. If its vision for Europe’s future institutional design gained some 
more coherence and became more sensitive to national legitimising traditions, it might 
still play a useful part in alleviating the considerable public discontent with the EU’s 
current institutional design. But institutional reforms must be preceded by a strategy 
which tackles the lack of a European demos directly. Communitarianism claims to 
offer such a strategy.
6.4 Communitarianism
6.4.1 Possible Approaches
Communitarianism addresses directly the most significant factors responsible for low 
levels of felt legitimacy in the EU, namely the lack of a European identity. It does so 
by employing a sociological analytical perspective according to which communal 
ideologies can be employed to stimulate a sense o f  political community, which 
measures the community’s cohesiveness as a group.104
As discussed in chapter two, communal ideologies can assume a number of guises. 
The discussion identified four theoretical approaches to the issue which were termed
103 Sverker Gustavsson: “Preserve or Abolish the Democratic Deficit?”, in: Eivind Smith (ed.): 
National Parliaments as Cornerstones o f European Integration. (London: Kluwen Law International,
1996), p. 109
104 Chapter 2. p.75
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primordialist, modernist, ethno-symbolist and post-modernist,105 The first three draw 
on the communal ideology of nationalism, which is rejected by the fourth approach. 
These four theoretical paradigms represent different views on the dynamics of 
collective identities, in particular whether a communitarian strategy can successfully 
remedy the legitimacy deficit by creating a European identity. The following sections 
assess whether any of these four theoretical perspectives meet the two criteria for 
solving the legitimacy deficit. To fulfil the pertinence criterion, they must 
demonstrate whether and how communal ideologies can be employed to enhance the 
EU’s legitimacy by creating a new European identity. To meet the feasibility 
criterion, communitarian strategies must find the endorsement of Europe’s political 
elites.
6.4.2 Primordialism
Primordialism represents a view of communal ideologies which is based on the 
equation of demos with ethnos. This amounts to an “objective” manifestation of 
nationhood whose members share a common ethnic history, culture and language.106 
This version of nationalism has been termed objective because it is linked to the 
notion that national identities are to be treated as ethnically primordial and organic
| r\n
rather than imagined.
A primordialist interpretation of nations and national identity has two important (and 
fatal) implications for communitarian strategies to solve the legitimacy deficit of the 
EU. First, a European national identity would struggle to establish itself vis a vis the
i nshistorically entrenched, organic and “natural” nationalisms of its member states. 
Because of their “authenticity”, these enduring myths about national ethnic origins 
continue to provide powerful communal ideologies which buttress the legitimacy of 
Europe’s nation states. Against the persistence of a multitude of national ethnies, a 
European demos will be unlikely to emerge.
105 Chapter 2 . pp.76ff
106 Joseph Weiler, Ulrich Haltem and Franz Mayer: “European Democracy and its Critique”, West 
European Politics, vol. 18, no.3, 1995, p. 10
107 For instance: van den Berghe, op. cit.. Geertz, op. cit.
108 Obradovic, op. cit.. pp.213ff
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Second, being the organic product of a common ethnic history, culture and language, 
national identities cannot be created from scratch. Some scholars, who have been 
given the label “Euro-nationalists”, maintain that a uniquely European ethnos, rooted 
in the distant past, does exist.109 However, many sceptics of the Euronationalist 
literature believe that the imprecise demarcation of Europe as a cultural and 
geographical unit makes the notion of objective nationhood fraught with difficulty.110 
The idea of a unified European identity lacks its pre-modem authentic myth which 
could provide it with pre-political social unity, emotional substance and historical 
depth.111 In Easton’s terminology, the problem with the idea of an “objective” thick 
identity is that Europe’s political community is not underpinned by a homogenous and
119powerful social community.
From a primordialist perspective, therefore, the communitarian strategy for solving 
the legitimacy deficit fails because a European ethnos cannot be created from scratch. 
However, the primordialist paradigm is itself contested, and its analysis is open to 
criticism on a number of points. Some member states, such as Belgium or Spain, 
arguably do not exhibit the primordialist characteristics of being based on a common 
ethnic history, culture and language. In many other European countries national 
identities have lost some of their organic coherence as a consequence of increasing
i n
ethnic diversity and a revival of older, regional loyalties. Moreover, the congruence 
of political and social community emphasised by primordialism may also be 
normatively undesirable. A communal ideology which is based on homogenising 
Europe’s diverse societies and cultures would be unable to command a great degree of 
felt legitimacy from European publics. Any departure from the multinational and 
multilingual nature of the EU may well be considered illegitimate right across 
member states.114
109 For a survey o f Euro-nationalist literature, see: A. Bance: “The Idea o f Europe: From Erasmus to 
ERASMUS”, Journal of European Studies, vol.22, no.l, 1992, pp.8-9
110 Obradovic, op. cit.. p.214f
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Traditional “objective” nationalism may have a proven historic track record as a very 
effective psychological tool for forging a strong sense of political (and social) 
community. But it has also been responsible for the suppression of minority cultures 
within national territories and for many of the violent European conflicts across 
national territories which the process of European integration was designed to 
overcome. Besides, such nationalist ideologies tend to define themselves negatively 
against “the others”, thus opening the EU to charges of creating a “fortress Europe” 
mentality of cultural exclusiveness.115 Even if the imposition of a homogenising 
European ethnos were possible, it would still fail both pertinence and feasibility 
criterion: it would neither find the support of Europe’s political elites, nor be 
considered legitimate by the wider publics.
6.4.3 Modernism
The modernist perspective on nationalism does not equate demos with ethnos. 
Instead, peoplehood manifests itself in a “subjective” way.116 Nations are “imagined 
political communities” because they are deliberate constructs of political elites.117 
National identity expresses itself in terms of public loyalty to, and cohesive support 
for, the national political community. By implication, the communitarian strategy of 
identity-building at the European level has the potential to succeed because collective 
identities are susceptible to dynamic transformation.
Deutsch et al suggest a number of conditions under which supranational integration,
defined as the attainment of a sense of community, can develop towards a full
• • • • 118political merger (“amalgamated international community”). These include the
fostering of unbroken social communication both across territories and across social 
strata (inter- and intra-group transactions) and the emergence of values, institutions 
and habits of action which mark the new community off from major neighbours.119 
Through a process of social learning, which involves increasing communicative bonds
115 Anthony Smith (92), op. cit.. p.76
116 Weiler et al (95), op. cit.. p. 10
117 Anderson, op. cit.. p.6
118 Deutsch et al, op. cit.. pp.5-36
119 Ibid.. pp.46-58
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and the generation of common memories and symbols, individuals can learn to
1 9 0become a people.
Some scholars have drawn on Deutsch’s study of the analogies between European 
integration and the historic nation-building process in the United States and 
Canada.121 Howe suggests that European leaders should follow in the footsteps of 
North American nation-builders who, in the absence of a common historic ethnos, 
based their communal ideology on the forward-looking idea of a common destiny. 
Over time, the myth of a common destiny could be complemented with an emerging
199history of positive joint European experiences. A closer inspection of the historical 
parallels reveals their limits, however.
Both the US and Canada are largely based on immigrant societies who developed a
19*1
plural rather than an ethnic concept of the nation. Nevertheless, the historic 
dominance of white Puritan Anglo-Saxon culture and language has provided a strong 
ethnic base, a public culture, an education system and a foundation myth for the 
welding together of successive waves of immigration. Successful nation-building has 
depended on a certain degree of initial historical and cultural affinity among a 
dominant core of the population. Where this affinity was weakly developed, or even 
contested by competing core ethnie, plural national identities have failed to become 
deeply entrenched, as the example of Canada illustrates.124 The Canadian federation 
represented more a marriage de convenance for Francophone settlers who disliked 
English-speaking rule, but urged loyalty to the British crown after the French 
revolution in 1789. In other words, Canada always remained “the home not of one
19c
nation but of a nation-and-a-half.”
But even the United States initially failed to generate a sense of nationhood stable 
enough to withstand serious regional conflicts in economic interests. When these were 
exacerbated by the emotional issue of slavery, “there developed something which
120 Deutsch (66), p. 174
121 Deutsch et al, op. cit., p.46-58
122 Paul Howe: “A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings”, Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies, vol.33, no.l, 1995, p.32f
123 Anthony D. Smith: Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 
p .l07ff
124 Ibid.. p,107ff
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i
could seriously be called southern national consciousness.” As the Southern States 
seceded, precipitating a very costly and destructive civil war, efforts were made to 
remodel public education with the aim of inculcating “national loyalty” specifically to 
the South rather than to the US as a whole.127
In short, the process of nation-building in the US has occurred under conditions rather 
dissimilar to the situation of the EU today. Plural nationalism was established on the 
basis of an immigrant society whose initial collective identity was underpinned by a 
large fragment of a core ethnie. The growing ties of communication and community, 
which arose as the populations of the colonies were increasingly linked by newsprint
198and commerce, preceded any widespread unification of political institutions. Once 
common interests and communal self-awareness had emerged, political conflict with 
Britain offered the external threat against which the American nation state could be 
formed.129
The EU is not composed of immigrant societies, recent immigration inflows
notwithstanding. It does not have a core ethnie which could provide the parameters
for a common public culture, heritage and educational framework. To the contrary,
110the EU is integrating sovereign states with distinct, entrenched national identities.
As a result, institutional integration has preceded the emergence of a European demos. 
Modernist attempts to “invent” a European nation are further complicated by the fact 
that the evolution of an American nation has been slow and sometimes precariously 
close to failure. Even Switzerland, a successful example of a plural, multi-lingual 
nation which is not based on immigrant societies, arose from one initially dominant,
n i
pre-modem (Alemmanic) ethnos. As with the USA, its modem plural identity 
emerged from a long and sometimes fragile integration process, including a short civil 
war in 1847, which in retrospect played a major part in eventual formation of a 
sufficiently cohesive Swiss nation.
125 Hugh Seton-Watson: Nations and States. (London: Methuen, 1977), p.230
126 I t td ,  P-214
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128 Anderson, op. cit.. p.64ff
129 Richard Merritt: “Nation-Building in America - The Colonial Years”, in: Karl Deutsch and William 
Foltz (eds.): Nation-Building, (New York: Atherton, 1966), pp.70ff
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To conclude, a comparison with historic nation-building processes in North America 
and Switzerland casts doubt on the viability of a modernist strategy for solving the 
legitimacy deficit. Nation-building occurred incrementally over generations around a 
core cultural ethnie, it preceded the state-building process and was catalysed by 
violent internal conflict and a “unifying” external enemy. These factors are either 
absent in Europe, or undesirable as a means of modem nation-building. Even if 
effective substitutes for them could be found for the EU, the most important lesson to 
be drawn from these historic cases is that the process of “inventing” successful and 
durable collective identities is likely to follow less linear dynamics and requires a
1 T)much longer time frame than most modernists assume.
6.4.4 Post-Modernism
The practical difficulties associated with a modernist strategy of “inventing” a 
European nation state play into the hands of scholars who could be loosely grouped 
under the label post-modernism. Rather than copying historic attempts at nation 
building to create a European nationalism intended to “trump” the nationalism of its 
member states, they seek to create a “thin” European identity which is compatible
t ' 5 ' i
with existing national identities. On this view, European democracy does not 
require a nationally organised, strongly resonating demos. All that is needed is a 
sense o f  political community strong enough to generate the degree of mutual trust and 
political identification necessary for democratic majority decisions to be universally 
accepted.
One of the leading representatives of this view, Joseph Weiler, proposes an 
intellectual “reformation of European constitutionalism” away from the old 
conceptions conflating citizenship and nationality, even if understood in organic- 
cultural rather than ethnic terms. His alternative is based on what he terms a 
“concentric circles approach” allowing the harmonious co-existence of multiple 
demoi with which the citizens of the Euro-polity can identify. Weiler wants to replace
132 Eatwell (97b), op. cit.. p.249
133 See for instance: Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. pp.43ff
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the “real or imaginary trans-European cultural affinities or shared histories”134 with an 
understanding about common social rights and duties and the values of a rational, 
intellectual culture beyond national differences.
Crucially, he does not aim to replace member state nationalism with a European one. 
This view
“invites individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to two 
demoi, based, critically, on different subjective factors o f identification. I  
may be a German national, or French or Italian in the in-reaching strong 
sense o f  organic-cultural identification and sense o f  belongingness with 
all the attendant emotional charge which may (at least to many) seem 
necessary and positive. I  am simultaneously a European citizen in terms 
o f  my European transnational affinities to shared values which transcend 
the organic-national diversity and which are the subject not o f emotional 
identification but o f reflective, deliberative rational choice. So much so, 
that in the range o f  areas o f public life, I  am willing to accept the 
legitimacy and authority o f decisions adopted by my fellow European 
citizens in the realisation that in these areas I  have given preference to 
choices made by my out-reaching demos rather than by my in-reaching 
demos. ”135
Habermas goes even further than Weiler because he wants to replace the old 
ethnicity-based concept of nationhood entirely, both at the national and the 
supranational level. As societies in the member states become increasingly multi­
cultural, collective identities and communal solidarity can no longer be justified in 
terms of exclusivist ethno-cultural nationalism. The socially-constructed fusion 
between national and republican citizenship, in other words between ethnos and
demos, must be disentangled because “citizenship was never conceptually tied to 
1
national identity.”
134 Weiler (97a), op. cit.. p.l 19
135 Ibid.. p. 119f
136 Jurgen Habermas: “The European Nation State - Its Achievements and its Limits”, Ratio Juris. 
vol.9, no.2, 1996, pp.289ff
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Habermas’s republican citizenship for the EU completely breaks with the notion of 
belonging to a “pre-political community integrated on the basis of descent, a shared
n o
tradition and a common language.” Freed from nationalist connotations, a 
republican citizenship should foster identity through citizens actively exercising their 
civil rights. A new constitutional patriotism must grow out of the different national 
interpretations of the same shared universalist constitutional principles, such a popular 
sovereignty and human rights. People may come to identify with the EU because it 
provides an infrastructure for collective will formation by which all their other over­
lapping attachments (local, gender, occupational and so on) can be managed and
1 3Qprevented from coming into excessive conflict with each other.
The idea of defining a community in terms of the rights, duties and practices of 
citizenship has been revived in the recent debate about the perceived need for a 
substantive European citizenship which, it is argued, can contribute to legitimise the 
EU in the eyes of its citizens.140 Most communitarians conceive such a European 
citizenship as being based on a “thin” conception of identity which can co-exist with 
national identities because it is open to reflexive adaptation and based on abstract 
standards of interaction rather than value-laden socio-ethnic identities.141
Two problems remain with almost all versions of communal ideologies based on the 
notion of thin identity. First, the content of thin identities is too vague and abstract in 
order to be able to inspire European citizens to shift their loyalties towards the EU’s 
political community. They do not address the problem of ranking different levels of 
communities, thus leaving the “thin” European identity in danger of being overridden 
by existing “thick” national ones. Second, the normative content of thin identities 
neglects country-specific variations in what constitutes legitimate values for a 
communal ideology.
138 Ibid, p.3
139 Habermas (96), o p . c it .. p.289
140 For an overview see: Garcia, op. cit.. pp. 1-29
Chapter Six 279
The Ranking of Loyalties
Both Weiler and Habermas argue against a mere replacement of member state 
nationalism with a future European nationalism. Yet their conception of the 
harmonious co-existence of the different levels of identity is perhaps too idealistic. 
Weiler’s theory underestimates the problem that political decisions by the EU may on 
occasions adversely affect some national polities, but not others.142 As a result, 
citizens will feel conflicting demands made on their loyalty towards each of their 
multiple demoi.
Even after reflective rational deliberation these will sometimes be hard to reconcile. 
Despite the substantially different nature of identification each circles evokes, many 
Europe-wide political issues and conflicts will require the competing demands of one 
circle to be weighed against another. The more European integration proceeds - and 
communitarianism is premised on a normative choice in favour of “ever closer 
Union” - the greater the need for a powerful sense of political community will 
become.143 For the EU to acquire powers of direct taxation or a military capability of 
its own would require the creation of a strong European demos which commands the 
primary political loyalty of Europeans.144
As argued in chapter three and four, the conditions for creating a European demos are 
more favourable in Germany than in Britain because Germany’s national identity is 
far more compatible with an additional, supranational layer of identity. But the last 
chapter revealed that around half the German population still has an exclusively 
national identity, and even among those who feel both German and European only a 
negligible minority identify primarily with the EU.145 Weiler concedes that the nation 
will still command greater attachment in any normative conflict between the two, but 
he does not develop this important argument.146 Similarly, Habermas assumes that in 
the future rational attachment to constitutional values will prevail over allegiance to a 
political community based on a common social and cultural tradition, even in times of
141 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. pp.43-47
142 Scharpf (96a), op. cit.. p.26f
143 Helen Wallace (93), op. cit.. p.lOOf
144 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.38, 78f
145 See: Chapter 5. pp.232ff
Chapter Six 280
crises. Such optimism seems misplaced. It remains questionable whether a European 
thin identity can ever achieve the degree of emotive loyalty which is indispensable for 
any political community, even the EU.147 Such loyalty need not be the kind of 
uncritical, xenophobic and nationalistic attachment that Weiler and Habermas rightly 
denounce. But their common emphasis on shared political values empties the content 
of a “we-feeling” to leave nothing more than the mere procedures and outputs of the
140
European political system itself.
Even if a thin identity were able to generate a widely resonating European identity, it 
would require a big shift of consciousness among the European publics which has not 
yet occurred. The emergence of a thin identity in the EU is premised on societal 
change which will need to be fostered over decades rather than years. Until then, 
judgement as to its feasibility must remain to some degree speculative. Considered 
from this perspective, Habermas’s argument appears almost circular: his 
constitutional patriotism requires a European constitution, which requires a demos to 
act as a popular sovereign, which his patriotism is designed to foster in the first place.
Political Values Are Country-Specific
A general commitment to shared political values such as democracy and human rights 
may well disguise substantial differences and disagreement about how these values 
diould be applied to the political system of the EU.149 This leads back to the central 
argument that the legitimacy of the EU depends on the country-specific perspective of 
each member state.
For instance, the strong judicial protection of human rights may help to legitimise the 
EU from Germany’s national context which is shaped by a depoliticised, legalistic 
plitical culture and a constitutional tradition of a powerful supreme court. From a 
Eritish perspective, where courts are constitutionally subordinate to Parliament and 
tie question of human rights is considered a political rather than a judicial issue, a 
rghts-based European citizenship may well be considered undemocratic, and thus
14 Weiler (97a), op. cit.. p .l 19
14 Anthony Smith (92), op. cit.. p.75
14 Beetham and Lord, op. cit., p.43f
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have a negative effect on the EU’s legitimacy.150 Even from a purely German 
perspective, the legitimising effect of protecting human rights at EU level remains 
doubtful, since they are already effectively guarded by the Basic Law, the FCC and 
even the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, Weiler agrees that the 
contribution of human rights to a sense of shared identity has “reached the point of 
diminishing returns.”151
Habermas stresses the universality of human rights that form the core of his 
republican citizenship, but he leaves their scope undefined. At least in terms of 
economic human rights, different national traditions prevail, such as Rheinish or 
Anglo-American capitalism. This will make the selection of a substantive list of 
common rights very contentious, and thus divisive rather than unifying. Once again, 
what is considered legitimate may differ considerable according to the national 
perspective of each member state. For instance, scepticism about economic rights is
1 Omore widespread in Britain than in Germany. Neither Weiler nor Habermas discuss 
the implementation of their abstract ideals of concentric circles or European 
constitutional patriotism. Yet many of the above-mentioned deficiencies in their 
approaches arise exactly when one attempts to derive guides for political action from 
them.
Similar objections can be raised against the arguments in favour of a substantive
European citizenship. Not only does the actual meaning of “citizenship” very often
1 ^remain nebulous and ill-defined. Even when the effort is made to spell out its 
meaning more clearly, citizenship seems to amount to no more than a conflation of 
the notion of political identity with a framework for civil, political and economic 
rights.154 Such arguments rest on a merely asserted causal link between so-called
149 Scharpf (94), op. cit.. p. 168
150 Witness the largely negative British reaction to recent proposals by Germany’s Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer to adopt a European Charter of Basic Rights: “Business Leaders Fear Threat Posed by 
Charter”, Financial Times, 29/3/2000, p.2
151 Joseph Weiler: “To be a European Citizen - Eros and Civilisation”, Journal o f European Public 
Policy, vol.4, no.4, 1997, p.501
152 “Necessary? The EU and Human Rights”, The Economist, vol.354, no.8156, 5/2/2000, p.42
153 Jennifer M. Welsh: “A Peoples’ Europe? European Citizenship and European Identity”, Politics, 
vol. 13, no.2, 1993, pp.25-31
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citizenship rights and public emotional identification with the EU.155 But this 
causality remains questionable for some of the reasons outlined in the previous 
paragraph.
Weiler has recently acknowledged that to confine citizenship to the “European” 
values of human rights and democracy is too narrow a view (“Saatchi&Saatchi 
European citizenship”156), since the EU member states, as signatories to the ECHR,
I C*!
already share these values. He also concedes that these values can differ 
significantly at a more substantive level, quoting the ECJ’s telling refusal to rule on 
the Irish Grogan v SPUC abortion case as an important example.
Yet a revised version of his multiple demoi argument still cannot escape some of the 
earlier objections. Weiler claims that European and national citizenship must be seen 
as totally interdependent. Europe should never seek to acquire an organic national- 
cultural demos, but “we are willing to submit aspects of our social ordering to a polity 
composed of “others” precisely because we are convinced that in some material sense 
they share our basic values.”159 Weiler thus links two poles of Europe’s cultural 
heritage: the valuable, but potentially destructive power of nationalism is tamed by a 
humanist, rational and enlightened supranational civilisation. As before, the challenge 
lies in making the two complementary rather than competing with each other, which 
in turn begs the question how the a European demos can be substantiated. Weiler 
offers some concrete policy proposals, but they are premised upon, rather than 
creating, a significant degree of European communal cohesion (European legislative 
ballot, European income tax).160
To summarise, post-modernists reject the communal ideology of nationalism in 
favour of thin identities which they believe a communitarian strategy for solving the 
legitimacy deficit can successfully create. However, a thin European identity would 
not meet the pertinence requirement of significantly enhancing diffuse support for the 
EU’s political community. Although it espouses communal values and rights which
155 “Belongingness was created step-by-step and area-by-area.” Ibid.. p.606 (my italics)
156 Weiler (97b), op. cit.. p.502
157 Ibid, p.510
158 See: Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan (19911 ECR1-4685
159 Weiler (97b) op. cit.. p .511
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are long established within most EU member states, this seeming advantage is also its 
problem. Concepts of thin identity do not offer anything over and above the values 
represented by enlightened national identities and a belief in internationalism. That 
makes thin identities unlikely to evoke strong affective loyalties, especially when 
competing with well-entrenched national identities. Yet as soon as conceptions of thin 
identity become more specific and value-laden, they conflict with different national 
legitimising traditions.
It may be objected that these criticisms are based on an understanding of collective 
identities that is unduly confrontational and one-dimensional, whereas in fact people 
always have multiple identities and are simultaneously members of many social and 
political communities.161 While this is undoubtedly true, these identities have a 
different degrees of political relevance. Smith agrees that
“theoretically, then, it would be perfectly possible for the peoples o f  
Europe to feel that they had more than one collective cultural identity: to 
feel themselves Sicilian, Italian and European, or Flemish, Belgian and 
European (as well as being female, middle class, Muslim or whatever). At 
the same time, it should also be asked: what is the relative strength o f  
these "concentric circles o f allegiance”? Which o f  these circles is 
politically decisive, which has most effect on people’s day-to-day lives?
And which o f  these cultural identities and loyalties is likely to be more 
durable and pervasive? ”162
Easton similarly acknowledges the existence of multiple levels of political 
community. Yet he also agrees that “the nation may be held out as the ideological 
symbol in terms of which the members of a system interpret their common political 
bonds as against the particularistic identification with tribe, village, region or
i
class.” In short, the communal ideology of nationalism tends to enjoy the 
legitimacy to arbitrate between the multiple individual identities that are contained 
within the broad collective identity of the nation. As Howe has put it, “while it is easy 
to imagine someone being intensely French and secondarily European, it is difficult to
160 Ibid., p.513ff
161 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.44f
162 Anthony D. Smith: Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 124
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conceive of someone being at once intensely French and intensely European.”164 As 
was argued above, even in countries like Germany, where national identities can 
accommodate the emergence of supranational loyalties, citizens continue to identify 
primarily, if not exclusively, with their nation rather than with Europe.
The recent regionalisation in some European countries, far from disproving this 
analysis, only serves to confirm it. In most countries, there has merely been a desire 
for devolved political decision-making which does not call the national political 
community into question. Bavarians may be fiercely proud of their regional identity, 
and they may seek to expand their political authority within Germany, but in an 
ultimate political conflict their collective loyalties lie with the Federal Republic as a 
whole. On the other hand, separatist movements such as in Scotland, Belgium or 
Spain do not aim for regionalisation. Instead, they reflect the re-emergence of even 
older national identities which in the past had been supplanted by the collective 
identities of the multi-national states into which they have been absorbed. For 
committed Scottish nationalists, their Scottish identity is politically decisive and 
trumps over their remaining British sense of political community.165
6.4.5 Ethno-Svmbolism
As discussed in chapter two, ethno-symbolists represent a intermediary position 
between primordialists and modernists. While they do not equate demos with ethnos, 
they stress the historic legacy of ancestral ethnic myths which underpin many modem 
mtional identities. Successful communal ideologies are based on a shared memory 
just as much as a common destiny and their historic myths and symbols can be 
reinterpreted to generate national identities.166
Which values could form the content of such a European peoplehood? As regards the 
shared memories of a European demos, the lack of clear ethnic or geographic 
boundaries leaves a common European heritage “the object of lofty reflections rather
16 Easton (65), op. cit.. p. 181, 334 
16' Paul Howe, op. cit.. p.33
16'Eurobarometer: British Public Opinion, op. cit.. p.38 
16( Anthony Smith (95), op. cit.. p. 133
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1 A7than the source of spontaneous emotions.” The founding fathers of the European 
movement, for instance, sought to evoke the pan-European Carolingian and Ottoman 
Holy Roman Empire as an example of shared historical experience. Others reach back 
to the legacy of classical antiquity which underlies most of today’s European 
languages and cultures. But such shared memories are historically remote and based 
on high culture which hampers their usefulness in providing a vivid and powerful 
sense of political community in the modem EU.168
It seems more promising to connect the legacy of classical culture with the common 
European experience of the Renaissance, the enlightenment, industrialisation and 
modernity which has culminated in a pan-European commitment to liberal 
democracy, pluralistic, open societies and respect for the mle of law.169
"These patterns o f  European culture [...] have created a common 
European cultural heritage and formed a unique culture straddling 
national boundaries and interrelating their different national cultures 
through common motifs and traditions. [...] It is here, rather than the 
mythology o f medieval Christendom [...] or a Rhine-based Holy Roman 
Empire [...] that we must look for the basis o f a cultural Pan-European
171)nationalism that may paradoxically take us beyond the nation. ”
It is true that the shared memories lying behind these historic symbols are also 
memories of divisions between European countries and the suppression of minorities. 
Maybe European history is simply a history of its peoples, written in terms of state
171conflict and war. However, a long history of internal conflict has not prevented 
German and British nation-building, and the pan-European values outlined below 
have emerged in response to past violent disputes and divisions in Europe. Although 
common historic experiences have highlighted Europe’s divisions, they have at the 
same time given rise to a shared history of tolerance and rationality whose values can
w Obradovic, op. cit.. p.215
16! Anthony Smith (95), op. cit.. p.l33f
161 Norman Davies: A History of Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1278
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be projected forward in shaping a common destiny.172 If seen from that perspective,
1 77there is no need for Europe to break with its (only partially haunted) past.
These shared memories must be connected with the common destiny evoked by the 
founders of the European Community.
"For many the prime motivation for European unification was, from the 
first, political, even military: the rejection o f war as an instrument o f  state 
policy and a reading o f recent European history as a futile carnage o f  
civil wars unleashed by the blind forces o f unbridled nationalism, 
culminating in the holocaust o f Nazism.1,174
The telos of “ever closer Union” reflects this desire to build the EU on the unifying 
and enlightened values that arose from a common history marked by strife and 
divisions. Appeals to a shared destiny have been at the heart of the communal
1 7Sideologies of many multi-ethnic states. Just as most Americans today prefer to 
interpret the Civil War as an important stage in American moral development, so 
Europe’s history must be treated as a shared lesson in the savagery and futility of 
war.176
Some have argued that today the values of peace and internationalism can no longer 
mobilise the publics in the member states to integrate ever further, especially as the
1 77memory of the two world wars becomes less vivid. But appeals to a common 
destiny can be supplemented by more contemporary interpretations of a European 
telos. Beetham and Lord refer to the image of a “community of fate” in the face of
1 78globalisation, which has sometimes been evoked in the context of EMU. The 
common mastery of threats to the peace and stability of the entire continent, be they 
of an economic nature or in the shape of military conflicts in the Balkans, also
172 Laffan, op. cit.. p.99
173 Anthony Smith (95), op. cit.. pp. 130-33
174 Anthony Smith (91), op. cit.. p. 151
175 Laffan, op. cit.. p.99
176 Paul Howe, op. cit.. p.32
177 Garton-Ash argues that European integration, rather than being a sign that Europeans have “learnt 
from history”, has been a product of the Cold War with the Soviet Union as negative external integrator 
and the US as a positive one. This historically favourable constallation has disappeared. See: Garton- 
Ash, op. cit.. p.54ff
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contributes to a sense of common destiny. Future experiences of joint political and 
military action to avert external threats to peace and security in Europe will help to 
build mutual trust. They will also provide shared historical myths and symbols for 
future generations. After all, political systems always operate within boundaries, and
1 70boundaries mark off those within them as distinct and belonging together.
Would the propagation of such a “thick” identity transform the telos of European 
integration from ever closer union among the peoples of Europe into the creation of
1 a n  • • • •one European people? It would, but not as an organic, “objective” ethnic 
manifestation of nationhood which merely transposes the potential excesses of
1 O 1
nationalism to the European level. Instead, it would create a multi-national state
identity for Europe. It would be based on a communal ideology consisting of a
(sometimes conflictual) shared history from which it derives a common telos of
peaceful co-operation within an integrated political system. Its myths, symbols and
values will have to be fashioned such that a European collective identity overarches,
1 8?but does not abolish individual nations.
Thick, subjective communitarianism could thus meet the pertinence criterion for 
solving the legitimacy deficit. Howe believes
"there is reason to think that the people o f  the EU can become intensely 
European yet remain secondarily French or Spanish or German; in other 
words, that the European loyalty will gain the upper hand without any 
significant erosion o f  the ethnic traits and distinct cultures that today
183sustain more intense local allegiances. ”
However, the contingency of EU legitimacy on the national perspective of each 
member state means that the promotion of a European demos would be received very
1 f i idifferently in Britain and Germany. As discussed in chapters three and four, post­
war Germany turned its back on strongly ethnicity-based, nationalistic communal 
ideologies (the legal notion of ius sanguinis notwithstanding) and embraced
179 William Wallace (90), op. cit.. p. 105
180 Weiler (97b), op. cit.. p.498
181 Ibid.. p.506f
182 Anthony Smith (91), op. cit.. p. 175
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supranational integration. In the FRG, low levels of national pride are therefore
1 8^positively related to popular identification with Europe. Military defeat, including 
the destruction of the country’s infrastructure, made the Federal Republic particularly 
receptive to the triple telos of peace, prosperity and European reconciliation espoused 
by the EC’s founding fathers. This provided positive moral content for a nascent, if 
weak, European identity in Germany which complemented rather than challenged the 
country’s post-war national identity.
By contrast, Britain’s national identity was strengthened rather than weakened by the 
experience of the two world wars. Historically defined against external enemies, 
British national identity has been based on the perceived dissimilarity to other nations 
which was reinforced by historical experiences which varied from those of continental 
Europe. Belated membership of the EC, far from offering a welcome substitute for a 
discredited national communal ideology as in Germany, only served to accentuate the 
inevitable end of Britain’s imperial tradition and was also perceived as a threat to 
national identity. As a consequence, levels of national pride, which are higher than the
1RA • • •European average, are negatively related to Europeanness. This makes Britain’s 
traditional national identity to some extent incompatible with the creation of an 
overarching European demos.
Both elements of a thick European identity, a shared memory and a common destiny, 
will therefore have less resonance in Britain than in Germany whose history is closely 
interwoven with that of its European neighbours. Such country-specific differences 
may hamper the EU-wide creation of vivid and clearly defined European identity 
which could sustain a sense of peoplehood, but they do not constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle. Smith concedes that “perhaps in time, over several 
generations” European rites and ceremonies will emerges to create a vivid and 
powerful sense of political community centred around the EU’s symbols and 
emblems, its institutions in Brussels and an emotive myth about its founding
m Laffan, op. cit.. p.86f
185 Chapter 5. p.234f 
,8< Chapter 5, p.234f
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1 8 7fathers. The speed at which such a largely “invented” traditions can mature and find 
a deeper response in subsequent following generations depends largely on the way a 
communal ideology is being communicated by political elites. This raises questions 
about the feasibility of communitarianism.
6.4.6 Is Communitarianism Politically Feasible?
To summarise, the above discussion has assessed four different theoretical 
interpretations of the degree to which the dynamics of collective identities can be 
influenced. Can a European demos be “created” and thus the legitimacy deficit be 
solved? Only a primordialist interpretation of nationalism considers the creation or 
modification of collective identities impossible. However, a primordialist 
interpretation of nationalism fails the pertinence criterion because Europeans 
increasingly reject its emphasis on ethnicity as divisive and outdated. The post­
modernist concept of thin identity similarly fails the pertinence criterion because it is 
incapable of creating a widely resonating and powerful European identity which could 
significantly bolster the EU’s felt legitimacy. Modernists believe that a European 
nation can be “invented”, but a comparison with nation-building processes in 
countries such as the US or Switzerland highlights the pitfalls of such an approach. 
Ethno-symbolists offer a more realistic assessment which considers the creation of a 
European demos possible, but acknowledge the differences between the EU and other 
“invented nations”. Ethno-symbolism stresses the need to ground a future European 
demos in shared collective memories as well as a common destiny and points to the 
length of the transformation process. Ethno-symbolism can therefore pass the 
pertinence criterion, but is it politically feasible?
Political actors were ahead of the academic discourse in realising that identity and
loyalty are indispensable ingredients for felt legitimacy. Stimulated by the Tindemans
188 180 Report and the Adonnino Report , the Commission in particular devised a whole
187 Anthony Smith (95), op. cit.. p. 139. For instance, 60% o f Germans and 46% o f Britons approve of  
the introduction of a “Europe day” celebrated as a “national” holiday across the EU. See: Europinion 
no.5. (Brussels: European Commission, 1995), p. 14
188 Report by Mr Leo Tindemans to the European Council - Bulletin o f the European Communities, 
Supplement 1/1976
189 Commission of the European Communities: A People’s Europe. Bulletin o f the European 
Communities, Supplement 7/1985
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range of policies aimed at making the peoples of Europe identify more closely with 
the EU.190 One of the first policies was to make the EU more recognisable by fitting it 
with the symbolic trappings of a state. A European flag was devised, and the wide use 
of its logo in the member states was actively encouraged. Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” 
became the designated European anthem, and the Commission launched a whole 
range of educational and exchange programmes {Erasmus, Socrates, etc.) dedicated to 
foster cross-border understanding and trust among the populations of the member 
states.191 The use of EURO banknotes and coins may also help to reinforce a sense of 
community, at least among those countries joining EMU. Yet EMU may equally 
cause feelings of identity and common purpose between the “ins” and the “outs” to 
weaken, which will become particularly salient in the course of Eastern enlargement 
of the Union.192
A second set of policies was designed to give legal substance to the gradual 
emergence of emotive communal feelings amongst “European citizens”. Art. 8 of the 
Maastricht Treaty established a European citizenship. Its most noticeable 
consequences were the introduction of common passports and separate customs 
controls at national borders. It also guarantees freedom of movement and residence 
within the EU as well as active and passive voting rights for local and European 
elections. The Schengen Agreement, fully integrated into the EU by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, complements these steps by abolishing border controls between most member 
states. The envisaged adoption of a European Charter of Fundamental Rights would 
lend further substance to the concept of EU citizenship.
The usefulness of these political efforts at identity-building has often been viewed 
1sceptically. Even if effective, such measures will only contribute incrementally 
towards the creation of a European political community with a strong sense of its own 
identity.194 Nevertheless, the last chapter contains evidence of some, albeit uneven, 
improvement. The modest impact of communitarian policies can partly be blamed on 
a lack of political will to implement them with sufficient vigour. National elites in the
190 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 148
191 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p. 148
192 Helen Wallace (97), op. cit.. p.231 f
193 For instance: Welsh, op. cit.. p.25ff
194 Wallace and Smith, op. cit.. p .l48ff
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member states can either facilitate or obstruct the emergence of a sense of political 
community in Europe, and their role in the mobilisation of public support for the EU 
is pivotal.195.
One of the most important factors determining the success in creating a stable and 
meaningful European identity is the way member states employ their monopoly over 
education policy and cultural politics.196 This is far from saying that national loyalties 
are to be fully transferred to the EU in a “feat of cultural and social psychological 
engineering.”197 However, by means of control over the national education system, 
the media, and the general political and cultural discourse the social and political 
elites of each member states have the power either to suppress or to foster a European 
communal ideology alongside their respective national communal ideologies.
Unless children at school are being taught how their own national identity is 
embedded in a wider, European one, they will never acquire a sense of shared 
memories and common destiny so vital for the legitimation of the EU. And unless 
young people acquire the linguistic competence to communicate fluently with at least 
some of their European neighbours, the transmission structures which are essential to 
a cross-European political dialogue will never emerge. Efforts to enhance linguistic 
competence may also increase the levels of mutual trust and understanding amongst 
the peoples of Europe, especially in the UK where only a small section of the public 
can converse in other European languages. European exchange programmes lose their 
effectiveness if large parts of a member states population are unable to participate in 
them.
Any substantial improvement in this area will require a concerted effort from the 
Commission, national governments and the political elites of the member states. They 
must interpret and codify Europe’s shared history and its current collective 
eiperiences into a communal ideology that makes a European identity readily visible,
191 Philip Everts and Richard Sinnot: “European Publics and the Legitimacy of Internationalised
Governance”, in: Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnot (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalised
Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.453ff
I9(Obradovic, op. cit.. p.214
19/Anthony Smith (95), op. cit.. p. 143
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1ORaccessible and transmissible over generations. In short, political leaders must 
engage in active identity-building. Once a European identity is created, social and 
political elites in the member states, by exercising their ability for opinion leadership 
through the media and political parties, must communicate the notion of a European 
demos to their citizens in order to win felt legitimacy for it.199 Those to whom the 
necessary prospect of a vigorous promotion of a European communal ideology does 
not appeal, are left with the alternative of departing from the underlying normative 
commitment to closer European integration. For this section has shown the concept of 
thin identity to be incapable of generating a loyalty-inspiring European demos.
The potential for an active legitimation of a European identity through political 
leadership depends on the degree of elite consensus on this issue, which varies among 
member states. As argued in chapter three, the merits of a communitarian strategy and 
its underlying commitment to ever closer Union are highly contested among Britain’s 
political elite.200 A significant part of the British media and at least one of the two 
major political parties tend to reject the creation of a European demos on normative 
grounds, arguing in favour of a containment strategy instead. Such a lack of an elite 
consensus on the issue renders the political legitimation of a European demos less 
feasible in the UK.
But even political decision-makers in Germany have so far preferred to pursue an 
incrementalist strategy because they remain disinclined towards a vigorous promotion 
of a European identity.201 The creation of a new, supranational demos would entail a 
relative demotion of national identities which still provide valuable legitimacy to the 
political system in the member states. However, there is far less political reluctance in
Germany towards the creation of a secondary European identity, possibly based on
000the concept of thin identity. Although such a thin identity will not be able to 
command the primary loyalties of European citizens, the broad pro-integration 
consensus of Germany’s political elites, and their greater willingness to consider 
communitarian legitimising strategies at all, means that in Germany the creation of a
198 Easton (65), op. cit.. p.333
199 Chapter 2. pp.82ff
200 Chapter 3. p. 108
201 Lepsius, op. cit., p.35ff
202 See for instance Foreign Minister Fischer’s 1999 speech to the EP: Fischer, op. cit.
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European demos is a more feasible strategy for solving the legitimacy deficit than in 
the UK.
6.4.7 Summary
Political leadership could create a European demos in the long-run, and thus resolve 
the legitimacy deficit, if a “thick” ethno-symbolist interpretation of peoplehood were 
chosen. Communitarianism passes the pertinence criterion, but it does not offer any 
short-term prospect for solving the legitimacy deficit. It also requires a shift of 
consciousness from the peoples of Europe (in particular Britons). However, a 
subjective, tolerant and multi-ethnic communal ideology should be capable of 
enjoying high felt legitimacy because it is based on a shared historical past. 
Politically, this shift of consciousness will require long-term and determined support 
from Europe’s social and political elites which at the moment remains uncertain. 
Communitariahism is more likely to pass the feasibility criterion in Germany than in 
Britain where parts of the political elite would prefer to tackle the lack of a European 
identity by pursuing a containment strategy.
6.5 New Governance
6.5.1 The Approach
The inadequacy of incrementalist solutions to the legitimacy deficit and the amount of 
time and resources required for a combination of constitutionalism and 
communitarianism both play into the hands of the new governance school of thought. 
It argues that these “old-style” remedies are structurally incompatible with the reality 
of the supranational European political regime. To summarise from chapter one, new 
governance has identified three distinctive characteristics of the EU, namely the close 
relationship between public and private actors, its multi-level nature and the 
predominance of regulation.
These characteristics render conventional solutions to the legitimacy deficit (like 
constitutionalism) obsolete because they are premised on the structural conditions for 
traditional statehood which no longer exist (no demos, transformed nature of
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governance). Instead, new forms of legitimacy have to be conceived which are 
congruent with the realities of post-modern statehood, such as non-majoritarian forms 
of democracy. If policy-making in the EU is mostly regulative in nature, then the 
existing multi-level system is far more Pareto-efficient than a “traditional” 
parliamentary regime because regulatory politics is conceptually more amenable to 
non-majoritarian bodies.
As indicated in the diagram at the outset of this chapter, new governance is therefore 
concerned both with the political authorities and the political regime component of 
legitimacy. Its arguments for non-majoritarian institutional reform and its rejection of 
both constitutionalist and containment visions of Europe are based on a functionalist 
analytical perspective according to which European integration was primarily 
designed to regain the political steering capacity lost by nations in the wake of 
globalisation. A reversal of integration or an empowerment of the EP would be 
counter-productive, since structurally unsuited. It would merely endanger the 
newly-strengthened capacity to govern effectively at the European level, thus 
increasing rather than diminishing the legitimacy deficit.
Does the new governance strategy for reform amount to a effective solution to the 
legitimacy deficit of the EU? To pass the pertinence criterion, new governance 
strategy must demonstrate why it does not tackle the low sense of community directly, 
or why it does not need to do so under conditions of post-modern statehood. It must 
explain how its strategy of increasing output support will create a spill-over into 
diffuse community support, when this has failed to materialise for neo-functionalism. 
New governance also must devise institutional reforms which meet public demands 
for greater democracy in Europe. Finally, their reform strategy must appeal to 
Europe’s political elites in order to pass the feasibility criterion.
6.5.2 Can New Governance Enhance Regime or Community Support?
Jtather than attempting to democratise particular European institutions, proponents of 
new governance have turned their attention to the possibilities of democratising the
2)3 ZUm, op. cit.. p.44
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multi-level system as a whole. For instance, Dehousse advocates the delegation of 
some of the Commission’s powers to independent agencies which would avoid 
turning the EU into a structurally unsuitable majoritarian parliamentary democracy.204 
Vibert develops this idea further and calls for an comprehensive “un-bundling” of the 
Commission by transferring its regulatory functions to independent agencies, such as 
a European Trade Commission, a European Environmental Agency and a European 
Cartel Office.205
These arguments turn partly on a functionalist view of legitimacy, since they are 
concerned with maximising specific output support as a means to create public loyalty 
to the political system. According to new governance theory, the EU enjoys a high 
degree of specific support because its regulatory style of policy-making has a 
particularly high capacity for problem-solving. Regulation by specialised independent 
agencies is legitimised through their Pareto-optimal outcomes, because regulatory 
policies, unlike redistributive policies, can be conceived of as positive sum games 
which enhance aggregate welfare. However, Pareto-optimal outcomes require a 
non-majoritarian institutional design which ensures that regulatory agencies cannot be 
captured by powerful and self-interested political groups bargaining in parliamentary 
coalitions.207
This does not mean regulation should proceed in an institutional vacuum. New 
governance theory also offers an institutional design for its regulatory polity, whose 
legitimising principles reflect values such as accountability and technocracy. 
Expertocracy is a rather fitting, if somewhat clumsy, terminology which has been 
given to this almost corporatist type of political system. The complex and highly 
technical nature of European policy-making requires that “expertise plays a central 
role in the discourse, negotiation, and decision-making”.208 Although different from a 
parliamentary understanding of representation, expertocracy can still be representative 
in character.
2)4 Dehousse, op. cit.. pp. 128-33
2)5 Frank Vibert: “The Case for “Unbundling” the Commission”, in: What Future for the European 
Commission?. (Brussels: Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, 1995), pp. 16-20 
2)6 Majone (96), op. cit.. p.294 
2)7 Ibid.. p.286
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“This is because the specialised forms [ofpolicy networks] bring together 
and organise agents with a particular interest in the policy area or 
i s s u e . . . . T h e s e  forms also realise, in a certain sense, general cultural 
notions o f  democracy, namely the right to form groups or organisations in 
order to advance or protect interest and the right to voice an opinion and 
to influence policies or laws that affect one’s interests or values ...which 
parliamentary representatives, “generalists”, cannot represent. ”209
As long as transparent decision-making is ensured through media, parliamentary and 
judicial scrutiny of the regulator, “no one controls an agency...[but] the agency is
91 fiunder control.” The new role for parliamentary bodies such as the European
91 1Parliament would then be to “hold participants in organic governance accountable”. 
As far as policy networks in general are concerned, it has been proposed to achieve 
legitimisation of European policy networks by means of a broad participatory base. 
Participation in those networks would be accorded through statistical representation or 
by means of interest representation rather than through elections. “Pluralism - 
understood in a comprehensive way as a mode of governance and participation - is a
919distinctive feature of the network model.”
The subsequent paragraphs argue that, despite some innovative ideas on how the EU’s 
formal legitimacy can be adapted to the realities of multi-level governance, the 
remedies proposed by new governance scholars fail to address the European 
legitimacy deficit effectively. Often preoccupied with regulation and public policy­
making, new governance tends to neglect the problem of legitimising the EU law­
making process which gains increasing salience as the expansion of EU competencies 
continues apace. But even within the regulatory domain their ideas remain 
problematic. New governance also fails the feasibility criterion because its policies 
remain often unspecific and do not enjoy the support of Europe’s political elites.
208 Svein S. Andersen and Tom R. Bums: The European Union and the Erosion o f Parliamentary 
Democracy: A Study o f Post-parliamentary Governance, in: Svein S. Andersen and Kjell Eliassen 
(eds.): The European Union: How Democratic Is It?, (London: Sage, 1996), p.235
209 IbkL, p.240
210 Majone (96), op. cit.. p.300
2,1 Andersen and Bums, op. cit.. p.250
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6.5.3 Problems with European Regulation
The first chapter argued that, despite some unique features, the EU did not constitute a 
discrete form of governance whose legitimising principles are structurally different 
and hence incomparable with those of states. While the EU is indeed characterised by 
a greater emphasis on regulatory policy, this fact does not preclude comparison of 
European and national regulatory legitimising principles. Quite to the contrary, a 
greater attention to the debates about the legitimacy of national regulation would 
reveal that scholars like Majone underestimate the difficulties associated with 
legitimising regulation. For instance, “the proliferation of agencies in the US has 
been attacked on the grounds that agencies constitute a non-representative fourth 
branch of government, undermining the separation of powers, and placing 
government further beyond the reach of private citizens.”214 Yet while regulatory 
agencies may, by their very nature, have to be independent from governmental 
influence, it does not follow that “no one controls an agency”. Under the premise of 
rational choice theory, the industries to be regulated will be self-interested rather than 
seeking to maximise aggregate welfare. At the very least, regulatory capture by these 
industries always remains a distinct possibility, thus subverting the institutional 
design for Pareto-efficiency.216
Current new governance thought has also neglected to take sufficient notice of 
difficulties in adapting American regulatory principles (on which most scholars model 
their arguments) to a very different European tradition of regulation. Even though 
Majone variously acknowledges these differences, he argues that considerable
717convergence has occurred between these two models of regulation. He seems to 
forget, however, that current EU law makes the establishment of independent 
regulatory agencies as they exist in the United States almost impossible because the
212 Jachtenfuchs (98), op. cit.. p.56
213 For a sceptical contribution on Britain, see: Rhodes, op. cit.. p.58, 197
214 Caporaso, op. cit.. p.42
215 Majone (96), op. cit.. p.300
216 Caporaso, op. cit.. p.43
217 For example: Giandomenico Majone (ed.): Deregulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform in 
Europe and the United States. (London: Pinter, 1990)
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Treaties permit no body other than the Council to exercise secondary rule-making
218competencies.
Other differences which set the EU apart from the American regulatory environment 
include the greater divergence of economic development and interests in Europe, the 
lack of legal and financial resources for regulatory agencies and the conflict between 
different national regulatory traditions.219 The biggest problem with Majone’s 
argument is that the democratic features which legitimise regulatory policy-making in 
the US, in other words Congress, are absent in the EU. Regulatory bodies require a 
wider democratic framework in which their broad objectives are set, but the EP is not 
yet able to provide that popular legitimation. In view of these factors, it seems 
necessary to devise a set of legitimising principles which adapt American theories to 
the particular conditions which obtain in the EU, but despite the relevance of this task 
to its agenda, new governance thought has not yet sufficiently matured in this area. Its 
remain generally vague about the design of actual political remedies and plays down 
the kind of legal and structural obstacles mentioned above.
6.5.4 The Neglect of Traditional Politics
The first chapter also argued that European politics is not exclusively concerned with 
regulatory policy and technical, and hence remote, public policy decisions. But even 
within their own area of focus new governance theory has not yet responded to the 
charge that regulation, and social regulation in particular, is never free of a normative 
political dimension. According to widely held public beliefs in Western Europe, 
political values are open to challenge and should be articulated in political debate.
Expertocracies or interest-oriented networks seem unable to accommodate such 
normative political discourse and will therefore struggle to generate sufficient felt
991legitimacy. It remains doubtful whether the new governance vision of pluralist (or 
neo-corporatist) participation in European policy networks “is sufficient to assure the
218 Christian Joerges: “Markt ohne Staat? - Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die 
regulative Politik”, in: Rudolf Wildenmann (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen fur eine 
Europaische Union. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), p.257
219 Ibid.. p.252
220 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.21
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legitimacy of a EU constructed as a network, or whether such an EU would in fact
000exclude large and distinguishable groups from the political process
This criticism gains critical importance in light of the fact that, “given the centrality of 
popular sovereignty in Western political culture, there are serious problems of 
legitimising governance forms whose principles of representation, technical character 
and low accountability deviate substantially from the concept of popular 
sovereignty”. In the terminology of the dual concept of legitimacy, the new 
governance school underestimates the need for congruence between its model of 
formal legitimacy and the political ideology considered legitimate by European 
publics. The model of a representative democracy may be structurally unsuited to the 
current EU, but it is the form of political regime which enjoys most felt legitimacy 
among the peoples of Europe. New governance proposals for the political regime may 
be more suitable to the EU, but they do not enjoy widespread felt legitimacy, thus 
failing to address low public diffuse support for the current European political regime. 
That makes them unattractive to Europe’s political elites who have not warmed to 
new governance strategies because they also remain too abstract and unspecific about 
the institutional structure they propose.
6.5.5 Summary
Unlike any of the other academic theories new governance does draw attention to the 
important institutional features of the multi-level structure of the EU and the relative 
importance attached to regulation. It rightly stresses the functionalist motivations 
behind European integration, in particular the economic synergies created by the 
Single Market and the positive effect on political steering capacity derived from 
international co-operation (one might add the role of maintaining peace in Europe).
Although the new governance view about the inevitability as well as irreversibility of 
globalisation must be rejected, new governance correctly identifies the core problem 
of a trade-off (in certain areas, particularly regulatory issues) between efficiency
221 Joerges (91), op. cit., p.252
222 Jachtenfuchs (98), op. cit„ p.56
223 Andersen and Bums, op. cit., p.244f
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(affecting output support) and democracy or accountability (affecting support for the 
political regime). This important analysis discredits both simplistic constitutionalist 
remedies of “simply more democracy” and the more extreme containment strategies 
for an abandonment of most of the EU’s functions or even its wholesale dissolution.
While new governance offers an interesting new analytical perspective of the 
legitimacy deficit, it fails to meet the pertinence and feasibility criterion for its 
successful remedy. Like incrementalism, the emphasis on specific output support is 
misplaced because it produces little spill-over to the other dimensions of the 
legitimacy deficit, notably the lacking sense of a European identity. Nor does new 
governance theory argue convincingly that the EU is structurally post-modern in its 
characteristics and therefore does not require a strong sense of European identity 
among its citizens. As regards the generation of diffuse regime support, new 
governance lacks a comprehensive institutional vision for legitimising the EU that 
extends beyond regulation to encompass other important areas, such as the allocation 
of legislative and judicial powers between EU institutions. The new governance 
strategy therefore fails the pertinence criterion because it does not result in a model of 
formal legitimacy capable of enjoying high levels of felt legitimacy amongst the 
peoples of Europe. These drawbacks also make it politically unattractive as a strategy 
for solving the legitimacy deficit of the EU, thus failing the feasibility criterion.
6.6 Containment
6.6.1 The Approach
All preceding strategies have been geared towards improving the legitimacy of the 
EU. Containment alone pursue a strategy of reducing the need for the EU to legitimise 
itself, which requires a willingness to abandon the normative commitment to the goal 
of ever closer integration. This entails particular assumptions about the political 
community component of the dual concept of legitimacy. In one version, intrinsic 
value is attached to the nation state as the most appropriate forum for political 
decision-making. The process of “ever closer Union” culminating in the emergence of
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a European supranational democracy is therefore rejected in principle because it is 
regarded as a threat to the concept of the sovereign nation state.224
In the other version, opposition to further integration is not linked to a categorical 
defence of the nation state. Instead, it is based on the empirical observation that, for 
the time being, nationally organised political systems enjoy much stronger felt 
legitimacy than supranational ones. Scepticism about an ever closer Union is therefore 
merely contingent upon the current lack of a sufficiently strong European identity to
99  ^legitimise the EU. If such a European identity were to emerge, opposition to further 
integration would disappear among this second group of people. If either of these two 
assumptions about the political community is accepted, then a partial reversal of some 
of the recent integrationist reforms can help relieving the EU of its “legitimacy 
overstretch” by reducing its need for legitimation.
The two-dimensional line of argument advanced by containment was described in the 
first chapter. On the one hand, its supporters are concerned about the decreasing 
compatibility of the EU’s formal legitimacy with that of its member states. On the 
other hand, they realise that the constitutionalist solution to this problem, namely the 
gradual creation of a European representative government, is unattainable because it 
presupposes the existence of a strong European identity which enjoys broad popular 
attachment.
Supporters of containment realise that this precondition is not fulfilled so far, and they 
share the pessimism about the possibility of its fulfilment even in the medium term. 
Instead, they aim to offer solutions to the legitimacy deficit which can be realised 
with immediate effect, while not falling foul of the constitutionalist fallacy. 
Essentially, this entails at least a partial reversal of European integration in order to 
recast the EU as a more traditional international organisation whose need for
99  f \legitimacy would be significantly lessened. Unlike most other approaches, the 
containment strategy thus implicitly acknowledges the interdependence of the 
different components of the dual concept of legitimacy.
224 Helen Wallace (93), op. cit., pp. 10Iff
225 For example: Anthony Smith (92), op. cit.. p.62
226 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p.68f
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Which policies does the containment school propose to remedy the legitimacy deficit? 
Containment uniquely questions the vertical balance of power between the national 
and the European level, thus addressing the public fear about member states 
“dissolving” into an ever-expanding Union. The most radical suggestion (apart from
9 9 7leaving the EU altogether) is to strip the EU down to its Single Market core. A 
politically less controversial solution is to delete the aim of “ever closer Union” from 
the preamble of the Treaty of Rome and replace it with the vision of a “Europe of 
Nation States” which entails no presumption of an automatic expansion of the
99Racquis.
These changes could be complemented with a return to unanimous decision-making 
in the Council for all major pieces of legislation. It would ease the potential 
incompatibilities with regard to formal legitimacy, and it would make the lack of 
democracy within the EU’s political regime less relevant and objectionable. A 
significant restriction of QMV voting in the Council and a lighter policy output from 
Brussels would enhance the potential for democratic scrutiny of the EU by national 
parliaments. The biggest attraction of a vertical rebalance of power, however, is that it 
lessens the need for a strongly developed sense o f a political community which the 
last chapter has identified as the most underdeveloped components of felt legitimacy 
in the EU.
Others, while generally pro-European, have considered EMU as either premature or 
“an unnecessary and divisive distraction” from the creation of a liberal European
7 9 0order valued by its civil society. Starting from fundamental doubts about the 
economic case for EMU, proponents of containment often argue that, even if 
generally successful, the economic benefits of the EURO will be unevenly split.230 
Specific output support generated by EMU will differ across member states which 
means that the EURO has at least the potential to destabilise the fragile sense of
27 Lamont suggests Britain should negotiate an “outer-tier community membership” which only 
hvolves the trade legislation of the Treaty of Rome, but he acknowledges the strain the complexity of  
such a construct would put on the institutional framework. See: Lamont, op. cit.. p. 108
28 Martin Howe: Europe and the Constitution after Maastricht. (Oxford: Nelson & Pollard, 1993), p.68
29 Dahrendorf (98b): op. cit.. pp. 10-12, very similar: Garton-Ash, op. cit.. p.63
20 Martin Feldstein: “The Case Against EMU”, The Economist, vol.323, no.7763, 13/6/1992, pp. 12-19
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political community. Much of the actual effect will depend on the degree to which 
political and economic conflicts can be absorbed by diplomatic means, not only 
between participants and outsiders, but also amongst the participating countries. Any 
serious disagreement over economic policy among core members of the EURO zone 
may damage mutual trust between these countries and weaken the sense of a common 
European identity. Feldstein goes further than most when suggesting that EMU 
might even undermine the fundamental aim of the EU’s founding fathers, namely to 
avoid the recurrence of an intra-European war.
Most advocates of containment also seek “horizontal ” institutional remedies aimed at 
bolstering national legitimising chains on the basis of the existent European 
framework. This applies first and foremost to the modus for decision-making. For if 
Weiler’s Anschlufi analogy is correct234, any kind of majority decision, whether in the 
EP or in the Council, will be illegitimate in the absence of a European demos. Hence 
the widespread hostility of containment supporters to the erosion of national vetoes in 
favour of QMV in the Council. Others have attacked the policy-initiating role of the 
supranational Commission which they want to confer on the intergovernmental 
European Council instead.
Could a containment strategy really offer better chances of eliminating the legitimacy 
deficit than any of the other strategies discussed above? Regarding the pertinence 
criterion, three problems threaten to hamper the potential success of a containment 
strategy. First, containment endangers both the problem-solving capacity of the EU 
and the ability of EU institutions for efficient decision-making. Second, the strategy 
relies heavily on the activation of indirect legitimising chains through national 
parliaments, but structural factors pose severe constraints upon such legitimising 
potential of national assemblies.
Third, the normative acceptability of a containment strategy varies considerably with 
country-specific perspectives on the EU. The political elites in Germany and most
231 Ralf Dahrendorf: “Disunited by a Common Currency”, New Statesman. 20/2/1998, pp.32-33
232 Peel, op. cit.. p.26
233 Martin Feldstein: “EMU and International Conflict”, Foreign Affairs, vol.76, no.6, 1997, p.61
234 See Chapter 1. p.36
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other member states remain committed to solving the legitimacy deficit by means of 
improving legitimacy rather than reducing the need for it. Although containment 
enjoys the support of a significant section of Britain’s divided political elite, it seems 
to fail the feasibility criterion which requires that solutions to the legitimacy deficit 
must be acceptable to political decision-makers across Europe. The half-hearted 
character of most existing containment policies can at least partly be explained in 
terms of little political will in the EU to adopt a containment strategy.
6.6.2 Does Containment Damage Output Support?
Chapter one argued that containment reduces the problem-solving capacity of the EU, 
thus potentially endangering the level of specific output support it can generate. 
Containment also threatens to rigidify the institutional structure of the EU. Involving 
even the current fifteen national parliaments closer in the supranational law-making 
process will slow down European policy-making and make the entire process more 
cumbersome (see below). The argument against majority voting in the Council is that 
it considerably weakens the impact of national parliamentary scrutiny over each 
government’s voting behaviour in the Council. But a return to the era of national 
vetoes poses grave dangers of political stalemate because it reduces the propensity to 
seek compromise. It is doubtful whether even the Single Market could have been 
created in the absence of at least some degree of majority voting.
A similarly uncomfortable dilemma for a containment strategy arises in the guise of 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. Its proponents generally support enlargement, often 
for the instrumental reason that it would decelerate the process of deepening 
integration. Yet enlargement presents containment with an unpleasant choice between 
accepting widespread majority voting in an enlarged Union with weaker collective 
identity or risking political stalemate as the likelihood of national vetoes increases 
with the number of member states. Dilemmas like these are likely to arise in other 
areas as well, since they are symptomatic of an increasing diversity of interests among 
the members of an enlarged Union.
35 Sked, op. cit.. p.23, also: The “No Turning Back” Group of Conservative MPs: A Conservative 
Europe 1994 and Beyond. (London: The European Foundation, 1994), p.26f
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One possible solution may be the introduction of flexibility clauses into the Treaties. 
Two forms of flexibility are already practised under the current arrangements. So- 
called “opt-outs” entitle some member states to abstain from specific commonly 
agreed policies. Examples for this are the British and Danish opt-out from EMU or 
the British and Irish opt-out from the Schengen acquis. Another kind of flexibility has 
been introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam, enabling individual member states to 
use the existing institutional framework to integrate more closely in specific areas 
without involving all other member states. For instance, this allows some member 
states to co-operate more closely in Police and Judicial matters (Art.40, Title VI, TA). 
Similar provisions have been introduced into the CFSP pillar where individual 
members can abstain from joint actions under CFSP which can then normally be 
implemented with qualified majority.
Britain’s decision at the time of the Amsterdam Treaty to terminate its opt-out from 
the “Social Chapter” exemplifies how flexibility can help the EU to continue to devise 
and adopt new policies even in the temporary absence of agreement about their 
desirability. But such arrangements also risk undermining the cohesion of the acquis
» 7^ 7and diminuating common policies, thus violating the EU’s political culture. 
Flexibility clauses might also undermine trust between the peoples of Europe if some 
countries were perceived to employ them to gain a relative competitive advantage by 
not implementing certain joint policies.238 Critical mutters about “un-communitaire” 
conduct could already be heard on the Continent subsequent to Britain’s departure 
from the ERM in 1992.
Britain’s opt-out from monetary union is bound to provoke similar sentiments i f  
Britain were seen to derive relative economic benefits from this decision at some 
point in the future. However, given the difficulties of Central European applicant 
countries with implementing the full acquis communautaire prior to accession, an 
increasing use of flexibility clauses may be the only means available to contain 
diverging interests and policy approaches within the enlarged EU.239 It would also
236 Article 23. Title V. Treaty o f Amsterdam
237 See: Chapter 5, p.235
238 Grabbe and Hughes, op. cit.. p.47f
239 Ibid.. p.48
Chapter Six 306
allow some member states to adopt a slower pace of integration which is more 
commensurate with their lagging development of felt legitimacy for the EU.240
Another problem is that flexibility clauses are mostly applied to additional policies, 
and hence of little value in legitimising the existing degree of integration. Recognising 
that the biggest challenge to the constitutional orders of the member states will be 
legal in nature, Redwood effectively calls for an end to the Simmenthal doctrine of the 
ECJ 241 But he evades the problem of how a uniform application of EC law is to be 
ensured unless it is superior to all forms of national law.
Howe’s proposes more practicable, if no less controversial, reforms to preserve the 
compatibility of European integration with national constitutions, thus addressing 
explicitly the challenge to Britain’s formal legitimacy. He suggests an amendment of 
the 1972 European Communities Act which enshrines the ultimate supremacy of 
Parliament over all EC law, but also introduces rules to ensure the precedence of EC 
law over unintentionally conflicting Acts of Parliament. Courts could for instance 
refer incompatible UK law to the Privy Council which could seek an amending Order 
in Council to bring the act in line with EC law.242 While this solution is less obviously 
in conflict with the Simmenthal doctrine, Howe’s other idea of a reserve list excluding 
the core of the British constitution from the jurisdiction of the ECJ seems too 
confrontational to stand a realistic chance of ever being acceptable to other member 
states, let alone the ECJ itself.
The Centre for Economic Policy Research has proposed a less radical attempt to 
address concerns about the existing degree of integration. It proposes to distinguish a 
common base of responsibilities shared by all member states from open partnerships 
that allow countries to opt into integration in other policy areas such as EMU or 
CFSP. Whereas decisions for the common base (comprising the Single Market and its 
flanking policies) would proceed by majority to preserve effective governance, 
member states would have a veto over their participation in open partnerships 243 In
:40 Redwood, op. cit., p. 193
'M Ibid.. p.202
142 Martin Howe, op. cit.. p.62
‘43 Giovazzi, Francesco, et al: Flexible Integration: Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe. 
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995)
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other words, flexibility rules would even apply to a sizeable part of the current (non- 
flexible) acquis communautaire.
The German elder statesman Count Lambsdorff has proposed another interesting 
strategy to remedy the legitimacy deficit.244 He argues that the EU’s relentless drive 
towards greater harmonisation and centralisation increasingly narrows the scope for 
policy competition between member states, thus stifling political innovation in the 
EU. Unlike most proponents of containment, Lambsdorff believes a clear-cut division 
of competencies and effective barriers against centralisation can only be achieved 
with a European constitution narrowly restricting the competencies of Brussels 
institutions. He considers external trade policy, cross-border environmental issues, 
Single Market policies, human rights protection and CSFP best dealt with at the 
European level. Other policy areas, such as agriculture, social and employment 
policy, education, taxation, should either remain at, or be repatriated to the national 
level. In addition, Lambsdorff demands the right for member states to nullify or opt- 
out of European legislation in all those policy areas not constitutionally reserved for 
the Union. By narrowly enshrining the allocation of competencies, a constitution can 
help to stem the centralising tendency inherent in most federal states, such as 
Germany. It would also protect the democratic will and identity of the member states.
However, multi-level systems like the EU might not be easily amenable to a clear 
vertical separation of competencies.245 More importantly, the legitimising effect of 
containment strategies like those of Lambsdorff, Howe or the Centre for Econonomic 
Policy Research varies with the country-specific perspectives on the legitimacy deficit 
of the EU. A slowdown of the integration process coupled with a renewed emphasis 
on indirect forms of democratic legitimacy would help to improve the compatibility of 
the EU with Britain’s formal legitimacy. It would equally increase felt legitimacy 
because Britons tend to oppose a constitutionalisation of the EU that would strengthen 
the EP at the expense of the Council and national parliaments. Making the EU less 
supranational would also reduce the need for a European demos whose creation may 
have conflicted with, and been perceived as a threat to, Britain’s national identity.
244 Otto Graf Lambsdorff: “Die EuropSische Union braucht eine Verfassung”, Handelsblatt 31/7/1998,
p.6
245 Wessels and Rometsch, op. cit.. p.364
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Finally, a containment strategy takes account of Britain’s elite cleavage on the 
European question because it reduces the need for active legitimation of the EU.
Almost the opposite is true for Germany, where a containment strategy would conflict 
with a more idealistic commitment to European integration and a preference for the 
EP as the central democratic institution of the EU. Attempts to reduce the common 
base of the acquis communautaire would also be opposed by the broad elite consensus 
in favour of ever closer Union which makes containment politically unfeasible in 
Germany.246
6.6.3 Is Containment Politically Feasible?
A general lack of political enthusiasm across Europe is the biggest obstacle to a 
success of the containment strategy. The great majority of Europe’s political elite 
rejects the normative lack of commitment to the ideal of ever closer Union, thus 
preventing the negotiation of a “watered-down” EU. In fact, advocacy of a 
“minimalist” Europe is confined to the fringes of the public debate in Germany, 
although it enjoys considerable mass and elite support in Britain. Containment, 
therefore, seems to suffer from an inconsistent triad where only any two out of three 
propositions are compatible with each other: widespread political support for 
extending the acquis communautaire, the demands of democracy and the absence of 
legitimacy outside established political identities.247
Although political actors have tended to be wary of its agenda, they have adopted two 
containment policies in the Maastricht Treaty. First, the TEU introduced the principle 
of subsidiarity in order to allay fears about an overcentralised Union undermining the
9 4 8remaining core of national statehood. It is intended to preserve the compatibility of 
the European with the national constitutional orders by delineating the respective 
spheres of competencies between the two vertical levels. The principle of subsidiarity 
evaluates whether the EU possesses legal competence for a particular legislative
246 Weale (98), op. cit.. p.60f
247 Weale (98), op. cit.. p.61
248 Art.3b, TEU
Chapter Six 309
measure, whether there is need for legislation and whether the legislation is 
proportionate to the need for it.249
The legal definition of subsidiarity has unfortunately been phrased in very vague
9 ^ 0  • •terms, even after its supposed clarification in the Amsterdam Treaty. EU legislation 
must prove why its objectives “cannot sufficiently be achieved by Member States’
9 S 1action” and “can therefore be better achieved by the Community”. Although this 
justification needs to be substantiated by qualitative or quantitative indicators, it will 
prove very difficult for the ECJ to establish the relative effectiveness of national 
versus EU action. Some commentators, such as the German FCC judge Grimm, even 
doubted whether the subsidiarity principle in its pre-Amsterdam form was properly 
justiciable at all.252
Moreover, the odds in any future conflict are already stacked in favour of the 
European level. By insisting that subsidiarity must not undermine the existing acquis, 
the principle cannot be used to call into question any of the established EU powers. 
The subsidiarity principle also is not applicable to the vast areas where the EU has 
exclusive responsibility.254 Even where it does apply, the objectives to be achieved by 
a particular EC action are themselves defined by the Commission. The application of 
the principle of subsidiarity is explicitly subject to the constraint of Art.6.4 TEU 
which states that “the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its 
objectives and carry through its policies.”
To justify individual cases of subsidiarity against such a loosely defined catch-all 
caveat amounts to a “hopeless undertaking.” Consequently, the subsidiarity 
principle does little to contribute to the legitimation of the EU, and its potential as a
249 Art.3b, TEU
250 “Protocol on the Application o f the Principles o f Subsidiarity and Proportionality as Annexed to the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community”, Treaty o f Amsterdam
251 Ibid.. Clause 4
252 Dieter Grimm: “Subsidiaritat ist nur ein Wort”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 17/9/1992, p.38
253 Martin Howe, op. cit.. p.45
254 “Protocol on the Application o f the Principles o f Subsidiarity and Proportionality as Annexed to the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community”, Treaty o f Amsterdam. Clause 3
255 Ibid.. Clause 2
256 Helmut Lecheler: Das Subsidaritatsprinzip - Strukturprinzip einer europaischen Ordnung. (Berlin: 
Duncker&Humblot, 1993), p. 15
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7^ 7motor for decentralisation has not been realised. This is regrettable, since the idea 
of subsidiarity enjoys strong felt legitimacy in both Britain and Germany and could 
ease the compatibility of both countries’ formal legitimacy with that of the EU.
Potentially equally promising from the containment perspective is a second 
innovation of the Maastricht Treaty, the Committee of the Regions. It is designed to 
tap the sometimes powerful popular loyalties towards subnational regions in Europe. 
However, it has been equipped with consultative powers only, and its lack of a 
prominent role in EU politics has left the Committee’s legitimising potential largely 
unexploited. Since the chance was missed to raise its institutional profile through the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Committee’s appeal will continue to be largely confined to 
regional policy makers.
If the Committee’s institutional status were upgraded, its members would need to 
have equal standing and be equally representative of their regions. With a mix of 
federal, devolved and unitary member states that requirement will be hard to meet. 
Representatives of sometimes artificially created sub-national units will do little to 
boost the EU’s felt legitimacy, thus making the Committee of the Regions “another 
case of symbolic politics.” The Committee only adds another body to the already 
over-complicated institutional structure, further increasing the existing pathologies of 
EU decision-making.
6.6.4 Can Containment Enhance Regime Support?
Containment seeks to increase support for the political regime of the EU by exploiting 
the legitimising potential of national parliaments. But there is some academic 
disagreement over the extent to which national parliaments can really call their 
national government to account over its actions in the Council. Theoretically, any 
action by a government in the Council could be made subject to prior parliamentary 
approval which would effectively extending the national veto over EU legislation to
257 Similarly: Armstrong and Bulmer (98), op. cit.. pp.292-96
258 Art. 198 a-c, TEU
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the domestic legislature. Judge argues that parliamentary scrutiny procedures have
9 6 0greatly improved in most member states over the past decade. As chapters three and 
four have shown, an increasingly well established “parliamentary reserve” has helped 
to ensure national scrutiny of EU legislation prior to its being voted upon in the 
Council. However, there remain three general problems with a meaningful 
participation of national parliaments in EU policy-making.
First, the scrutiny of EU legislation by national parliaments has been frequently 
frustrated by the slow flow of information from EU institutions and a sometimes 
negligent compliance with the consultation procedure by national governments. 
Despite visible improvements, the British and German parliaments continue to play a
9 6 9rather marginal role in the EU policy process. Only the Danish political system has 
ever come close a significant influence over a national government’s day-to-day EU
9 fi'Xpolicy. Even if these problems could be overcome, both Germany’s and Britain’s 
national parliament can only pass non-binding resolutions on such legislation which 
does not amount to the binding parliamentary approval legitimising national 
legislation.264 Under such circumstances, national parliaments can at best fulfil a 
informative function conducive to a national political debate about European
'J f .C
legislation. In short, the formal powers of most national parliaments in the scrutiny 
of EU legislation, and the obstacles to their exercise in practice, compare poorly with 
respective national legislating procedures.
Second, there are also structural problems with the idea of fifteen national parliaments
9 6 7exercising binding scrutiny powers over European legislation. These range from the 
sheer geographical distance to the decision-making centre to the potential time 
constraints and lack of expertise of national parliaments. Attempts to overcome these
259 Heidrun Abromeit: “How to Democratise a Multi-level, Multi-dimensional Polity”, in: Albert Weale 
and Michael Nentwich (eds.): Political Theory and the European Union - Legitimacy. Constitutional 
Choice and Citizenship. (London: Routledge, 1998), p.l 14
260 Judge (95), op. cit.. p.80
261 Ibid,, p.80
262 See: Chapter 3. p.l04f, Chapter 4 . p .l56f
263 John Pinder: “The EC, the Rule o f Law and Representative Government: The Significance o f the 
Intergovernmental Conference”, Government and Opposition, vol.26, no.2, 1991, p.207
264 Weber-Panariello, op. cit.. p. 106, 306
265 Ibid.. p.309
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constraints by improving the inter-institutional flow of information and co-operation 
across member states resulted in the ill-fated joint conference of national parliaments 
and the EP (“Assizes”) in 1990 which has remained a singular event. More successful 
have been the now well-established COS AC meetings launched also in 1990. They 
bring together members of national parliamentary EU committees to discuss both 
procedural and policy-issues of common interest and to devise improvements to
' J / 'O
national scrutiny procedures. However, the greatest structural obstacle to an 
effective parliamentary scrutiny of EU law would be the ensuing institutional 
pathologies if European policy-making became hostage to the approval of fifteen 
additional institutions.269 Further deepening (EMU) and widening (Eastern 
enlargement) of the EU will only exacerbate these problems.
Third, the introduction of majority voting in the Council has made the link to national 
parliaments even more tenuous than it previously was in Britain and Germany (or any
7 7 0other member states). The Council of Ministers, like the European Council, is not 
legally answerable to any other body and most of its meetings still take place behind
771closed doors. But there is also the Commission to consider which currently enjoys 
too much political independence to be plausibly legitimised through the connection of
7 77the Council to domestic electorates. Enlargement will make the use of QMV in the 
Council even more ubiquitous, thus reducing the scope for national parliaments to 
hold the Council to account for its decisions. In short, these three obstacles 
demonstrate that their influence of national parliaments on EU policy-making is 
necessarily restricted, given the supranational character of the EU.273
The same problems affect many of the other containment proposals which have 
focused on representative institutions. Sked rather boldly suggests to abandon direct 
elections to the EP and to “reaffirm the wisdom of the founders of the Community” 
by returning to a system whereby the EP is composed of representatives from national
268 Weber-Panariello, op. cit.. p.312
269 Scharpf (94), op. cit.. p .l70f
270 Grainne de Burca: “The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union”, Modem Law Review. 
vol.59, no.3, 1996, p.353
271 Classen, op. cit.. p.253
272 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. pp.64-67
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parliaments.274 The lines of legitimacy would then remain firmly rooted in highly 
legitimate national assemblies, and the constitutional compatibility between the two 
layers of governance would be enhanced. However, the very long and indirect chain 
of legitimacy compared to a directly elected European chamber would be a significant 
drawback of this idea. Given historic experience, it remains doubtful whether such an 
essentially appointed parliament could command more felt legitimacy than the current 
arrangements, even in the UK. While Heseltine’s idea of a Senate of national 
parliamentarians as a second chamber to the EP would avoid these disadvantages, it 
would make the EU institutionally even more cumbersome and hamper efficient law­
making.275
6.6.5 Summary
A containment strategy can indeed reduce the need for legitimising the EU, thus 
alleviating the “legitimacy overstretch” on the political community and the political 
regime of the EU. However, containment strategies often have the negative side-effect 
of reducing the EU’s potential to generate economic benefits from supranational co­
operation. The challenge is to devise containment policies which minimise the 
negative side-effect on specific output support and do not produce institutional 
stalemate.
For instance, Lambsdorff s vision of “competitive federalism” coupled with the 
provision of flexibility clauses could actually enhance output support compared to the 
more rigid, homogenised federalism generally favoured by constitutionalists. Such a 
solution would escape the new governance charge of endangering the capacity for 
effective governance. Only the more extreme, Euro-sceptic versions of containment 
have a self-defeating tendency to undermine the economic benefits of European 
integration. However, the impact of such reforms on felt legitimacy of the EU will be 
stronger in the UK whose citizens generally prefer to strengthen national channels of 
legitimation. There is little elite or mass support in Germany for containment’s 
normative aim of reducing the need for legitimation in the EU, which limits its 
legitimising potential in the FRG and makes the political obstacles against its
274 Sked, op. cit.. p.21
275 Heseltine, op. cit.. p.25f
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realisation difficult to surmount. As a result, country-specific differences in the nature 
of the legitimacy deficit mean that a containment strategy may pass the pertinence 
criterion in the UK, but not in the FRG and most other member states. This lack of 
EU-wide elite support for containment makes it unlikely to pass the feasibility 
criterion.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has assessed whether any of the five legitimation strategies discussed 
will succeed in solving the legitimacy deficit of the EU. Their examination against a 
pertinence and a feasibility criterion has yielded the following conclusions.
First, only two strategy, communitarianism and containment, successfully address the 
lack of a European identity which lies at the core of the legitimacy deficit right across 
EU member states. The former strategy seeks to forge a European demos, the latter 
reduces the EU’s need for legitimation to alleviate its current “legitimacy 
overstretch”. All other strategies fail the pertinence criterion because they cannot 
redress the EU’s missing sense of community. New governance fails to identify the 
lack of a European demos as the weakest component of legitimacy. Incrementalism 
and constitutionalism do seek to create a European identity, but they misjudge the 
dynamics of identity-building. Their strategies seek to enhance output or regime 
support in the mistaken belief that this will spill over into a sense of community in the 
EU. Functionalist output satisfaction (incrementalism) or institutional engineering 
(constitutionalism) may be necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the creation of 
a European demos.
Second, the effectiveness of legitimation strategies varies with the country-specific 
nature of the legitimacy deficit in Britain and Germany. Britain’s formal and felt 
legitimacy remains to some extent incompatible with EU membership, and its national 
identity cannot easily accommodate the creation of a European demos. Together with 
the lack of public support for “ever closer Union” and a persistent elite cleavage 
which limits the scope for active legitimation policies, these factors favour a remedial 
strategy which reduces the EU’s need for legitimacy. This means containment will be 
a more effective strategy for resolving the legitimacy deficit than communitarianism.
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By contrast, Germany’s formal and felt legitimacy is more integration-geared and its 
national identity is compatible with an emerging European demos. A general mass 
and elite consensus in favour of European integration means that from a German 
perspective communitarianism is likely to be the more successful legitimation 
strategy.
Third, political elites across Europe remain reluctant to pursue either 
communitarianism or containment which makes these strategies unlikely to pass the 
feasibility criterion. Political decision-makers have in the past always pursued 
incrementalism, which offers little hope for a solution to the legitimacy deficit. The 
second research question of this thesis can therefore be answered thus: the legitimacy 
deficit of the EU is susceptible of resolution. The EU can be successfully legitimised 
either by creating a European demos or by containing the integration process and 
thereby reducing the need for a common identity. But there remains a serious question 
mark over the political will or ability of Europe’s political elites to pursue either of 
these two successful legitimation strategies. This is not least because country-specific 
variations in the legitimacy deficit mean that the definition of what constitutes a 
successful strategy for its resolution differs from member state to member state.
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Conclusion
The discussion of the two research questions that were raised in the introduction has 
yielded the following answers. The political system of the EU suffers from a 
legitimacy deficit relative to the well-legitimised national political systems in Britain 
and Germany. The severity and nature of this deficit depends on country-specific 
factors within these two member states. From both countries’ perspective, the single 
most important cause for the legitimacy deficit is the absence of a European identity 
which could instil a sense o f political community. This diagnosis implies that the 
legitimacy deficit can only be remedied either by creating a European identity or by 
reducing the need for its creation. The relative effectiveness of these two strategies 
varies with the country-specific nature of the legitimacy deficit.
The two research questions discussed in this thesis reflect an increasing interest 
among political scientists in the problem of legitimising the EU. The original 
contribution to this academic debate lies not so much in the research questions 
themselves, but rather in the way they have been answered. Starting from an analysis 
of the limitations of the existing research on the issue, the discussion of the two 
research questions has produced important insights, both for the theoretical analysis of 
legitimacy in the EU and for the political debate about possible strategies for 
resolving the legitimacy deficit.
At an analytical level, the thesis has supplied the academic debate with a theoretical 
framework, the dual concept of legitimacy, which enables an empirical, falsifiable and 
comparative analysis of the legitimacy of the EU. Although dualistic conceptions of 
legitimacy exist, their usefulness for applied research is limited because they do not 
clearly identify the various components of legitimacy or analyse in detail their 
dynamic interaction. The dual concept focuses on this multi-facetted nature of 
legitimacy. It distinguishes between formal and felt legitimacy, and also subdivides 
the latter into the components regime, authorities and community. The dual concept 
therefore enables a more nuanced analysis of legitimacy deficits because it 
disaggregates the legitimacy of a political system into support for its institutional 
framework, support for the outputs it produces and identification with the political
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community it represents. It also investigates the dynamic aspects of legitimacy, in 
particular how legitimation policies can raise support for a political system and under 
which conditions support from one component of legitimacy can “spill over” into (or 
be substituted with) support for another component.
The dual concept also contains the important theoretical argument that the EU 
constitutes a full-blown political system which is most profitably studied from the 
analytical paradigm of comparative politics. Indeed, for the study of the EU’s 
legitimacy a comparative approach is even analytically necessary. Unlike normal 
states, the legitimacy of the EU cannot be studied in isolation. Its formal legitimacy is 
closely intertwined with that of its member states, and its felt legitimacy depends on 
the way the EU is perceived in each country. In other words, the legitimacy of the EU 
is contingent on the member state from whose perspective it is discussed. This 
contingency is best illustrated by comparing two well-legitimised member states 
whose different degree of compatibility with the EU has resulted in distinct 
perspectives on its legitimacy.
The dual concept has been specifically designed for comparative legitimacy research, 
which requires an empirical rather than a normative theory of legitimacy that seeks to 
measure how well legitimacy for the EU has been secured in its member states. As a 
second-order theory, the dual concept is free from any normative bias in favour of 
particular forms of legitimation. The application of the dual concept is based on 
empirical, falsifiable data about the formal and felt legitimacy of the EU. Their 
validity can be tested both on empirical and methodological grounds (for example 
concerning the technical specifications of survey research).
At a political level, the thesis makes two contributions. First, it has provided a 
detailed diagnosis of the nature and extent of the legitimacy deficit and its differences 
among member states. This diagnosis can serve as a starting point from which to 
develop political strategies for remedying the deficit. Second, the thesis has offered 
two criteria against which the potential of legitimation strategies for resolving the 
deficit can be evaluated. These criteria help to assess whether remedial strategies 
correctly identify and target the least legitimised component of the dual concept, 
whether they makes correct assumptions about how the components of the dual
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concept interact dynamically (for instance through spill-overs), whether remedial 
strategies can raise legitimacy across the different member states, and whether 
proposed reforms are likely to be supported and implemented by Europe’s political 
elite. The discussion of these two criteria has clarified the political options for 
successful legitimation strategies, and it has drawn attention to some of the 
implications and side-effects of pursuing them.
These analytical and political insights have yielded the following detailed conclusions 
from the application of the dual concept of legitimacy to the EU. As regards formal 
legitimacy, Britain and Germany each operate with a distinct domestic constitutional 
framework. This causes different kinds and degrees of incompatibilities between the 
formal legitimacy of the EU on the one hand and the formal legitimacy of Britain and 
Germany on the other. Despite recent domestic reforms, Britain’s formal legitimacy 
still has a low constitutional fit with the EU whose increasingly supranational formal 
legitimacy challenges the core doctrine of the British constitution, parliamentary 
sovereignty. Germany’s formal legitimacy is geared towards European integration and 
exhibits a high constitutional fit with the EU, although there remains an unresolved 
judicial dispute about the competencies of the FCC and the “inviolable” core of the 
Basic Law.
There are similar variations in compatibility at the level of felt legitimacy which is 
high for both the British and the German political system. Britain’s national identity 
has historically been shaped by a perceived dissimilarity from other (European) 
countries and a (con-)fusion of national with parliamentary sovereignty. Both factors 
complicate the emergence of a supranational identity at EU level. Despite a 
resurgence of older sub-national identities, levels of national attachment and pride 
remain high so that European integration is often perceived as a threat to British 
identity. By contrast, Germany’s post-war national identity has rejected traditional 
conceptions of nationalism in favour of constitutional patriotism and a commitment to 
European integration. This has resulted in low levels of national pride and a national 
identity which can more easily co-exist with supranational loyalties and identification 
with the EU.
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These variations have given rise to distinct national perspectives on the legitimacy of 
the EU which deviate from the European average in opposite directions. British 
support for EU membership is consistently around twenty per-cent below the level 
recorded in Germany. It rarely extends beyond fifty per-cent of the British population. 
Likewise, around two-thirds of Britons would not regret very much if the EU were 
dissolved, whereas the Germans who would regret a (hypothetical) dissolution of the 
EU nearly always outnumber those who would not. Different policy preferences and 
distinct economic cycles have been responsible for country-specific fluctuations in the 
perceived benefits of EU membership. Despite strong support for the Single Market, 
specific output support is generally lower in the UK than in the FRG, not least 
because a majority of Britons remain opposed to some of the other EU policies, such 
as CAP or EMU.
Both Britons and Germans consider the EU insufficiently democratic. But public 
attitudes towards institutional reform are shaped by different perspectives on the EU’s 
constitutional philosophy, which reflect distinct national conceptions of sovereignty 
and democracy. From a British constitutional perspective, the EU is legitimised 
indirectly through the Westminster Parliament. German courts have argued that the 
EU rests on a dual legitimacy which is partly derived from the EP. Reflecting these 
differences, Germans prefer to strengthen the EP, if necessary at the expense of the 
Council, while Britons favour a strengthening of national parliaments and a retention 
of the national veto in the Council. A majority of Britons is also opposed to the 
formation of a European, government responsible to the EP, whereas their German 
neighbours indicate cautious support for the idea.
As regards diffuse support for the political community, Britons feel considerably less 
attached to the EU and they are less likely to feel part of a common European culture 
than Germans. Around half of the German population identifies exclusively with their 
own nationality, and another third regard themselves primarily German and only 
secondarily European. The primacy of national identity is even more pronounced in 
the UK. Almost two-thirds of citizens exclusively identify themselves as Britons, and 
a majority in the UK fear that European integration threatens the survival of their 
national identity and culture. Two-thirds of Britons, but only a third of Germans, 
cannot speak another European language.
Conclusion 320
Beyond these substantial country-specific differences, the thesis has shown that the 
EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit relative to both the German and the British 
political system. In both countries this deficit manifests itself primarily in the absence 
of a European identity, which even in Germany is only weakly developed. There is 
little, and contradictory, empirical evidence of any rise in Europeanness over the last 
decade. Although older age groups are more likely to identify exclusively with their 
own country, demographic factors (or the length of a country’s EU membership) play 
only a limited role in creating positive identification with Europe. Moreover, any 
effects of generational change may become diluted with the forthcoming Eastern 
enlargement of the EU which will increase the cultural diversity within the EU, thus 
complicating the creation of a European identity even more.
Germans and Britons strongly support a constitutional philosophy based on the 
principles of representative government, both for their own domestic political system 
and for the EU. Since the formal legitimacy of the EU deviates from this desired 
constitutional philosophy, diffuse support for the EU’s political regime is low. 
Despite their inflated perceptions of the influence and powers of the EP, Britons and 
Germans consider the EU much less democratic than their national political systems 
and participation in EP elections has been in almost continuous decline in both 
countries.
Faced with low diffuse support for its political community and its political regime, the 
felt legitimacy of the EU remains over-dependent on specific support for the political 
authorities. This is problematic because during the 1990s public opinion on the 
benefits of EU membership has fluctuated by up to twenty-five percentage points in 
both countries. In a number of recent years a plurality of Britons and Germans 
considered membership unbeneficial, thus suspending any positive spill-over into 
diffuse support. Both countries have therefore witnessed a noticeable decline in 
support for EU membership during the 1990s.
To summarise, unlike national political systems whose legitimacy has rarely been a 
subject of attention in recent years, the EU is in an almost chronic state of forced
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reflection upon its legitimacy.1 In the absence of a sufficient degree of legitimacy the 
EU will have to rely on public acquiescence and inertia which provides no stable 
foundation for effective governance and the long-term stability of the EU. The current 
legitimacy deficit also endangers the future development of the EU, since its 
dependence on legitimacy increases in proportion to the degree of European 
integration. These findings raise the important question whether a resolution of the 
legitimacy deficit is possible.
The thesis has identified five potential legitimation strategies which political elites can 
pursue in order to resolve the legitimacy deficit of the EU. The effectiveness and 
problem-solving capacity of legitimation strategies can be measured with the help of a 
pertinence and a feasibility criterion. Successful solutions must contribute to the 
creation of a European identity, accommodate country-specific variations in the 
legitimacy deficit and be normatively acceptable to Europe’s political elites. Analysis 
of the five legitimation strategies has yielded the following result.
Strategies which seek to generate a European identity indirectly by means of boosting 
support for other components of legitimacy offer no viable remedy to the legitimacy 
deficit. In particular, institutional engineering or the functionalist creation of desirable 
policy outputs fail to generate sufficient spill-overs into diffuse support for the 
political community. Public satisfaction with political outputs and diffuse regime 
support are both necessary, but not sufficient conditions for a well legitimised 
political system. Neither the generation of economic benefits, nor a democratisation of 
EU institutions contribute effectively to the creation of a European identity.
That leaves the two strategies which tackle the lack of a European identity directly, 
communitarianism by seeking to generate a European demos and containment by 
reducing the need for one. But can the pursuit of active legitimation policies by 
political elites actually create a European demos, and if so how? An answer to this 
question depends on the dynamics of collective identities. This thesis has argued that 
political leadership can influence the dynamics of collective identities, but this 
process is a slow one which has to be pursued over decades and does not always
1 Beetham and Lord, op. cit.. p .l23f
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follow a linear development. In particular, recent proposals for a thin European 
identity are unlikely to generate a strong European demos which could command the 
primary loyalties of Europeans. Analogies to the traditional nation-building process of 
other multi-ethnic states such as the United States or Switzerland are also misleading. 
In these countries, nation-building did not occur against the background of entrenched 
national identities, it preceded the state-building process, was based on a core ethnie, 
and was accompanied by often violent internal or external conflict.
These conditions are either absent in Europe or normatively undesirable. Although 
self-identification against an internal or external “hostile other” has historically been a 
highly successful means of identity-building, it would not create the outward-looking, 
pluralist demos required to command popular loyalty across the existing and future 
member states. Chapter six suggested that it would be more promising and 
appropriate to forge a European identity around the shared memories of past conflicts 
from which a common destiny of peaceful co-operation can be projected.
The potential for a European demos that could command strong public attachment 
alongside the pre-existing national identities seems to be influenced by three factors in 
particular which can be distilled from the analysis of the preceding chapters. First, the 
degree of active political legitimation required for the creation of a European demos 
necessitates a strong, long-term elite consensus in its favour. Second, the nature of 
national identities in the member states must be compatible with the creation of a new, 
supranational level of identity. Third, the legitimation of a European demos can only 
succeed on the basis of sufficient mass support in favour of a supranational EU. If 
citizens in the member states are sceptical about European integration, they are 
unlikely to endorse an integrationist solution to the legitimacy deficit.
Considering these three factors in the context of Britain’s and Germany’s different 
perspective on the legitimacy of the EU suggests that a communitarian strategy has 
greater potential for resolving the legitimacy deficit from a German than from a 
British perspective. Germany’s elite consensus on the EU could facilitate the active 
legitimation of a communitarian strategy, the national identity of the Federal Republic 
can accommodate the emergence of a supranational European demos and there is 
sufficiently strong mass support in favour of ever closer Union. By contrast,
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containment would be a more successful strategy to resolve the legitimacy deficit 
from a British perspective. It would take account of Britain’s elite cleavage by 
reducing the need for an active legitimation of the EU, it would lessen the challenge 
that EU membership represents to Britain’s formal legitimacy and national identity, 
and it would accommodate generally weaker public support for European integration 
in the UK.
This is not to say that a containment strategy must be ruled out in Germany, nor that a 
communitarian strategy will never be able to resolve the legitimacy deficit from a 
British perspective. It would merely make a successful legitimation of the EU more 
difficult. As suggested before, decisive political leadership might over time secure 
sufficient felt legitimacy for a continued Europeanisation of Britain’s constitution, 
political culture and national identity. Making the British political system more 
compatible with EU membership may in turn eliminate many of the barriers towards 
higher levels of British mass and elite support for the EU, thus facilitating the creation 
of a European identity in the UK. While under these conditions a communitarian 
strategy could succeed in Britain, it would currently require a much greater amount of 
elite legitimation and political leadership than a containment strategy.
These country-specific differences in the legitimation potential of communitarianism 
and containment may complicate the search for a common strategy for the EU as a 
whole. However, political decision-makers in Europe have not attempted to pursue 
either communitarianism or containment, preferring instead incrementalism which 
offers little hope for a solution to the legitimacy deficit. This may be for a number of 
reasons. To some extent, the pursuit of incrementalism may be a reflection of the
structurally-induced need for political compromise at the lowest common
• • ■ • 0denominator, since the Treaties can only be amended with unanimous agreement.
Moreover, incrementalism may be the only feasible strategy in a fragmented political 
system where diverse political preferences reflect country-specific approaches to the 
legitimacy deficit. Yet another possible explanation would be that political decision­
makers in Europe seem unwilling to invest the degree of elite leadership necessary for 
consolidating the EU’s legitimacy. This could be either because they regard the
2 Hix (99), op. cit.. p.26
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legitimacy deficit as a problem of only secondary importance, or because national 
governments have been reluctant to legitimise the EU to an extent where it could 
rival, or even challenge, the legitimacy of the member states which they represent.
However, explaining the preferences of the various political actors in the integration 
process, and determining the exact causes for the reluctance of national governments 
to pursue successful legitimation strategies goes beyond the scope of this thesis.4 The 
feasibility criterion is primarily intended to indicate whether, rather than why, 
political elites in the member states are prepared to support a particular legitimation 
strategy. On that basis, the conclusions of this thesis can be summed up as follows: 
the legitimacy deficit of the European Union is in principle susceptible of resolution, 
but the political prospects for one of the two potentially effective remedial strategies 
to be adopted and implemented are slim.
3 William Wallace: “Government without Statehood: The Unstable Equilibrium”, in: Helen Wallace
and William Wallace (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), pp.455ff
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